A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

I find this statement equivalent to a claim that blue can only be blue, and therefore CANNOT be a specific range of wavelengths of light.

It's nonsensical to say blue is a wavelength of light. Blue is something we perceptually experience. Blue(E) and blue(M) do not refer to one and the same thing. Just because we use the same name doesn't mean to say that they are the same thing.
And BTW, if you don't know what something like blue(E) means, then I suggest you read through the thread.

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However, I repeat my claim that if you acknowledge the irreducibility of qualia, metasubjective cognition can't (as such) take place in the brain.
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And if you don't? Do you have an argument for the irreducibility of qualia I can tear into? I haven't found such an argument yet.

OK, let's see you tear into Titus's answer. Namely where he says "you can’t give an exhaustive quantitative definition of qualia, which would be necessary if qualia would be reducible to quantifiable processes in the brain".

II
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But "b" simply begs the question by presupposing that materialism is correct at the outset. We can only explain phenomenal conscious experiences by supposing it is identical to some physical processes.
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Such assumptions are perfectly valid at the level of hypothesis.

Is the assumption that an elephant is one and the same thing as a biscuit equally valid?

Given that we are thus far incapable of reproducing the processes of reason, we're essentially stuck at the hypothesis level except for a few predictive validations - which, as noted above, have thus far supported the identity theory position.

The hypothesis has to make some sort of sense which the identity hypothesis doesn't.

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But given the objective aspect of such processes is so apparently unlike the subjectively inner aspect of these experiences, then it prima facie seems implausible to declare they are one and the very same thing.
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Speaking of horrendous assumptions...

I have not made any assumptions. Saying that it seems implausible is not an assumption

The exact same thing can be said of a computer chip - "a bit of sand can't accomplish that!"

Hang on a sec, my whole post was concerned with refuting this position. A refutation you have not remotely addressed.

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But first of all materialism is extremely implausible and, in any case, this is unlike any other entity or process in the world which clearly do not depend upon any such metaphysical stance.
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Huh? The plausibility of materialism is precisely (and, IMO, entirely) the fact that it DOESN'T require some new and undescribed form of existence.

It requires the existence of a material world which lies beyond anything which we could immediately experience, and it says this wholly mysterious material reality somehow magically gives rise to conscious experience.

The point is that under materialism consciousness is simply tacked onto the world. You need to try and accommodate it by making somewhat rather implausible claims that it is really one and the same thing as physical processes in the brain, or that it doesn't exist altogether etc.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian

There is no circularity. I am not claiming that your brain knows everything there is to know about consciousness. I am claiming that your brain knows everything you know about consciousness.
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Stimp, A piece of meat doesn't know anything. At the very least, by claiming it does, you are presupposing materialism and therefore begging the question.

It should be clear that when I say your brain "knows" something, I am simply claiming that it possesses the information, and can operate on it.

If you want to assert that there is something more to "knowing" than just what your brain does, fine. I already explained that my argument does not depend on the claim that there is nothing more to "knowing" than brain processes. All that is required for my argument to be valid is that one acknowledge that those brain processes are an integral part of "knowing".

Your entire position seems to be based on the rather naive notion that the brain is not an active participant in things like thinking and knowing, but instead just some sort of receiver for these processes, which are performed independently of it. Is this what you are asserting?
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The brain is a participant in that it "filters" consciousness.

I already know what your position on this matter is. I am asking Titus. Since you are a supernaturalist, none of the arguments I am making here are going to be acceptable to you anyway.

Why do you feel the need to label me? I don't even know what you mean by "eliminative materialist". If you mean what Ian means, then I am not one. I am a scientific reductionist. My position is purely epistemological. I make no claims about the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and everything else. Such things are unknowable, and thus wholly irrelevant.
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Scientific reductionism entails reductionist materialism. I remind you that you claimed before that reductionist materialism and eliminitivism materialism mean the very same thing. Therefore if you are a reductionist materialist you necessarily are a eliminitivist materialist.

More fun with definitions.

First of all, scientific reductionism is not equivalent to what you call reductionist materialism, nor does it entail it.

Scientific reductionism is an epistemological position. It is the position that everything that can be observed can be reduced to basic natural laws, which can be determined from observation.

What you call reductionist materialism is the metaphysical position that everything which exists is reducible to some material substance. Science makes no claims about metaphysical substances, and neither do I.


