A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

I've noticed that neither Slimshady or Loki have answered my questions yet. Before I spell out the paradox would you both care to provide answers? Incidentally Loki, the duplicates environment is irrelevant, but we'll make it identical anyway to ward off people spewing forth irrelevancies. I repeat the 2 questions:

Lets suppose we have the technology to precisely physically duplicate peoples' bodies. Let's imagine that someone were to offer you $10,000 if you allowed them to physically duplicate your body, but that they would kill the duplicate you 24 hours after duplication so that duplicate you only actually lives 24 hours. Let's further imagine that you never even get to see the duplicate you.

You would surely accept this offer because after all this duplicate doesn't exist now, so when he gets killed after allowing him to live 24 hours, that cannot possibly make you worse off than you are now. So basically you would be getting $10,000 for nothing, right?
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Another thought experiment. This is exactly the same as above except it's the original you who gets killed 24 hours after the duplicate has been created, and the duplicate is allowed to live. The duplicate will receive the $10,000 and the duplicate will never get to see the original you. Of course this situation is precisely the same as the first one although one might not feel that it is.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

I've noticed that neither Slimshady or Loki have answered my questions yet.

Oookay...I can only see one question, but I'll try to guess what you mean.

So basically you would be getting $10,000 for nothing, right?

Leaving ethics and morality out of it, then yes.

Of course this situation is precisely the same as the first one although one might not feel that it is.

You're asking if this is the same? No, it's not - the person who is the original won't think so. I've already answered this. Or isn't that your question?

Incidentally Loki, the duplicates environment is irrelevant,...

No, it's not irrelevant. If the environments are not identical then the two humans *immediately* become different in *more* than just location since they will experience different interactions. Therefore, after 24 hours, you are killing a single unique human - the universe will be minus a human with 24 hours of unique experiences.

 

[ceptimus]

Assuming this duplicator has been proven totally reliable, I'd accept both offers. If the duplicate is really the same, right down to the sub atomic level, then it wouldn't matter which one of me got killed. I hope a painless killing method would be employed.

Of course, it would be better still to leave both of me alive. I think two of me would make a great team.

 

[Loki]

ceptimus,

Assuming this duplicator has been proven totally reliable, I'd accept both offers.

This is the same answer that Win gave a year ago - as long as the universe contains *at least* one Win, he wasn't concerned which one.

If there are two of me in this world, and one of us has to go, from my point of view I'd rather it be the other one. My wife wouldn't care (no remarks implying she might rather see the end of both, thank you).

 

[slimshady2357]

Ian, why should I answer any questions you ask when you REFUSE to answer the ones I put to you?

When you start answering the questions I've been asking for about 10 pages now, then I'll consider returning the favour.

I don't see you as someone special who gets to ask all the questions and never answer any, sorry.

Adam

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wait, I get it! The paradox is that Ian never actually reveals the paradox! It's also ironic!

~~ Paul

 

[slimshady2357]

Wait, I get it! The paradox is that Ian never actually reveals the paradox! It's also ironic!

~~ Paul

The only strange thing Ian even CAN show with his new thought experiments is that, like Billyjoe in the Staying Alive thread, some materialists have intuitive ideas of 'self' that are inconsistent with Materialism. Whoopee do!

Adam

 

[Mercutio]

Interesting...I make the choice before the duplication process...but both Merc-1 and Merc-2 have the memory of making the decision...each of us (each of them? each of me?) would be utterly surprised when he (they? I?) find out he {ditto) is slated for slaughter. I won't take the 10 grand for either scenario--the net result may be no gain in Mercutios, but either scenario kills off someone who believes fully that he is the original Mercutio. Just as I would not condone infanticide (the net result of which is the same number of kids you had a year ago), I won't condone Mercutiocide, no matter how that particular Mercutio came into being. The only difference between your scenario and infanticide, really, is the time scale. (hmmm, murder, too, for that matter, is the same--the net result is the same number of victims you had before this victim was born...again, just the time scale differs)

 

[ceptimus]

Interesting...I make the choice before the duplication process...but both Merc-1 and Merc-2 have the memory of making the decision...each of us (each of them? each of me?) would be utterly surprised when he (they? I?) find out he {ditto) is slated for slaughter.

