A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

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And Ceptimus and also Win don't appear to hold that the original person is really the true you more so than the duplicate.
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Neither do I. Not only is your thinking deserting you on this topic, but apparently your reading skills as well.

But you're directly contradicting what you siad before! I said:

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Of course this situation is precisely the same as the first one although one might not feel that it is.
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and you replied:

You're asking if this is the same? No, it's not - the person who is the original won't think so. I've already answered this. Or isn't that your question?
[/quote]


I repeat the outline of the 2 experiments

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Lets suppose we have the technology to precisely physically duplicate peoples' bodies. Let's imagine that someone were to offer you $10,000 if you allowed them to physically duplicate your body, but that they would kill the duplicate Adam 24 hours after duplication so that he only actually lives 24 hours. Let's further imagine that you never even get to see the duplicate Adam.

You would surely accept this offer because after all this duplicate Adam doesn't exist now, so when he gets killed after allowing him to live 24 hours, that cannot possibly make you worse off than you are now. So basically you would be getting $10,000 for nothing, right?
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Another thought experiment Adam. This is exactly the same as above except it's the original Adam who gets killed 24 hours after the duplicate has been created, and the duplicate is allowed to live. The duplicate will receive the $10,000 and the duplicate will never get to see the original Adam. Of course this situation is precisely the same as the first one although one might not feel that it is.

The point here is that both Loki's are continuous with the Loki before duplication. Therefore the 2 experiments must be identical. Obviously in the first experiment the original Loki lives, and in the second experiment the duplicate Loki lives. But both Lokis are absolutely identical in all ways. Therefore the 2 experiments are the same and if you accepted the $10,000 for the first you should do so for the second. This is because as you approach the point of duplication you will have 50/50 chance of your stream of consciousness experiencing out of the original Loki or a 50/50 chance of your stream of consciousness experiencing out of the duplicate Loki.

 

[ceptimus]

Nice post Loki.

Ian, I think my position and Loki's are pretty much identical on this. I'm a latecomer to this thread, and I can't be bothered to study it properly all the way through (sorry). I don't know whether Loki has shifted his position, but reading his latest posts, he certainly doesn't think he has.

I'm waiting for the dramatic revelation of the stunning paradox like everyone else. Why do I expect that I'll be disappointed? I hope not though - something that makes me totally change my world view would be cool.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Snip a lot of this since you don't appear to be saying anything I disagree with.

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Allow me to commit another fallacy, and appeal to popularity yet again - I see no inconsistency by anyone (including you) for the past 10 pages or so - everyone seems to be saying the same thing, over and over. Even you have been consistent - simply failing again and again to comprehend what is being said to you.

I'm saying that it is not possible for there to be 2 streams consciousnesses of a particular person. If one thinks it through one simply arrives at an absurdity. No-one has said anything whatsoever to cause me to question my conclusion here.

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What I'm asking is whether you believe that the duplicate is you in every conceivable fullest sense of the word.
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Yes, again, yes. Is there a reason you feel compelled to ask the same thing repeatedly?

Excellent! Now at last I can give my proof that it leads to a logical absurdity! Do so tomorrow now as it's a bit late.

The two are identical Ian - each is "me" in the fullest sense of the word. Both of us are married to the same woman, have the same children, have the same rights to the family inheritance (ha!), pay the same (exhorbitant) amount of tax to the government, and both find InterestingIan only occasionally interesting.

I'm disappointed you feel the need to insult me

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Lets suppose both the original is standing in a booth for the purposes of duplication, and the duplicate gets created in another booth. Lets suppose both booths are transparent and both copies of Adam can see the rooms they are situated in. Let's also suppose that the 2 rooms are different.