Titus,

There is no circularity. I am not claiming that your brain knows everything there is to know about consciousness. I am claiming that your brain knows everything you know about consciousness. You can speculate about consciousness having other properties you don't know about, but such properties cannot possibly be anything you are aware of.
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I knew that already. The main epistemological difference between our positions is that I claim that we do know things about our consciousness, which our brains cannot know. We experients know that we have irreducible subjective, qualitative experiences. This is something the brain can't know as it is a physical system with no irreducible qualia. It can form no concept of qualia. So it's not that I claim there might be a mysterious, unknown extra to consciousness, but rather that I claim there is a well-known extra dimension, unknowable for the brain as a physical system. It's not a question of desperately crying: "It [meaning materialism] is not real", as someone put it a few posts ago, but of recognizing that we know the non-physical aspects by direct first person-acquaintance rather than through hypothetical neural representations of these aspects in the brain.

I do not see how you can possibly hold this position without asserting that some of the information storage and information processing that constitute "thinking" and "knowing", are being done by something other than the brain. Is that what you are asserting?

I do not see how this is even remotely conceivable. You are capable of thinking about consciousness, your brain is what is doing the information processing that goes happens when you think. If your brain does not have that information, you cannot think about it. I do not see how you can possibly deny this, without simply ignoring basic neurospysiological facts.

All this is hardly surprising, as you deny this irreducible, non-physical aspect to consciousness and I regard it as the basis of my philosophy.

Then I can only conclude that your philosophy is incoherent.

Like I said, my argument does not require that things like "knowledge" and "thinking" be completely brain processes. What it does require is that you acknowledge that those brain processes are necessary components of "knowing" and "thinking".
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Well, I don't. The only thing I might acknowledge is that a lot of times the brain seems to play a supporting role of in itself mental cognition. I see the brain as a physical computational device comparable to a computer, which supports our mental life during an incarnation in this world. But the real (mental) metasubjective thinking about qualia takes place in the mind, not in the brain as such. The brain does not contribute any content to metasubjective cognition, let alone that it would be a logical prerequisite for such cognition.

This is nonsense. Clearly your brain knows about consciousness. If it did not, you could not be talking about it.

You can assert that your brain only knows some of the information about consciousness, but not all of it. But if this were the case, your brain would not know that it is missing some of that information. It would think it has it all. This would produce the clearly ludicrous result of your body sitting there telling me that there is nothing more to consciousness than what your brain knows about, while you are trapped inside, knowing full well that your brain is wrong, but helpless to do anything about it.

The only way you could salvage this position, would be to assert that your brain does not do any of the information processing at all. That it is just a receiver, taking commands from consciousness, and conveying them to your body. Is that really what you believe?

I do not see how you can dispute this fact, without arguing that all of the information processing and storage your brain does is somehow duplicated non-physically.
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Not exactly duplicated. For one thing, I believe that certain parts of sensory processing is purely neurological rather than mental. On the other hand, I believe there are parts of cognition which I've term metasubjective that have no close parallel in the brain. So it's a matter of interaction, not of parallellism.

So you believe that the brain does some of the processing, and your consciousness does the rest, and that they interact. So why do you think it is impossible to study consciousness by studying those interactions at the neurological level?

Clearly by studying those interactions, we would gain some information about consciousness. What makes you think we would not get it all? Indeed, how is it even possible that we not get it all? I don't see how you can reasonably claim that when you are thinking about your subjective experiences, your brain is not processing any information about them.

Your entire position seems to be based on the rather naive notion that the brain is not an active participant in things like thinking and knowing, but instead just some sort of receiver for these processes, which are performed independently of it. Is this what you are asserting?
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No, I believe the brain is responsible for certain phases of perceptual processing, for certain instincts and a few other things. I also believe that it supports certain non-cerebral, mental processes through interactional laws. However, I believe the brain is only active in the blind, mechanical sense. The brain is not the self, it's no experient, it's completely non-conscious and therefore it has no conceptual access whatever to metasubjective cognition and the emotion, motivation and action based on this specific type of cognition. The brain is a machine we use during incarnation for certain parts of our information processing and as a center from which we control our motor activity. In some cases it may limit our mental freedom (e.g. Alzheimer, etc.) and then death can mean a real liberation for the mind.
The brain may be involved in quite a lot of processes, but it's not absolutely, logically necessary. One of the privileges of dualism, especially if you don't dismiss it as a supernatural phantasy .

