A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Titus Rivas]

Too bad

Well Paul, it's a pity I haven't been able to make it clear to you. I give up.

Thanks anyway.

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus, I think I understand why you think the mind is a separate thing. What I don't understand is how the whole shebang works.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

By now

Paul,

What I don't understand is how the whole shebang works.

You don't give me any reason to ignore you, but I feel I've done quite enough to explain my views.

Titus

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: By now

Paul, You don't give me any reason to ignore you, but I feel I've done quite enough to explain my views.

Titus

Translated from the original Dutch:

Paul, You are the weakest link. Guh-bah.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Paul is not stupid, but I've done enough

Someone said

Translated from the original Dutch. Paul, You are the weakest link. Guh-bah.

I'm not saying Paul is stupid. I just think I've given him enough information about my views. There are other sources of misunderstanding, apart from stupidity. One is conscious dogmatism, another is non-conscious rigidity of thought.
I'm here to share my ideas with others and to learn from them, but only within the boundaries of my limited time and energy. You may believe my position is supernatural, but that doesn't mean I would have supernatural powers. Not even in the sense of superhuman rhetorical skills.

Titus

 

[BillHoyt]

Someone said

I'm not saying Paul is stupid. I just think I've given him enough infomration about my views. There are oither reasons for misunderstanding, apart from stupidity. One is conscious dogmatism, another is non-conscious rigidity of thought.
I'm here to share my ideas with others, but only within the boundaries of my limited time and energy.

Titus

Paul's question is similar to mine. And, once again, you dance around it. Paul also understands what you are saying and wants to know how it works. You claim a non-physical thingie has an effect upon the physical universe. Paul wants to know how this is possible. It is a perfectly question, as your claim violates everything we know about the universe.

Evidence, please?

 

[Mercutio]

Re: What more should I repeat?

Mercutio,

I have given reasons for my position. You'll find them on this thread.

Titus

I've been with this thread from the beginning. I've read it all, including the reasons for your positions. I disagreed with points along the way, and have in no way been satisfied with the explanations.

I, too, am here to learn from the views of others. I hope to be able to understand your views. I'm not asking questions or arguing just for the fun of it. It's just that, as of yet, the missing piece has not yet clicked into place, and without it I cannot see your picture; it also seems that the pieces you give me to try are too big or the wrong color.

I understand if you give up on me, but don't let it be because you think I'm not earnest in my attempts to understand.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Reaching the point of saturation

Mercutio,

I understand if you give up on me, but don't let it be because you think I'm not earnest in my attempts to understand.

That's not the reason of course. I'm actually quite surprised by the honesty many skeptics show in their approach.

If you reformulate your questions and make them more specific, making sure also that they aren't just variations on questions that have already been asked, I just might give it another try. Forgive me if I don't though.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

we are talking about the assumption that everything functions according to a set of consistent logical rules.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In that sense I certainly believe that there are psychological laws of perception, thought and emotion as well as interactional laws of brain-mind interaction. But that doesn't mean I would consider these physical laws, in the sense that all the processes would be observable from a third person perspective.

Then the problem I pointed out is valid. To assert that consciousness, and its interactions with the brain, function according to consistent logical rules, but that those rules cannot be deduced by observing those interactions, is to assert that there are characteristics of consciousness which have no effect, direct or indirect, on your brain. But if such characteristics exist, you cannot possibly know about them, because that would imply that you have knowledge which cannot, in any way, affect your actions.

The fact that qualia have physical effects implies that they can either be described in terms of those effects, or that they are supernatural.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Again, you seem to be confusing cause and effects. I've no problem if you insist on calling my position supernatural, as long as you acknowledge that it isn't seen from within my own perspective. In my perspective, qualia and mind-brain interactions are part of the natural order and at the same time irreducible to anything purely physical.

Saying that they are part of the "natural order" means nothing to me. I have no idea what this hypothetical natural order you are referring to is. If qualia effect the physical world, but cannot be understood by observing how they interact with it, then this necessarily implies that either qualia have characteristics which don't have any effect on the physical world, or that qualia do not function according to consistent logical rules. The latter is what I call supernaturalism.

