A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Pyrian]

I don't have time to read this entire thread - I read the first page and the last.

Obviously I missed a lot.

What I've seen a lot of is Titus Rivas attacking the position that consciousness MUST be a result of physical processes - at least, that's what I've gotten out of it.

What I'm looking for is the converse of that argument, that consciousness must have a non-material component. Could someone point me in that direction?

 

[Dancing David]

Titus;

I have read the introspection argument,

and I would still argue that the expeiences are not irreducible. They can be reduced and discussed. They are alos learned, you as child did not recognise many of the more complex emotions. They are usualy taught. Even adults frequently need help in learning to identify and label thier emotions.

So they are open to discussion which makes them open to examination. While we can, and should rightly, claim to have independant expeiences; that does not mean that they can not be studied in the scientific sense. It is part of biology and just as understanding the genetics of a horse does not make a horse less beautiful, the study of consiousness does not reduce the wonder of awareness.


As a side point the buddha said that :
It is a mistake to think that we are better than someone else, it is a mistake to think that we are worse than someone lese, it is a mistake to assume we are the same as someone else.


To all:

This discussion has carried on for over two pages with the bare minimum of name calling!

You all stink!

 

[Titus Rivas]

Examination

So they are open to discussion which makes them open to examination. While we can, and should rightly, claim to have independant expeiences; that does not mean that they can not be studied in the scientific sense.

Dancing David, I'm sorry to say so, but please read again.

Examination does not equal physical examination. That should be enough for now. It's about 3 a.m. over here, so I'm getting some sleep

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Paul, though I've said this more than once before, let me repeat that being (partially or even totally) a -hypothetical- product of physical processes does not equal being a physical process itself. Is that really so hard to understand? If it is, can you explain why?

I agree: A product of a physical process is not a physical process. It is, exactly, the product of a physical process. Why would that make it supernatural?

Ian said:

I'm afraid not as I have explained. I have told you and Dymanic a couple of days ago why consciousness should not be considered physical simply because it has an effect on the world. Are you truly too stupid to understand?

Apparently so. What was the explanation again?

Stimpy said:

As I said, this issue is completely irrelevant to my argument. To claim that there are characteristics of consciousness which are irreducibly subjective, is to claim that those characteristics have no physical effects.

and Ian replied:

Emmmmm . . .how is it possible that someone could be so stupid as to think this???

Don't know. Now if it's irreducibly subjective, which part of it has physical effects?

Qualia are not physical because there is absolutely zero commonality between qualia and the physical.

A commonality: The quale of redness pertains to the color red.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Dancing David said:

To all:

This discussion has carried on for over two pages with the bare minimum of name calling!

You all stink!

As someone said: "I was hoping to settle this without avoiding some sort of argument."

~~ Paul

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Response to BillHoyt

Hi BillHoyt, No sirree. I'm a dualist interactionist, which means I recognize the existence of somatogenic effects upon consciousness.

Interesting. I have to suppose that "dualist interactionist" roughly translates to "I know dualism has a fundamental problem and I shall try to dodge it." Now before you dispute this, I must point out your statement:

There is efficacy regarding the mind (through introspection) and there is efficacy regarding the physical world (through action). Two different things.

"Two different things". Alas, it is more than that. First, your description here misses the full nature of this interaction. Your "ghost" receives information from the physical world. You missed that. The "ghost" also wants something, some change, and somehow directs that action to the physical world. That is the action part to which you alluded.

But it gets even more complicated, resulting in greater and greater dodges. We can alter what the "ghost" reports as its experiences. Even those you classify as "introspective". We can put the mind into a dream state, or semi-dream states, and direct its imagined experiences. We can alter the "introspection".

Scratch a bit deeper and dualism begins to bleed to death. We can hook electrodes to the brain, and make the ghost replay past experience. The ghost loses all control! Place certain chemicals in the body and the ghost's wants suddenly change. The ghost's essential personality is altered. Cut the brain in specific locations and those alterations are permanent.