Well, I am afraid that is exactly what it is. This fantasy you have come up with is nothing but a bunch of ad-hoc rationalizations for your belief that you are not a lump of meat in your head. There is no logical or evidential justification for any of it. You might as well just imagine that you are really an alien operating your body from remote control as some sort of game. Of course, you wiped out any memory of that fact, in order to make the game more realistic.

Once again, I think we need to go back to something I said a few days ago. Your entire position seems to hinge on the assertion that a physical process cannot be self aware. What evidence do you have for this assertion? Indeed, by what reasoning can you assert that a natural process (meaning one which functions according to logical, consistent rules), can be self-aware, but a physical process cannot be? As I mentioned before, a physical law is just a natural law which can be inferred from observations. To assert that consciousness is natural, but not physical, is to assert that the laws it functions according to cannot be determined by observation. What possible reason could you have for asserting this?

If you were an epiphenomenalist, I could understand such a claim, since you would believe that consciousness has no physical effects to be observed. But you claim that consciousness does have physical effects. Why do you assume that the natural laws it functions according to cannot be determined by observing those effects? What possible reason could you have for making such an assumption?

Consider parsimony here. If one thing has been made abundantly clear over the past several posts, it is that the form of dualism you are proposing is far less parsimoneous than scientific reductionism. Unless you have some actual evidence to support the claim that physical processes cannot be self-aware, there is absolutely no logical reason to prefer your position over mine. It is unfalsifiable, and requires us to believe in some disembodied spirit which interacts with our brains. Unless you can demonstrate that the mind does something which the brain cannot possibly do, your position is not rational.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Pyrian]

It's nonsensical to say blue is a wavelength of light. Blue is something we perceptually experience. Blue(E) and blue(M) do not refer to one and the same thing. Just because we use the same name doesn't mean to say that they are the same thing.
And BTW, if you don't know what something like blue(E) means, then I suggest you read through the thread.

Okay, we can play with definitions if you like, but the one is still the result of the other, which leads right back to consciousness as a result of brain processes. Redefining my argument won't affect its validity.

Is the assumption that an elephant is one and the same thing as a biscuit equally valid?

Heck, it beats everything we've got on this thread, since it's easily falsifiable.

The hypothesis has to make some sort of sense which the identity hypothesis doesn't.

It makes sense to me.

The exact same thing can be said of a computer chip - "a bit of sand can't accomplish that!"

Hang on a sec, my whole post was concerned with refuting this position. A refutation you have not remotely addressed.

You misunderstood me. I was drawing a correlation between your opinion that brain processes producing consciousness is implausible with 18th century opinions that would consider performing massive calculations on chips of silicon as implausible.

It requires the existence of a material world which lies beyond anything which we could immediately experience, and it says this wholly mysterious material reality somehow magically gives rise to conscious experience.

Dualism still requires the existence of a material world AND still requires what you would call a "magical" rise of conscious experience, I'm afraid, so identity theory is still winning the Ockham's Razor contest.

You need to try and accommodate it by making somewhat rather implausible claims that it is really one and the same thing as physical processes in the brain, or that it doesn't exist altogether etc.

The fact that you find it implausible does not particularly bother me. I find the claims of you dualists to be implausible.

Alright, back to Titus.

Now, it's true that I am not an expert at Kant. Still, I am an empiricist, and from what you described of him so was he. So if I diverge from his philosophy, I'm sorry.

Let me try again, starting here: "really" can be used in ways that do not mean "noumenally".

I have phenomenal knowledge of matter, such as scarves. I do a scarf trick where I make a scarf appear to disappear. I then explain that what really happened was I stuffed it into a false thumb.

When I say that, I don't mean that I have noumenal knowledge of the scarf or my little plastic thumb.

Huh? I specifically state, as you’ve just quoted, that Kant rejects the validity of any claims of noumenal knowledge about the mind. I just say that in his view, the mind could really be (part of) the brain, i.e. we simply cannot know according to his view. Nothing incorrect about that, as far as I know.

What's incorrect is your idea that identity theory is inherently noumenal instead of phenomenal - identity theory is rooted firmly in empiricism.

The materialist identity theory is the metaphysical or ontological theory that mind is really (noumenally) a form of matter.

