A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[BillHoyt]

Love to contribute guys, but I'm absolutely cream crackered.

Bill Ho, unless you can say anything constructive then kindly p*ss off.

The last I heard, challenging extraordinary claims was part and parcel of JREF m.o. Did you perhaps mistake this for the defunct Survival Nonsense board?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Bill, calm down, man.

Ian, stop eating those crackers!

Titus said:

Then, you appear to use the word seem in the exclusive sense of "just seem, but really aren't". This may be due to the fact that English is not my native language, but I used the words seem and appear in a neutral sense of "seem, but thereby it isn't clear if they are or aren't".

That is a fine way to use those words. But then you say that subjective experience is irreducible.

Perhaps you're trying to say that, in the domain of subjective experience, "seem" = "is", because, after all, my subjective experience just is the way things seem to me.

But none of this means that subjective experience isn't a product of brain function.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

The last I heard, challenging extraordinary claims was part and parcel of JREF m.o. Did you perhaps mistake this for the defunct Survival Nonsense board?

Politeness and respect doesn't cost anything.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Causes and effects

Paul,

Perhaps you're trying to say that, in the domain of subjective experience, "seem" = "is", because, after all, my subjective experience just is the way things seem to me.

You've really got it! My compliments!

But none of this means that subjective experience isn't a product of brain function.

and

That is a fine way to use those words. But then you say that subjective experience is irreducible

Oh, it seems I was rejoicing a bit too soon You're still confusing cause and effects. The question of what subjective experiences really are, isn't identical to the question of what causes subjective experiences. For example, take this hypothetical case on which I expect we will agree. Someone is having a particular nasty migraine attack. He loses part of his visual phenomenal field, feels a hellish pain in his head and feels like vomiting. Now, it's quite (at least if we accept the existence of a physical world, so this wouldn't go for idealists) certain that it's a particular kind of dysfunctional brain processes which causes all of these subjective symptoms. However, it's absurd to claim that these subjective symptoms really ARE the dysfunctional brain processes themselves, just as much as it would be to claim that the dysfunctional brain processes really ARE the subjective symptoms. Let's see if that will do the trick for you.

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Oh, it seems I was rejoicing a bit too soon You're still confusing cause and effects. The question of what subjective experiences really are, isn't identical to the question of what causes subjective experiences. For example, take this hypothetical case on which I expect we will agree. Someone is having a particular nasty migraine attack. He loses part of his visual phenomenal field, feels a hellish pain in his head and feels like vomiting. Now, it's quite (at least if we accept the existence of a physical world, so this wouldn't go for idealists) certain that it's a particular kind of dysfunctional brain processes which causes all of these subjective symptoms. However, it's absurd to claim that these subjective symptoms really ARE the dysfunctional brain processes themselves, just as much as it would be to claim that the dysfunctional brain processes really ARE the subjective symptoms. Let's see if that will do the trick for you.

Nope, sorry.

Let's consider this particular scenario. Some of the aspects of the symptoms are "purely physical." For example, if I can't see part of my visual field, or if I throw up. Other aspects are more subjective, such as the pain or the feeling that I'm going to throw up. In neither case do I see any reason to suppose that the totality of the symptoms can't be a result of brain processes. And I am acknowledging that the subjective symptoms are what they "seem to me," which may be different from the way they seem to another sufferer. Just like the affects of the migraine on my visual field or stomach.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Hmmm...If seems = is...I can work with that; in fact, it explains quite a bit. But...I looked over the sea of faces at the county fair and saw an 8 foot tall child. Saw him clearly. Rubbed my eyes and looked again, because I could not believe it. Saw a child on his father's shoulders. Now, since I responded to the 8-footer in a manner correspondent to his height, I can see the argument that, functionally, the 8-foot child was real. I responded to him differently a moment later; obviously, the child had changed. My "seems" had changed; my "is" changed. I can actually understand this.

But I cannot claim it works according to natural law. If my reality can change before my very eyes, and in non-trivial ways, trying to apply natural laws would be like Newton trying to describe bodies in motion with a gravity that only worked sometimes.

I can easily explain away my illusion if I assume a material real world and imperfect senses...but that would violate "seems = is".

 

[Titus Rivas]

Paul & Mercutio

Paul,

Some of the aspects of the symptoms are "purely physical." For example, if I can't see part of my visual field, or if I throw up.

I was obviously referring to the purely subjective symptoms.

In neither case do I see any reason to suppose that the totality of the symptoms can't be a result of brain processes.

Again, that's not the issue we were discussing (it's the causes-effects confusion I've repeatedly alluded to).

Mercutio,

Now, since I responded to the 8-footer in a manner correspondent to his height, I can see the argument that, functionally, the 8-foot child was real. I responded to him differently a moment later; obviously, the child had changed. My "seems" had changed; my "is" changed. I can actually understand this.