This ghost of yours is mighty puny, I'm afraid. We can make it make it dance like a sock puppet, with physical existents in control of its every hurk and jerk.

Why should I be concerned with your impotent, girlie-ghost? It seems to me that, if it exists at all, my chemicals are far more powerful. My surgery trumps the phantasm every time. Why should I care that you can construct such a lame ideation? I can put it to sleep by turning the gas knob.


About the unrealibility of introspection, I'd like to refer to my answer to Mercutio.

I suppose you mean qualities.

The term irreducible simply refers here to the fact that we can't reduce the qualities to anything else than themselves without losing their identity. I understand the misunderstanding

Best wishes,

Titus [/B][/QUOTE]

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Response to BillHoyt

Hi BillHoyt, No sirree. I'm a dualist interactionist, which means I recognize the existence of somatogenic effects upon consciousness.

Interesting. I have to suppose that "dualist interactionist" roughly translates to "I know dualism has a fundamental problem and I shall try to dodge it." Now before you dispute this, I must point out your statement:

There is efficacy regarding the mind (through introspection) and there is efficacy regarding the physical world (through action). Two different things.

"Two different things". Alas, it is more than that. First, your description here misses the full nature of this interaction. Your "ghost" receives information from the physical world. You missed that. The "ghost" also wants something, some change, and somehow directs that action to the physical world. That is the action part to which you alluded.

But it gets even more complicated, resulting in greater and greater dodges. We can alter what the "ghost" reports as its experiences. Even those you classify as "introspective". We can put the mind into a dream state, or semi-dream states, and direct its imagined experiences. We can alter the "introspection".

Scratch a bit deeper and dualism begins to bleed to death. We can hook electrodes to the brain, and make the ghost replay past experience. The ghost loses all control! Place certain chemicals in the body and the ghost's wants suddenly change. The ghost's essential personality is altered. Cut the brain in specific locations and those alterations are permanent.

This ghost of yours is mighty puny, I'm afraid. We can make it make it dance like a sock puppet, with physical existents in control of its every hurk and jerk.

Why should I be concerned with your impotent, girlie-ghost? It seems to me that, if it exists at all, my chemicals are far more powerful. My surgery trumps the phantasm every time. Why should I care that you can construct such a lame ideation? I can put it to sleep by turning up the anaesthesia knob.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Examination

Dancing David, I'm sorry to say so, but please read again.

Examination does not equal physical examination. That should be enough for now. It's about 3 a.m. over here, so I'm getting some sleep

Best wishes,

Titus

Wow, you type better in English at three in the morning than I do at eight in the morning!

I would start the counter move by saying that while perhaps each experience is unique, which I do believe because I don't believe in the self, there are commonalities to the experiences.

These commonalities can lead to some ineteresting things from the point of view of the very young science psychology. There are now methods for dealing with depression that are generated by examining these commonalities.

So while there may be point at which a reasonable person(you, me& Mecrutio) might say, this is the limit of the subjective, it can be examined and put to the scientific method.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hoyt said:

Why should I be concerned with your impotent, girlie-ghost? It seems to me that, if it exists at all, my chemicals are far more powerful. My surgery trumps the phantasm every time. Why should I care that you can construct such a lame ideation? I can put it to sleep by turning the gas knob.

Most excellent sig material! I nominate this for something.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Examination

Wow, you type better in English at three in the morning than I do at eight in the morning!. [/B]

Well it's 3am for me now too. I'm also drunk and knackered. I see little reason though why it should have any effect on my tpying ability.

Goodnight.

 

[Mercutio]

Hoyt said:
Most excellent sig material! I nominate this for something.

~~ Paul

Do so! (I checked; as of this post, you had not yet...)

DancingDavid--be careful...calling me reasonable may be going too far out on a limb!

 

[Titus Rivas]

Common misconceptions

Paul and Hoyt,

You seem to think that admitting that consciousness is not physical is the same as claiming it is 'supernatural'. In my system consciousness is part of the natural order, because consciousness is just as basic as matter. It's you who create the problem by terming it supernatural.