I don't think that's true, although it may be for some (some do consider empirical knowledge to be absolute), it certainly isn't for me - since I, apparently like Kant, reject noumenal knowledge altogether. When I say that mind is a result of matter, I mean that phenomenally.

If Kant says we can in principle only have phenomenal knowledge about reality, that implicitly is a noumenal claim about the types of knowledge we can have. It’s a claim about knowledge as it is (an sich), not just about knowledge as it appears to be.

It's not implicit, you've merely inferred it, and inferred it incorrectly at that, if I'm not mistaken (as I might be, not having recently studied Kant). Certainly I would not make the claim that noumenal knowledge is noumenally impossible without having a better working definition of knowledge. If I could define knowledge to my satisfaction, my definition would likely exclude it from being noumenal - which is fine.

If Kant was just being phenomenal(ist) about this claim , he would be pretty much like the relativist who claims all knowledge is relative, i.e. including his own relativism.

And the problem with this is? I don't think Kant intended to somehow grant himself some bizarre exception to his own rules. "Kant rejects the validity of any claims of noumenal knowledge about the mind" is pretty cut and dried.

It basically is that you can’t give an exhaustive quantitative definition of qualia, which would be necessary if qualia were reducible to quantifiable processes in the brain.

Okay, I'll keep biting, why can't I give an exhaustive quantitative definition of qualia?

Just like BillHoyt whom I prefer to ignore, you don’t seem to grasp the fact that we’re talking about philosophical issues here. Theories which can only be tackled by argumentation or logic, not by empirical evidence, as they aren’t empirical theories to be corroborated or falsified by empirical research.

But I disagree even with this. I think the day will come when we can correctly model all brain processes in a computer simulation - and at that point we will either demonstrate that the brain functions as described, or that it doesn't and needs some additional entity. Then, our theories will have been tackled empirically.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Getting nowhere

Dr. Stupid:

I do not see how you can possibly hold this position without asserting that some of the information storage and information processing that constitute "thinking" and "knowing", are being done by something other than the brain. Is that what you are asserting?

Of course, and I've even said so before .

I do not see how this is even remotely conceivable. You are capable of thinking about consciousness, your brain is what is doing the information processing that goes happens when you think. If your brain does not have that information, you cannot think about it. I do not see how you can possibly deny this, without simply ignoring basic neurospysiological facts.

This is begging the question, Stimpson, and I wonder why you cannot realize that. If I logically deduce some conclusion from premisses to interpret certain facts (in casu metasubjective cognition) you can't simply point at empirical evidence. The point is that we're interpreting the evidence differently. I'm doing this on an explicit philosophical basis. You are just claiming you're right, but without giving any valid reason for it. That should make you wonder.

Then I can only conclude that your philosophy is incoherent.

Another non sequitur.

This is nonsense. Clearly your brain knows about consciousness. If it did not, you could not be talking about it.

Begging the question. You're much too intelligent to continue making this basic error time and again. What's holding you from taking a more rational stand?

You can assert that your brain only knows some of the information about consciousness, but not all of it. But if this were the case, your brain would not know that it is missing some of that information. It would think it has it all.

Again, as I explicitly stated, I don't think the brain really thinks about anything in the way an experient does. You can't just assume it does. I've given my reasons for my position, you have given none. Other than just denying the existence of irreducible qualitative subjectivity. So what else is there to say about this?

This would produce the clearly ludicrous result of your body sitting there telling me that there is nothing more to consciousness than what your brain knows about, while you are trapped inside, knowing full well that your brain is wrong, but helpless to do anything about it.

What are you talking about? That would be (partial, intraphysical) epiphenomenalism and you know already that I reject that position.

The only way you could salvage this position, would be to assert that your brain does not do any of the information processing at all.

Why's that? I've already claimed that the brain can do some or even all of the physical information processing, particularly during the pre-subjective perceptual, quantitative processing. And I have also claimed already that the brain does not know anything about consciousness, precisely because information about consciousness qua consciousness cannot be physically processed.

That it is just a receiver, taking commands from consciousness, and conveying them to your body. Is that really what you believe?

Again, I also believe in purely physical processing of purely physical information in the brain, but that would certainly exclude all types of metasubjective cognitive processing.

So you believe that the brain does some of the processing, and your consciousness does the rest, and that they interact.

Well, your consciousness and more generally your (non-physical) mind in which metasubjective memory is stored.