Now just before duplication you're standing there in the booth. As you reach the moment of duplication do you concede that you might well experience a sudden shift of perspective and see the room the dupicate booth is situated in? In other words you find, perhaps to your surprise, that you are now the duplicate?
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One consciousness does, one does not

Could you please answer the question??? You either experience one or the other. You can't experience both because that's my position which you are denying (ie experiencing out of both bodies simultaneously)

- but that's because the moment the two consciousnesses receive even *one* physical experience that is not identical, they cease being identical consciousnesses.

Yes I know, but you've completely avoided my question!

There's no ambiguity here - assume that the original enters a booth in a white room, and the duplicate appears in a booth in a red room :

1. I walk into a booth in the white room, and close my eyes.
2. A voice says "Activating duplicator in 5..4..3..2..1.."
3. I open my eyes and see the white room. "Gee... that didn't hurt at all" I say to the assistant, "but I should have gone to the toilet before we did this...where's the nearest loo?"
4. I open my eyes and see the red room. "That's cool ! I've gone from the white room to the red room in an instant! " I say to the assistant, "but I should have gone to the toilet before we did this...where's the nearest loo?"

(Edited to add) : [In case it's not clear, #3 and #4 above happen simultaneously. In each case, the *I* being referred to is one of the two identical *I*'s created in step #2]

There are two *I*'s here - identical in terms of the past, different in terms of the future. Each has the exact same right to "Loki's past", including punishments and rewards!

Yes I agree with all that above. I can't imagine why you think I disagree with it. Of course I am claiming it leads to an absurdity. Anyway, tomorrow I'll try to explain the problem I have with this duplication business. For definite this time.

 

[slimshady2357]

This is the paragraph which confused me. What I'm asking is whether you believe that the duplicate is you in every conceivable fullest sense of the word.

Not in every conceivable sense of the word, no. It does not occupy the same space-time location as me, nor do I experience seeing out of four eyes. The molecules which make up it's body are not the same molecules that make up my body. The brain processes that is it's consciousness are identical to mine, but still a seperate set of brain processes running in a seperate brain. Am I clear on the only basic difference yet? It is identical to me but not the very same entity as me.

Other than that, it is the same as me in every conceivable way.

Clear now?

Allow me to put it another way. Lets suppose both the original is standing in a booth for the purposes of duplication, and the duplicate gets created in another booth. Lets suppose both booths are transparent and both copies of Adam can see the rooms they are situated in. Let's also suppose that the 2 rooms are different.

Now just before duplication you're standing there in the booth. As you reach the moment of duplication do you concede that you might well experience a sudden shift of perspective and see the room the dupicate booth is situated in? In other words you find, perhaps to your surprise, that you are now the duplicate?

One consciousness would and one wouldn't, just as Loki said. The one caused by the brain of the original would not.

The one caused by the brain of the duplicate would.

Adam

edited to correct code and add some stuff, hoping to clarify

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

What I'm asking is whether you believe that the duplicate is you in every conceivable fullest sense of the word.

Of course not. How silly. It is not the same as me in every sense of the word because it is not me. As Slim just said.

Now just before duplication you're standing there in the booth. As you reach the moment of duplication do you concede that you might well experience a sudden shift of perspective and see the room the dupicate booth is situated in? In other words you find, perhaps to your surprise, that you are now the duplicate?

Of course not. How silly. How could my consciousness shift to the other room if it's a function of my brain? You're still thinking that when we say "function of my brain" we mean that it's some kind of fluffy spirit thing that oozes out of the brain and then can flit around at will.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wait, I've got it! Ian isn't going to present us with a paradox. He's going to rephrase this thought experiment in terms of a pair of docs.

~~ Paul

 

[Loki]

Paul,

I just burst into laughter in the office...please, be more considerate.

 

[Interesting Ian]

OK here's my proof

I think it has been broadly agreed that with a star trek teletransporter device, where the original person gets destroyed and a perfect duplicate gets created somewhere else, that the duplicate would be you in the absolute fullest sense of the word. Anyway I'm going to take for granted that this is agreed upon.

Now if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer!