Then, Hoyt seems to think that a consciousness which is not physical should be a consciousness which can't be affected by anything physical. Another strawman I'd say. As I said before, somatogenic influences are part and parcel of interactionism.

By the way, have you ever heard of Penfield's research? Take a look at this paper, to see how inevitable drawing materialist conclusions from brain research really is. If you were right, all dualist neurologists would be just plain stupid. Let's reserve that title for Stimpson.

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

But therein lies your problem. I submit that it is impossible for you to know anything about any characteristics of consciousness other than those which have effects on the physical world.
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You submit incorrectly. Let's skip the metaphysical behaviourism nonsense should we?

This has nothing to do with behaviorism. It doesn't make any difference how you know about the characteristic. You can infer it from behavior, or directly experience it, or even "anomalously cognate" it, for all I care. The fact remains that if you know about it, then it has physical effects. This means that any characteristic of consciousness you know about, is necessarily a physical characteristic.

You can easily prove me wrong. Simply name a characteristic of consciousness that you know about, but which has no physical effect.

The proof of this is simple. If you know something about a characteristic of consciousness, then that knowledge can affect your actions.
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But which certainly isn't identical to our actions.

So what? It's a physical effect. End of story.

Even if you assert that there is more to thought and memory than brain processes, the fact remains that everything you know, has an effect on your actions, and thus has physical effects.
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Even if this is so, this does not establish identity.

I am not arguing about identity here. I am arguing that consciousness is physical. Once that is accepted, we can worry about whether it is identical to brain processes, or something else which affects brain processes.

This means that you can divide the characteristics of consciousness into two subsets, A and B:

Subset A consists entirely of characteristics which can be inferred from the physical effects that consciousness has. In effect, set A is everything that science could ever potentially try to study. If consciousness functions according to natural laws,
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You mean the world is physically closed? What makes you think that?

You are going backwards here, Ian. I am not claiming that the world is physically closed, and then from that claiming that interactive dualism is false. I am showing that if the world is naturally closed, then by the definition of physical, it is also physically closed.

then this subset of characteristics can be understood scientifically, and would be considered by a materialist to be all there is to consciousness.
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So, a materialist thinks we're all p-zombies. I thought so

If by "p-zombie" you mean "somebody who doesn't think there is anything more to his own consciousness than what he knows about", then yes. As far as I know, this is not the standard definition of the term.

Subset B consists entirely of characteristics which do not have any effects on anything physical.
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I feel there is no such subset

Good for you. If this is the case, then your only options are that consciousness is physical, or consciousness is supernatural. We already know that you choose the second option, so I don't see why you have a problem with any of this.

I think you should be able to see the problem here. If you agree that consciousness functions according to natural laws,
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No I don't.

I know, but Titus does, and he is who I was addressing.

Interactive dualism is vacuous. When you consider it logically, it ends up being exactly equivalent to either materialism (all of consciousness is in set A, and it functions according to natural laws),
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What a perverse idea of logic you have Stimp.

Another brilliant refutation from Ian.

The fact that you know about it implies that it has an effect on the physical world. If it doesn't have an effect on the physical world, you don't know about it.
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Is this just because of the way the world is? Or are you insinuating a logically necessary relationship here? You cannot conclude the latter without begging the question.

I am saying that it is a trivial observation that this is the way things are. I don't know what you mean by "logically necessary" in this context. When you ask if something is logically necessary, you must stipulate the premises from which that necessity is derived.

This means that unless you are going to claim that it does not function according to natural laws, every single aspect of consciousness that you could possibly know you have, can be explained scientifically.
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Science only deals with the physical i.e our sensory perceptions. It does not deal with the self which has those perceptions. You are conflating the experienced with the experiencer. Naughty naughty!

You are completely ignoring my argument, and attacking individual statements out of context, as usual. Why do you bother? Do you even realize that you are doing this?

And again you fail to realize that even if I were to agree with this, it would be completely irrelevant. There is no characteristic of consciousness that you know about that does not have a physical effect on the world.
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How often do you need to be told that this is wholly irrelevant??

