A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Suggestologist]

Re: Metasubjective

Suggestologist:
My point was of course that this type of metacognition is special as it involves cognition about subjectivity and thus cognition about non-quantifiable, irreducible subjective experiences. Cognition about non-physical experiences that is.

Titus

I agree that they are cognitions about subjectivity and thus cognitions about non-quantifiable, irreducibly subjective experiences. You wouldn't say that meta-meta-subjective experience (subjective experience about meta-subjective experience) requires a second tier of consciousness separate from meta-cognition, would you? So how does meta-subjective experience require a different tier of existence from simple subjective experience?

 

[Suggestologist]

Hmmm...If seems = is...I can work with that; in fact, it explains quite a bit. But...I looked over the sea of faces at the county fair and saw an 8 foot tall child. Saw him clearly. Rubbed my eyes and looked again, because I could not believe it. Saw a child on his father's shoulders. Now, since I responded to the 8-footer in a manner correspondent to his height, I can see the argument that, functionally, the 8-foot child was real. I responded to him differently a moment later; obviously, the child had changed. My "seems" had changed; my "is" changed. I can actually understand this.

But I cannot claim it works according to natural law. If my reality can change before my very eyes, and in non-trivial ways, trying to apply natural laws would be like Newton trying to describe bodies in motion with a gravity that only worked sometimes.

I can easily explain away my illusion if I assume a material real world and imperfect senses...but that would violate "seems = is".

I could be completely wrong, but this "seemed" (to me) to be a simpe idea. The "8-foot tall child" was your REAL subjective experience from what you saw and from what you thought about what you saw. Your subjective experience WAS your REAL subjective experience. Why must a subjective experience coincide with whatever the physical reality "IS"?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Identifying the source of confusion

Especially for Paul, but probably interesting for other posters as well:

Ontological reduction is the theoretical reduction of one part of reality to what is naively conceived of as another part of reality.

In the case of the reduction of chemistry to physics, or of physiology to chemistry and physics, we see that the reduction really concerns the regularities of the processes taking place in the domain concerned. For example, chemical laws can be understood as special instances of physical laws and therefore chemistry can be reduced to physics. Similarly physiological laws can be understood as special instances of chemical and physical laws and therefore physiology can be reduced to chemistry and physics.

The reason why this type of reduction concerns laws rather than substance, is that the general underlying ontology states that the substance is one an the same in all of these cases, namely the physical world or matter. The generally assumed difference between biology and physics is not that one would be non-physical and the other physical, but that the first is clearly governed by more complex laws than the second.
The battle between reductionists and holists in this field concerns the question whether the laws governing biology can be reduced to physical laws or not. Holists claim that biological laws are radically different from physical laws rather than simply special, complex manifestations of them.

However, there is a second battle in theoretical biology, and that is the battle between reductionism and vitalism. Vitalism differs from holism in that it claims that biology is irreducible to physics, not primarily because of irreducible laws, but first of all because biology is about a different substance than physics, namely life (Latin: vita). Life would not just be a special manifestation of matter.

Similarly, in the philosophy of mind we find two battles which involve reductionism:
- Reductionism versus Holism. So far, there have been no proponents of holism in this thread. Holists, such as Roger Sperry, claim that the mind -though completely physical- functions according to special higher level laws which cannot be reduced to physiology.
- Reductionism versus Dualism. This is the battle of which I'm one of the main participants here.

(Idealism is a third position which is not so much a battle against reductionism but rather rejects the category of matter as irreducible to mind)

The question central to the reductionism vs. dualism debate concerning qualia is primarily one about substance, not about reducibility of the laws that govern the mind to physiology. In other words, we don't ask ourselves if consciousness can be said to function according to the laws we already know from physiology, but if consciousness IS really something different from the brain. So the causes of consciousness is not our primary concern, but the question whether consciousness can be regarded as a physical phenomenon. To answer this question it is not enough to state that mental laws can in principle be reduced to physiological laws. That would be begging the question, as you would just assume that the mind is nothing but the brain. Whereas the dualist position is that it is not, and that we have every reason to believe it is not and no reason to believe that it is.

I truly hope this helps.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Getting technical

Suggestologist:

You wouldn't say that meta-meta-subjective experience (subjective experience about meta-subjective experience) requires a second tier of consciousness separate from meta-cognition, would you? So how does meta-subjective experience require a different tier of existence from simple subjective experience?

