A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Titus Rivas]

Answer to BillHoyt

Hi guys,

Thanks for the compliments from some of you.

I'm afraid I generally haven't read any really new points that call for an answer. Paul has even correctly answered Mercutio's question about my position.

BillHoyt, since you seem to have changed your tone, I'd like to answer this question of yours:

What are you claiming about Lorber's conclusions?

What I'm claiming is that the cases reported by John Lorber were quite a shock to the community of cognitive scientists, especially for those who believed in a clear-cut parallellism between the neocortex and higher mental functioning. I actually don't know how neuroscientists have changed their models to include these cases (of people with an abnormally thin cortex and normal or even good intelligence). But I what meant is that cases such as those discovered by Lorber suggest that (what I see as) mind-brain interactions may actually be much more complex than expected.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[BillHoyt]

Wow, I didn't even realize there was a battle going on there.

Also, the jury is still out on gravity. Many learned scientists still think the earth simply sucks and that that explains everything, Stimpy's scientistic claims about Newton and Einstein notwithstanding.

Cheers,

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Answer to BillHoyt

What I'm claiming is that the cases reported by John Lorber were quite a shock to the community of cognitive scientists, especially for those who believed in a clear-cut parallellism between the neocortex and higher mental functioning. I actually don't know how neuroscientists have changed their models to include these cases (of people with an abnormally thin cortex and normal or even good intelligence). But I what meant is that cases such as those discovered by Lorber suggest that (what I see as) mind-brain interactions may actually be much more complex than expected.

Lorber's work has shown the plasticity of functional mapping. The brain prefers to locate functionality in certain areas, but has the ability to re-wire itself to get around limitations. The fact that this was a shock to cognitive scientists actually serves to demonstrate science's ability to self-correct.

Cheers,

 

[BillHoyt]

Repeated post

Lest you lose track.

quote:
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However, there is a second battle in theoretical biology, and that is the battle between reductionism and vitalism. Vitalism differs from holism in that it claims that biology is irreducible to physics, not primarily because of irreducible laws, but first of all because biology is about a different substance than physics, namely life (Latin: vita). Life would not just be a special manifestation of matter.
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Provide five citations from peer-reviewed theoretical biology or theoretical biophysics or mathematical biology journals demonstrating the modern-day existence of this battle.

Cheers,

 

[Titus Rivas]

Second answer to BillHoyt

Another question by BillHoyt I had overlooked is whether I can provide any evidence for my 'claim' about different ontological battles. You don't seem to understand that I was talking about the various types of discussions that can be distinguished.

How important the different batlles are in terms of scholars who are involved in it, is simply beside my point. However, I do know a theoretical biologist over here who is a holist. Another theoretical biologist known to me is a vitalist. I won't mention their names here though, as I don't want to compromise them.

Another example of what many view as modern day vitalism and very "hot' at that, can be found in Rupert Sheldrake's theories.

But I suggest if you're interested in these issues, you might as well start looking for evidence yourself.

Regardless of any concrete evidence about the sociological strength of every specific position within (several) scientific circles, my post was about distinctions.

Keep up the polite tone,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

And yet another answer for BH

Bill Hoyt,

The fact that this was a shock to cognitive scientists actually serves to demonstrate science's ability to self-correct.

I've never doubted this ability, despite the misguided dogmatism about the mind-body problem encountered in many gifted scientists. I remain quite hopeful that the scientific consensus will soon read that the orthodox views on this issue need to be replaced by their dualist and idealist alternatives.
By the way, I know already that you'll find this parallel unacceptable, so...

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Second answer to BillHoyt

Another question by BillHoyt I had overlooked is whether I can provide any evidence for my 'claim' about different ontological battles. You don't seem to understand that I was talking about the various types of discussions that can be distinguished.

How important the different batlles are in terms of scholars who are involved in it, is simply beside my point. However, I do know a theoretical biologist over here who is a holist. Another theoretical biologist known to me is a vitalist. I won't mention their names here though, as I don't want to compromise them.

Another example of what many view as modern day vitalism and very "hot' at that, can be found in Rupert Sheldrake's theories.

But I suggest if you're interested in these issues, you might as well start looking for evidence yourself.

Regardless of any concrete evidence about the sociological strength of every specific position within (several) scientific circles, my post was about distinctions.

Keep up the polite tone,

Titus

Titus,

This is a non-answer.

Your unnamed acquaintances are not evidence, sir. Please do not try to palm off this McCarthyesqe trick.

Sheldrake is not a theoretical biologist, sir.

Finally, it is not up to me to do your homework for you. You made a claim, and I've called upon you to marshall evidence.

I'll ask you again: five citations as I previously described, please.

