A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

Titus presented that article refuting Kant as a definitive refutation of another posters position. I can find no evidence of any such refutation, and went to his article trying to find the argument.

Frankly, Ian, I've seen considerably less reason from you than anybody else here, so I might question why you're here. You certainly haven't provided a serious refutation of anything I've posted - the best you've done is a few redefinition tricks.

It is me who started the thread! Perhaps I should only initiate threads then play no further part? Would that be satisfactory to you?

 

[Interesting Ian]

It is me who started the thread! Perhaps I should only initiate threads then play no further part? Would that be satisfactory to you?

Of course most probably the thread would have ended by now if it were not for my contributions. I have made the most posts on this thread. The top 5 posters to this thread are:

Interesting Ian 205
Titus Rivas 110
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos 83
Stimpson J. Cat 73
Mercutio 69

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

We are going around in circles. All you are doing is responding to my arguments by adding additional layers of indirection between the physical effects and the characteristics of consciousness. Such layers of indirection are irrelevant. It does not matter whether a particular characteristic of consciousness has a direct effect on your brain, or an indirect effect through some other aspect of consciousness. All that matters is that it has effects.

Consider the following facts:

1) Any characteristic of consciousness which has no effect, directly or indirectly, on your brain, is a characteristic you don't know about, because if you did, then this would create the situation I mentioned before, where you know about it, but are unable to say you do, or in any way allow that knowledge to effect your actions.

2) If a characteristic of consciousness has a physical effect on your brain, and both consciousness and those interactions with your brain operate according to natural laws, then it is possible, at least in principle, to describe that characteristic in terms of those effects.

To claim that there are characteristics of consciousness which cannot be described in terms of physical effects, is to claim that those characteristics are either supernatural, or have no physical effect on the world, whatsoever. There are no other options, and no amount of indirection of those effects will change this.


That said, what I do not understand is this: What possible reason could you have for assuming that there are facts about consciousness which cannot be determined by studying the effects it has on your brain?

If you were advocating supernaturalism, I could understand this. For example, Ian claims that consciousness does not follow natural laws, and that therefore it clearly cannot be described in terms of its physical effects. But you are advocating naturalism.

What does consciousness do, which a natural process can do, but a natural process which can be described in terms of physical effects, cannot do?

It appears to me that your entire reason for believing that consciousness is non-physical, is intuitive. Is this correct?

Consider parsimony here. If one thing has been made abundantly clear over the past several posts, it is that the form of dualism you are proposing is far less parsimoneous than scientific reductionism.
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To speak of parsimony in this context is absurd. I've once written somewhere that if the right application of Occam's razor can be compared to shaving Plato's beard, the over-zealous application of the principle may be compared to shaving off his ears or nose. Parsimony should not be abused for the denial of the obvious.

How is it in any way obvious that there are characteristics of consciousness which cannot be determined from observations of its effects on your brain? I think you are just saying that it is intuitively obvious that consciousness is irreducibly subjective, and that it therefore cannot be reduced to its physical effects. But as we both know, intuition is not reliable. Parsimony most definitely can be used to deny the intuitively obvious. In fact, that is one of its most important applications.

Can you please explain why this is begging the question? What question?
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Stimpson is begging the question by just claiming apriori that knowledge implies knowledge in the brain and calling other views irrational.
He just assumes knowledge implies knowledge in the brain and there is nothing logical about that assumption.

It is not an assumption, it is a scientific fact. You are just inventing ghost which also know things, that somehow telepathically communicate with the brain. The fact that you believe this, in the absence of any reliable supporting evidence, makes you irrational. The fact that you believe that these ghosts cannot be scientifically studied by observing their interactions with the physical world, makes you a supernaturalist. And the fact that you claim they are not supernatural makes your entire position self-contradictory.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

That's it

Well Stimpson,

We're running in circles, that's right. And it's getting pretty exhausting too on this side ;-)

All the questions you've asked me in your latest post, have been answered by me on former pages. For example, NO, I don't think the claim that qualia aren't reducible to quantifiable processes in the brain is intuitive. I hold it's a perfectly rational standpoint. Another example: natural laws don't equal physical laws.

What's the point of a mere repetition of moves? You claim that my position is irrational. I claim that your position is irrational. We don't seem to convince each other on any point, which makes further discussion pretty useless. So, that's it I suppose. Unless you would be able to ask me really new questions I hadn't answered yet, or formulate new arguments in favour of your position.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Natural vs. Supernatural

Just one more point. I've noticed that many skeptics see the notion of the efficacy of a non-physical mind or consciousness with regard to the physical world as a supernatural notion. As I've said several times before, I regard such efficacy as natural, i.e. part of the (orderly) nature of reality. It's obviously a matter of definition. If you accept that individual minds are irreducible elements within the natural order, you don't have any reason to call it supernatural anymore, regardless of the precise character of their effects on physical reality.
In my system, I'd reserve the word supernatural for anything which transcends the natural order, especially a possible spiritual source of that order, say a divinity.