What had changed was purely the way you experienced the child, not the child itself. But this is another question, namely changes within subjectivity. A valid topic of course, but a different one.

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Again, that's not the issue we were discussing (it's the causes-effects confusion I've repeatedly alluded to).

You gotta 'splain that confusion, brother!

~~ Paul

 

[Loki]

Titus Rivas,

Subjective experiences ARE (they don't just SEEM) subjective, i.e. they can't be observed via any other means than through introspection.

You mean that *my* experience of "red" is and will always be only available to me? At some time in the future science may be able to monitor my brain and say "he's currently experiencing 'red'", but it won't be able to describe what that "red experience" is?

Assume at some stage in the future a clever Dutch scientist invents the "Brain Shaper (tm)". We take a reading from your brain while you are "experiencing red" and using this device we place my brain into *exactly* the same physical state as yours. Would I then "experience red" *exactly* as you did? I understand that we can never *prove* that I did have the identical experience - that's really your whole point, that there is *no way* that a third person can say "yes, Titus and Loki just had the identical experience". I concede that, even while I say that I believe we would have the same identical experience. My question is - do you think we'd have the identical experience? If so, then in what sense is this non-physical (even though it's clearly subjective)? If not, then what caused the difference?

Then they [subjective experiences]are qualitative in a sense which also implies they are non-quantifiable.

Not sure I can see this - they are certainly quantifiable *to me*.
It seems entirely possible to me that eventually we will have sufficient knowledge of the brain's workings to enable us to invent a machine that can induce "pain" or "pleasure" on demand, and via a scale of intensity. If such qualia are inherently unquantifiable then how would this be possible?

Both intrinsic subjectivity and intrinsic non-quantifiability are at odds with (the dominant) materialistic definitions of physical reality.

Well, perhaps I simply disagree on the definition of "subjective". Rather than defining it as "non-physical" or "irreducible" I see it as similar to "momentum" or "heat" - a label/concept applied to a particular (physical) process that describes that process in terms relative to a different framework. "Subjective" isn't incompatible with materialism, it's simply a different perspective on (certain parts) of physical reality.

Therefore subjective experiences can't be considered physical by such definitions.

If I accepted your definitions, this would be correct of course. But the point is I feel your definitions are deliberately cast to make such a conclusion inevitable.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Knowing subjectivity

Loki:
Dancing David,
I'm not sure I understand your question. I brought it up, because if Stimpson is right there would be no fundamental difference between the information about consciousness you can get through introspection and other information about consciousness gained through external means, e.g. by studying the brain. I am saying of course that the difference is very fundamental.

I would say that the only difference is that the person reporting the introspective data, might be unable to label the experience, or that they may misrepresent the experience. So how is talking about an internal experience nessecarily different from the experience?
Well, thank you very much, that's actually very nice of you.
I didn't feel chased away ( not by 90% of the skeptics on this thread anyway ) but I think I've pretty much shared what I had to say about this topic. I may just be too impatient for Sisyphus-like repetitions.


Best wishes,

Titus

I think that the frustration lies in the fact that you do know the material that you are discussing and that you have come to embrace certain beliefs about that material, and come to conclusions about it. Then when we read your posts our maps are not in agreement. We all have to discuss the basis of our beliefs, which may seem like a struggle, but remember some of us struggle the same way to even comprehend the immaterial view.

Peace

 

[Interesting Ian]

Assume at some stage in the future a clever Dutch scientist invents the "Brain Shaper (tm)". We take a reading from your brain while you are "experiencing red" and using this device we place my brain into *exactly* the same physical state as yours. Would I then "experience red" *exactly* as you did?

If we assume the correctness of materialism you would no longer exist. "You" would be Titus. Titus would experince red simultaneously out of both bodies.

 

[Suggestologist]

Re: The puppetmaster

I really mean that the brain does not have any information about "what the feeling of consciousness is like".

Is consciousness a feeling?

 

[Suggestologist]

Re: Interaction

Not quite, Mercutio, my claim is that the concepts and cognition based on the basis of introspection can't be cerebral either, as they involve non-physical phenomena. If we accept that certain phenomena can't be described in purely quantitative terms, this has clear implications for representations of those phenomena. Metasubjective cognition can't be purely quantitative and therefore it can't take place in the brain.

Metacognition differs from cognition -- only in the subject of cognition, not in location - but it often differs in intramental point of view.

 

[Loki]

Ian,

If we assume the correctness of materialism you would no longer exist. "You" would be Titus.

Yes, and nice of you to side step the question and point out the bleeding obvious.

But what would *you* expect to happen under your Idealism? Obviously you'd expect you to "remain you", rather than "becoming Titus" - but do you think you'd have the same "experience of red" as Titus?

Titus would experince red simultaneously out of both bodies.