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: And yet another answer for BH

Bill Hoyt,
I've never doubted this ability, despite the misguided dogmatism about the mind-body problem encountered in many gifted scientists. I remain quite hopeful that the scientific consensus will soon read that the orthodox views on this issue need to be replaced by their dualist and idealist alternatives.
By the way, I know already that you'll find this parallel unacceptable, so...

Best wishes,

Titus

That is my basic point in questioning your Lorber reference. Lorber's work does not lead to any dualist conclusions. That was precisely the implication in your original cryptic comment, and it is precisely wrong. Lorber simply found an extraordinarily squished brain in a human whose IQ was measured as 126. The brain had re-mapped itself within very tight confines, and managed to achieve this extraordinary result. This evidence supports the incredible plasticity of brain organisation.

 

[Mercutio]

I think Titus meant that "seems" = "is" for internal subjective experiences: However my pain feels, that's how my pain is. I don't think he meant that equality to apply to external sensory experiences. I'm still not sure why that equality is interesting.

As I understand it, the problem of pain and the problem of visual illusions are actually one and the same, the only difference being a publicly available referent. Although we say "however my pain feels, that's how my pain is", we have in fact had to learn what internal states to label as "pain". The tricky thing is, the only way to do this is through our language community, and their inferences about our pain which they make from our observable behavior. A child winces, and a parent asks "are you in pain?"...of course, the realities of social life insure that not all of our traumas are labeled, and sometimes they will be mislabeled. Since we are still learning the language, we end up with a fuzzy definition of "pain" (or "love" or anything without a publicly shared referent--"red" and "book" we learn pretty solidly). Looking at a tree and saying "I see a tree", or getting a nail stuck in your food and saying "I feel pain" are both reacting to stimuli appropriately...that the latter has mentalistic baggage is a byproduct of learning and culture.

Aside from whether a label is solid or fuzzy, the same "seems" and "is" problem exists. And again, I don't have a problem with defining "what seems to be" as the real thing...I just cannot see how this can ever be the basis for a scientific investigation, as the "seems" in my life are much too unpredictable for science. The reality of seems is a neat philosophical trick, but it is not until I make the assumption that a real world exists that I can make a science of it.

 

[69dodge]

Re: Another good question

Originally posted by Titus Rivas
What I'm talking about is that we have metasubjective concepts, i.e. concepts that represent subjectivity as it is as an irreducible category or domain within reality. These concepts can't just be representations of physical patterns that give rise to subjectivity, as that would make it impossible to distinguish between concepts of physical patterns that give rise to subjectivity and concepts of subjectivity itself. We can distinguish between physical patterns that may give rise to subjective experiences and those subjective experiences themselves, which means they must be separately stored in our conceptual memory. In such a way that we know what distinguishes one concept from the other.

This doesn't seem to be a big problem at all. A brain pattern can have, so to speak, a little note attached to it. The note might say, "interpret me as a physical brain pattern," or it might say, "interpret me as the subjective experience I give rise to."

This would be similar to the way a computer file can be interpreted either as a program or as data. The same file, in fact, can be interpreted differently at different times; you don't even need two copies of it.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Final post to Bill Hoyt

Dear Sir,

You've a special, perhaps even unprecedented talent for misunderstanding opponents. It must be quite frustrating, so I can feel some sympathy for your outbursts.

My point about Lorber's study really was about the complexity of the relations between mind and brain.

And my post about the various distinguishable discussions really was about distinctions.

But I notice you've lost your acceptable tone again. So have a nice day.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

"Subjective experience" as a concept in memory

69dodge,

A brain pattern can have, so to speak, a little note attached to it. The note might say, "interpret me as a physical brain pattern," or it might say, "interpret me as the subjective experience I give rise to."

The problem would be of course that the added information "subjective experience" would be what is supposed to be represented in the first place in a metasubjective concept.
In other words, the point is precisely that the concept referred to in a hypothetical note, must already be part of memory itself. Otherwise the note could never refer to a concept of subjective experiences and simply wouldn't make any sense.
We know what we mean by the term "subjective experience" because through introspection we've formed a notion of it and labelled it that way in memory. Any time you refer to this term, we subconsciously look it up in our mental lexicon stored in memory to see what it means. Its meaning must be in memory if we're really going to use the term meaningfully.

Titus

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Final post to Bill Hoyt

But I notice you've lost your acceptable tone again. So have a nice day.

Titus

When the questions get tough, Titus gets going.

One more shot, Titus: will you marshall proper evidence to support your theoretical biology claim? If so, when?