So why do you think it is impossible to study consciousness by studying those interactions at the neurological level?

Precisely because it would only be the physical effects of the interaction, not consciousness qua consciousness.

Clearly by studying those interactions, we would gain some information about consciousness.

Well yes, in the sense of part of its causes and effects, but not in the sense of consciousness qua consciousness.

What makes you think we would not get it all?

Haven't I told you that before? Because consciousness does not equal its physical effects.

Indeed, how is it even possible that we not get it all? I don't see how you can reasonably claim that when you are thinking about your subjective experiences, your brain is not processing any information about them.

Why not? Apart from the obvious fact that it does not accord with your own views, I mean.

Well, I am afraid that is exactly what it is. This fantasy you have come up with is nothing but a bunch of ad-hoc rationalizations for your belief that you are not a lump of meat in your head.

Not at all, it's purely based on logical reasoning. If I go astray anywhere you should show me where it happens. So far you've done nothing of the kind.

There is no logical or evidential justification for any of it.

Only somebody who denies the existence of subjectivity can really believe that.

You might as well just imagine that you are really an alien operating your body from remote control as some sort of game. Of course, you wiped out any memory of that fact, in order to make the game more realistic.

Well, even that would still be more rational than the denial of consciousness in the subjective, qualitative sense.

Once again, I think we need to go back to something I said a few days ago. Your entire position seems to hinge on the assertion that a physical process cannot be self aware.

Wrong, it is based on the assertion that a physical process cannot be irreducibly, unquantifiably qualitative and that it cannot be irreducibly subjective.

What evidence do you have for this assertion?

First of all one's own consciousness. But we've been there before.

Indeed, by what reasoning can you assert that a natural process (meaning one which functions according to logical, consistent rules), can be self-aware, but a physical process cannot be?

Well, that's a misunderstanding. My point is not at all about self-awareness. By the way, a subjective experience is not a self-aware experience, but it is an experience undergone by an experient. It does not take any self-awareness for an experient to undergo, for example, pain or pleasure. We can't identify subjectivity (or sentience) with self-awareness.

As I mentioned before, a physical law is just a natural law which can be inferred from observations.
To assert that consciousness is natural, but not physical, is to assert that the laws it functions according to cannot be determined by observation. What possible reason could you have for asserting this?

Very simple. It's everything to do with how you define 'observation'. If it's linked to physical, quantitative registration, then consciousness cannot be observed. There is no machine that can observe consciousness. The only way to directly observe consciousness is introspection. The little I understand of the physical method is that it does not concern itself with introspection.

If you were an epiphenomenalist, I could understand such a claim, since you would believe that consciousness has no physical effects to be observed. But you claim that consciousness does have physical effects. Why do you assume that the natural laws it functions according to cannot be determined by observing those effects? What possible reason could you have for making such an assumption?

We were not talking about knowing the laws according to which it functions, but about knowing consciousness itself. The main characteristics of consciousness can only be observed by the non-physical method of introspection.

Consider parsimony here. If one thing has been made abundantly clear over the past several posts, it is that the form of dualism you are proposing is far less parsimoneous than scientific reductionism.

To speak of parsimony in this context is absurd. I've once written somewhere that if the right application of Occam's razor can be compared to shaving Plato's beard, the over-zealous application of the principle may be compared to shaving off his ears or nose. Parsimony should not be abused for the denial of the obvious.

Unless you have some actual evidence to support the claim that physical processes cannot be self-aware, there is absolutely no logical reason to prefer your position over mine.

Again, our differences of insight aren't about self-awareness, but about subjectivity, which aren't synonyms.

It is unfalsifiable,

In the empirical sense, yes, but you might still prove me wrong in the analytical sense. That's the philosophical version of falsifiability. If you can't show me wrong, my view is coherent.

and requires us to believe in some disembodied spirit which interacts with our brains.

What's so bad about that, if I've shown that this is a coherent view?

Unless you can demonstrate that the mind does something which the brain cannot possibly do, your position is not rational.

Well, I can't say I'm baffled by your conclusions, given your premisses.

Respectfully,

Titus

For the occasional Dutch reader, here's my concise treatise about the philosophy of mind: Geesten met of zonder lichaam

 

[Titus Rivas]

About the materialist identity theory

Let's forget about Kant for the moment, Pyrian, as you might have to read his Kritik der Reinen Vernunft to understand what I really mean by my criticism.

