A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[slimshady2357]

As I have stated, there is absolutely nothing I can do about that. I have shown that it is incoherent to suppose that 2 identical streams of consciousnesses can be created. I am satisfied with that. It would be too much to expect materialists to understand my proof.

You most certainly have not. My last post explains that clearly.

The two original Ian's (situation A and situation B) have different sets of information, you would expect them to calculate different probabilities for their own survival in your experiment.

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

You most certainly have not. My last post explains that clearly.

And you are simply begging the question as I have explained.

The two original Ian's (situation A and situation B) have different sets of information, you would expect them to calculate different probabilities for their own survival in your experiment.

This is irrelevant. So the 2 Ians could have access to total information earlier so my unique stream of consciousness finds out earlier whether I am the original or the duplicate. Maybe I could find out at the precise moment of duplication. So what? How does that alter anything??

 

[slimshady2357]

But the concept of "original Ian" in terms of a stream of consciousness has no meaning! In my thought experiment I turned out to be the duplicate. Yet my conscious experiences were continuous.

They seemed continuous, yes, but they were not. In point of fact they started at a definite time only shortly ago. You think you have the same meat brain as the original, but you are mistaken. Throughout all of this you confuse the Ian's ability to distinguish themselves as the ultimate test of their distinguishability. This is not so, the ultimate test of their distinguishability is the totality of physical facts. This includes that the duplicate Ian consciousness is not attached to the original's meat brain.

So I am the original Ian in the sense of the stream of consciousness, even though I am now located somewhere else. The whole purpose of my thought experiment is to show there isn't 2 streams of my consciousness really!. There can't be because it leads to a logical paradox. Do you see yet??

I see what you think is a paradox, but I can also see that you are mistaken.

No, this is erroneous reasoning. I have demonstrated that at the beginning of the film I know that my stream of consciousness occupies the original Ian's body.

The original Ian knows this and is correct, the duplicate Ian thinks he knows this and is incorrect.

Yet the distinct possibility remains that I will watch the film, it will just feel like I had watched the film at home with absolutely no break in my stream of consciousness, and yet I turn out to be the duplicate.

This is a confusion. If you are the duplicate Ian, you will only feel like you have watched the whole film, you will be wrong about that, your meat brain, which is generating you ever since you popped into existence, is brand new.

Basically your argument is completely failing to address my thought experiment. You must address this issue from Ian's first person perspective, not from a third person perspective which is what you're doing.

Nope, because the first person perspective can be incorrect. In the case of the duplicate his consciousness just sprang into being, it was not a continuous stream that had watched the whole film.

You are once again confusing distinguishability from the perspective of the Ians with distinguishability in general.

And the probability calculated by this information gives an absolutely correct probability of whether I will receive the £10,000,000. It's meaningless to talk about me having more information.

If you think it's meaningless to talk about what information is available when calculating probabilities, you're in bigger trouble than I though

No you're wrong for the reasons I have delineated.

I'm sure you'll continue to believe so *sigh*.

Edited to add: Basically Adam you're begging the question. You're assuming there is definitely 2 streams of consciousnesses which are both me, and ignoring my thought experiment demonstrating the incoherency of this notion.

I'm assuming there is two streams of consciousness because that's what your thought experiment said!! Now you say you have shown an inconsistency, but this is only true from the limited perspective of the Ian's. Materialism doesn't claim that the Ian's should know which is which.

I have shown you why we would expect the Ian's to calculate different probabilities.

I have to go to bed now, perhaps someone else will be able to better exlpain it.

Adam

 

[Loki]

Ian,

I've decided it's entirely possible that I'm not clever enough to understand your "paradox". I don't even see it, let alone think I can explain/resolve it.

The whole purpose of my thought experiment is to show there isn't 2 streams of my consciousness really!.

But there are two streams, each having the same contents.
That contents is "cool, I'm the original, I'm going home with cash in a few minutes". What your experiement does is show that there is either (a) one consciousness or (b) two consciousnesses with identical contents. How does it "show" that (a) is correct? If (b) was the correct interpretation of what is happening, where is the logical contradiction created by this?

