A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

I think you're still assuming that my consciousness is a separate thing that can hop between bodies.

Well yes it can. Why do you think it can't? Otherwise the teletransporter wouldn't genuinely reproduce the self and the physical configuration of the brain doesn't determine the self. A direct denial of materialism.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian, you are assuming that my consciousness is a separate thing from my brain:

The very material "stuff" so to speak, yes. But if you deny this then you certainly wouldn't be using the teletransporter. The materialist has to suppose that the self is what the brain does, not what it is.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Well yes it can. Why do you think it can't? Otherwise the teletransporter wouldn't genuinely reproduce the self and the physical configuration of the brain doesn't determine the self. A direct denial of materialism.

I cannot parse this. Could you restate it?

The transporter indeed reproduces the self. It does not move the self.

The materialist has to suppose that the self is what the brain does, not what it is.

Correct.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
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So ok, I'm sitting there watching the film, and I most probably will be thinking to myself "hmmmm, I wonder if I have been duplicated yet or not?". Because I have no way of knowing. Moreover, even if I have been duplicated, I have absolutely no way of telling whether I am the original or the duplicate. But now the end of the film arrives. I know that duplication must have taken place, but there is absolutely nothing about the character of my experiences which could enable me to determine whether I am the original or the duplicate. My consciousness has been continous. I might feel therefore that I must be the original Ian. But of course the duplicate will be thinking exactly the same thoughts. Bearing this in mind I cannot ascribe anymore probability than I am the original than the duplicate, and the same reasoning will be gone through by the other Ian. So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.
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Probabilities only apply to things that have not yet happened.
If you are about to flip a coin, there is a 50% chance of heads. But once you've flipped the coin and it comes up heads, it is 100% heads.
Original Ian is always 100% Original Ian and Duplicate Ian, once he is created by the duplicator, is always 100% Duplicate Ian.
It doesn't make sense to say "Ian" has a 50% chance of being Original Ian and 50% chance of being Duplicate Ian. If "Ian" is defined as the "self" produced by Original Ian's brain at the instant of duplication then the "self" produced by Duplicate Ian's brain at the instant of duplication is identical to "Ian" in every detail except position in space. In other words, the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain will be identical to but not be the same as the self produced by Original Ian's brain.

I'm sorry but your remarks are irrelevant. You're failing to understand the problem.

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Then the door to the room opens, and the person standing there says "I regret to inform you that you are the duplicate Ian, and therefore must be immediately executed"
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The self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain has only ever been the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain . Certainly this self is identical to - if not the same as - the self produced by Original Ian's brain and, until now, when confronted by the executioner, he felt as if he could have been the self produced by Original Ian's brain but he clearly never was .

Same remarks apply. You are just not getting it.

Imagine a slightly different scenario where instead of Duplicate Ian being executed, Original Ian or Duplicate Ian is randomly chosen to die. What then?

It's exactly the same situation.

No Problem for the Self referred to above. This Self is going to survive whatever happens. This Self will survive as that produced by Original Ian's brain or, in a slightly different location, as the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain. It can even be set up so that nobody knows whether is was Original Ian who survived or Duplicate Ian who survived but, from the point of view of the survivor (and everyone else for that matter) it won't matter one bit. As you said yourself, Ian, in your scenario, Duplicate Ian feels in every way as if he is Original Ian - until the executioner arrives at his door.

{SIGHS VERY HEAVILY}

Again this is completely irrelvant.

Look, it's clearly no-one has got a f*cking clue what my argument is. I'm going to have to rephrase it.

 

[Dancing David]

Rephrase it but please don't duplicate....

I do understand your point, it seems to be that under materialism if you replicate the body, than you replicate the self. And since you do not beieve that the self is solely limited to the brain case, there are some wierd sides effects.

For the duplicate the experience is the same as the dupee, except the experimenter shocks them by saying that they are the one that is going to die. But they feel that they are the original, and have no way of knowing which one they are.

I even understand the arguement that at the point of duplication the two selfs will be the same for a brief while.

Oh well, I guess I wil resign myself to perpetual idiotdom, did you know that we are Both on American's ignore list. Quite a hall of fame.

We can understand, without agreeing, just as you probably understand what I am saying without agreeing.

 

[BillyJoe]

Ian,

Let me just concentrate on the paradox then...

So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time.

Translation: The self produced by Original Ian's brain concluded that it was just being given £10,000,000 to watch its favorite film of all time.

There should have been no danger to myself at all.

There was no danger to the self produced by Original Ian's brain but for the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain, well, that's another story. It is going to die along with Duplicate Ian.