You'd be right if you were talking exclusively about conscious metasubjective cognition or as you call it "metasubjective experience". However, metasubjective cognition comprises both subjective cognitive experiences about consciousness and non-conscious cognitive representations and processes (working on those representations) about consciousness. My point is that these representations and processes, i.e. instances of metasubjective cognition which are not conscious while they take place, must be part of a non-physical mind, as they concern representations of irreducible experiences which can't be implemented in the brain (as they involve non-quantifiable concepts).

Thank you for inviting me to such a technical post

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Elements

Loki,

No, I'm not confusing them - your getting ahead of me.

Sorry, I think I was getting confused because of all the confusion

I simply want to know what you think the "causes" are for the "effect" of "experiencing red"? Are they purely physical? Or is there a non-physical causal agent as well?

That actually is a good question. The answer depends on whether you believe, like Karl Popper, that mind is an irreducible emergent ontological domain that is created by the brain, though it radically differs from the latter and even controls it to a large extent. Or whether you're a classical or Neo-Cartesian substantialist dualist like myself. I personally don't buy the idea that the brain can by itself create something so utterly different from physical reality as subjective experiences. I would only buy emergence if it could take place within physical reality. As it can't, ascribing the creation of mind to the brain, is like venerating an intrinsically mindless creator who'd create consciousness ex nihilo (rather than within the physical world). Creation ex nihilo is even problematic for a non-physical God let alone for a hypothetical physical one with no non-physical properties or (real) supernatural powers.

If I were able to take the physical causes that are responsible for me "experiencing red" and reproduce them 100% inside your head, do you believe that you would "experience red" identically to me?

Yes, I do, because I believe in common interactional laws that govern brain-mind interactions similarly in all human beings (eventhough the laws may not be so simple as is sometimes believed; see e.g. the cases of hydrocephalic patients studied by John Lorber).
So I believe I would experience red identically to you by analogy.
However, I must stress again that the brain could only create a similar sensation of redness in 'someone' if the brain is animated by a substantial self in the first place. So again, it is not the brain alone which creates the redness, but also the laws governing the psychical nature of the self, which is a necessary element along with the brain processes to create the subjective sensory experience of red.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Suggestologist]

Re: Getting technical

Suggestologist:

You'd be right if you were talking exclusively about conscious metasubjective cognition or as you call it "metasubjective experience". However, metasubjective cognition comprises both subjective cognitive experiences about consciousness and non-conscious cognitive representations and processes (working on those representations) about consciousness. My point is that these representations and processes, i.e. instances of metasubjective cognition which are not conscious while they take place, must be part of a non-physical mind, as they concern representations of irreducible experiences which can't be implemented in the brain (as they involve non-quantifiable concepts).

Thank you for inviting me to such a technical post

Titus

You're saying that subconscious processes and representations can't exist in the physical brain because they involve non-quantifiable concepts. The brain can't store them because they are purely subjective.

But isn't that like saying that a computer can't store sound, because it's not composed of sound waves? A computer can store the data and program that will produce sound, when properly connected (both logically and physically) to speakers.

So why couldn't a brain store the sensory patterns that can produce feelings similar to the feelings originally presented by the "world" -- when played back on the person's logical [meaning: cognitively mapped back to the locations where the sensations were originally sensed] body?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Another good question

Suggestologist,

But isn't that like saying that a computer can't store sound, because it's not composed of sound waves? A computer can store the data and program that will produce sound, when properly connected (both logically and physically) to speakers.

Another good question, thank you

The point I'm making is not that the brain could not possibly store the physical patterns that gave rise to certain subjective experiences and reactivate them later on, from physical memory, so that they will produce (the same or very similar) subjective experiences.
The point I'm making is one level more complex. I'm not talking about storage of the patterns necessary to give rise to subjective experiences, but of patterns of subjective experiences themselves. This may at first seem an unimportant nuance, but it is not.
What I'm talking about is that we have metasubjective concepts, i.e. concepts that represent subjectivity as it is as an irreducible category or domain within reality. These concepts can't just be representations of physical patterns that give rise to subjectivity, as that would make it impossible to distinguish between concepts of physical patterns that give rise to subjectivity and concepts of subjectivity itself. We can distinguish between physical patterns that may give rise to subjective experiences and those subjective experiences themselves, which means they must be separately stored in our conceptual memory. In such a way that we know what distinguishes one concept from the other. This distinction must be there even if the metasubjective concepts aren't activated consciously, as otherwise the distinction would be absent in consciousness itself. We don't make the distinction from scratch every time we're talking about consciousness, because if we did, we would never have discussions about it. The label 'consciousnes' would lose its meaning without a steady content in memory.