That's why it is very strange for me to see some of you guys repeat time and again that interaction would be supernatural.

Is it because of your implicit conviction that there is no such thing as irreducible qualia? Is it really necessary to call any non-materialist theory a supernatural theory?

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Stimp
If you were advocating supernaturalism, I could understand this. For example, Ian claims that consciousness does not follow natural laws, and that therefore it clearly cannot be described in terms of its physical effects. But you are advocating naturalism.

Just to make it quite clear, I deny that the physical world is closed, and I believe that we have libertarian free will. I do not believe that our actions follow an algorithm. Does that mean I deny that consciousness follows natural laws? I mean I don't know because I don't know what you mean by natural laws. I maintain our behaviour isn't rigidly governed by physical laws though.

BTW you clearly conflate the effects of consciousness with consciousness itself. I have yet to hear any reason from you why you do this. Until you do one could only consider your position as being gibberish.

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Interaction

As I understand it, Fechner discovered among other things that there was a interactional correspondence, which accords well with the tenets of interactionism. In my interactional system, the mind is basically operating by its own laws but it can also be influenced by the brain. Similarly, the brain basically operates by physical laws, but it is also influenced by the mind. If we follow your idea, we might as well say that as the brain is operating by physical laws, why on earth should its processes follow non-physical laws, i.e. whenever it's influenced by the mind? These questions make no sense, as interactionism holds that there is interaction between minds and brains and the respective laws they operate by.

(underlining mine)

First tell me when the brain follows non-physical laws, then I might make heads or tails of your paragraph.

 

[Titus Rivas]

When the brain follows the mind

Mercutio:

First tell me when the brain follows non-physical laws, then I might make heads or tails of your paragraph.

Whenever it's the non-physical mind rather than the brain which (during incarnation) initiates a particular cognitive process. As stated before, I hold that this is the case in metasubjective cognition. You know the logical deduction already, so please don't ask for it again

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Just one more point. I've noticed that many skeptics see the notion of the efficacy of a non-physical mind or consciousness with regard to the physical world as a supernatural notion. As I've said several times before, I regard such efficacy as natural, i.e. part of the (orderly) nature of reality. It's obviously a matter of definition. If you accept that individual minds are irreducible elements within the natural order, you don't have any reason to call it supernatural anymore, regardless of the precise character of their effects on physical reality.
In my system, I'd reserve the word supernatural for anything which transcends the natural order, especially a possible spiritual source of that order, say a divinity.

I think to be called natural, something ought to operate by natural laws. At the very least, natural laws should be laws we can discern through observation and experiment. You claim that the mind cannot be studied scientifically, yet also claim that its efficacy is "part of the (orderly) nature of reality." There is no way, even in principle, to demonstrate the latter claim if the former claim is true. The mind is supernatural, or nonnatural, or metanatural, or whatever word you'd like to use.

That's why it is very strange for me to see some of you guys repeat time and again that interaction would be supernatural.

Is it because of your implicit conviction that there is no such thing as irreducible qualia? Is it really necessary to call any non-materialist theory a supernatural theory?

I don't think it has anything to do with qualia. I think the simple fact that you say the mind interacts with the brain, yet cannot be understood by science, makes your theory supernatural. I don't understand why you expect scientists to pay attention to this theory, especially when they have plenty of fruitful theories to work on.

I suspect that your puppetmaster theory is designed to ensure that a discarnate mind can retain its memories and personality. I think you're putting the cart before the horse.

~~ Paul

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Bye bye, Bill

BillHoyt,

As I don't want to alter my own standards, I will just ignore you from now on.

Titus

Oh, I am soooooooo rude to have said the emperor has no clothes.

Titus, you have made claims here at JREF. Asking you to back up those claims with evidence is well within the rules. In fact, it is very much encouraged by JREF. I note your refusal to respond to repeated requests for evidence. I note your attempt to respond to such requests with a URL to a book review.

For someone who claims to be a parapsychologist, your assiduous avoidance of requests for evidence is quite interesting. You certainly could have responded with citations to your own research in reincarnation, telepathy, animal PSI, Near-Death Experiences and intrasomatical psychokinesis, couldn't you? But you did not, which causes one to speculate that you know exactly how weak the evidence is and that your arguments would crumble under such scrutiny.

So, TR, don't expect me to buy your "standards" line, or your intellectual dishonesty. Peddle it on a believers site.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Ping pong

Paul,

I think to be called natural, something ought to operate by natural laws. At the very least, natural laws should be laws we can discern through observation and experiment. You claim that the mind cannot be studied scientifically, yet also claim that its efficacy is "part of the (orderly) nature of reality." There is no way, even in principle, to demonstrate the latter claim if the former claim is true. The mind is supernatural, or nonnatural, or metanatural, or whatever word you'd like to use.