But yet there is.

No, the only danger is to the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain.

But this is clearly absurd!

It only seems so because you are using the term "myself" instead of "the self produced by Original Ian's brain" and "the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain".

After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place?

Because, in this situation, there is only one self so it is pretty straight forward: here is the self produced by Original Ian's brain and here it still is.
However when there is duplication there are two selves: the self produced by Original Ian's brain and the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain. At the moment of duplication the brains and the selves are identical but not the same (afterall, there are two of them)

[where] no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.

But who the hell are "you" anyway Ian?
Translation of your quoted sentence......
Where a duplicate is NOT created, there is absolute 100% certainty that the self produced by Original Ian's brain is the self produced by Original Ian's brain. (No arguments here )
Where a duplicate IS created, there is still absolute 100% certainty that the self produced by Original Ian's brain is the self produced by Original Ian's brain. And now we also have a self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain which is...... the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain. (Don't blame me Ian, it's your sentence I'm translating )

It might be popinted out that at least the other Ian gets the £10,000,000. But this doesn't interest me anymore than anyone else I like who receives £10,000,000.

But who the hell are "you" Ian?
All we have is the self produced by Original Ian's brain and the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain. Both of them feel as if they are "you". If, in one of the alternative scenarios, Duplicate Ian gets the money, "you" will get the money. But really that "you" is almost superfluous as I hope to illustrate below....

I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency.

Yes, I can see why you think so. Your problem is "Where the hell is Ian?" If the self produced by Original Ian's brain is identical to the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain and, if "you" are the self produced by Original Ian's brain, then you must also be the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain. Therefore you say that "you" must be experiencing out of both bodies simultaneously. But can you not see that you are regarding the self ("you") as an entity that needs to take up residence in a brain rather than a process in a brain. In one way of looking at it, the "you" is superfluous because we already have two selves (that's okay because there are two brains) but where did this third self come from . In another way of looking at it, "you" are the self that the self produced by Original Ian's brain feels he is AND "you" are also the self that the self produced by Duplicate Ian's brain feels he is. But all we really mean is that what Original Ian and Duplicate Ian individually feel is identical.

regards,
BillyJoe


PS
You have shown us how what Original Ian and Duplicate Ian feel while watching "Groundhog Day" is identical. So, if Original Ian was executed and Duplicate Ian got the money wouldn't "you" be happy with that. I mean, "you" are still alive and have the money.

(Sorry, I have edited this a few times)

 

[ceptimus]

I'm sure I'm not the only one annoyed by the fact that Ian responds to some of our posts, and totally ignores others.

Perhaps the 'other Ian' is responding to to them? In Ian's view the 'other Ian' (unless he's a corpse) must inhabit a different universe. Yes - I suppose if Ian were right that might explain the missing responses.

 

[BillyJoe]

ceptimus, sometimes you have to be patient.

 

[ceptimus]

ceptimus, sometimes you have to be patient.

Sometimes, I have a tough time being that.

Everything comes to him who waits.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I'm sure I'm not the only one annoyed by the fact that Ian responds to some of our posts, and totally ignores others.

I don't have enough time to respond to everything which has been said to me.

 

[BillyJoe]

I don't have enough time to respond to everything which has been said to me.

Well, there have been only three replies since you last posted. Why not toss a coin. Heads I win, tails Davo wins, and ceptimus wins if it lands on its edge

BillyJoe
(Oh, hold on, you've already replied to ceptimus)

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well, there have been only three replies since you last posted. Why not toss a coin. Heads I win, tails Davo wins, and ceptimus wins if it lands on its edge

BillyJoe
(Oh, hold on, you've already replied to ceptimus)

I'll go through peoples posts and address what I feel to be the main areas of contention. As I recall it's basically that people are looking at this from the third person perspective. In talking about streams of consciousnesses this is obviously the wrong approach. Also people seem to feel that the original Ian after duplication is more deserving of really being the original Ian before duplication. An easy mistake to make, but a mistake it is.

 

[BillyJoe]

I'll go through peoples posts and address what I feel to be the main areas of contention.

Fair enough. In the "Staying Alive" thread I managed to reply to every post directed to me but I don't remember it going to 32 pages! However even then it comsumed a great deal of my time and when it was over my wife had nearly got up and left me.

As I recall it's basically that people are looking at this from the third person perspective. In talking about streams of consciousnesses this is obviously the wrong approach.

Well, in the "Staying Alive" thread it was Original BillyJoe and Duplicate BillyJoe so I had plenty of experience D) with the first person perspective.