I hope that is explicit enough.

I consider metasubjective cognition as the key to the rehabilitation of the concept of asubstantial soul, as it shows that there is a non-physical memory and non-physical cognition, both consciously and non-consciously. This also has great consequences for axiology and our dignity, and should be seen as a bridge between cognitive psychology and humanist psychology and also as a bridge between psychology and parapsychology.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Suggestologist,

That depends on whether by "behaviorism" you are including all physical activity associated with the person in question (including their brain activity, and the activity of any physical processes interacting with their brain). If so, then yes.


Titus,

Just one last thing, since it is quite clear you have no interest in discussing this with me anymore. Why do you think that introspection gives us perfect knowledge about the nature of our experiences?

It seems to me that your entire position rests on the assumption that not only do experiences exist, but that they are exactly what they seem to be. And you further define "what they seem to be" to be our knowledge of them through introspection.

But isn't introspection just our own intuitive interpretation of our experiences? Why should we assume that this intuitive interpretation of our experiences accurately represents what experiences really are? And if they do not, then clearly we cannot claim that "subjective experiences" (defined by you to be what our experiences seem to be), actually exist at all.

Do you agree that this is at least possible? If so, isn't it clearly a far more parsimonious position, in light of all of the available reliable evidence, than too assume that our intuitive interpretations of our experiences are correct?


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

Introspection as the only road to direct knowledge of subjective experiences

Dr. Stupid,

First of all, it's not a matter of not being interested in discussing with you, at most of not being interested in discussing this particular subject with you.

But isn't introspection just our own intuitive interpretation of our experiences? Why should we assume that this intuitive interpretation of our experiences accurately represents what experiences really are? And if they do not, then clearly we cannot claim that "subjective experiences" (defined by you to be what our experiences seem to be), actually exist at all.

You would be right, yes, that if introspection is purely an intuitive, (completely) fallible interpretation of our experiences, it could be false. However, I clearly don't consider introspection merely an intuitive interpretation of our experiences.

We should distinguish between introspection in the sense of the direct observation of our subjective experiences, and introspective reports.
Introspection (and its twin brother retrospection) is the only road we can walk to get directly in touch with our own subjective experiences. The only way to discount EVERYTHING we know about consciousness through introspection is to deny that we really have subjective, qualitative experiences.
Introspective reports (and thus the use of the introspective method) may be fallible and inaccurate. But introspection in the strictly private, unreported sense is not. Precisely because it is not primarily a method of interpretation but of observing our own subjectivity.
For example, when in (subjective) pain, we don't need any interpretation to know that we're undergoing a painful feeling, regardless of how we interpret the feeling or of how we label it. We just know we hurt.

Again, only if you really believe there are no (real, i.e. irreducible) subjective experiences, it makes sense to believe introspection does not lead to any reliable knowledge about them.
If you don't, it makes no sense. In other words, petitio principii.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
Titus would experince red simultaneously out of both bodies.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Loki
No, he wouldn't, since under materialism *by definition* two bodies means two consciousnesses. Even if for some instant in time they are identical, they remain individual.

Why or how does this follow by definition?? I would say that materialism entails that they can only be one mind for a particular given physical state.

I intend to start a thread about this in R&P in the near future. So maybe we could discuss it there rather than here?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Identifying the source of confusion

Especially for Paul, but probably interesting for other posters as well:

Ontological reduction is the theoretical reduction of one part of reality to what is naively conceived of as another part of reality.

In the case of the reduction of chemistry to physics, or of physiology to chemistry and physics, we see that the reduction really concerns the regularities of the processes taking place in the domain concerned. For example, chemical laws can be understood as special instances of physical laws and therefore chemistry can be reduced to physics. Similarly physiological laws can be understood as special instances of chemical and physical laws and therefore physiology can be reduced to chemistry and physics.

