A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

Just one more time:

I start from the perfectly rational idea that we have subjective experiences and that we know through introspection that we have these experiences.

I know that. What I am asking you is why you start from the position that we have subjective experiences, where you define "subjective" to mean that they are exactly what they seem to be. Why do you start from the position that our experiences are exactly what they seem to be? And why do you consider this to be a rational position?

It's a common practice of the eliminative materialist to claim that definitions of subjective experiences and introspection are circular, because they would "just refer to each other". However, these concepts obviously do not just refer to each other, but primarily to our real subjective experiences.

How can I possibly not consider that circular??? A and B do not just refer to each other, but instead they primarily refer to A? Is that supposed to make sense?

I've given my reasons for considering subjective experiences irreducible, so please don't ask me to do it again. My paper Kant's Error certainly offers you enough information and justification.

Have you? Because I cannot for the life of me find such a reason in anything you have said. The closest thing to a reason I can extract from your posts is that you consider it to be intuitively obvious, but you claim that this is not your reason at all.


Dr. Stupid

 

[hammegk]

Re: Re: Re: Re: The same old tune

Since when did though experiments have to be possible? When Einstein founded his relativity theory based on the thought experiment, 'What would it be like to ride along at the speed of light?', thank god you weren't there to discourage him.

I may be wrong, but as I recall, his thought experiment did not exceed light speed, but approached it as a limit. I.E. TLOP was observed.

 

[ceptimus]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: The same old tune

I may be wrong, but as I recall, his thought experiment did not exceed light speed, but approached it as a limit. I.E. TLOP was observed.

Fair point. I didn't pick the best example. But lots of thought experiments do disobey TLOP don't they, especially the ones used by philosophers?

 

[Loki]

kevin_lowe,

This brings up the question, what reason would you (Titus) give me to make me believe that the scenario is conceptually implausible? Because if the scenario is plausible, even in a very loose sense, then your argument that experience is irreducibly subjective and hence spooky does not work.

That's pretty much what I was trying to say...

 

[Suggestologist]

Re: Re: Relevant characteristics

Yes, but perhaps the process of recalling a memory is analogous to playing the file, rather than simply examining its contents.

Examining its contents is analogous to meta-cognition.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Re: Re: Nothing personal

I have no idea what you could possibly mean by "spooky" in this context. The only think spooky about consciousness, would be if it is not what it appears to be, but is something physical.
This once agian just sidesteps the whole issue of how you can alter your consiousness through anoxia, or alcohol. What is it, something divorced from the brain. Oh, gosh thats rights, I can function when I am alcohol toxic because my consiousness isn't dependant on my brain.

Also Ian, this is when someone should point out that , hey this is the same argument that materialsists use, "it sure looks material" and idealists go "well ofeten intuition is wrong". So you just stepped into the Hammegk Intuition Trap. Sproing.


How impressively stupid you are.
Coming from you I am sure that means alot. Like gee I can't respond to your post so I will show my intelligence by name calling. *********. What an impressive figure you are , I didn't know they could stack **** that high.



I think that in certain areas of philosophy you simply do not have the requisite understanding to mark anyones work.

I think that you are an ***** **** waiting for it's pitiful end, why do you glory so much in name calling? Do you lack strong ego identity? Do you just run out of smarts and start insulting people?

Ah here is the man with integrity. ********.

 

[Suggestologist]

Re: Re: Hi Kevin

So just to make everything crystal clear, one of your main points is that subjective experiences cannot be observed except through introspection?

Okay. Here's a thought experiment. I am an alien with sufficiently advanced technology. I put you in a blank room and I make a copy of you, perfect down to the quark level, which I put in an identical blank room.

I show the original you a rose. You smell it, touch it, fiddle with it, everything. I record what goes on in your brain and bloodstream and glands, with quark-level accuracy, using my alien scanning widget.

Then I use my alien action-at-a-distance widget to cause the exact same brain events, again replicated at the quark level, in the copy of you I made. I, the alien, know there is no rose but I fiddle your copy's brain states so it has exactly the same experiences as the original did.

I can't see why your copy wouldn't then have an identical set of subjective experiences, and be as convinced as you are that they had handled a rose. Unless that thought experiment has something drastically wrong with it, your story has something wrong with it.

Specifically, that you are confusing a technical problem (we can't read minds yet) with a fundamental philosophical problem - you think that minds cannot be read even in theory because something spooky is afoot with them.

The problem is that this experiment uses behaviorism in a way that MUST reduce to introspectionism.

Consider: How do you know that the two experience the SAME thing? The subjective experience(s) are decidedly private; and there is no way to directly compare them. The only way to conclude that they are the "SAME" is from reports by both - of their respective experiences -- and this cannot be suitably controlled for in a scientific experiment.

This is the same problem Stimpson has when I asked him to design a double-blind protocol for a mind-reading machine. You simply cannot escape the fact that it reduces to introspectionism.