Clearly there is no empirical evidence that there is something like what you are describing, interacting with the brain.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That depends on the term 'empirical'. If you define this as: 'observable either by introspection or through physical registration', then we all have plenty of empirical, i.e. introspective evidence for a non-physical mind and by deduction also for its effects on the physical world. If you exclude introspection from the category of empirical evidence, you simply ban consciousness from science. Which doesn't make your eliminative materialism any less irrational by the way.

Our introspection certainly constitutes evidence for the existence of consciousness. That is not in question. The mere existence of introspection in no way constitutes supporting evidence for the claim that consciousness is irreducibly subjective.

If you disagree, then please present your formal logical proof that consciousness is irreducibly subjective. Simply claiming that it seems to be, isn't going to cut it. Nor is appealing to the fact that the details about our conscious experiences cannot be inferred from observing overt behavior. I can't infer the details of what a CPU is doing by observing the overt behavior of my computer, either.

If the system you are claiming is interacting with the brain can be described in terms of some set of consistent logical rules, then there is absolutely no reason to think that the brain is incapable of doing whatever it is you think this system is doing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wrong, you seem to overlook the fact that I was talking about conceptual cognitive processing concerning subjectivity or 'metasubjective cognition'. As metasubjective cognition itself is non-quantifiable (due to the non-quantifiable nature of qualia) it cannot be performed by the brain.

How can anything that functions according to consistent logical rules be non-quantifiable?

That does not imply there wouldn't be any natural egularities within metasubjective cognition. But again, such regularities aren't equal to the conceptual contents of this type of cognition. The regularities may well be describable in mathematical terms, but the concepts are not. And that's what I was talking about.

Wait a minute, are you saying that the interactions between consciousness and the brain can be mathematically modelled, but that consciousness itself cannot be? Isn't this just a fancy way of saying that there are characteristics of consciousness which have no effect, whatsoever, on the physical world? And since everything we do is, presumably, quantifiable, doesn't that imply that any non-quantifiable aspects of consciousness cannot have any effect on the physical world? and therefore cannot possibly affect our actions? further implying that if we know about them, then that knowledge cannot possibly affect our actions?

Don't you see how absurd this is?


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

Inner logic

Dr. Stupid,

is to assert that there are characteristics of consciousness which have no effect, direct or indirect, on your brain. But if such characteristics exist, you cannot possibly know about them, because that would imply that you have knowledge which cannot, in any way, affect your actions.

That is only true within your framework, which claims that consciousness equals patterns in the brain. It is not true however for my position, as in my view consciousness does not equal patterns in the brain. Consciousness does affect our actions nonetheless but not by its supposed virtue of being a set of certain processes in the brain. So the implication does not hold in my case, only in yours. If you want to find an inconsistency in my position you should try finding it within my line of thought, not in yours, as that would boil down to a strawman. My position reads that all aspects of consciousness can and do have effects on the physical world, but not automatically as a hypothetical part of some kind of parallellism. Consciousness is a distinct, efficacious part of reality, not just another word for brain processes. You may not agree with this view, but if you wish to tackle it, you have to attack its inner logic instead of projecting conclusions which make sense in your system but not in mine.

Saying that they are part of the "natural order" means nothing to me. I have no idea what this hypothetical natural order you are referring to is. I

By the natural order I mean here (at minimum) the physical world + the individual experients with their individual irreducible minds.

If qualia effect the physical world, but cannot be understood by observing how they interact with it, then this necessarily implies that either qualia have characteristics which don't have any effect on the physical world, or that qualia do not function according to consistent logical rules. The latter is what I call supernaturalism.

A third position which I hold is that a law can be consistent and logical without automatically (through their supposed reducibility to physical laws) affecting the physical world. I thought you knew by now that this is what I think, as I've repeatedly told you so.

The mere existence of introspection in no way constitutes supporting evidence for the claim that consciousness is irreducibly subjective.

That could only be true if what we observe of our own consciousness through introspection would be the physical processes in the brain you identify consciousness with.
As you don't admit that this is absurd, you simply deny that what we know through introspection of our own consciousness is that it's irreducible to anything else, as well as subjective and qualitative. Again, what you're saying only makes sense within your own framework and is ineffective when attacking mine.