 

[Mercutio]

Re: "Subjective experience" as a concept in memory

[B*snip*.
We know what we mean by the term "subjective experience" because through introspection we've formed a notion of it and labelled it that way in memory. Any time you refer to this term, we subconsciously look it up in our mental lexicon stored in memory to see what it means. Its meaning must be in memory if we're really going to use the term meaningfully.[/B]

A quick question, of a different sort--memory researchers in experimental psychology have, for the most part, dropped the metaphor of "storage in a lexicon" as misleading and inaccurate. Does the dualistic view use the metaphor in a separate way, or is this a holdout from earlier memory work, or what?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

But isn't introspection just our own intuitive interpretation of our experiences? Why should we assume that this intuitive interpretation of our experiences accurately represents what experiences really are? And if they do not, then clearly we cannot claim that "subjective experiences" (defined by you to be what our experiences seem to be), actually exist at all.
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You would be right, yes, that if introspection is purely an intuitive, (completely) fallible interpretation of our experiences, it could be false. However, I clearly don't consider introspection merely an intuitive interpretation of our experiences.

That is clear. The question is, why don't you even consider it to be a possibility?

We should distinguish between introspection in the sense of the direct observation of our subjective experiences, and introspective reports.

Hang on. You can't define introspection to be the direct observation of our subjective experiences, and then define "subjective experiences" to be "what our experiences seem to be, according to our introspection". That is circular.

Introspection (and its twin brother retrospection) is the only road we can walk to get directly in touch with our own subjective experiences. The only way to discount EVERYTHING we know about consciousness through introspection is to deny that we really have subjective, qualitative experiences.

First of all, we don't have to discount "everything" we (think) we know about consciousness through introspection. All we have to do is acknowledge that introspection, like any other form of intuitive inference, is fallible.

Introspective reports (and thus the use of the introspective method) may be fallible and inaccurate. But introspection in the strictly private, unreported sense is not. Precisely because it is not primarily a method of interpretation but of observing our own subjectivity.

This is circular. You define subjectivity to be what our experiences seem to be, based on introspection, and then claim that introspection is a method for observing our subjectivity. That means that you are defining introspection to be a method for observing what our experiences seem to be, based on ... what?

At this point, I no longer have any idea what you mean by introspection, so I will rephrase without making reference to that word.

I am aware of my own experiences.

I do not know how to logically derive from those experiences that they are irreducibly non-physical.

Please explain to me how to make this logical deduction.

For example, when in (subjective) pain, we don't need any interpretation to know that we're undergoing a painful feeling, regardless of how we interpret the feeling or of how we label it. We just know we hurt.

Yeah, so? How does that in any way indicate that there is anything more than physical processes involved? How do you assert, without making any interpretation about the experience of pain, that it is not reducible to physical processes?

Again, only if you really believe there are no (real, i.e. irreducible) subjective experiences, it makes sense to believe introspection does not lead to any reliable knowledge about them.

OK. So convince me. Why do you believe that there are real irreducible subjective experiences? Certainly if you have a valid reason for believing this, you can explain it?

If you don't, it makes no sense. In other words, petitio principii.

So why don't you? Why do you make the a-priori assumption that there is such a thing as irreducibly subjective experiences? What possible logical justification could you have for doing that?


If you are just saying that your dualism is based on an assumption which you cannot logically justify, then we can move on to discussing whether or not that is a reasonable position to hold. If you think that there is some sort of logical justification for the assumption that our experiences are what they seem to be, then please provide it.


Dr. Stupid

 

[69dodge]

Re: "Subjective experience" as a concept in memory

Originally posted by Titus Rivas
The problem would be of course that the added information "subjective experience" would be what is supposed to be represented in the first place in a metasubjective concept.
In other words, the point is precisely that the concept referred to in a hypothetical note, must already be part of memory itself. Otherwise the note could never refer to a concept of subjective experiences and simply wouldn't make any sense.

You appear to insist that a representation be identical to the original. That doesn't seem reasonable to me. If it were identical, we'd call it a copy not a representation. It is enough that we be able to recreate the original from the representation.

If I emailed you a computer sound file, with the intention that it represent the encoded sound, I don't have to include in the email a note that says, "this file represents the sound that results when you double-click on it." My note can simply say, "this file represents whatever it is that results when you double-click on it." Would such an email not qualify as a representation of the sound, even though it doesn't explicitly refer to sound?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Relevant characteristics

69dodge,

Would such an email not qualify as a representation of the sound, even though it doesn't explicitly refer to sound?

no, it wouldn't as (again) you could never have an idea of the sound which would be produced unless you already have a representation of it in your memory. You could never remember the sound produced. Whereas in general it certainly is necessary to recall what we mean by subjective experiences so that we can think and talk about them.

I wasn't referring to "photographic" (for lack of a better word) representations which would be exact copies of original, but to conceptual representations which would at least contain abstractions of the main relevant characteristics of subjective experiences. Characteristics which would define those experiences so that we can explicitly refer to them without referring to another category.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Exhausted

Well, Dr. Stupid,

Just one more time:

I start from the perfectly rational idea that we have subjective experiences and that we know through introspection that we have these experiences.