The reason why this type of reduction concerns laws rather than substance, is that the general underlying ontology states that the substance is one an the same in all of these cases, namely the physical world or matter. The generally assumed difference between biology and physics is not that one would be non-physical and the other physical, but that the first is clearly governed by more complex laws than the second.
The battle between reductionists and holists in this field concerns the question whether the laws governing biology can be reduced to physical laws or not. Holists claim that biological laws are radically different from physical laws rather than simply special, complex manifestations of them.

However, there is a second battle in theoretical biology, and that is the battle between reductionism and vitalism. Vitalism differs from holism in that it claims that biology is irreducible to physics, not primarily because of irreducible laws, but first of all because biology is about a different substance than physics, namely life (Latin: vita). Life would not just be a special manifestation of matter.

Similarly, in the philosophy of mind we find two battles which involve reductionism:
- Reductionism versus Holism. So far, there have been no proponents of holism in this thread. Holists, such as Roger Sperry, claim that the mind -though completely physical- functions according to special higher level laws which cannot be reduced to physiology.
- Reductionism versus Dualism. This is the battle of which I'm one of the main participants here.

(Idealism is a third position which is not so much a battle against reductionism but rather rejects the category of matter as irreducible to mind)

The question central to the reductionism vs. dualism debate concerning qualia is primarily one about substance, not about reducibility of the laws that govern the mind to physiology. In other words, we don't ask ourselves if consciousness can be said to function according to the laws we already know from physiology, but if consciousness IS really something different from the brain. So the causes of consciousness is not our primary concern, but the question whether consciousness can be regarded as a physical phenomenon. To answer this question it is not enough to state that mental laws can in principle be reduced to physiological laws. That would be begging the question, as you would just assume that the mind is nothing but the brain. Whereas the dualist position is that it is not, and that we have every reason to believe it is not and no reason to believe that it is.

I truly hope this helps.

Titus

Yes, I thought it was a very interesting post and you explained the underlying issues extremely well.

 

[slimshady2357]

Introspective reports (and thus the use of the introspective method) may be fallible and inaccurate. But introspection in the strictly private, unreported sense is not. Precisely because it is not primarily a method of interpretation but of observing our own subjectivity.
For example, when in (subjective) pain, we don't need any interpretation to know that we're undergoing a painful feeling, regardless of how we interpret the feeling or of how we label it. We just know we hurt.

Titus,
How about 'experiencing' instead of 'observing' above?

Anyway, good couple of last posts.

Adam

 

[Loki]

Ian,

I intend to start a thread about this in R&P in the near future. So maybe we could discuss it there rather than here?

I'm not sure there's all that much to say that wasn't covered 12 months ago - but I'll keep an eye out for the thread and we can try again I suppose...

 

[BillHoyt]

However, there is a second battle in theoretical biology, and that is the battle between reductionism and vitalism. Vitalism differs from holism in that it claims that biology is irreducible to physics, not primarily because of irreducible laws, but first of all because biology is about a different substance than physics, namely life (Latin: vita). Life would not just be a special manifestation of matter.

Provide five citations from peer-reviewed theoretical biology or theoretical biophysics or mathematical biology journals demonstrating the modern-day existence of this battle.

Cheers,

 

[Mercutio]

I could be completely wrong, but this "seemed" (to me) to be a simpe idea. The "8-foot tall child" was your REAL subjective experience from what you saw and from what you thought about what you saw. Your subjective experience WAS your REAL subjective experience. Why must a subjective experience coincide with whatever the physical reality "IS"?

But that was precisely my point. My subjective reality is not consistent--that is absolutely no problem with a subjective reality. The kid was 8 feet tall, then he wasn't; no big deal. The only problem with it arises when we say that it follows natural laws...even Titus says:

What had changed was purely the way you experienced the child, not the child itself. But this is another question, namely changes within subjectivity. A valid topic of course, but a different one.

If seems = is, it makes no difference whether the child changed or not, my experience did--in fact, we cannot even (unless I am really misunderstanding) infer that the child has not changed. At least, not without assuming a constant real world and imperfect perception of it, which violates seems = is. So...can we, in fact, trust our "seems"?