It's easy enough to get around this not-really-a-paradox. The offer should really be, 'A fair coin will be flipped. If it comes down heads, only your duplicate will be killed; if it's tails then only you will be killed. Would you accept the $10,000 to carry out this offer?'

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Both of me would have the knowledge that, 24 hours later, I will have a 50/50 chance of being killed. Sounds somewhat unpleasant, even if I have chucked morality down the toilet.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

It's easy enough to get around this not-really-a-paradox. The offer should really be, 'A fair coin will be flipped. If it comes down heads, only your duplicate will be killed; if it's tails then only you will be killed. Would you accept the $10,000 to carry out this offer?'

Hi, just got in. Yes an absolutely excellent suggestion. And may I also congratulate you (and Mercutio to a certain degree) of displaying a great deal more sense than Slimshady and Loki and various others

 

[Interesting Ian]

Both of me would have the knowledge that, 24 hours later, I will have a 50/50 chance of being killed. Sounds somewhat unpleasant, even if I have chucked morality down the toilet.

~~ Paul

Actually yes you're right, butit has nothing to do with the coin flip. I'll explain why when I get round to explaining the logical paradox.

 

[Mercutio]

Hi, just got in. Yes an absolutely excellent suggestion. And may I also congratulate you (and Mercutio to a certain degree) of displaying a great deal more sense than Slimshady and Loki and various others

Gee, I'm flattered, to a certain degree...

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian, why should I answer any questions you ask when you REFUSE to answer the ones I put to you?

When you start answering the questions I've been asking for about 10 pages now, then I'll consider returning the favour.

I don't see you as someone special who gets to ask all the questions and never answer any, sorry.

Adam

The reason being that there are 3 scenarios where my paradox doesn't apply.

1) An assertion that the original is really you. This is the view which you and Loki and most other people subscribe to. Unfortunately it's a flat out denial of materialism. It also contradicts what you said when you claimed that it would really be you if you used a teleporter where your original body is destroyed and another one is created at a new location.

2) There is the answer that both Ceptimus and Win supply. I shall address this response in due course.

3) Then there is my answer which no-one else shares. This is the scenario where the person duplicated experiences simultaneously out of both bodies.

Now I will explain the paradox, but I was really hoping that you would acknowledge that your position is simply incompatible with materialism before I do so. Otherwise it obviously won't impress you at all.

 

[slimshady2357]

The reason being that there are 3 scenarios where my paradox doesn't apply.

1) An assertion that the original is really you. This is the view which you and Loki and most other people subscribe to. Unfortunately it's a flat out denial of materialism. It also contradicts what you said when you claimed that it would really be you if you used a teleporter where your original body is destroyed and another one is created at a new location.

Is your reading comprehension really this low? I've been saying since the beginning that it's identical to me, but not the actual same me! This gets sadder and sadder

Two brains which are identical except for space-time location will create two consciousness' which are identical except for space-time location. If you still think I'm saying it's really me (there is only one consciousness) then I have no idea how to address such ridiculousness! If all you mean is that he has the same right to call himself me, then, yes I have said that. His Consciousness is identical. No contradiction with Materialism though.

2) There is the answer that both Ceptimus and Win supply. I shall address this response in due course.

3) Then there is my answer which no-one else shares. This is the scenario where the person duplicated experiences simultaneously out of both bodies.

Now I will explain the paradox, but I was really hoping that you would acknowledge that your position is simply incompatible with materialism before I do so. Otherwise it obviously won't impress you at all.

Go ahead and explain what you think is a paradox and keep dodging the questions you can't answer, it speaks volumes, both about you and your position.

Perhaps you'll gain the courage of your convictions and actually address the points raised against you, but I doubt it and I certainly won't be holding my breath waiting!

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

Given the fact that everyone (Titus included) *except you* seems to be saying the same thing, I think it's a reasonably safe bet that the "paradox" is not only hard to find, but probably non existent.