If you disagree, then please present your formal logical proof that consciousness is irreducibly subjective.

Well, that only works if you accept the major premiss that there are real qualia (i.e. qualia which aren't just an abstract term for certain types of quantifiable physical processes in the brain) whose existence we directly know through introspection. As you deny this, my logic won't make any difference. I acknowledge that our premisses are different. That's why we should necessarily find the other's positions irrational. You've already suspected that my position is based on an unfounded intuition. Well, I suspect that your position is based on what I sometimes call the effect of the 'dogmatic genius'. Meaning that some people are so intelligent that they hardly are confronted by any expressions of real, intellectually worthy criticism against their ideas. This can be fatal if one of the basic ideas is ill-founded. Through the years the dogma can grow stronger (as it meets no opposition) and more 'obvious' and obstruct one's freedom of thought, without the person being aware of it. For me, the denial of irreducible qualia is one of the greatest absurdities imaginable. I've never ('empathically') understood how anyone can seriously believe in it. Nowadays I ascribe it to either the dogmatic genius-effect just mentioned or to sheer mindless epigonism (meaning that a person holds something without really understanding what it means, just because his or her 'idol' teaches it).

Simply claiming that it seems to be, isn't going to cut it.

Please read my paper on Kant's error again and you'll see how I think about this.

Nor is appealing to the fact that the details about our conscious experiences cannot be inferred from observing overt behavior. I can't infer the details of what a CPU is doing by observing the overt behavior of my computer, either.

This obviously is not my point. It's not a difference between overt and covert, which would also go for a computer, as you say. It's a difference between 'by principle exclusively accessible through introspection' and 'by principle accessible through non-introspective physical registration even if the realization of this meets with some serious practical problems'. Again, this differentiation is only important if you accept that introspection yields information about the irreducibly subjective and qualitative. If you don't then the distinction is irrelevant, but then you're obviously reasoning from another framework than mine.

How can anything that functions according to consistent logical rules be non-quantifiable?

Another question which shows you don't really imagine what it means to be thinking from within my system. In my system there is more to consciousness than just the physical functioning of brain processes. If there weren't, your question would make sense, because functioning would be the only thing there is to consciousness. Consciousness would then be the equivalent of certain types of cerebral 'behavior' which is as such indeed purely quantifiable. However, in my system, consciousness is not just a specific type of cerebral behavior. It is primarily something else than the behavior or functioning of something else in the physical world, namely the experience of an experient, which cannot be reduced to (i.e. reformulated, understood or described as) covert computational behavior in the brain or private functioning of the brain. That's the main difference between our systems, and whether you like it or not, it's a very basic ontological difference, which can't possibly be solved through any type of compromise. The problem lies not so much in the logical deductions, but in the premisses. Asking me for empirical evidence for my position just shows you can't even imagine I'm right, whereas in my view the evidence is lived every moment we're subjectivly experiencing anything and only a real zombie can deny this.
Which also shows all further discussion is useless, as to tackle an opponent's position it's first necessary to understand it is as it's understood by its proponent. I've shown you that I perfectly understand your position, but not vice versa.

Wait a minute, are you saying that the interactions between consciousness and the brain can be mathematically modelled, but that consciousness itself cannot be? Isn't this just a fancy way of saying that there are characteristics of consciousness which have no effect, whatsoever, on the physical world? And since everything we do is, presumably, quantifiable, doesn't that imply that any non-quantifiable aspects of consciousness cannot have any effect on the physical world? and therefore cannot possibly affect our actions? further implying that if we know about them, then that knowledge cannot possibly affect our actions?

I'm indeed claiming that "certain effects of consciousness on the physical world only make sense to other minds". For example, if we write something about inner feelings, it does not affect the physical world in that it would itself become all of a sudden more qualitatively emotional or sensitive. The physical world just reflects the verbal signs we use to express what we can only directly know through introspection. In that sense the physical world is blind for what consciousness is. But we as experients with non-physical minds, memory etc, ARE directly affected by consciousness and its non-physical aspects and we let this knowledge affect the physical world through our actions. That's what Popper has called the creation of World III: a part of the physical world which remains as such physical but which is created by the non-physical World II (the mind), which bears witness to it (but only for non-physical experients, not for mindless physical things) and which in turn evokes certain desired effects in consciousness (using instruments ranging from the verbal signs expressed through our vocal apparatus or writing to musical partitures, etc.). So certain effects of consciousness on the physical world aren't so much physical in the sense of meaningless physiological brain processes but rather semantical in the sense that the physical instruments used (such as speech and writing) refer to the non-physical reality of subjective experiences.