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas
Again, that is not enough if what you're doing is precisely examining the contents.

But that's not what I'm doing. When I think about the concept of redness, I do not examine the portion of my brain that contains that concept, in the way that a doctor looking at an X-ray might examine it. Rather, that portion of my brain actively undergoes a process similar to the process that occurs when I actually see a red object. Both processes result in me having subjective experiences.

If you agree to the possibility that certain brain processes invariably do result, according to fixed natural laws, in certain conscious experiences, whatever your explanation is of how that might work, then, it seems to me, you should also agree that a brain structure which enables those processes to occur can be considered to be a representation of those conscious experiences, or, in other words, to embody the concept of those conscious experiences. And, therefore, you cannot argue for the particular explanation involving a non-physical self, based on the claim that brains cannot represent concepts about conscious experiences.

 

[69dodge]

Re: Re: Re: Relevant characteristics

Originally posted by Suggestologist
Examining its contents is analogous to meta-cognition.

I'm not sure what you mean by "meta-cognition."

Examining the contents of the file is analogous to examining our physical brain.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: The same old tune

Since when did though experiments have to be possible? When Einstein founded his relativity theory based on the thought experiment, 'What would it be like to ride along at the speed of light?', thank god you weren't there to discourage him.

No you don't understand. The thought experiment is logically incoherent if we assume materialism to be true. As I keep saying, even if materialism were true you would not create another stream of consciousness, but rather get the one stream of consciousness experiencing out of both bodies. If you did create another stream of consciousness this would entail that the complete physical facts about the brain is insufficient to determine the self, since in principle an infinite number of streams of consciousnesses could be created from the exact same physical configuration. But this directly contradicts what materialism holds.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Inevitable conclusions

69dodge,

If you agree to the possibility that certain brain processes invariably do result, according to fixed natural laws, in certain conscious experiences, whatever your explanation is of how that might work, then, it seems to me, you should also agree that a brain structure which enables those processes to occur can be considered to be a representation of those conscious experiences, or, in other words, to embody the concept of those conscious experiences. And, therefore, you cannot argue for the particular explanation involving a non-physical self, based on the claim that brains cannot represent concepts about conscious experiences.

Again, you've not understood my point. My very last attempt: in order to use the concepts about conscious experiences you absolutely need stored representations of those concepts in memory which cover their characteristics. It is not enough to have references attached to brain processes. Is this really so hard to understand? Add anything you like, but if it doesn't contain new arguments, you can't expect me to repeat mine.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Reversed logic

BillHoyt,

Thanks for nominating me. The nomination coming from you, I should feel honored.

Titus

He's nominated me also. I feel so proud! BTW Suggestologist, he's nominated you as well LOL

 

[69dodge]

Re: Inevitable conclusions

Originally posted by Titus Rivas
Again, you've not understood my point. My very last attempt: in order to use the concepts about conscious experiences you absolutely need stored representations of those concepts in memory which cover their characteristics. It is not enough to have references attached to brain processes. Is this really so hard to understand?

Apparently.

The essential characteristic of an experience, which you believe any adequate stored representation must cover, is the characteristic of being experienced by someone.

Why must a stored representation cover this explicitly, and furthermore, how could it possibly do so?

I am not, right now, consciously aware of all the memories that are stored in my mind, although I might recall any of them at some future time. So, although they are memories of experiences, they are not currently being experienced by anyone. In what sense can a memory of an experience be said to store the characteristic of being experienced, if most of the time no one is experiencing it? Only in the sense that, when I actually recall the memory, I will reexperience whatever the memory is a memory of. And if brains can store that kind of memory, then why the need for anything else?

I don't care what a memory looks like when I'm not remembering it. That's completely irrelevant. If, when I remember it, it has all the necessary characteristics, what more can I expect of it?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

No you don't understand. The thought experiment is logically incoherent if we assume materialism to be true. As I keep saying, even if materialism were true you would not create another stream of consciousness, but rather get the one stream of consciousness experiencing out of both bodies. If you did create another stream of consciousness this would entail that the complete physical facts about the brain is insufficient to determine the self, since in principle an infinite number of streams of consciousnesses could be created from the exact same physical configuration. But this directly contradicts what materialism holds.

This is just plain wrong. Materialism claims that two different streams of consciousness will be produced. It also claims that at the moment of their production, they will be identical. There is no contradiction. The physical facts about the brain are sufficient to determine the self. Each brain has its own self. Likewise, each of those selves are, at the moment of their creation, identical, just as each of the brains are identical.

As usual, you are confusing materialism with some sort of epiphenomenalism. If consciousness were some sort of non-physical thing, logically entailed by the brain, the maybe you could argue that two identical brains would share the same consciousness. But this is not what materialism claims.