So ok, I agree to it. Now let's suppose that the copying will take place in a room with a TV set. The copying will take place sometime whilst I am watching my favorite film of all time Groundhog Day, although precisely when duplication will take place is not specified. It could take place anytime during the duration of the film. Imagine also that the duplicate will suddenly appear in an absolute identical room with the same film playing which is also precisely synchronized to the other film.

It should be obvious that nothing untoward will happen at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the original obviously nothing will happen. I will be watching the film and will notice absolutely nothing at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the duplicate, again I will note nothing untoward. At the precise moment of duplication I will suddenly appear in the duplicate room, sitting exactly in the same relative position and posture, the film will be continuous with the film being shown in the other room, and my memories will be continuous with the original Ian just prior to duplication.

So ok, I'm sitting there watching the film, and I most probably will be thinking to myself "hmmmm, I wonder if I have been duplicated yet or not?". Because I have no way of knowing. Moreover, even if I have been duplicated, I have absolutely no way of telling whether I am the original or the duplicate. But now the end of the film arrives. I know that duplication must have taken place, but there is absolutely nothing about the character of my experiences which could enable me to determine whether I am the original or the duplicate. My consciousness has been continous. I might feel therefore that I must be the original Ian. But of course the duplicate will be thinking exactly the same thoughts. Bearing this in mind I cannot ascribe anymore probability than I am the original than the duplicate, and the same reasoning will be gone through by the other Ian. So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.

Then the door to the room opens, and the person standing there says "I regret to inform you that you are the duplicate Ian, and therefore must be immediately executed".

So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd! After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place? Then, since no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.

It might be popinted out that at least the other Ian gets the £10,000,000. But this doesn't interest me anymore than anyone else I like who receives £10,000,000.

I honestly don't think there is anyway around this paradox apart from suggesting my own solution, namely that after duplication and before an Ian gets destroyed, in other words whilst there exist 2 Ians', I will simultaneously experience out of both of Ian's bodies. Otherwise materialism just generates an incoherency.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

I'm disappointed you feel the need to insult me

I'd use "tease" rather than "insult", but apologies if you feel bruised. Perhaps I need to drink more alcohol before I post.

Could you please answer the question??? You either experience one or the other.

I thought I had answered the question? Yes, I do experience one or the other - on fact, both *I*'s experience one or the other (but both cannot experience the same one!) Does this help :

1. I enter the duplicator in the white room, MaterialistIan (the mad researcher) is watching. MaterialistIan say's "There's only one you (loki) in the universe". I say "I am the only loki in the universe".
2. MaterialistIan throws the switch. MaterialistIan says "there are two you's in the universe!"
3. I say "I am one of two loki's in the universe, and I'm in the white room"
4. I say "I am one of two loki's in the universe, and I'm in the red room".

(#3 and #4 happen simultaneously)

Which one is me? Both - there are two me's now, and each me knows that they are (a) themselves (they have an *I*) and (b) that somewhere else is another human that also is them. Each is an individual. When you ask "which one is you" the answer is "both", since *everything that makes a human "me" now exists in two different locations. Two "you's", to "me's". Which "me" is "you"? Both!

But you're directly contradicting what you siad before! I said:

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Of course this situation is precisely the same as the first one although one might not feel that it is.
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and you replied:

You're asking if this is the same? No, it's not - the person who is the original won't think so.

No contradiction at all - you really are struggling with this aren't you.

There is no difference between the the scenarios from the point of view of *any* human other than the original and duplicate. My wife says goodbye to me in the morning, next day I come home with $10,000 in my pocket. The "real" me left home, and the "real" me comes back with the money. Whether the home coming me is the original or the duplicate is a quantifiable yet irrelevant fact.

There *is* a difference from the point of view of the original. In the first scenario he is approached, offered $10,000, duplicated, then sent home. In the second, he is approached, duplicated, killed, and the duplicate sent home with $10,000.

From the perspective of the original the scenarios are different.

From the perspective of the duplicate, the scenarios are different.