No, he wouldn't, since under materialism *by definition* two bodies means two consciousnesses. Even if for some instant in time they are identical, they remain individual.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Suggesto asked:

Is consciousness a feeling?

Good question. Sitting around thinking about "redness" is a feeling, I think, at least in the broad sense of the term. Meditating and calming your mind sometimes results in periods where you know you were not asleep, but otherwise your thoughts were quiet. Everyone in the meditation biz calls that "experience of (more or less) pure consciousness." Seems like a good description to me, but I see no reason to think of it as anything but being awake with fewer than normal thoughts.

~~ Paul

 

[Suggestologist]

Titus,
Then the problem I pointed out is valid. To assert that consciousness, and its interactions with the brain, function according to consistent logical rules, but that those rules cannot be deduced by observing those interactions, is to assert that there are characteristics of consciousness which have no effect, direct or indirect, on your brain. But if such characteristics exist, you cannot possibly know about them, because that would imply that you have knowledge which cannot, in any way, affect your actions.

Are you saying that introspectionism must be reducible to behaviorism?

 

[Titus Rivas]

4 Skeptics

Paul,

You gotta 'splain that confusion, brother!

What more is there to explain?

Suggestologist,

Metacognition differs from cognition -- only in the subject of cognition, not in location - but it often differs in intramental point of view.

Please note that I'm specifically talking about Metasubjective cognition. For more information please search for my posts on this topic.

Dancing David,

hen when we read your posts our maps are not in agreement. We all have to discuss the basis of our beliefs, which may seem like a struggle, but remember some of us struggle the same way to even comprehend the immaterial view.

I acknowledge that, but it doesn't make my own limits any wider

Loki,

You mean that *my* experience of "red" is and will always be only available to me? At some time in the future science may be able to monitor my brain and say "he's currently experiencing 'red'", but it won't be able to describe what that "red experience" is?

Correct.

Assume at some stage in the future a clever Dutch scientist invents the "Brain Shaper (tm)". We take a reading from your brain while you are "experiencing red" and using this device we place my brain into *exactly* the same physical state as yours. Would I then "experience red" *exactly* as you did? I understand that we can never *prove* that I did have the identical experience - that's really your whole point, that there is *no way* that a third person can say "yes, Titus and Loki just had the identical experience".

Not really, it's not primarily my point that we wouldn't know if our experiences would be identical, but WHAT our experiences would be like. We'd never know just by studying our brains as long as we don't have any introspective knowledge of our own consciousness. That's the basis, and it can't be missed. All the rest we know by analogy, not directly.

I concede that, even while I say that I believe we would have the same identical experience. My question is - do you think we'd have the identical experience? If so, then in what sense is this non-physical (even though it's clearly subjective)? If not, then what caused the difference?

Please, when will it sink in that you're confusing cause and effect? Just because similar brain processes would cause similar subjective experiences, we can't possibly conclude that these subjective experiences are really nothing but brain processes. I've said time and again that in order to know whether subjective experiences are non-physical we have to consider subjective experiences themselves and not any brain processes that might give rise to them. I won't go into this very basic error again. Don't take that personally, as you're not the only one who's making this mistake.

via a scale of intensity. If such qualia are inherently unquantifiable then how would this be possible?

You should know already what I meant by quantifiable, namely not that qualia would in principle have no quantifiable dimensions whatsoever, but that they are not totally quantifiable, being qualitative experiences. That's my point: qualities aren't just a special case of quantities, although they certainly can be more or less intense. Another basic error I won't go into anymore.

But the point is I feel your definitions are deliberately cast to make such a conclusion inevitable.

They are not, unless you would like to claim that we can imagine a materialist system which defines matter as something subjective and non-quantifiable.

Titus

 

[Suggestologist]

Re: 4 Skeptics

Suggestologist,
Please note that I'm specifically talking about Metasubjective cognition. For more information please search for my posts on this topic.

That's just a type of metacognition, though.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Metasubjective

Suggestologist:

That's just a type of metacognition, though.

My point was of course that this type of metacognition is special as it involves cognition about subjectivity and thus cognition about non-quantifiable, irreducible subjective experiences. Cognition about non-physical experiences that is.

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus Rivas,

...but WHAT our experiences would be like. We'd never know just by studying our brains as long as we don't have any introspective knowledge of our own consciousness. That's the basis, and it can't be missed. All the rest we know by analogy, not directly.
...
Just because similar brain processes would cause similar subjective experiences, we can't possibly conclude that these subjective experiences are really nothing but brain processes. Please, when will it sink in that you're confusing cause and effect?

No, I'm not confusing them - your getting ahead of me. I simply want to know what you think the "causes" are for the "effect" of "experiencing red"? Are they purely physical? Or is there a non-physical causal agent as well? If I were able to take the physical causes that are responsible for me "experiencing red" and reproduce them 100% inside your head, do you believe that you would "experience red" identically to me?