Materialism claims that consciousness is something your brain is doing. Make another exact copy of the brain, and it will be doing the same thing. But they are still different brains, and what they are each doing amount to two different instantiations of the same process.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

Conceptual representation

69dodge,

The problem would occur, as I have said more than once, whenever we're thinking, talking or writing about the concept of subjective experiences. The distinguishing features should be stored in conceptual memory, as we wouldn't be able to work with our concepts if they weren't.

That really should be enough.

Add whatever you like, but don't expect a reply unless you've understood my point.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[slimshady2357]

No you don't understand. The thought experiment is logically incoherent if we assume materialism to be true. As I keep saying, even if materialism were true you would not create another stream of consciousness, but rather get the one stream of consciousness experiencing out of both bodies.

Nope, that sounds more like your 'transmission' theory to me. Materialsim says, make a certain kind of physical construct and processes and you get a consciousness. Have two similiar constructs and processes, get two consciousness'. Hmmm, and have two exactly the same constructs and processes and you get two exact same consciousness'.

It's like your saying that if we had a computer running a hologram simulation and we exactly duplicated the compter we would not have two hologram simulations, we would have two computers running the same single hologram simulation.

If you did create another stream of consciousness this would entail that the complete physical facts about the brain is insufficient to determine the self

Wrong again. It would suggest (read Hammy for why it's not show) that the physical facts are sufficient to determine a self, because we replicated the physical facts and we replicated the self, since there are now two. Only if the physical facts are NOT sufficient to determine the self would you wind up with any scenario where the consciousness is not duplicated (e.g. you get a corpse, or one consciousness seeing out of two pairs of eyes...)

since in principle an infinite number of streams of consciousnesses could be created from the exact same physical configuration. But this directly contradicts what materialism holds.

Um, how?

The infinite number of streams of consciousness', for the instant they have identical complete physical states, are identical themselves. Exactly consistent with materialism, since that's what it would predict

IF and only IF the consciousness' were DIFFERENT in some way would your argument hold. But materialism says they are NOT going to be different. They will diverge and become different, but only as their brain states do, again consistent with materialism.

It amazes me you cannot see this. Is there anyone out there, Titas? Suggestoligist? Franko? anyone? who Ian is more likely to listen to that would like to comment? Anyone who agrees with Ian like to comment?

Adam

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Reversed logic

BillHoyt,

Thanks for nominating me. The nomination coming from you, I should feel honored.

Titus

Any chance you'll marshall evidence to support your bizarre claim about vitalism in theoretical biology? (Not the lame McCarthyesque crap about having unnamed theo. bio. friends.) By Randi's JREF advice, you are free to simply declare that you have none. Or that you refuse to present some.

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Re: Reversed logic

He's nominated me also. I feel so proud! BTW Suggestologist, he's nominated you as well LOL

Suggestologist

Titus

Cheers,

 

[Interesting Ian]

Nope, that sounds more like your 'transmission' theory to me. Materialsim says, make a certain kind of physical construct and processes and you get a consciousness. Have two similiar constructs and processes, get two consciousness'. Hmmm, and have two exactly the same constructs and processes and you get two exact same consciousness'.

It's like your saying that if we had a computer running a hologram simulation and we exactly duplicated the compter we would not have two hologram simulations, we would have two computers running the same single hologram simulation.



Wrong again. It would suggest (read Hammy for why it's not show) that the physical facts are sufficient to determine a self, because we replicated the physical facts and we replicated the self, since there are now two. Only if the physical facts are NOT sufficient to determine the self would you wind up with any scenario where the consciousness is not duplicated (e.g. you get a corpse, or one consciousness seeing out of two pairs of eyes...)




Um, how?

The infinite number of streams of consciousness', for the instant they have identical complete physical states, are identical themselves. Exactly consistent with materialism, since that's what it would predict

IF and only IF the consciousness' were DIFFERENT in some way would your argument hold. But materialism says they are NOT going to be different. They will diverge and become different, but only as their brain states do, again consistent with materialism.

It amazes me you cannot see this. Is there anyone out there, Titas? Suggestoligist? Franko? anyone? who Ian is more likely to listen to that would like to comment? Anyone who agrees with Ian like to comment?

Adam

You're infuriating! I explained all this over a year ago in that staying alive thread! Pity it's gone. I think I may have been arguing about it with Stimp on another thread as well. Can you remember Stimpy? You know, I think I was talking about the replica appearing in an absolutely identical environment. I outargued you comprehensively if you remember?

Adam, before responding to you I'm going to do a search to try and find what I've written on this in the past.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You're infuriating! I explained all this over a year ago in that staying alive thread! Pity it's gone. I think I may have been arguing about it with Stimp on another thread as well. Can you remember Stimpy? You know, I think I was talking about the replica appearing in an absolutely identical environment. I outargued you comprehensively if you remember?

Adam, before responding to you I'm going to do a search to try and find what I've written on this in the past.

Well here is the thread. I'll just copy and paste the relevant bits later on.
http://host.randi.org/vbulletin/sho...8&perpage=40&highlight=duplicate&pagenumber=4