Again, try to understand the inner logic of my system. If you find any fault in that, I'm open to suggestions. But you can't just project conclusions which can only be valid in yours.

Respectfully,

Titus

 

[hammegk]

Replying to Titus

You claim a non-physical thingie has an effect upon the physical universe. Paul wants to know how this is possible. It is a perfectly [edit: insert "good"] good question, as your claim violates everything we know about the universe.

Bill, we agree on something! Titus' reasoning and discourse so far hasn't convinced me either that dualism is a logical proposition.

Of course, I'd say "You claim a non "what-is" thingie has an effect upon the "what-is" universe." Idealism works fine too, but doesn't need to find a life / non-life boundary at the lower end, or wonder how consciousness can be efficaceous at the (current, postulated) upper end, now homo sap.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

is to assert that there are characteristics of consciousness which have no effect, direct or indirect, on your brain. But if such characteristics exist, you cannot possibly know about them, because that would imply that you have knowledge which cannot, in any way, affect your actions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That is only true within your framework, which claims that consciousness equals patterns in the brain. It is not true however for my position, as in my view consciousness does not equal patterns in the brain. Consciousness does affect our actions nonetheless but not by its supposed virtue of being a set of certain processes in the brain.

It doesn't matter how or why it affects the brain, only that it does. Look at my post again. I said that to assert that consciousness cannot be described in terms of its physical effects, is to assert that there are characteristics which have no effect, direct or indirect on your brain.

That does not require that consciousness equals patterns in the brain. This argument applies to any interactive scenario. Consciousness could be some physical processes not located in the brain, which interacts with it. It could be a physical process which is wholly unlike any physical processes we currently understand, requiring us to abandon our notions of matter and energy. But it cannot be non-physical. Not without either asserting that it is supernatural, or that it has characteristics which have no physical effects at all.

If you know about a particular characteristic of consciousness, then you can act on that knowledge. That means that the characteristic has had an effect on your brain. It does not make any difference whether the knowledge of that characteristic is physically represented in the brain, or whether the effect on your brain is indirect, by virtue of the characteristic affecting something else which is non-brain, which then affects your brain. All that matters is that it has had an effect.

My position reads that all aspects of consciousness can and do have effects on the physical world, but not automatically as a hypothetical part of some kind of parallellism.

No parallelism is required for my argument. My argument would apply perfectly well to a scenario by which your brain is just a receiver of signals from some alien who is operating you by remote control.

Consciousness is a distinct, efficacious part of reality, not just another word for brain processes. You may not agree with this view, but if you wish to tackle it, you have to attack its inner logic instead of projecting conclusions which make sense in your system but not in mine.

I do not agree with this view, but my argument does not depend in any way on the claim that consciousness is a brain process! On the contrary, the entire argument I have presented is based on the premise that consciousness is something other that brain processes, which interacts with your brain according to some set of logical rules.

Saying that they are part of the "natural order" means nothing to me. I have no idea what this hypothetical natural order you are referring to is. I
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

By the natural order I mean here (at minimum) the physical world + the individual experients with their individual irreducible minds.

So consciousness is natural by the definition of natural? If this is what you mean by natural order, then saying that consciousness is part of the natural order is a completely empty statement!

If qualia effect the physical world, but cannot be understood by observing how they interact with it, then this necessarily implies that either qualia have characteristics which don't have any effect on the physical world, or that qualia do not function according to consistent logical rules. The latter is what I call supernaturalism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A third position which I hold is that a law can be consistent and logical without automatically (through their supposed reducibility to physical laws) affecting the physical world. I thought you knew by now that this is what I think, as I've repeatedly told you so.