Perhaps I should just leave you be...you're not maing any sense to me at all, I'm afraid.

 

[slimshady2357]

And you are simply begging the question as I have explained.



This is irrelevant. So the 2 Ians could have access to total information earlier so my unique stream of consciousness finds out earlier whether I am the original or the duplicate. Maybe I could find out at the precise moment of duplication. So what? How does that alter anything??

How does that alter anything?

If the original Ian knew at duplication that he was the original his calculation of what his probability for survival is would be 100%!

In each situation, the original Ian's chances of living are 100%, do you agree?

In the situation with the duplicate, the original Ian thinks his chances of living are 50%, do you agree?

This is because he doesn't know if he is the duplicate or not, right?

So the reason the probabilities are calculated differently is because the two Ian's are in different situations after all. One knows he is the only Ian (ever) and one knows there are two Ian's and doesn't know which one he is.

Where is the paradox? What above don't you agree with?

Adam

 

[Mercutio]

I really don't think I should be posting now...too much pinot grigio...on the other hand, perhaps this is the time I will best understand....

From the perspective of Merc-1 and Merc-2 (or Ian-1 and Ian-2, if you prefer), Ian is right--there is no difference. There is absolutely no way to know, from any perspective other than the experimenter's (and if I may digress here for just a moment, please be more careful about apostrophes here! "Ians" = two of Ian, while "Ian's" = possessive of Ian), which Merc is the "original". In fact, Ian's claim that both are the original is absolutely correct (or rather, it cannot be disproven by anybody but the experimenter). Claims that the two Mercs will immediately diverge in consciousness due to quantum mechanics may be absolutely correct, yet completely irrelevant; such changes are the same changes that we go through from moment to moment within the same body (thus the comment "you are not the same person you were when you began reading this post"), and so each Merc will have no reason at all to doubt that he is the original. I do, however, still say "each Merc". There are two. They differ only in location (if we have done our thought-experiment correctly), and if we do not have the special knowledge of the experimenter (who, alone, knows the location of the "original" [in quotes now, because both truly are the same except for location--which really is meaningless except as an identifier of a particular set of molecules]), we cannot in any way distinguish between the two.

Still, there are two. Only the experimenter knows the meaningful difference, but the difference is nonetheless meaningful. Your thought experiment, Ian, has created a new life. It has done so with none of the fun of the traditional way, and with none of the uncertainty (no "how tall will he be?" or "will he be musical?" or "will he get my nose?"; we will know all these things and more--in fact, we will know everything there is to know about this new life, up until the point of its [his?] creation). This new Merc will remember my childhood, remember my adolescence, remember agreeing to participate in a rather odd experiment with this Ian fellow...

Is this "the same stream of consciousness"? Yes and no. It absolutely is the same memories; it is not the same person thinking it (although, of course, without the location information, this person will argue this point). As of the moment of duplication, it is no longer the same. Same roots, different tree.

This is a neat thought experiment, Ian. It really does tease apart some of our assumptions and biases. I hope you understand my analysis--there is much here wherein I agree with you; the bad news is, you have not pointed out any fatal flaws in materialism.

 

[Loki]

Mercutio,

I agree with everything you've said - it's what I have (hopefully) been saying all along. The use of the term "original" is in reference to "that body/brain which has existed for 20 years". The use of the term "duplicate" is in refrence to "that body/brain which has existed for 59 minutes". The terms are used to differentiate between two objects that are otherwise indistinguishable.

Each one believes he has existed for 20 years. Each one is a fully formed human.

This is a neat thought experiment, Ian. It really does tease apart some of our assumptions and biases.

The first time this was discussed (which ended in failry similar terms) the main thing I "learned" was that duplicators are probably immoral, even if somehow physically possible. Trying to untangle the web of conflicting ethical and legal questions generated appears almost impossible.

A murderer, fleeing from the law, runs into the room, knocks Ian off the couch, slips and falls on the duplicator button. Bingo, second copy of criminal in the other room. Which one (or both?) is sent to trial?

Ian, sitting in the room watching "Groundhog Day", gets duplicated. Two minutes later his moble phone rings, and he has just won the lottery. Does he share it with the duplicate?