It's a common practice of the eliminative materialist to claim that definitions of subjective experiences and introspection are circular, because they would "just refer to each other". However, these concepts obviously do not just refer to each other, but primarily to our real subjective experiences. You may of course continue to deny this essential point, but please don't ask me to regard that as rational.

I've given my reasons for considering subjective experiences irreducible, so please don't ask me to do it again. My paper Kant's Error certainly offers you enough information and justification.

Add anything you like, as I've had my say I guess.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[69dodge]

Re: Relevant characteristics

Originally posted by Titus Rivas
no, it wouldn't as (again) you could never have an idea of the sound which would be produced unless you already have a representation of it in your memory.

The computer file and its encoded sound are just an analogy. In the analogy, "sound" means the physical waves in the air, not the subjective experience of hearing them. I claim that, even though a computer file is very different from sound waves, the file should be considered a representation of the sound waves because I can recreate the sound waves from the file. Analogously, a certain pattern in my brain should be considered a representation of a subjective experience if that pattern can somehow be used to recreate the experience.

Whereas in general it certainly is necessary to recall what we mean by subjective experiences so that we can think and talk about them.

Yes, but perhaps the process of recalling a memory is analogous to playing the file, rather than simply examining its contents.

When I hear you say "red," for example, I do not look the word up in a sort of mental dictionary and merely read the "definition." The "definition" is a brain process that occurs, with the result that, upon hearing the word "red," I relive to some extent the experience of seeing red.

I think this would be sufficient to allow thinking and talking about subjective experiences without the need for anything non-physical to store memories of those experiences. If my brain can at any time recreate an experience from physical patterns that it stores, there is no need for the experience to be stored anywhere else as an experience. (What would that even mean? What is a stored experience without anyone who is currently experiencing it? How can it be subjective in the absence of a subject?)

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Re: Hi Kevin

What I meant by these words is that though some agree that subjective experiences appear to exist as such (i.e. not as anything else), they claim that subjective experiences ARE not really what they seem.

In a certain sense nothing is what it seems, since our eyes and ears can't resolve individual atoms and electromagnetic waves. In the same way our sense of introspection can't resolve individual neurotransmitters, neuron firings and whatnot.

I still think the simplest story is that our perceptions are brain states, and our perceptions about our perceptions and so on (metathingies and metametathingies) are also brain states.

We just happen to have brains that can check up on what they are doing, in roughly the same way that a computer can monitor its internal processes.

Well, I've said so several before on this thread but as it is so long already, let me repeat my main points. Subjective experiences ARE (they don't just SEEM) subjective, i.e. they can't be observed via any other means than through introspection.

If they could, though, you'd admit you were wrong? Would that be right?

So just to make everything crystal clear, one of your main points is that subjective experiences cannot be observed except through introspection?

Okay. Here's a thought experiment. I am an alien with sufficiently advanced technology. I put you in a blank room and I make a copy of you, perfect down to the quark level, which I put in an identical blank room.

I show the original you a rose. You smell it, touch it, fiddle with it, everything. I record what goes on in your brain and bloodstream and glands, with quark-level accuracy, using my alien scanning widget.

Then I use my alien action-at-a-distance widget to cause the exact same brain events, again replicated at the quark level, in the copy of you I made. I, the alien, know there is no rose but I fiddle your copy's brain states so it has exactly the same experiences as the original did.

I can't see why your copy wouldn't then have an identical set of subjective experiences, and be as convinced as you are that they had handled a rose. Unless that thought experiment has something drastically wrong with it, your story has something wrong with it.

Specifically, that you are confusing a technical problem (we can't read minds yet) with a fundamental philosophical problem - you think that minds cannot be read even in theory because something spooky is afoot with them.

Then they are qualitative in a sense which also implies they are non-quantifiable.

I can't quantify the number of atoms in a peach just by looking at it. That doesn't mean that the number of atoms in a peach is irreducibly unquantifiable. In the same way, the fact that we cannot quantify the atoms involved in a given brain state yet doesn't make it irreducibly unquantifiable.

Both intrinsic subjectivity and intrinsic non-quantifiability are at odds with (the dominant) materialistic definitions of physical reality. Therefore subjective experiences can't be considered physical by such definitions.

This doesn't follow unless you accept the first sentence without sufficient evidence.

My view of a rock is subjective and unquantifiable. This simply doesn't mean that there is not an objective rock out there that we could exhaustively quantify in terms of atoms and energy. In the same way the fact that my introspection gives me reports which are subjective and unquantifiable in no way means that there is not a brain state underneath it all that we could exhaustively quantify in terms of atoms and energy.

Introspection is just another sense, like touch or smell. It gives us useful reports, but it isn't perfect and it doesn't accurately represent reality at the atomic level. Why should we presume that it alone of our senses gives us access to an otherwise inaccessible, supernatural realm? It just seems a bit silly.

Cheers,

Kevin Lowe.