Simply telling me that it is irrelevant isn't going to convince me. Try actually presenting a counter-argument, rather than just assertions.

You can speculate all you want about such characteristics, but none of those hypothetical characteristics can possibly be what you directly experience as consciousness.
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Oh but we do experience it. Only a p-zombie could plausibly deny this.

Did you even read my argument, or just skim over it, and pick out random phrases to attack? The point is that we are not p-zombies, we do have direct experiences, and those direct experiences must have physical effects.

Stimp
Great. Then you need to explain how there are more than the two following options:

1) Consciousness functions according to natural laws. Since all characteristics of consciousness have effects on the physical world, those natural laws can be inferred by observing the effects consciousness has on other things. This is exactly how we scientifically study any other phenomenon. Thus consciousness can be understood scientifically, in exactly the same manner as any other physical phenomena.
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Even if consciousness did function according to natural (physical) laws, this is not what consciousness is. You are describing a world of p-zombies, not real people.

Metaphysical nonsense. How is this any different than claiming that our scientific descriptions of electrons, in terms of their physical effects, are not what they are? Of course they're not! That is not the point.

I don't give a rat's @ss what consciousness, or anything else "is". What I care about is an accurate and reliable description of it. In this respect, I fail to see how consciousness is different from any other phenomenon which has physical effects, or why we should imagine that it has some sort of special metaphysical properties that nothing else has.

While Idealists and Dualists are fantasizing about metaphysical worlds where consciousness is somehow "special", scientists are busy figuring out how the world we actually live in works. If you want to imagine that consciousness is the source of all reality, or that your mind will survive your death, or that you will be reincarnated after you die, etc..., go right ahead. Just don't expect anybody else to care, and don't try to claim that people who do not delude themselves into believing that such fantasies are true, are being irrational.

2) Consciousness does not function according to natural laws.

If you select option (1), then consciousness meets all of the criteria for being "physical" that any other physical object or process meets. That is materialism.
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I'm afraid not as I have explained. I have told you and Dymanic a couple of days ago why consciousness should not be considered physical simply because it has an effect on the world. Are you truly too stupid to understand?

You presented no actual argument to be understood. Only assertions which beg the question.

If you choose (2), then that is supernaturalism.
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Gosh! Free will is supernatural! Is . .er . . this supposed to constitute some sort of reason or evidence?? LOL

If you believe that free-will is supernatural, and that people actually have it, then you are a supernaturalist. So what? I can't prove that supernaturalism is false. You can't prove that naturalism is false. All we can do is argue about which view seems to more accurately represent the world we actually live in.

As I said, this issue is completely irrelevant to my argument. To claim that there are characteristics of consciousness which are irreducibly subjective, is to claim that those characteristics have no physical effects.
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Emmmmm . . .how is it possible that someone could be so stupid as to think this???

I often wonder the same thing myself.

What does that mean? If all of their characteristics have physical effects, then in what sense are they not physical? Certainly they meet every criteria that anything else which is physical meets.
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Qualia are not physical because there is absolutely zero commonality between qualia and the physical.

On the contrary, the commonality is 100%. Qualia possess all of the necessary and sufficient characteristics for being physical.



Titus,

The fact that you know about it implies that it has an effect on the physical world. If it doesn't have an effect on the physical world, you don't know about it.
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That's where you go astray. I never said that knowing consciousness in itself implies that consciousness has an effect on the physical world.

I know you didn't. I did. Can you refute this obvious claim?

I don't hold that knowing consciousness is a physical phenomenon. I hold that it is a mental, non-physical phenomenon, based on introspection.

Irrelevant. If knowing consciousness has physical effects, then consciousness has physical effects. You can shift as much of cognition as you want into this hypothetical "non-physical" category. It does not change the fact that anything in that category that we are capable of knowing about, has physical effects, and therefore qualifies for being called "physical" every bit as much as anything else which we claim is "physical".