Appealing to popularity. Logical fallacy I'm afraid Loki me old boy. And Ceptimus and also Win don't appear to hold that the original person is really the true you more so than the duplicate. Your position is a denial of materialism

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(Replying to Paul) : Well you're holding the position that the original is really you.
...
All that is happening is that people are thinking that the original is really them and the duplicate isn't
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Gee, I *really* hope this isn't your "paradox"

Well no, that's not a paradox, just a denial of materialism (and epiphenomenalism).

- can you really fail to understand what people have said to you this badly? Even Win was arguing against the nonsense you are offering up.

Win didn't reach the same conclusion as me. But I don't think he agreed with you either!

Let me see if I understand you so far...

We place person 'A' in room 'A'. We duplicate (instantaneously, painlessly, and undetectibly) the entire room and the person in every possible physical detail (except location, of course) to create person 'A1' in room 'A1'. For the next 24 hours, every single physical interaction that ocurs to/with/on person 'A' also occurs with person 'A1'. At the end of the 24 hour period, we kill either person 'A', or person 'A1'. You seem to be implying that materialists believe that it makes a difference whether we kill 'A' or 'A1'?

It certainly makes a difference to A and A1!

Well, I think it matters to 'A' or to 'A1', but not to the universe :

The Universe is not sentient. Nothing matters to it. If you mean the totality of physical facts will remain the same, then yes this is true.

At the start of the experiment the universe contains one 'instance' of a human we call 'A'.

For 24 hours the the universe contains two 'instances' of a human we call 'A'. We can differentiate between them by location only. We can refer to them as 'A' (the original) and 'A1' (the duplicate) if we like, but they are in fact identical in every way. We *can* refer to them as 'A' and 'A1' (that is, we can tell them apart) because they differ in location.

At the end of the 24 hours, we kill one, and the universe now contains only one instance of a human called 'A'.

From the perspective of the surviving 'A', there is no loss of continuity - they are, and have always been, 'A'. From the perspective of the universe there has always been *at least* one 'A' (for a short period there were two). From the perspective of the the 'A' that died, they...died!

Yes this is all fine.

Please, you'd better reveal this paradox...I'm just not seeing it.

Patience.

 

[Interesting Ian]

The duplicate brain gives rise to ANOTHER consciousness, that's how brains work under materialism, they generate a consciousness. So the duplicate generates a consciousness, exactly like the first, but not the actual same one, because it's not being generated by the actual same brain.

This is the paragraph which confused me. What I'm asking is whether you believe that the duplicate is you in every conceivable fullest sense of the word.

Allow me to put it another way. Lets suppose both the original is standing in a booth for the purposes of duplication, and the duplicate gets created in another booth. Lets suppose both booths are transparent and both copies of Adam can see the rooms they are situated in. Let's also suppose that the 2 rooms are different.

Now just before duplication you're standing there in the booth. As you reach the moment of duplication do you concede that you might well experience a sudden shift of perspective and see the room the dupicate booth is situated in? In other words you find, perhaps to your surprise, that you are now the duplicate?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Is your reading comprehension really this low? I've been saying since the beginning that it's identical to me, but not the actual same me! This gets sadder and sadder

Two brains which are identical except for space-time location will create two consciousness' which are identical except for space-time location. If you still think I'm saying it's really me (there is only one consciousness) then I have no idea how to address such ridiculousness! If all you mean is that he has the same right to call himself me, then, yes I have said that. His Consciousness is identical. No contradiction with Materialism though.
[/B]

Are you agreeing then that both Adam's will both in equal measure be you, that in other words neither one has any greater rights to claim to have been the you before duplication? If so then necessarily you must agree that the 2 experiments are equivalent and you wouldn't mind using a teletransporter provided it produced a perfectly physical copy. Right?? {sweats}

Why can't you express a consistent position?

 

[Loki]

Ian,

Appealing to popularity. Logical fallacy I'm afraid Loki me old boy.

Actually Ian, I'd call it an Appeal to Frustration - everyone seems to know where this is heading but you insist you've got some "surprise paradox" that awaits. Continue...