From the persepctive of my wife the scenarios are identical.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hey Ian, that's really quite good! Heck, the experimenters don't have to give either of you the money, because they can just lie and tell both of you that you are the duplicate.

I don't see a paradox, though.

I agree that Groundhog Day was a fantastic movie.

~~ Paul

 

[Loki]

Ian,

(cross posted)

So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd! After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place? Then, since no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.

Nope, can't see the paradox. Can you explain what exactly the problem is?

You've just admited that both Ians would have concluded "there is a 50/50 chance I am the original". You then immediately say "I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 ". So which is it? Have The Ians concluded they are definitely the original, or have they concluded they don't know and it's 50/50?

After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place?

In terms of "knowledge available to the Ians" it isn't meaningfully different. Which is why, if the Ian's were the determine "I am the orginal", they'd be reaching a conclusion with insufficient evidence - quite Ian-like, in fact!

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Another thought - perhaps this might (finally) demonstrate why "location" is relevant in all of this.

You have painted a picture (nice one, too) of two Ian's in an identical physical environment, unable to know if they are the original or the duplicate, but both tending towards the conclusion they are the original due the fact they are able to access a continuous history of the past hour or so since entering the room. One actually did enter the room they occupy 2 hours ago. The other simply "popped into existence" about an hour ago in the room. For this second one, his memories of his environment from the previous second exactly match his current environment, so he is unaware that he is the duplicate.

At the appointed hour, the researchers enter a room and kill one Ian. The decision on which one to kill (Paul's suggestion not withstanding) is based upon location only - no other factor is involved. The Ian's, unable to differentiate their locations, cannot know (if they stop to think about it for a moment) if they are the one about to die. The researchers, who can differentiate betwen the locations, know exactly which is the one to go.

Still can't see a paradox, though.

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favorite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd! After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place? Then, since no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.
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Nope, can't see the paradox. Can you explain what exactly the problem is?

I just have in quite some detail. If you still cannot understand the paradox then I just have to conclude you're not sufficiently intelligent to understand. Sorry, but there's nothing I can do about it.

You've just admited that both Ians would have concluded "there is a 50/50 chance I am the original". You then immediately say "I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 ".

I most certainly said no such thing! My conclusion that I would be getting a definite £10,000,000 was before I had accepted the offer. At that time I was, like you, and Adam, and everyone else in that I hadn't thought out the implications. Let's imagine I came to the conclusion that I actually only had a 50/50 chance of receiving £10,000,000 during the watching of the film.

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After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place?
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In terms of "knowledge available to the Ians" it isn't meaningfully different. Which is why, if the Ian's were the determine "I am the orginal", they'd be reaching a conclusion with insufficient evidence - quite Ian-like, in fact!

Huh??? What are you talking about? I'm saying how does my thought experiment outlined differ from someone simply offering to give me £10,000,000 by sitting in a room and watching my favorite film (in other words without being duplicated). It shouldn't do, but it does. Because in one I only have a 50/50 chance of receiving £10,000,000, and in the other I will definitely receive £10,000,000. But clearly this is absurd because the mere duplication of my body shouldn't have that effect!

Do you deliberately misunderstand everything or what?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

I just have in quite some detail. If you still cannot understand the paradox then I just have to conclude you're not sufficiently intelligent to understand. Sorry, but there's nothing I can do about it.

We're all dumb as a bag of hammers, Ian.

Huh??? What are you talking about? I'm saying how does my thought experiment outlined differ from someone simply offering to give me £10,000,000 by sitting in a room and watching my favorite film (in other words without being duplicated). It shouldn't do, but it does. Because in one I only have a 50/50 chance of receiving £10,000,000, and in the other I will definitely receive £10,000,000. But clearly this is absurd because the mere duplication of my body shouldn't have that effect!

You're joking, right?

I knew this was going to be about two doctors.

~~ Paul

 

[slimshady2357]

Ian,

Another thought - perhaps this might (finally) demonstrate why "location" is relevant in all of this.