Introspection is not a physical phenomenon. In my system, the fact that consciousness has physical effects too is not equal to the fact that we know consciousness through introspection or vice versa. These are two distinctly different facts, though both are correct.

You can claim that all you want. It has no relevance to the argument I have presented. It does not matter by what mechanism you know about it. The point is that if you know about it, then it is physical.

This means that unless you are going to claim that it does not function according to natural laws, every single aspect of consciousness that you could possibly know you have, can be explained scientifically.
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Not if you mean by natural physical, nor if you mean by scientifically 'via the methods of physical science'. You leave out introspection, which implies subjectivity itself.

Nonsense. Like I said, if every characteristic of consciousness has physical effects, and functions according to natural laws, then we can study every characteristic of consciousness by applying science to those physical effects. Since introspection, like everything else, has physical effects, it is not left out. It too can be studied scientifically, by looking at its physical effects.

The only way a scientific understanding of consciousness would not be possible is if either consciousness does not function according to natural laws (supernaturalism), or it has characteristics which have no physical effects (epiphenomenalism).

You can speculate all you want about such characteristics, but none of those hypothetical characteristics can possibly be what you directly experience as consciousness.
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You've clearly misunderstood my position. There is efficacy regarding the mind (through introspection) and there is efficacy regarding the physical world (through action [other than introspection]). Two different things.

No, just another layer of abstraction. If all of the characteristics of consciousness have physical effects, then consciousness has only physical characteristics. This is a tautology. Adding layer upon layer of abstraction between consciousness and the physical effects, does not change this.

All a physical law is, is a natural law which can be determined from observation of physical interactions. If, as you claim, all characteristics of consciousness have physical effects, then it necessarily follows that any natural laws they follow are, by definition, physical laws.
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I hope you see now where our views differ regarding the definition of a natural law.

The difference is that you don't recognize irreducible qualities and subjectivity. That's why you're an eliminative materialist and that's why I'm a dualist.

I hope that clarifies it for you.

It clarifies nothing. As I said before, irreducible subjectivity is a contradiction in terms. If every characteristic of X has physical effects, then X can be completely described in terms of those physical effects. That is what scientific reductionism means.

I suppose you could be a scientific reductionist with respect to consciousness, but still believe there is some sort of metaphysical difference between consciousness and everything else. But that is not a very rational, or coherent, position.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Stimp
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But therein lies your problem. I submit that it is impossible for you to know anything about any characteristics of consciousness other than those which have effects on the physical world.
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II
You submit incorrectly. Let's skip the metaphysical behaviourism nonsense should we?
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Stimp
This has nothing to do with behaviorism. It doesn't make any difference how you know about the characteristic. You can infer it from behavior, or directly experience it, or even "anomalously cognate" it, for all I care. The fact remains that if you know about it, then it has physical effects. This means that any characteristic of consciousness you know about, is necessarily a physical characteristic.

You can easily prove me wrong. Simply name a characteristic of consciousness that you know about, but which has no physical effect.


Stimp
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The proof of this is simple. If you know something about a characteristic of consciousness, then that knowledge can affect your actions.
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II
But which certainly isn't identical to our actions.
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Stimp
So what? It's a physical effect. End of story.


Stimp
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Even if you assert that there is more to thought and memory than brain processes, the fact remains that everything you know, has an effect on your actions, and thus has physical effects.
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II
Even if this is so, this does not establish identity.
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Stimp
I am not arguing about identity here. I am arguing that consciousness is physical. Once that is accepted, we can worry about whether it is identical to brain processes, or something else which affects brain processes.

Hang on a sec. Why are you starting to talk about this again? I have already refuted this position of yours in 2 or 3 posts a couple of days ago. How did you respond? You essentially went off on a tangent and started arguing about how unreasonable dualism is, or some such nonsense.

If and only if what we currently understand as dualism is correct then it is sheer stupidity to relabel it as materialism. And even if we were to do so, this is simply a relabelling and doesn't render your metaphysical position any more likely!

Must I paste in my posts demonstrating this??