And Ceptimus and also Win don't appear to hold that the original person is really the true you more so than the duplicate.

Neither do I. Not only is your thinking deserting you on this topic, but apparently your reading skills as well.

Your position is a denial of materialism.

Nope - read again.

(Ian wrote) : It certainly makes a difference to A and A1!
...
(Loki wrote) : Well, I think it matters to 'A' or to 'A1'...

We agree!

Since you seem to have managed to read my post and derive a position that is exactly the opposite of my intention, I'll accept the possibility that I wasn't clear enough, and I'll try again. I said :

At the end of the 24 hours, we kill one, and the universe now contains only one instance of a human called 'A'.

Let me state it as plainly as I can - at the end of the 24 hours, the universe *does contain* exactly one genuine guaranteed real actual Loki. Whether this is the original or the duplicate does not matter to anyone or anything *except* the two Lokis (Lokii?) - one of whom is glad to see they have survived, the other is now dead.

Questions you asked of Adam (but which you seem to be confused about my position on) :

Are you agreeing then that both Adam's will both in equal measure be you, that in other words neither one has any greater rights to claim to have been the you before duplication?

Yes - neither is "more Adam" that the other. The designation "original" and "duplicate" can be determined via location only, and does not affect in any way the contents of the consciousnesses. That's why this is murder - you are killing a genuine human either way.

If so then necessarily you must agree that the 2 experiments are equivalent and you wouldn't mind using a teletransporter provided it produced a perfectly physical copy. Right?

Correct - beam me up Scotty!

Why can't you express a consistent position?

Allow me to commit another fallacy, and appeal to popularity yet again - I see no inconsistency by anyone (including you) for the past 10 pages or so - everyone seems to be saying the same thing, over and over. Even you have been consistent - simply failing again and again to comprehend what is being said to you.

What I'm asking is whether you believe that the duplicate is you in every conceivable fullest sense of the word.

Yes, again, yes. Is there a reason you feel compelled to ask the same thing repeatedly? The two are identical Ian - each is "me" in the fullest sense of the word. Both of us are married to the same woman, have the same children, have the same rights to the family inheritance (ha!), pay the same (exhorbitant) amount of tax to the government, and both find InterestingIan only occasionally interesting.

Lets suppose both the original is standing in a booth for the purposes of duplication, and the duplicate gets created in another booth. Lets suppose both booths are transparent and both copies of Adam can see the rooms they are situated in. Let's also suppose that the 2 rooms are different.

Now just before duplication you're standing there in the booth. As you reach the moment of duplication do you concede that you might well experience a sudden shift of perspective and see the room the dupicate booth is situated in? In other words you find, perhaps to your surprise, that you are now the duplicate?

One consciousness does, one does not - but that's because the moment the two consciousnesses receive even *one* physical experience that is not identical, they cease being identical consciousnesses.

There's no ambiguity here - assume that the original enters a booth in a white room, and the duplicate appears in a booth in a red room :

1. I walk into a booth in the white room, and close my eyes.
2. A voice says "Activating duplicator in 5..4..3..2..1.."
3. I open my eyes and see the white room. "Gee... that didn't hurt at all" I say to the assistant, "but I should have gone to the toilet before we did this...where's the nearest loo?"
4. I open my eyes and see the red room. "That's cool ! I've gone from the white room to the red room in an instant! " I say to the assistant, "but I should have gone to the toilet before we did this...where's the nearest loo?"

(Edited to add) : [In case it's not clear, #3 and #4 above happen simultaneously. In each case, the *I* being referred to is one of the two identical *I*'s created in step #2]

There are two *I*'s here - identical in terms of the past, different in terms of the future. Each has the exact same right to "Loki's past", including punishments and rewards!

 

[Dancing David]

The resolution is that they are both the same person with diverging streams of awareness.( Go Loki, Go Loki, pretty strage coming from an adorer of Freya, after you stole from her and all)

Whichever of the two gets killed is going to belief that it is the real one and is going to be very upset.

There is a sci-fi story about this where teleporters just ceate duplicates, who suffer all sorts of problems, without any effect on the prime subject.