Also people seem to feel that the original Ian after duplication is more deserving of really being the original Ian before duplication. An easy mistake to make, but a mistake it is.

If you are saying that it is a mistake to talk about what deserves to be the case rather than what really is the case, then I agree.

regards,
BillyJoe


PS
I am still interested in your answer to the PS in my last post which I'll rephrase below.....

A while back you were at pains to show us that Original Ian and Duplicate Ian, while watching "Groundhog Day", both think they are Original Ian. They both feel that they are "you". So, if Original Ian was executed and Duplicate Ian got the money, wouldn't "you" be happy with that. I mean, "you" would still be alive and have the money wouldn't you?

 

[Interesting Ian]

PS
I am still interested in your answer to the PS in my last post which I'll rephrase below.....

A while back you were at pains to show us that Original Ian and Duplicate Ian, while watching "Groundhog Day", both think they are Original Ian. They both feel that they are "you". So, if Original Ian was executed and Duplicate Ian got the money, wouldn't "you" be happy with that. I mean, "you" would still be alive and have the money wouldn't you? [/B]

It would depend if my stream of consciousness ends up in original or duplicate Ian.

 

[BillyJoe]

It would depend if my stream of consciousness ends up in original or duplicate Ian.

Sorry Ian, I meant from the point of view of a materialist.
(We are trying to understand why, as you say, the materialist's view leads to a paradox as far as the duplicator is concerned.)

BillyJoe.

 

[slimshady2357]

It would depend if my stream of consciousness ends up in original or duplicate Ian.

Until you take on board that 'streams of consciousness' (which are created by a single brain) cannot 'end up' in another brain, you will be hopelessly lost.

It is duplicated in another brain, not 'transferred there', not 'split off into two brains', not 'the original stream "ending up" in another brain'.

You are so entrenched in your own views of the self you cannot properly perspective shift to a materialist viewpoint. Titus pointed this out twice before and Dancing David has been pointing it out recently. (and I see BillyJoe just pointed it out above too)

Good luck in your re-phrasing though.

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
It would depend if my stream of consciousness ends up in original or duplicate Ian.
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Sorry Ian, I meant from the point of view of a materialist.

That is my POV from the materialist perspective. I mean if you insist that there are 2 streams of consciousnesses then necessarily one of them is me, and the other isn't.

 

[ceptimus]

That is my POV from the materialist perspective. I mean if you insist that there are 2 streams of consciousnesses then necessarily one of them is me, and the other isn't.

Why? Why can't they both be you? And I don't mean that a single you is in both of them at the same time. I mean they are two identical copies of the same thing. We can photocopy documents. We can make backup copies of CDs. If you want to look at this from a materialist's point of view, then we can also copy Ians.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Until you take on board that 'streams of consciousness' (which are created by a single brain) cannot 'end up' in another brain, you will be hopelessly lost.

If a stream of consciousness is terminated when one uses a teletransporter, then since you are that stream of consciousness, then you will cease to exist and you shouldn't use the transporter. It's also a denial of materialism.

It is duplicated in another brain, not 'transferred there', not 'split off into two brains', not 'the original stream "ending up" in another brain'.

Why can't the original stream end up in another brain? If you have absolutely identical physical processes then you must get one and the very same stream of consciousness. Otherwise there is something more than the totality of physical facts which determines you i.e you are denying materialism.

You are so entrenched in your own views of the self you cannot properly perspective shift to a materialist viewpoint. Titus pointed this out twice before and Dancing David has been pointing it out recently. (and I see BillyJoe just pointed it out above too)

I have absolutely no interest how many people who disagree with me, whether they are materialists or not, how intelligent they are.

If you accept that offer that my thought experiment outlined you cannot be 100% certain that you will get the money rather than dying. Indeed you only have 50/50 of a chance.

But ok, tell me, would you take that offer up? Would you have absolute certainty that you, your stream of consciousness won't end up dying? If you have this confidence then you'll accept the offer, right?

 

[Win]

Hi Ian:

Why can't the original stream end up in another brain? If you have absolutely identical physical processes then you must get one and the very same stream of consciousness. Otherwise there is something more than the totality of physical facts which determines you i.e you are denying materialism.

Maybe I can contribute something here.

There's an equivocation on the words "same" and "identical" in what you write above. You allow that the physical processes in Ian1 and Ian2 can be "identical" while being spatially distinct, yet maintain that the streams of consciousness can't be the "same" while also being spatially, or otherwise, distinct.

If you think about it, you'll see that the two "identical" physical processes are correlated with two streams of consciousness that are the "same."

No paradox. No danger for materialism.

Materialism's still false though.