When I say that mind is a result of matter, I mean that phenomenally.

Well, the absurd part about that is that if you do, you can't make a distinction between the first person and third person perspective. If both are phenomenal, there is no reason to consider the third person perspective "more real' or "objective". Both would be equally phenomenal, which means your identity theory can't be called a materialist identity theory anymore. That may seem trivial to you, but it isn't if we're talking ontology, which was what I was doing.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Pyrian]

Well, the absurd part about that is that if you do, you can't make a distinction between the first person and third person perspective.

I'm not sure I understand this; why can't I make that distinction? I experience my thoughts differently than I experience what I assume are your thoughts.

If both are phenomenal, there is no reason to consider the third person perspective "more real' or "objective". Both would be equally phenomenal, which means your identity theory can't be called a materialist identity theory anymore.

Your first statement is nonsense, and is predicated on the statement "equally phenomenal" - which is true but doesn't mean what you're trying to make it mean. To go back to my scarf analogy, the statement "the scarf disappeared magically" and "the scarf was secreted in a plastic thumb" are both phenomenal, but one is empirically correct and objective and the other is neither.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Stimpy said:

This is nonsense. Clearly your brain knows about consciousness. If it did not, you could not be talking about it.

and Titus responded:

Begging the question. You're much too intelligent to continue making this basic error time and again. What's holding you from taking a more rational stand?

Can you please explain why this is begging the question? What question?

Why's that? I've already claimed that the brain can do some or even all of the physical information processing, particularly during the pre-subjective perceptual, quantitative processing. And I have also claimed already that the brain does not know anything about consciousness, precisely because information about consciousness qua consciousness cannot be physically processed.

Do you really mean that the brain has no information about consciousness, or do you mean it doesn't know what the "feeling of consciousness is like"?

Your puppetmaster idea is so radical that it surely must lead to some experiments that we could run to support or disprove it. Can you think of any?

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Titus-- I was willing to understand, though not accept, your notion of knowledge through introspection, as you explained it to me. That is, what I called "seeing", you called the experience of a quale through some introspective process; that "introspection" being the very basic perception of a quale, without which we cannot work with that perception to build up something which we can report on (the report which was your interpretation of my definition of introspection). Now, it seems, you have taken that irreducible subjectivity and run with it. How did you get from qualia to complex thought as things that happen without the use of the physical brain? When we discussed the problems with introspection, I thought you stated that the one thing we cannot doubt about introspection was the existence of the qualia to begin with--now, suddenly, we trust introspection enough to claim that complex perception is mental, not physical?

I don't think the brain really thinks about anything in the way an experient does. You can't just assume it does. I've given my reasons for my position, you have given none.

I have not read reasons, I have only read assertions; these usually have the word "recognize" where "assume" belongs.

I think that various parts of the brain may support various mental functions during incarnation. Whatever the precise mechanisms, all this is accounted for in the framework of dualist interactionism.

"Accounted for" = "glossed over"? If you can make the mind influence the body here, why not move the interaction to a place that still allows for all the neuroscience research that we know about--move it to where you say we irreducibly experience qualia. Say that "the body sees qualia" through its nervous processes, and suddenly you are on very nearly the same page....a little more thinking, and maybe you will realize that that step is irrelevant too...Hey, if the mind can effect the body later on down the chain, why not at the beginning?

One last thing that has been bugging me...it seems to me that a dualist world view leaves us with very little in the way of predictive value (I know I am not expressing what I mean very well here)...I mean, if the mind is operating by non-physical laws, why on earth should our experiences follow physical laws? (This was the problem for Fechner, as I alluded before).

 

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas
It basically is that you can’t give an exhaustive quantitative definition of qualia, which would be necessary if qualia were reducible to quantifiable processes in the brain.

I doubt we can give an exhaustive quantitative definition of anything, if we interpret that phrase as strictly as you do when applying it to qualia.

The point is that there are certain theories which can only be falsified by argumentation. In general these are called analytical or philosophical (ontological) theories. Just like BillHoyt whom I prefer to ignore, you don’t seem to grasp the fact that we’re talking about philosophical issues here. Theories which can only be tackled by argumentation or logic, not by empirical evidence, as they aren’t empirical theories to be corroborated or falsified by empirical research.

As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. --Albert Einstein

 

[Loki]

Titus Rivas,

(Paul wrote) : Now if the brain has no access to emotion, for example, then how can we say "I'm sad"? Does the mind animate the mouth?