 

[Titus Rivas]

Effect and cause

Dr Stupid:

Can you refute this obvious claim?

It's even quite simple. We don't have to act physically on our knowledge of consciousness. Our knowledge can be without specific physical consequences observable by physical science. Note that I'm not talking about possible physical correlates of consciousness, but about the contents of our knowledge of consciousness which as such can't have exhaustive physical correlates.

No, just another layer of abstraction.

Only if you regard knowledge as a layer of abstraction of physical processes in the brain. In other words, only if you're an eliminative materialist. You're begging the question, in other words. I don't see knowledge of consciousness as physical and I've given my reasons on this forum as to why I don't.

t clarifies nothing. As I said before, irreducible subjectivity is a contradiction in terms. If every characteristic of X has physical effects, then X can be completely described in terms of those physical effects. That is what scientific reductionism means.

This is a game of words. I'm talking about ontological reduction, and you know I do. Within an ontological perspective, your error consists of a failure to distinguish between cause (consciousness) and effect (physical effects of consciousness).

But that is not a very rational, or coherent, position.

Curiously enough that's more or less how I view your own position.

I'm not sure if this discussion leads anywhere.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

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This means that you can divide the characteristics of consciousness into two subsets, A and B:

Subset A consists entirely of characteristics which can be inferred from the physical effects that consciousness has. In effect, set A is everything that science could ever potentially try to study. If consciousness functions according to natural laws,
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You mean the world is physically closed? What makes you think that?
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You are going backwards here, Ian. I am not claiming that the world is physically closed, and then from that claiming that interactive dualism is false. I am showing that if the world is naturally closed, then by the definition of physical, it is also physically closed.

This is interesting. Before today you have never drawn any distinction between natural laws and physical laws. Now Titus mentions a distinction last night and you act as if you have been aware of such a distinction and have been earnestly discussing it for many years!

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Subset B consists entirely of characteristics which do not have any effects on anything physical.
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I feel there is no such subset
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Good for you. If this is the case, then your only options are that consciousness is physical, or consciousness is supernatural.

Well you're just saying here that if consciousness is not physical, then it is supernatural. You continually try to win by relabelling positions so as to try and convey, by the substituted words, that your position is the more reasonable. You do it all the time and it is infuriating. Can't you win your arguments honestly? Ummmm . . .silly question!

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I think you should be able to see the problem here. If you agree that consciousness functions according to natural laws,
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No I don't.
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I know, but Titus does, and he is who I was addressing.

What does a natural law mean then if it doesn't mean a physical law? I'm simply denying consciousness functions according to physical laws. I might well concede consciousness functions according to "natural laws" if you specify what you mean.

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Stimp
Great. Then you need to explain how there are more than the two following options:

1) Consciousness functions according to natural laws. Since all characteristics of consciousness have effects on the physical world, those natural laws can be inferred by observing the effects consciousness has on other things. This is exactly how we scientifically study any other phenomenon. Thus consciousness can be understood scientifically, in exactly the same manner as any other physical phenomena.
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Even if consciousness did function according to natural (physical) laws, this is not what consciousness is. You are describing a world of p-zombies, not real people.
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Metaphysical nonsense. How is this any different than claiming that our scientific descriptions of electrons, in terms of their physical effects, are not what they are? Of course they're not! That is not the point.

Electrons are more than their physical effects?? What metaphysical unsubstantiated nonsense is this??

I don't give a rat's @ss what consciousness, or anything else "is". What I care about is an accurate and reliable description of it.

You can't describe it if you don't know what it is! This is different of course for the physical realm as its reality is exhausted by a description.

And by the way, I believe ass is an allowed word.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

It's even quite simple. We don't have to act physically on our knowledge of consciousness. Our knowledge can be without specific physical consequences observable by physical science. Note that I'm not talking about possible physical correlates of consciousness, but about the contents of our knowledge of consciousness which as such can't have exhaustive physical correlates.

Where is this "content of our knowledge of consciousness"? If it is on the consciousness side of the fence entirely, then how are we talking about it? If it is on the brain side of the fence, it has physical consequences.