We should distinguish between introspection in the sense of the direct observation of our subjective experiences, and introspective reports.
Introspection (and its twin brother retrospection) is the only road we can walk to get directly in touch with our own subjective experiences. The only way to discount EVERYTHING we know about consciousness through introspection is to deny that we really have subjective, qualitative experiences.
Introspective reports (and thus the use of the introspective method) may be fallible and inaccurate. But introspection in the strictly private, unreported sense is not. Precisely because it is not primarily a method of interpretation but of observing our own subjectivity.

So, my interpretation of the 8-foot kid...when it was just my own perception...was that introspection, or introspective report? If the first, it was accurate (apparantly), but if I was reporting to myself, it may have been faulty (?)...so how do I know when I am introspecting and when I am introspectively reporting?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Ontological reduction is the theoretical reduction of one part of reality to what is naively conceived of as another part of reality.

Really? Each part of reality is a separate ontological existent?

The reason why this type of reduction concerns laws rather than substance, is that the general underlying ontology states that the substance is one an the same in all of these cases, namely the physical world or matter.

Then I wouldn't call it ontological reduction, but perhaps my definition of ontology is too limited.

The battle between reductionists and holists in this field concerns the question whether the laws governing biology can be reduced to physical laws or not. Holists claim that biological laws are radically different from physical laws rather than simply special, complex manifestations of them.

Wow, I didn't even realize there was a battle going on there.

However, there is a second battle in theoretical biology, and that is the battle between reductionism and vitalism.

That one is dead and buried, no?

To answer this question it is not enough to state that mental laws can in principle be reduced to physiological laws. That would be begging the question, as you would just assume that the mind is nothing but the brain. Whereas the dualist position is that it is not, and that we have every reason to believe it is not and no reason to believe that it is.

I'm not sure how begging the question is relevant here. If the first statement is begging the question, then so is your last statement. And we have lots of reasons to believe that the mind is a brain function. Most importantly, we have argued that your kind of mind must be supernatural, since you insist that science isn't going to understand it.

I also don't understand your insistence that certain types of cognition are "nonquantifiable." What does that mean, exactly? Are you claiming to understand all possible ways that the brain might represent things? And if these things cannot be represented in the brain, why can they be represented in the mind?

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Why or how does this follow by definition?? I would say that materialism entails that they can only be one mind for a particular given physical state.

If I make two cars, identical to the quark, there are still two cars, not one. If the "mind" arises through the working of the physical brain, two physically identical brains will give rise to two identical minds. Of course, they will not remain identical. Since they will, by definition, have separate input from the time of their creation (even Zaphod's two heads looked in different directions--it is literally impossible for two sets of eyes to have the exact same view, since they don't occupy the same space), they will of course diverge from being identical. How much, of course, is a matter of conjecture (as is the entire question, of course), and materialists would say that the amount of difference will be determined by how dissimilar their experiences are after the time of identical creation.

In your "only one mind for a particular given physical state" explanation, you are re-inserting your own definition of mind, not the materialist's. As the materialist believes (in this thread, I am tempted to use the word "recognizes") that the processes we label "mind" arise purely through the workings of that particular body, the "mind" is inseparable from that body. Thus, 2 identical bodies = 2 identical minds.

 

[BillHoyt]

Yes, I do, because I believe in common interactional laws that govern brain-mind interactions similarly in all human beings (eventhough the laws may not be so simple as is sometimes believed; see e.g. the cases of hydrocephalic patients studied by John Lorber).

Please clarify this comment. I presume you are discussing his extreme hydrocephalus cases. What are you claiming about Lorber's conclusions?

Cheers,

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Mercutio said:

If seems = is, it makes no difference whether the child changed or not, my experience did--in fact, we cannot even (unless I am really misunderstanding) infer that the child has not changed. At least, not without assuming a constant real world and imperfect perception of it, which violates seems = is. So...can we, in fact, trust our "seems"?

I think Titus meant that "seems" = "is" for internal subjective experiences: However my pain feels, that's how my pain is. I don't think he meant that equality to apply to external sensory experiences. I'm still not sure why that equality is interesting.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

The only way to discount EVERYTHING we know about consciousness through introspection is to deny that we really have {irreducible} subjective, qualitative experiences.

I think this is the heart of the matter. I simply cannot grok why you think irreducible subjective experiences are required to explain our introspections. I guess you think it not possible that the brain could observe, evaluate, and have feelings about its own processing.

~~ Paul