(Titus wrote) : Certainly, that's a basic tenet of interactionism

"The mind can animate the mouth" is a basic tenet of interactionism? Can the mind continute to animate the mouth if I sedate the brain?

If I administer drugs to suppress your depression, why does the mind also feel "less sad"?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Phenomenal and objective

Pyrian,

To go back to my scarf analogy, the statement "the scarf disappeared magically" and "the scarf was secreted in a plastic thumb" are both phenomenal, but one is empirically correct and objective and the other is neither.

Which only shows you don't understand the difference between phenomenal and objective. Please read my answer again, as I can do little more than repeat it.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Misunderstandings about interaction

Loki said:

"The mind can animate the mouth" is a basic tenet of interactionism? Can the mind continute to animate the mouth if I sedate the brain?

Who's claiming it can? Dualist interactionism is about interactions between mind and brain. So both entities are important for the outcome.

"The mind can animate the mouth" is a basic tenet of interactionism? Can the mind continute to animate the mouth if I sedate the brain?

Again, interactionism is about interaction, i.e. mutual influences. It's not the hypothetical mirror image of epiphenomenalism, which might claim only the mind would have an impact on the brain and the brain would have no impact on the mind.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Answer to Dodge

69dodge:

I doubt we can give an exhaustive quantitative definition of anything, if we interpret that phrase as strictly as you do when applying it to qualia.

Perhaps I haven't formulated my point clear enough. I don't mean you would have to know the precise quantitative measures of consciousness to be able to consider it quantifiable. I meant that there are non-quantitative dimensions to consciousness, which by definition cannot be described in quantitative terms at all. So it's not a matter of degree, but an absolute claim about the non-quantifiable nature of certain characteristics of consciousness (subjectivity and qualitativeness). They are totally unquantifiable rather than not totally quantifiable.

As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. --Albert Einstein

A nice quotation, but he's referring to mathematics, which is not a synonym to logic or analytical argumentation. BTW it's an argument to authority.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

The puppetmaster

Paul said:

Can you please explain why this is begging the question? What question?

Stimpson is begging the question by just claiming apriori that knowledge implies knowledge in the brain and calling other views irrational.
He just assumes knowledge implies knowledge in the brain and there is nothing logical about that assumption.

Do you really mean that the brain has no information about consciousness, or do you mean it doesn't know what the "feeling of consciousness is like"?

I really mean that the brain does not have any information about "what the feeling of consciousness is like".

Your puppetmaster idea is so radical that it surely must lead to some experiments that we could run to support or disprove it. Can you think of any?

That depends on what you mean by my puppetmaster idea. If you mean my claim that qualia are non-physical, then it is obvious that there can be no experiments to prove or disprove it, as it is an ontological interpretation of qualia, not an empirical theoretical claim.
If you mean my claim that metasubjective cognition is not taking place in the brain, it's also hard to do any experiments as that would involve shutting down the brain completely. The closest we come to such a situation is in naturalistic cases of the reincarnation type in young children who seem to recall experiences they had when they were linked to another brain (this recall is sometimes termed Extra-Cerebral Memory), and naturalistic cases of Near-Death Experiences in which there was a flat EEG and clear memories of (real time) impressions of what happened during that stage.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Interaction

How did you get from qualia to complex thought as things that happen without the use of the physical brain? When we discussed the problems with introspection, I thought you stated that the one thing we cannot doubt about introspection was the existence of the qualia to begin with--now, suddenly, we trust introspection enough to claim that complex perception is mental, not physical?

Not quite, Mercutio, my claim is that the concepts and cognition based on the basis of introspection can't be cerebral either, as they involve non-physical phenomena. If we accept that certain phenomena can't be described in purely quantitative terms, this has clear implications for representations of those phenomena. Metasubjective cognition can't be purely quantitative and therefore it can't take place in the brain.

I have not read reasons, I have only read assertions; these usually have the word "recognize" where "assume" belongs.

Well, we've been there before. I've nothing to add about this point.

Accounted for" = "glossed over"? If you can make the mind influence the body here, why not move the interaction to a place that still allows for all the neuroscience research that we know about--move it to where you say we irreducibly experience qualia. Say that "the body sees qualia" through its nervous processes, and suddenly you are on very nearly the same page....a little more thinking, and maybe you will realize that that step is irrelevant too...Hey, if the mind can effect the body later on down the chain, why not at the beginning?