You have painted a picture (nice one, too) of two Ian's in an identical physical environment, unable to know if they are the original or the duplicate, but both tending towards the conclusion they are the original due the fact they are able to access a continuous history of the past hour or so since entering the room. One actually did enter the room they occupy 2 hours ago. The other simply "popped into existence" about an hour ago in the room. For this second one, his memories of his environment from the previous second exactly match his current environment, so he is unaware that he is the duplicate.

At the appointed hour, the researchers enter a room and kill one Ian. The decision on which one to kill (Paul's suggestion not withstanding) is based upon location only - no other factor is involved. The Ian's, unable to differentiate their locations, cannot know (if they stop to think about it for a moment) if they are the one about to die. The researchers, who can differentiate between the locations, know exactly which is the one to go.

Still can't see a paradox, though.

I agree with this totally, Loki, good post

Ian, you seem to be confusing "indistinguishable to the Ian's" with "totally indistinguishable".

Ahh I just scrolled down and you posted in the time I hit the quote button, because now your last post is at the bottom.

Let me go to that.

Loki:

In terms of "knowledge available to the Ians" it isn't meaningfully different. Which is why, if the Ian's were the determine "I am the original", they'd be reaching a conclusion with insufficient evidence - quite Ian-like, in fact!

Ian:

Huh??? What are you talking about? I'm saying how does my thought experiment outlined differ from someone simply offering to give me £10,000,000 by sitting in a room and watching my favorite film (in other words without being duplicated). It shouldn't do, but it does. Because in one I only have a 50/50 chance of receiving £10,000,000, and in the other I will definitely receive £10,000,000. But clearly this is absurd because the mere duplication of my body shouldn't have that effect!

Let's call them situation A and B

In situation A you are just getting paid £10,000,000 to watch Groundhog Day (sweet!).

In situation B you are just getting paid £10,000,000 to watch Groundhog Day, but a duplicate will be made of you and then killed.

Ok, we are assuming you are a total Materialist, correct? So you know that the duplicate will think just like you, and that's what leads you and the duplicate to believe that you have a 50/50 chance of living, correct?

Yet, for SURE original Ian will be left alive and get the £10,000,000.

Where you go wrong is taking the Ian's assessments to be the real probabilities.

In both situations original Ian's chances of living are 100%. In situation B, he comes to a point where his information is limited, he no longer knows if he IS original Ian! (this will surely happen at the end of movie if not before).

But the fact (a physical one) remains that he is the original Ian. And that indeed his chances are 100% of survival.

You see, the Ian's have different information in the two situations, therefore you would expect the probabilities that they calculate to be different!

Ian in situation A knows he will not be duplicated, he knows he is the original Ian, therefore he knows his chances of getting £10,000,000 are 100%

Ian in situation B has different information, he realizes he could be either the original or the duplicate, and calculates his odds based on that to be 50%.

No paradox, it makes perfect sense.

Probability original Ian will live in each case 100%

Probability original Ian will live in each case from the perspective of the original Ians, situation A = 100%, situation B = 50%.

Again, this difference is explained by the different information the two original Ian's are dealing with.

Adam

 

[Loki]

Ian,

If you still cannot understand the paradox then I just have to conclude you're not sufficiently intelligent to understand.

You must be sober - that's a fairly restrained reply from you! I tend to think the problem lies in the scenario you're proposing rather than my ability to understand it.

I most certainly said no such thing!

Apologies - have just re-read your post and can see how you meant it to be read.

I'm saying how does my thought experiment outlined differ from someone simply offering to give me £10,000,000 by sitting in a room and watching my favorite film (in other words without being duplicated). It shouldn't do, but it does.

No, it doesn't. In both cases (no duplication, and duplication with duplicate being killed) the actual person who walked in the first room will walk out with the money, guaranteed, 100%.

Because in one I only have a 50/50 chance of receiving £10,000,000, and in the other I will definitely receive £10,000,000.