You are really confusing me here. Do you believe that there are characteristics of consciousness which have no effect on the physical world, or not? It certainly seemed earlier like you were saying no, but now it appears that you are saying yes.

The mere existence of introspection in no way constitutes supporting evidence for the claim that consciousness is irreducibly subjective.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That could only be true if what we observe of our own consciousness through introspection would be the physical processes in the brain you identify consciousness with.

No, it could also be true if consciousness is something which interacts with the brain, as long as its characteristics can be determined by studying those interactions. That is the whole point of my argument. Even if you could somehow prove that there is more to consciousness than just brain processes, this would in no way prove that consciousness is irreducibly non-physical.

As you don't admit that this is absurd, you simply deny that what we know through introspection of our own consciousness is that it's irreducible to anything else, as well as subjective and qualitative. Again, what you're saying only makes sense within your own framework and is ineffective when attacking mine.

As I said above, my argument against your position in no way assumes the correctness of my own. Even if there is more to consciousness than brain processes, that does not mean it is irreducibly subjective. The mere existence of introspection implies neither that consciousness is irreducibly subjective, nor that it involves anything more than brain processes. You can therefore not cite introspection as supporting evidence for irreducible subjectivity.

If you disagree, then please present your formal logical proof that consciousness is irreducibly subjective.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Well, that only works if you accept the major premiss that there are real qualia (i.e. qualia which aren't just an abstract term for certain types of quantifiable physical processes in the brain) whose existence we directly know through introspection.

Fine. Imagine that I have accepted the premise that qualia are not reducible to brain processes. Now prove that they are not reducible to some other sort of physical process, which interacts with the brain.

As you deny this, my logic won't make any difference. I acknowledge that our premisses are different.

If the claim that consciousness is not a brain process is a premise, and not a conclusion you have drawn from reliable evidence, then your philosophy is not rational.

Note that my claim that consciousness is a brain process is not a premise of my philosophy at all. I have concluded this from the fact that there is no evidence to support the less parsimonious hypothesis that there is more to consciousness than just brain processes.

Provide evidence of something else interacting with the brain, and I will gladly reject the theory that consciousness is a brain process, in favor of the theory that it is some other physical process interacting with the brain.

That's why we should necessarily find the other's positions irrational.

Why should you find my position irrational? What possible justification could you have for claiming that it is irrational for me to not assume that consciousness is irreducibly subjective, when you can cite no evidence to support this claim, and must take it as a premise for all arguments in support of your position?

You've already suspected that my position is based on an unfounded intuition. Well, I suspect that your position is based on what I sometimes call the effect of the 'dogmatic genius'. Meaning that some people are so intelligent that they hardly are confronted by any expressions of real, intellectually worthy criticism against their ideas.

Give me a break. I asked you for the proof that consciousness is irreducibly subjective, and you said that I would have to accept your major premise that consciousness is not a brain process, first. Not only have you have offered no justification for that premise, but you have not even provided the proof that you claim exists if that premise is true. How can you possibly claim that you have presented a reasonable argument that my position is irrational?

This can be fatal if one of the basic ideas is ill-founded. Through the years the dogma can grow stronger (as it meets no opposition) and more 'obvious' and obstruct one's freedom of thought, without the person being aware of it.

What dogma??? I have simply asked for some kind of evidence to justify abandoning my current theory for another less-parsimonious one. You have provided none.

For me, the denial of irreducible qualia is one of the greatest absurdities imaginable.

Why? Are you sure that your belief that they must be irreducible is not dogmatic? Like I said above, assume that I have accepted the premise that there is more to qualia than brain processes. Can you provide any evidence at all that they are irreducibly non-physical?

I've never ('empathically') understood how anyone can seriously believe in it.

Why? What is so unimaginably absurd about believing that something can be understood by studying its physical effects? Isn't that normally the default position? What, other than your intuitive preconceptions, makes the situation any different for consciousness?

Nowadays I ascribe it to either the dogmatic genius-effect just mentioned or to sheer mindless epigonism (meaning that a person holds something without really understanding what it means, just because his or her 'idol' teaches it).

You really need to consider the possibility that it is you who is being dogmatic. If you can provide no evidence to justify your belief that consciousness is not a brain process, then it is you who are being dogmatic, not I.