What do you mean? You seem to mix up a physical impact by consciousness with consciousness itself. Why is it so hard for many of you to make this elementary distinction?

I mean, if the mind is operating by non-physical laws, why on earth should our experiences follow physical laws? (This was the problem for Fechner, as I alluded before).

As I understand it, Fechner discovered among other things that there was a interactional correspondence, which accords well with the tenets of interactionism. In my interactional system, the mind is basically operating by its own laws but it can also be influenced by the brain. Similarly, the brain basically operates by physical laws, but it is also influenced by the mind. If we follow your idea, we might as well say that as the brain is operating by physical laws, why on earth should its processes follow non-physical laws, i.e. whenever it's influenced by the mind? These questions make no sense, as interactionism holds that there is interaction between minds and brains and the respective laws they operate by.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well, the absurd part about that is that if you do, you can't make a distinction between the first person and third person perspective.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I'm not sure I understand this; why can't I make that distinction? I experience my thoughts differently than I experience what I assume are your thoughts.

You experience other peoples thoughts?? You mean telepathy??

 

[Pyrian]

No, I don't mean telepathy, I mean reading this forum. Was that too difficult a connection for you to make, Ian? Your thought, your typing, the forum, my screen, my experience.

Which only shows you don't understand the difference between phenomenal and objective.

More precisely, I do not consider them to be in conflict. I can see how that would be difficult for someone who believes in absolute knowledge to comprehend.

Let's forget about Kant for the moment, Pyrian, as you might have to read his Kritik der Reinen Vernunft to understand what I really mean by my criticism.

The problem, Titus, is that article formed the sum total of one of your counter-arguments; if we drop it at this point you have none.

Anyway, I have no qualms about repeating myself when salient commentary is ignored, so here you go:

What do you think will happen when we have enough computing power to model the sum total of brain processes? Will your hypothesized separate-but-connected mind be conspicuous in its absense, or find a way to interact with such software such that we won't be able to tell the difference between it and a human? If the latter, will we be able to pinpoint the effects the mind is having on the software?

Put another way, is your theory falsifiable? It seems to me that it is.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Pyrian,

What is the point of you contributing here? You haven't read scarcely any of this thread, you haven't read anything of Kant, you think I'm a dualist. And yet you feel that you're in a position to pontificate on all these things.

Hey, has it occurred to you that the reason why no-one else may have read Titus's article on Kant is that because no-one else knows anything about Kant's philosophy?? Doesn't deter you though! God forbid.

 

[Pyrian]

Hey, has it occurred to you that the reason why no-one else may have read Titus's article on Kant is that because no-one else knows anything about Kant's philosophy?? Doesn't deter you though! God forbid.

Titus presented that article refuting Kant as a definitive refutation of another posters position. I can find no evidence of any such refutation, and went to his article trying to find the argument.

Frankly, Ian, I've seen considerably less reason from you than anybody else here, so I might question why you're here. You certainly haven't provided a serious refutation of anything I've posted - the best you've done is a few redefinition tricks.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Im not dropping anything

Pyrian,

The problem, Titus, is that article formed the sum total of one of your counter-arguments; if we drop it at this point you have none.

I meant let's forget about what you have understood or misunderstood about Kant's position. I do not drop anything I've claimed. Maybe you should .

What do you think will happen when we have enough computing power to model the sum total of brain processes?

I suppose we shall be quite glad we'd reached the model, but that can in principle only happen if we know enough about the impact by consciousness upon the brain.

Will your hypothesized separate-but-connected mind be conspicuous in its absense, or find a way to interact with such software such that we won't be able to tell the difference between it and a human?

As I said before the software could never mimic the contents of metasubjective cognition. It might mimic the purely physical effects of consciousness, but not consciousness itself. The difference would be that the model could never contain exhaustive metasubjective concepts. In other words, the model could never intelligently communicate about qualia or subjectively in positive terms. At best it could tell you what qualia and subjectivity are not. In other words, the model can have no adequate representation of consciousness.

If the latter, will we be able to pinpoint the effects the mind is having on the software?

You probably mean "on neural computation". Well, yes, if we know everything there is to know about the brain as a purely physical system, it must be possible to pinpoint on what points consciousness influences its processes.

Titus