To be clear, you are referring to two scenarios in the above quote, which bring the total to 3?

1. You enter a room, are not duplicated, leave after movie ends with cash
2. You enter a room, are duplicated, leave after movie ends with cash (duplicate suffers "regrettable accident" following experiment)
3. You enter a room, are duplicated, meet grissly demise, duplicate goes home with the cash.

Where is the paradox, Ian? The difference between #1 and The other two is that a new human being is created in #2 and #3, in a new location. In #1, Ian's knowledge of the facts, and the real facts, are in agreement. In #2 and #3, each Ian might *think* they have access to all the facts, but one of them is wrong! This is because, simply, they don't know their location. The scenario is set up in such a way that the Ian's are prevented from knowing a crucial fact - it's worse, one of the Ian's is deliberately being feed data to create an impression that is not true - the duplicate is being feed data that (falsely) leads him to conclude he is the original.

Still can't see a paradox...

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,

Another thought - perhaps this might (finally) demonstrate why "location" is relevant in all of this.

You have painted a picture (nice one, too) of two Ian's in an identical physical environment, unable to know if they are the original or the duplicate, but both tending towards the conclusion they are the original due the fact they are able to access a continuous history of the past hour or so since entering the room. One actually did enter the room they occupy 2 hours ago. The other simply "popped into existence" about an hour ago in the room.

Which is of course wholly irrelevant. They both were the original Ian in every meaningful sense. You're trying to draw a wedge between the 2 Ian's which simply does not exist.

For this second one, his memories of his environment from the previous second exactly match his current environment, so he is unaware that he is the duplicate.

At the appointed hour, the researchers enter a room and kill one Ian. The decision on which one to kill (Paul's suggestion not withstanding) is based upon location only - no other factor is involved. The Ian's, unable to differentiate their locations, cannot know (if they stop to think about it for a moment) if they are the one about to die. The researchers, who can differentiate between the locations, know exactly which is the one to go.

Still can't see a paradox, though.

As I have stated, there is absolutely nothing I can do about that. I have shown that it is incoherent to suppose that 2 identical streams of consciousnesses can be created. I am satisfied with that. It would be too much to expect materialists to understand my proof.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I must be completely misunderstanding the two scenarios. In one, I'm told I will be duplicated, enter the room, watch the movie etc., etc. In the other, I'm just allowed to watch the show and then paid. No duplication enters into it. Yet you say:

Because in one I only have a 50/50 chance of receiving £10,000,000, and in the other I will definitely receive £10,000,000. But clearly this is absurd because the mere duplication of my body shouldn't have that effect!

But it isn't just mere duplication. In the first scenario, I'm told about the duplication.

~~ Paul

 

[Dancing David]

That's it Ian, there isn't a paradox, it is not the same as being offered a sum of money for watching the movie for the duplicate. There is the room which is the dupe suite, that dupe is in for the suprise as it it going to be taken out and forced to watch the Wiggles until death by boredom. Now what is interesting is that there is no way for the dupe or the dupee to know that they are the dupe. Unless the dupee say made a mark that was not replicated in the second room.

The only way here would be a paradox is if
a. there was no outside frame of reference
b. you could maintian the duplication after copying event and constrain the dupe room to the dupee room.

But unfortunately the two rooms will immedeatly diverge from the moment of duplication, so from the scientific view the two rooms are different.

I don't see the incoherence, I admit it is a great little experiment, and one which I would not agree to at all. After all that is me which is going to be killed and you have to trust the ethics of the people doing this.

I think again that under the conditions of not having the secret mark, the dupee and the dupe will not know which one will be killed. A great way to teach ethics!

 

[Interesting Ian]

Loki
Another thought - perhaps this might (finally) demonstrate why "location" is relevant in all of this.