Nor is appealing to the fact that the details about our conscious experiences cannot be inferred from observing overt behavior. I can't infer the details of what a CPU is doing by observing the overt behavior of my computer, either.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This obviously is not my point. It's not a difference between overt and covert, which would also go for a computer, as you say. It's a difference between 'in principle exclusively accessible through introspection' and 'in principle accessible through non-introspective physical registration even if the realization of this meets with some serious practical problems'. Again, this differentiation is only important if you accept that introspection yields information about the irreducibly subjective and qualitative. If you don't then the distinction is irrelevant, but then you're obviously reasoning from another framework than mine.

I asked for a reason to believe that consciousness is irreducibly subjective. If any reason you could give me requires me to already believe they are, then you have no reason. How can I possibly accept that introspection yields information about something irreducibly subjective, without first believing that consciousness is irreducibly subjective?

Do you have any reason for me to believe this that does not require me to already believe it?

How can anything that functions according to consistent logical rules be non-quantifiable?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Another question which shows you don't really imagine what it means to be thinking from within my system.

What the question shows, is that I cannot imagine what it means to be thinking from within your system, because your system, as you have described it to me so far, is incoherent. Something cannot be both non-quantifiable, and function according to consistent logical rules. This is a tautology which is true under any logical system.

In my system there is more to consciousness than just the physical functioning of brain processes. If there weren't, your question would make sense, as functioning would be the only thing there is to consciousness. Consciousness would then be the equivalent of certain types of cerebral 'behavior' which is as such indeed purely quantifiable. However, in my system, consciousness is not just a specific type of cerebral behavior. It is primarily something else than the behavior or functioning of something else in the physical world, namely the experience of an experient, which cannot be reduced to (i.e. reformulated, understood or described as) covert computational behavior in the brain or private functioning of the brain.

Irrelevant. I am not in any way assuming here that consciousness is just brain functioning. I am saying that if consciousness, whatever it is, functions according to logical rules, then it is quantifiable. If it is non-quantifiable, then it does not function according to logical rules.

That's the main difference between our systems, and whether you like it or not, it's a very basic ontological difference, which can't possibly be solved through any type of compromise.

Of course not. It is the assertion that consciousness does not function according to logical rules. If this is what you believe, then just say so.

The problem lies not so much in the logical deductions, but in the premisses. Asking me for empirical evidence for my position just shows you can't even imagine I'm right, whereas in my view the evidence is lived every moment we're subjectivly experiencing anything and only a real zombie can deny this.

Like I said, your belief that consciousness is not only not just brain-processes, but also irreducibly non-physical, is not based on any evidence. It is an assumption you have made, for no reason that you seem to be able to express. You keep saying that it is obvious because of the fact that you have experiences, but I find it inconceivable that you do not realize that this is a purely intuitive argument.

Which also shows all further discussion is useless, as to tackle an opponent's position it's first necessary to understand it is as it's understood by its proponent. I've shown you that I perfectly understand your position, but not vice versa.

I do not think that you understand my position at all. If you did, you would not be claiming that it is based on dogmatism.

Wait a minute, are you saying that the interactions between consciousness and the brain can be mathematically modelled, but that consciousness itself cannot be? Isn't this just a fancy way of saying that there are characteristics of consciousness which have no effect, whatsoever, on the physical world? And since everything we do is, presumably, quantifiable, doesn't that imply that any non-quantifiable aspects of consciousness cannot have any effect on the physical world? and therefore cannot possibly affect our actions? further implying that if we know about them, then that knowledge cannot possibly affect our actions?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I'm indeed claiming that "certain effects of consciousness on the physical world only make i]ense[/i] to other minds". For example, if we write something about inner feelings, it does not affect the physical world in that it would itself become all of a sudden more qualitatively emotional. The physical world just reflects the verbal signs we use to express what we can only directly know through introspection. In that sense the physical world is blind for what consciousness is. But we as experients with non-physical minds, memory etc, ARE directly affected by consciousness and its non-physical aspects and we let this knowledge affect the physical world through our actions. That's what Popper has called the creation of World III: a part of the physical world which remains as such physical but which is created by the non-physical World II (the mind), which bears witness to it (but only for non-physical experients, not for mindless physical things) and which in turn evokes certain desired effects in consciousness (using instruments ranging from the verbal signs expressed through our vocal apparatus or writing to musical partitures, etc.). So certain effects of consciousness on the physical world aren't so much physical in the sense of meaningless physiological brain processes but rather semantical in the sense that the physical instruments used (such as speech and writing) refer to the non-physical reality of subjective experiences.