Again, in my system a law is natural as soon as we are talking about regularities within nature. As I believe both the mind and he brain are part of nature (i.e. of the natural order rather than part of a supernatural god), interactional laws are natural laws by this definition.

I suspect that your puppetmaster theory is designed to ensure that a discarnate mind can retain its memories and personality. I think you're putting the cart before the horse.

That's exactly how I feel about eliminative materialism. In an attempt to exorcize anything non-physical from science, the non-physical is simply denied.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Not impressed by all the fireworks

BillHoyt,

On top of the standards of this Forum, I have my own standards. Again, I won't alter them for you. Try to start a (civil or other) conversation with somebody else on this forum.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Bye bye, Bill

Oh, I am soooooooo rude to have said the emperor has no clothes.

Titus, you have made claims here at JREF. Asking you to back up those claims with evidence is well within the rules.

As apparently are asking stupid questions. It is not a question of evidence but rather one of ontological analysis.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

Just one more point. I've noticed that many skeptics see the notion of the efficacy of a non-physical mind or consciousness with regard to the physical world as a supernatural notion. As I've said several times before, I regard such efficacy as natural, i.e. part of the (orderly) nature of reality. It's obviously a matter of definition.

Perhaps you could define what you mean when you say something is natural? I have no idea what you mean by "orderly nature of reality". Are you saying that natural just means real?

If you accept that individual minds are irreducible elements within the natural order, you don't have any reason to call it supernatural anymore, regardless of the precise character of their effects on physical reality.
In my system, I'd reserve the word supernatural for anything which transcends the natural order, especially a possible spiritual source of that order, say a divinity.

How could anything which is part of reality transcend the orderly nature of reality? I have no idea what you are trying to say here.

That's why it is very strange for me to see some of you guys repeat time and again that interaction would be supernatural.

Did you see where I explained what I mean by natural laws? I assumed that since you did not raise any objection, that you agreed with what I said. When we (scientific materialists) talk about naturalism, we are talking about the assumption that everything functions according to a set of consistent logical rules. As Ian puts it, an algorithm.

Is it because of your implicit conviction that there is no such thing as irreducible qualia?

No, my conviction that there is no such thing as irreducible qualia comes from my conviction that naturalism is true, and that qualia have physical effects. The fact that qualia have physical effects implies that they can either be described in terms of those effects, or that they are supernatural.

Is it really necessary to call any non-materialist theory a supernatural theory?

No, but it is necessary to call any theory which holds that things affect the physical world, but cannot be described in terms of those physical effects, a supernatural theory.

Clearly there is no empirical evidence that there is something like what you are describing, interacting with the brain. That means that your entire reason for believing that there is something interacting with the brain, comes from your belief that consciousness does things which the brain simply can not do. But what can the brain not do, that is not also impossible for any other mathematically describable system? If the system you are claiming is interacting with the brain can be described in terms of some set of consistent logical rules, then there is absolutely no reason to think that the brain is incapable of doing whatever it is you think this system is doing.

And even if you could prove that there are aspects of consciousness which the brain could not possibly do, if you agree that these things follow consistent logical rules, then there is no reason to believe those rules cannot be determined by studying its interactions with the brain.

If it does not operate according to such rules, then it is supernatural. I cannot prove that there are not supernatural influences on the physical world. I can, and do, claim that the there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that there are, and that therefore the belief that there are is irrational.

Appeals to consciousness, subjectivity, qualia, etc..., do not in any way demonstrate that there is any aspect of consciousness which does not function according to consistent logical rules. Nor is there anything about our subjective experiences that logically implies that consciousness cannot be completely understood by studying our brain activity.


Ian,

Just to make it quite clear, I deny that the physical world is closed, and I believe that we have libertarian free will. I do not believe that our actions follow an algorithm. Does that mean I deny that consciousness follows natural laws?

That is exactly what it means.

I mean I don't know because I don't know what you mean by natural laws. I maintain our behaviour isn't rigidly governed by physical laws though.

Natural laws: A set of consistent logical rules which completely describe something.

Physical Laws: A set of consistent logical rules which completely describe something in terms of its physical effects.

If Libertarian free-will exists, then your behavior is not governed by any natural laws at all, physical or otherwise.

BTW you clearly conflate the effects of consciousness with consciousness itself. I have yet to hear any reason from you why you do this. Until you do one could only consider your position as being gibberish.