One idea I did like from the earlier thread - using transporter/duplicators for surgery! You have an inoperable tumour in your brain. Step into the duplicator; get "scanned" in preparation for duplication. Edit the "scan" to remove the inforamtion regarding the tumour. Hit "copy" and the duplicate walks out withjout the tumour. Painless, instant, brain surgery!!

Still, it's probably impossible anyway, so....

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hey Ian, you seem to be ignoring me, but I have a suggestion. Could you state the paradox succinctly in a sentence or two? It seems to have something to do with the scenario where I'm just given the money after watching the movie, with no duplication involved. Yet clearly that is not the same scenario with only the duplication missing, so perhaps we don't have the correct scenario.

~~ Paul

 

[BillyJoe]

The only strange thing Ian even CAN show with his new thought experiments is that, like Billyjoe in the Staying Alive thread, some materialists have intuitive ideas of 'self' that are inconsistent with Materialism.

Do you mean at the start of that thread or at the end?

BillyJoe
(True Blue Materialist - now!)

 

[slimshady2357]

Do you mean at the start of that thread or at the end?

BillyJoe
(True Blue Materialist - now!)

Sorry BillyJoe!

I should have been more clear, you certainly did come around in the end!

What do you think of Ian's paradox?

Adam

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The Interesting Monty Paradox

Loki is a contestant on the Interesting Monty Show. There are two curtains. Behind one is a brand new yellow Enzo Ferrari. Behind the other is a box of feta cheese (and not any of that bogus goat's milk cheese). Loki can select one of the curtains and he gets whatever is behind it. The audience holds their collective breath . . .

Loki picks curtain number B. Interesting Monty cracks a sardonic smile. At this instant, Loki figures he has a 50/50 chance of winning of the Ferrari. Monty knows whether he won.

Paradox, or simply different probabilistic viewpoints?

~~ Paul

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: The Interesting Monty Paradox

...box of feta cheese (and not any of that bogus goat's milk cheese).

~~ Paul [/B]

What's real feta cheese? I thought feta cheese was goat's milk cheese.

Adam

 

[BillyJoe]

Sorry BillyJoe!

I should have been more clear, you certainly did come around in the end!

Well, "coming around" is probably not the correct description of what happened....

I knew from the start that my (intuitive) idea about identity was not consistent with materialism and my purpose in that original thread ("Staying Alive") was to discover where my thinking was going wrong. Finally and at long last I suddenly understood what everyone was trying to explain to me. Many had tried and I thank them for that, but in the end it was only Win (a dualists who understood the materialist's view even though he did not agree with it) who wouldn't give up and finally got me to see what is now so obvious to me.

What do you think of Ian's paradox

There is no paradox but I can see why he thinks so.

After I had seen the light in the "Staying Alive" thread, I went back and re-read some of the posts where others were trying to explain things to me. The first time round I completely misundertood what they were saying. Their posts seemed totally unconvincing and even contradictory. I even thought they were fooling themselves about what they were saying. I thought I was winning the debate - which was a problem because I was supposed to be wrong!
It was truely amazing how differently I interpreted those posts once I finally understood the materialist's position on the question of identity.

I think Ian is having the same problem here.
I think it was easier for me, though, because I was already a materialist - just not a good one.

BillyJoe

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Slim asked:

What's real feta cheese? I thought feta cheese was goat's milk cheese.

Feta is sheep's milk cheese.

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

Ian's paradox rests on the fact that from his viewpoint he does not feel that the two streams diverge he feeld that the two streams are the same. Even though I have discussed divergence at the quantum and mechanical level and in light of chaos theory, he believes that the two stream are identical.

The paradox seems to revolve around the lack of a frame of reference and the assertion that the first Ian is getting paid to watch a movie.

 

[Interesting Ian]

There is no paradox but I can see why he thinks so.

In that case you would have no hesitancy in taking up the offer for the £10,000,000. Looking at my thought experiment you would have 100% certainty that when the guy opens the door at the end of the film, that you will be the original, and will receive the £10,000,000. The same goes for you, Adam, Loki, Paul, David et al. I submit though that you cannot possibly be certain, and indeed must only have half a chance of receiving the 10,000,000 and half a chance of being killed. But you know this.