You have painted a picture (nice one, too) of two Ian's in an identical physical environment, unable to know if they are the original or the duplicate, but both tending towards the conclusion they are the original due the fact they are able to access a continuous history of the past hour or so since entering the room. One actually did enter the room they occupy 2 hours ago. The other simply "popped into existence" about an hour ago in the room. For this second one, his memories of his environment from the previous second exactly match his current environment, so he is unaware that he is the duplicate.

At the appointed hour, the researchers enter a room and kill one Ian. The decision on which one to kill (Paul's suggestion not withstanding) is based upon location only - no other factor is involved. The Ian's, unable to differentiate their locations, cannot know (if they stop to think about it for a moment) if they are the one about to die. The researchers, who can differentiate between the locations, know exactly which is the one to go.

Still can't see a paradox, though.
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Slimshady
I agree with this totally, Loki, good post

In what sense is it a good post?? It has made no attempt whatsoever to address the paradox that I have outlined. If your lack of comprehension is as great as Loki's, is there any point in reading your post??

quote:
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Loki:

In terms of "knowledge available to the Ians" it isn't meaningfully different. Which is why, if the Ian's were the determine "I am the original", they'd be reaching a conclusion with insufficient evidence - quite Ian-like, in fact!
quote:
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Ian:

Huh??? What are you talking about? I'm saying how does my thought experiment outlined differ from someone simply offering to give me £10,000,000 by sitting in a room and watching my favorite film (in other words without being duplicated). It shouldn't do, but it does. Because in one I only have a 50/50 chance of receiving £10,000,000, and in the other I will definitely receive £10,000,000. But clearly this is absurd because the mere duplication of my body shouldn't have that effect!
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Let's call them situation A and B

In situation A you are just getting paid £10,000,000 to watch Groundhog Day (sweet!).

In situation B you are just getting paid £10,000,000 to watch Groundhog Day, but a duplicate will be made of you and then killed.

Ok, we are assuming you are a total Materialist, correct? So you know that the duplicate will think just like you, and that's what leads you and the duplicate to believe that you have a 50/50 chance of living, correct?

Yet, for SURE original Ian will be left alive and get the £10,000,000.

But the concept of "original Ian" in terms of a stream of consciousness has no meaning! In my thought experiment I turned out to be the duplicate. Yet my conscious experiences were continuous. So I am the original Ian in the sense of the stream of consciousness, even though I am now located somewhere else. The whole purpose of my thought experiment is to show there isn't 2 streams of my consciousness really!. There can't be because it leads to a logical paradox. Do you see yet??

Where you go wrong is taking the Ian's assessments to be the real probabilities.


In both situations original Ian's chances of living are 100%. In situation B, he comes to a point where his information is limited, he no longer knows if he IS original Ian! (this will surely happen at the end of movie if not before).

But the fact (a physical one) remains that he is the original Ian. And that indeed his chances are 100% of survival.

No, this is erroneous reasoning. I have demonstrated that at the beginning of the film I know that my stream of consciousness occupies the original Ian's body. Yet the distinct possibility remains that I will watch the film, it will just feel like I had watched the film at home with absolutely no break in my stream of consciousness, and yet I turn out to be the duplicate. Basically your argument is completely failing to address my thought experiment. You must address this issue from Ian's first person perspective, not from a third person perspective which is what you're doing.

You see, the Ian's have different information in the two situations, therefore you would expect the probabilities that they calculate to be different!

And the probability calculated by this information gives an absolutely correct probability of whether I will receive the £10,000,000. It's meaningless to talk about me having more information.

Ian in situation A knows he will not be duplicated, he knows he is the original Ian, therefore he knows his chances of getting £10,000,000 are 100%

Ian in situation B has different information, he realizes he could be either the original or the duplicate, and calculates his odds based on that to be 50%.

No paradox, it makes perfect sense.

No you're wrong for the reasons I have delineated.

Edited to add: Basically Adam you're begging the question. You're assuming there is definitely 2 streams of consciousnesses which are both me, and ignoring my thought experiment demonstrating the incoherency of this notion.