What???

Could you please just directly answer the question? Do you believe that there are characteristics of consciousness which have no physical effects at all?

Again, try to understand the inner logic of my system. If you find any fault in that, I'm open to suggestions. But you can't just project conclusions which can only be valid in yours.

I am trying to, but you keep telling me contradictory things.

If you believe that consciousness has characteristics which do not effect the physical world, then your system is inconsistent because that would imply that you have knowledge which cannot affect your actions.

If you believe that consciousness does not have such characteristics, and that it does not function according to logical rules, then you are a supernaturalist.

If you believe that consciousness has no such characteristics, but that it functions according to logical rules, then your system is inconsistent because it cannot possibly be both of the above, and be irreducibly non-physical.

If you believe that if functions according to non-quantifiable logical rules, the your system is inconsistent because that is self-contradictory.


And, of course, internal consistency issues aside, if you have no logical justification for your premise that consciousness is irreducibly non-physical, then your belief that your system is true, is irrational.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

That's really enough

Well, Stimp, let's simply leave it at that as you have misunderstood me on practical every point I made, and that's certainly not entirely due to me. It's useless to go any further. You still make no difference between cause and effect, between introspective knowledge and external third person-knowledge and you still accuse me of irrationality and incoherence where there is neither of these. There is only so much a person, however rational, can take.

Interpret this any way you want. Your irrational views obviously can't be changed by my posts.

Find someone who can help you out or stick to your system. Whatever you like. It's a free world, or rather it's should be.

Best wishes,

Titus

P.S.: Hammegk, I had thought you would at least understand me somewhat better than our friend I prefer to ignore.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Encore

In that sense I certainly believe that there are psychological laws of perception, thought and emotion as well as interactional laws of brain-mind interaction. But that doesn't mean I would consider these physical laws, in the sense that all the processes would be observable from a third person perspective.

Thats quite true Titus, but science merely asks for the ability to repeat and verify. And while there are those who would answer surveys dishonestly, there are those who do answer honestly. And in fact introspection is a valuable tool for psychology. But if I understand your argument, there is no third person perspective ever. So why bring that up? Are you saying that there is a third person perspective in the scientific sense?





Wrong, you seem to overlook the fact that I was talking about conceptual cognitive processing concerning subjectivity or 'metasubjective cognition'. As metasubjective cognition itself is non-quantifiable (due to the non-quantifiable nature of qualia) it cannot be performed by the brain. That does not imply there wouldn't be any natural egularities within metasubjective cognition. But again, such regularities aren't equal to the conceptual contents of this type of cognition. The regularities may well be describable in mathematical terms, but the concepts are not. And that's what I was talking about.
Again I think that you are just defining that qualia are unquantafiable and irreducable, it is not a requirement of science that you have quantification of therory. I again state you base thos whole premise on the assumption that qualia are irreducable and ineffable. That hasn't been proven either way and it just an assumption.

Titus [/B]

Titus, I respectfully submit that qualia can be described, again in science replication is teid to experiment. There are experiments that involve qualia, and therefore they can be reduced. Especialy when it comes to anxiety and depression.

Abd please keep posting, we may not agree with what you say, but I certainly have learned a lot from you, that I have not been able to learn from the idealists.

We all have our own thoughts and beliefs, yours have helped me a lot.

Pespectfully
David

 

[Interesting Ian]

Damn, I'm going to be really busy tomorrow so shall have to make some comments upon the exchange between Titus and Stimpy on Wednesday. Essentially it seems to me Stimp that you're taking an instrumentalist approach to science and applying it to consciousness like you would for any scientific entity playing a fruitful role in our successful scientific theories describing the external world. Thus you treat the reality of consciousness as being analogically akin to the reality of an electron. In other words you're begging the question.