I do no such thing. When I claim that consciousness is reducible to its physical effects, I am not claiming that it is its physical effects. I am claiming that it can be scientifically described in terms of those effects. This is no different than the approach used by science for any other phenomenon. We describe everything in terms of their physical effects. To claim that consciousness has characteristics which cannot be described in terms of its physical effects, is absolutely no different than claiming that anything else has characteristics which cannot be described in terms of its physical effects. It is pure metaphysical speculation, for which there can never be any supporting evidence.


I see absolutely no reason to assume that some aspect of reality which clearly exists (consciousness) cannot be scientifically understood, until such time as it is unambiguously demonstrated that this is the case.


Dr. Stupid

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Re: Re: Bye bye, Bill

As apparently are asking stupid questions. It is not a question of evidence but rather one of ontological analysis.

Yes, we already know you have absolutely no evidence. We're just establishing that Titus is in the same sinking boat.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Encore

Stimpson said:

Are you saying that natural just means real?

No, I'm saying that supernatural is a term that should be reserved for a hypothetical transcendent source of nature. If that source is real, then reality comprises the natural and the supernatural. But by my definition, consciousness and the experient is natural.

How could anything which is part of reality transcend the orderly nature of reality? I have no idea what you are trying to say here.

It's not very complex though. I'm just saying that the supernatural would transcend the natural order, in stead of claiming that it would be transcendent to reality as a whole (as that would be absurd, since the supernatural would be part of that reality).

we are talking about the assumption that everything functions according to a set of consistent logical rules.

In that sense I certainly believe that there are psychological laws of perception, thought and emotion as well as interactional laws of brain-mind interaction. But that doesn't mean I would consider these physical laws, in the sense that all the processes would be observable from a third person perspective.

The fact that qualia have physical effects implies that they can either be described in terms of those effects, or that they are supernatural.

Again, you seem to be confusing cause and effects. I've no problem if you insist on calling my position supernatural, as long as you acknowledge that it isn't seen from within my own perspective. In my perspective, qualia and mind-brain interactions are part of the natural order and at the same time irreducible to anything purely physical.

Clearly there is no empirical evidence that there is something like what you are describing, interacting with the brain.

That depends on the term 'empirical'. If you define this as: 'observable either by introspection or through physical registration', then we all have plenty of empirical, i.e. introspective evidence for a non-physical mind and by deduction also for its effects on the physical world. If you exclude introspection from the category of empirical evidence, you simply ban consciousness from science. Which doesn't make your eliminative materialism any less irrational by the way.

If the system you are claiming is interacting with the brain can be described in terms of some set of consistent logical rules, then there is absolutely no reason to think that the brain is incapable of doing whatever it is you think this system is doing.

Wrong, you seem to overlook the fact that I was talking about conceptual cognitive processing concerning subjectivity or 'metasubjective cognition'. As metasubjective cognition itself is non-quantifiable (due to the non-quantifiable nature of qualia) it cannot be performed by the brain. That does not imply there wouldn't be any natural egularities within metasubjective cognition. But again, such regularities aren't equal to the conceptual contents of this type of cognition. The regularities may well be describable in mathematical terms, but the concepts are not. And that's what I was talking about.

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

That depends on the term 'empirical'. If you define this as: 'observable either by introspection or by physical registration', then we all have plenty of empirical, i.e. introspective evidence for a non-physical mind and by deduction also for its effects on the physical world.

Such as? What have you introspected about your mind that leads you to think it is not a product of brain processes? When you think about various things, can you tell the difference between your brain doing the thinking and your mind doing it? If I shut off your brain, can you still do the mind thinking?

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Re: When the brain follows the mind

Whenever it's the non-physical mind rather than the brain which (during incarnation) initiates a particular cognitive process. As stated before, I hold that this is the case in metasubjective cognition. You know the logical deduction already, so please don't ask for it again

...so I looked back for "metasubjective cognition", to remind myself of the logical deduction...

I've explained that before. I don't know what -if any- part of knowledge is stored in the brain. I can be sure however that at least part of it is not stored in the brain, but in the mind (which here is a better term than consciousness, as it comprises at least consciousness and knowledge about consciousness), namely all of the knowledge of consciousness qua consciousness. I've termed this type of knowledge "metasubjective" (or "metaphenomenal")knowledge.

...ah, yes, the logical deduction. "I assume that the mind does stuff, and I call what it does metasubjective cognition". I also like the phrase "I can be sure...". I'll have to try it sometime.

 

[Titus Rivas]

What more should I repeat?

Mercutio,

I have given reasons for my position. You'll find them on this thread.

Paul,

You're once again confusing cause and effect.

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus, I am sure you have a picture, perhaps even a model, of your puppetmaster theory in your head. You have described bits of it to us. But you do not seem to understand that you have not given us a coherent description that we can understand. If you won't give us one, that's fine, but please stop being so amazed that we don't get it.

Vague appeals to the obviousity of peeling off some portion of the brain and placing it in the ether is not an explanation.

~~ Paul