Capitalism: Early benefits, Late problems?

Not necessarily -- in my view, probably not at all. That's certainly an approach, but the systems that seem to be the best at the minimax game do so by creating substantial wealth and then redistributing large fractions of it, instead of forcibly equalizing all of it.
OK. I wondered for a moment whether you were advocating central planning and all that.
 
But if we established a 95% CEO salary tax, they would continue to do their job.
I find it hard to believe you would be serious about this point. They would flee their jobs unless you made it (globally) impossible for them to avoid 95% tax, and basically centrally-planned their income at a global level.
 
OK. I wondered for a moment whether you were advocating central planning and all that.

Some degree of central planning is of course both necessary and appropriate. History bears this out -- for example, the British food rationing system in the Second World War actually managed to substantially increase public heath over the uncontrolled, unrationed system that had been in place before and after. Similarly, the nationalized health services of Europe with their "central planning" deliver a better average life-expectancy than the unplanned competition of the USA.

On the other hand, Soviet-style centralized overplanning demonstrably hasn't worked.
 
So, how much effect would it have on the ecomomy to have the second tier of high flyers (the slightly lower flyers?) be the captains of industry while the elite ran off in search of more money? Would it really make that huge a difference? (Honest question, I really don't have the knowledge to answer it myself)
In other words, does a "talent-drain" matter? If the "second tier" is able to compete with the first tier that has left, they too will be competed away, until you end up with inferior non-competitive firms.

In addition, given that it is now a global marketplace, how many places could these CEO's run off to for lower taxes? (again, honest question)
Not sure exactly what you are asking. The existence of global competition is exactly what stops any individual country from implementing punitive tax rates.
 
I find it hard to believe you would be serious about this point. They would flee their jobs unless you made it (globally) impossible for them to avoid 95% tax.

So make it globally impossible. If you want to sell products in Ruthenia, you have to follow Ruthenian tax laws. Corporations are already used to this kind of regime-based mutliple taxation scheme where it's globally impossible to flee their local tax burden. Several US states do this for individuals as well, depending upon the states where you live and/or work, you may owe taxes to several different states.

Indeed, expatriates are used to it as well. US citizens are responsible for paying (US) taxes on their income earned abroad, subject to a couple of provisos....
 
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So make it globally impossible. If you want to sell products in Ruthenia, you have to follow Ruthenian tax laws.
Well this is exactly why you can't make it "globally impossible". You can't ask the Ruthenians to tax CEOs at 95% so that these CEOs won't leave your country when you do that.

Corporations are already used to this kind of regime-based mutliple taxation scheme where it's globally impossible to flee their local tax burden.
You were talking about CEOs not companies. but the same applies. You can't ask Ruthenia to levy corporation tax at a level you desire to stop it being a more competitive location for business. (If you did, you'd probably see a wave of advertising paid for by the Ruthenian government about how much lower the business tax rates were over there . . .)

Several US states do this for individuals as well, depending upon the states where you live and/or work, you may owe taxes to several different states.

Indeed, expatriates are used to it as well. US citizens are responsible for paying (US) taxes on their income earned abroad, subject to a couple of provisos....
Sounds a bit like you're saying that people can't alter their tax liability by shifting domicile or residence. That isn't true at all. Of course, it isn't usually necessary for a US ex-pat to shift domicile because US income tax rates aren't punitively high. If they became so, people would have a large incentive to leave.
 
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Sounds a bit like you're saying that people can't alter their tax liability by shifting domicile or residence.

That's exactly what I'm saying. Many jurisdictions (and forms of taxation) are not based on domicile or residence. Try flying to NYC and telling the man at the off-licence that you shouldn't have to pay tax on that bottle of whisky because you don't live in NYC.

If you're lucky, he'll think you're joking.
 
That's exactly what I'm saying. Many jurisdictions (and forms of taxation) are not based on domicile or residence. Try flying to NYC and telling the man at the off-licence that you shouldn't have to pay tax on that bottle of whisky because you don't live in NYC.

If you're lucky, he'll think you're joking.