Stimp
It doesn't matter how or why it affects the brain, only that it does. Look at my post again. I said that to assert that consciousness cannot be described in terms of its physical effects, is to assert that there are characteristics which have no effect, direct or indirect on your brain.

Of course there can be characteristics of consciousness which have an effect on the brain. Maybe all characteristics of consciousness have some effect on the brain. But it does not follow from this that consciousness and its characteristics can be so described. Not unless you conflate consciousness or its characteristics, with the effect on the brain of consciousness or its characteristics.

I'll say more on Wednesday if I have time.

Titus, it seems to me you've clearly shown that Stimps arguments are wholly irrelevant to your position. OK guys, goodnight.

 

[Loki]

Titus Rivas,

I'm not saying Paul is stupid. I just think I've given him enough information about my views. There are other sources of misunderstanding, apart from stupidity. One is conscious dogmatism, another is non-conscious rigidity of thought.

And another would be a failure to address the substance of the questions being asked? Perhaps because you've already decided that the questioner is too "rigid of thought" to have made any valid points?

(Stimpy wrote) : When I claim that consciousness is reducible to its physical effects, I am not claiming that it is its physical effects. I am claiming that it can be scientifically described in terms of those effects. This is no different than the approach used by science for any other phenomenon. We describe everything in terms of their physical effects.

I still can't see your answer to this - you seem to be skipping around this wildly. The "feeling of pain" is a quale. This quale has a physical effect - I can draw upon it to write a story for exmaple. The quale itself is (indirectly) having a physical impact on the world. This then, at least, means that *some* parts of the quale can be measured doesn't it?

 

[hammegk]

Re: That's really enough

....Hammegk, I had thought you would at least understand me somewhat better than our friend I prefer to ignore.

I'd like to think I do. We agree "mind" is a primary existent at any rate.

I perhaps just don't understand your path to a satisfactory, logical, solution to dualism (and remain an idealist ). I will need to reread and rethink this thread a number of times, and thanks for your interesting and coherent contributions to this discussion.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Damn, I'm going to be really busy tomorrow so shall have to make some comments upon the exchange between Titus and Stimpy on Wednesday. Essentially it seems to me Stimp that you're taking an instrumentalist approach to science and applying it to consciousness like you would for any scientific entity playing a fruitful role in our successful scientific theories describing the external world. Thus you treat the reality of consciousness as being analogically akin to the reality of an electron. In other words you're begging the question.

What question?

Of course there can be characteristics of consciousness which have an effect on the brain. Maybe all characteristics of consciousness have some effect on the brain. But it does not follow from this that consciousness and its characteristics can be so described. Not unless you conflate consciousness or its characteristics, with the effect on the brain of consciousness or its characteristics.

Correct. If consciousness is more than a brain function and not another physical process, all we can do is describe how consciousness operates on the brain. We cannot actually determine what consciousness is or identify its additional non-brain-affecting characteristics. What other rational position is there?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Tonight I'm inaugurating the Dogmatic Genius and Mindless Epigonist club. Dues are US$20 per year and there is no newsletter.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Knowing subjectivity

Loki:

This then, at least, means that *some* parts of the quale can be measured doesn't it?

They can, by introspection. But not by any type of physical, third person registration.

Dancing David,

But if I understand your argument, there is no third person perspective ever. So why bring that up? Are you saying that there is a third person perspective in the scientific sense?

I'm not sure I understand your question. I brought it up, because if Stimpson is right there would be no fundamental difference between the information about consciousness you can get through introspection and other information about consciousness gained through external means, e.g. by studying the brain. I am saying of course that the difference is very fundamental.
I won't go into the assumption-part anymore as Mercutio and I have dwelled on it enough.

Abd please keep posting, we may not agree with what you say, but I certainly have learned a lot from you, that I have not been able to learn from the idealists.

We all have our own thoughts and beliefs, yours have helped me a lot.

Well, thank you very much, that's actually very nice of you.
I didn't feel chased away ( not by 90% of the skeptics on this thread anyway ) but I think I've pretty much shared what I had to say about this topic. I may just be too impatient for Sisyphus-like repetitions.


Best wishes,

Titus