Incidentally, haven't read any of the posts in this thread yet that were made today. Been busy playing Halo which has just come out. Nothing that anyone can say can escape the paradox though. If people don't understand this by now they never will. Will read peoples posts tomorrow though.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You're using an awful lot of delay tactics in this conversation, Ian. It's getting tiresome.

~~ Paul

 

[ceptimus]

You're using an awful lot of delay tactics in this conversation, Ian. It's getting tiresome.

~~ Paul

Shush Paul - this is just part of the dramatic build up. The calm before the storm. I think I can hear the drum roll just beginning....

 

[Interesting Ian]

Hey Ian, you seem to be ignoring me, but I have a suggestion. Could you state the paradox succinctly in a sentence or two? It seems to have something to do with the scenario where I'm just given the money after watching the movie, with no duplication involved. Yet clearly that is not the same scenario with only the duplication missing, so perhaps we don't have the correct scenario.

~~ Paul

First of all imagine that your original body gets completely destroyed and 2 copies of your body are made. So there now is no original. You either suddenly experience a sudden shift of perspective so you find yourself experiencing out of copy1 of Paul, or you suddenly experience a sudden shift of perspective so you find yourself experiencing out of copy2 of Paul. But whichever you experience will be a unique continuous stream of consciousness from experiencing out of the destroyed body to experiencing out of one of the two copies. Now note that you do not experience both. Your stream of consciousness is unique and ongoing and uninterrupted. Basically it's an experiential thing. You only ever experience one stream of consciousness. In order for your original stream of consciousness to get to be split up so as for you to then both wholly experience out of copy1 and to wholly experience out of copy2 (not out of both simultaneously) the Universe literally has to split into 2. So we then have 2 Universes after copying rather than the original one.

This stuff is hard to explain

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
But the concept of "original Ian" in terms of a stream of consciousness has no meaning! In my thought experiment I turned out to be the duplicate. Yet my conscious experiences were continuous.
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They seemed continuous, yes, but they were not.

This is truly hopeless if you cannot even agree too something as obvious as this!

In point of fact they started at a definite time only shortly ago.

No that's not true. Otherwise if you used the teletransporter in Star Trek, everytime they beamed down to a planet one would have to say they only just sprung into being! They do not spring into being anymore than our normal second by second existence. Of course I maintain that people do in a sense cease to be and a duplicate replaces them on a second by second basis should materialism be true. But the point is, is that there is absolute no distinction between our second by second existence up to the point of duplication and after it, whether we turn out to be the original or duplicate.

You think you have the same meat brain as the original, but you are mistaken.

The 2 meat brains are absolutely identical. You cannot distinguish 2 consciousnesses arising from each one.

Throughout all of this you confuse the Ian's ability to distinguish themselves as the ultimate test of their distinguishability. This is not so, the ultimate test of their distinguishability is the totality of physical facts. This includes that the duplicate Ian consciousness is not attached to the original's meat brain.

I have explained your error here in the very post you're responding to I think. My consciousness doesn't need to be attached to the original brain. It can be attached to another brain providing it is absolutely physically identical. Otherwise we wouldn't use the teletransporter!

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Yet the distinct possibility remains that I will watch the film, it will just feel like I had watched the film at home with absolutely no break in my stream of consciousness, and yet I turn out to be the duplicate.
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This is a confusion. If you are the duplicate Ian, you will only feel like you have watched the whole film,

What nonsense!

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Edited to add: Basically Adam you're begging the question. You're assuming there is definitely 2 streams of consciousnesses which are both me, and ignoring my thought experiment demonstrating the incoherency of this notion.
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I'm assuming there is two streams of consciousness because that's what your thought experiment said!! Now you say you have shown an inconsistency, but this is only true from the limited perspective of the Ian's. Materialism doesn't claim that the Ian's should know which is which.

I start of with the assumption of 2 streams of consciousnesses, and by my thought experiment shows it leads to an absurdity. Your only defence is to say the duplicate is not really literally the same person as the original, but this is simply not true. Otherwise you would never use a teletransporter and in effect you would be saying materialism is false.