It seems to me that you are not arguing the points and objections raised but trying to sidestep them.

Anyway, as a British citizen I can fly to NYC and buy tax free whisky (albeit from controlled sources at the airport). Different rates of taxation of alcohol have a very real economic impact in Europe where it is common for people to cross national boundaries to minimise tax exposure on alcohol purchases. British tax revenue from alcohol is negatively impacted by this.

The point is that without a world government your 95% CEO tax will have bad consequences for the country that implements it. Your story about the man flying to an off-licence in NYC is entirely irrelevant as a refutation of this point.
 
That's exactly what I'm saying. Many jurisdictions (and forms of taxation) are not based on domicile or residence. Try flying to NYC and telling the man at the off-licence that you shouldn't have to pay tax on that bottle of whisky because you don't live in NYC.

If you're lucky, he'll think you're joking.
You've not too subtly switched from direct to indirect taxation now. You brought it up in the context of direct (income) tax of a CEO.

I agree that indirect tax can be controlled on where the transaction takes place. But that is not the argument you made, which was incorrect.
 
To sum it all up I think that in the late game trying to out compete your rivals would earn less profits than meeting behind closed doors and setting prices and durability/quality.

To me it seems not a question of what would cause this to happen, but what would stop it from happening?

One thing that stops collusion is the lack of trust in each other.

Imagine 3 companies have 95% of the market share of a particular product. And the CEOs from these 3 companies decide to meet to price fix. At the end of the meeting they have all decided to raise their prices by 15% over the equilibrium market price, they shake hands and leave. Now the next day comes and the top 3 producers of this product are suppose to have raised prices 15%. What is to keep anyone of the CEOs from not raising their prices, which would give that company almost the whole market share and possibly put the other two companies into bankruptcy? Nothing, which is why collusion isn't a regular practice.
 
One thing that stops collusion is the lack of trust in each other.

Imagine 3 companies have 95% of the market share of a particular product. And the CEOs from these 3 companies decide to meet to price fix. At the end of the meeting they have all decided to raise their prices by 15% over the equilibrium market price, they shake hands and leave. Now the next day comes and the top 3 producers of this product are suppose to have raised prices 15%. What is to keep anyone of the CEOs from not raising their prices, which would give that company almost the whole market share and possibly put the other two companies into bankruptcy? Nothing, which is why collusion isn't a regular practise.

In Australia if one of those CEOs goes to <a certain government department I cannot recall now> they can get the other two companies in very hot water. I think there is something similar in the USA.
 
In Australia if one of those CEOs goes to <a certain government department I cannot recall now> they can get the other two companies in very hot water. I think there is something similar in the USA.

Here too. Price fixing is illegal. But it's still done. Vexed's post withstanding, Pepsi and Coke "price fix" week in and week out. Go to the store (here) and one or the other will be on sale, but never both. I'm not sure how they arrange it, but they do.

Not that I care, I get the 'store brand' product much cheaper than whichever is on sale. Nevermind that the kids hate anything but the name brands....or on second thought, don't nevermind it! More for me because I can't tell the difference.
 
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Here too. Price fixing is illegal. But it's still done. Vexed's post withstanding, Pepsi and Coke "price fix" week in and week out. Go to the store (here) and one or the other will be on sale, but never both. I'm not sure how they arrange it, but they do.

Not that I care, I get the 'store brand' product much cheaper than whichever is on sale. Nevermind that the kids hate anything but the name brands....or on second thought, don't nevermind it! More for me because I can't tell the difference.

Easy way to satisfy your kids.
1. Buy one name brand drink in a bottle.
2. Let your kids drink it.
3. Rescue bottle from trash.
4. Fill with 'store brand' drink.
5. Put in fridge.:D

Your are now conducting a single blind test to see if your kids can taste the difference between 'name brand' and 'store brand.' :boxedin:


Or if you want to really be cheap
1. As per steps 1 - 3 above
2. Buy plain soda water
3. Add a shocking amount of brown sugar.
4. As per step 4 and 5 above
 

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