Only if you regard knowledge as a layer of abstraction of physical processes in the brain. In other words, only if you're an eliminative materialist. You're begging the question, in other words. I don't see knowledge of consciousness as physical and I've given my reasons on this forum as to why I don't.

Ah, so it's on the consciousness side of the fence. How are we talking about it, then?

This is a game of words. I'm talking about ontological reduction, and you know I do. Within an ontological perspective, your error consists of a failure to distinguish between cause (consciousness) and effect (physical effects of consciousness).

You keep saying that consciousness is irreducibly subjective. If so, how can it have a physical effect? If it does have a physical effect, then the term "irreducibly subjective" is incorrect. (I understand you're talking ontologically.)

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Why does "having physical effects" imply "being reducible to the physical world"

If so, how can it have a physical effect? If it does have a physical effect, then the term "irreducibly subjective" is incorrect. (I understand you're talking ontologically.)

Paul, I don't see how! Try to explain your position as I find it incomprehensible. I see little more than another attempt at begging the question.

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

Can you refute this obvious claim?
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It's even quite simple. We don't have to act physically on our knowledge of consciousness. Our knowledge can be without specific physical consequences observable by physical science.

Not if it has physical effects, it can't. Overt behavior is irrelevant. If it has physical effects, then those effects can be observed, and consciousness can be described in terms of those effects. To assert that such a description is not complete, is to assert that consciousness has characteristics which have no physical effects.

Note that I'm not talking about possible physical correlates of consciousness, but about the contents of our knowledge of consciousness which as such can't have exhaustive physical correlates.

If the physical effects do not exhaust consciousness, then that necessarily implies that consciousness has characteristics which have no physical effects. That is epiphenomenalism.

No, just another layer of abstraction.
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Only if you regard knowledge as a layer of abstraction of physical processes in the brain. In other words, only if you're an eliminative materialist. You're begging the question, in other words. I don't see knowledge of consciousness as physical and I've given my reasons on this forum as to why I don't.

It is another layer of abstraction, because the same argument I presented for consciousness applies to it. Are there characteristics of knowledge which do not have physical effects? If not, then knowledge is physical. Is it possible for you to know something, anything, without that thing having some physical effect? I say it is not. At the very least, it effects your brain processes, because your brain is thinking about it.

t clarifies nothing. As I said before, irreducible subjectivity is a contradiction in terms. If every characteristic of X has physical effects, then X can be completely described in terms of those physical effects. That is what scientific reductionism means.
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This is a game of words. I'm talking about ontological reduction, and you know I do. Within an ontological perspective, your error consists of a failure to distinguish between cause (consciousness) and effect (physical effects of consciousness).

The very idea of ontological reductionism is nonsense. We could speculate forever on how many different categories of ontological existents there are. What is the point? My whole argument is that such arbitrary categorization is both meaningless and arbitrary.

I am arguing for scientific reductionism. Do you agree with me that consciousness can be scientifically understood by studying its physical effects? If not, why not?

In any event, as I said before, to claim that consciousness is not reducible to its physical effects, is to claim that consciousness has characteristics which are not physical. This is exactly what you are doing when you start talking about it being "non-ontologically reducible". You are not only claiming that consciousness has characteristics with no physical effects, but that everything does, and that consciousness somehow differs from everything else only in these completely unknowable characteristics.

This position is nonsensical. In effect, you are claiming to know something which, by construction, is intrinsically unknowable.

At best you could claim that ontological dualism could be true, as could ontological monism, or any other form of ontological pluralism. But since all of these positions are indistinguishable from each other, it is nonsensical to claim that one of them is true.

Epistemologically, consciousness is no different from anything else. You can claim that it is metaphysically different, but you can never justify such a claim. You certainly cannot reasonably argue that rejection of such a claim is irrational.


Ian,

You are going backwards here, Ian. I am not claiming that the world is physically closed, and then from that claiming that interactive dualism is false. I am showing that if the world is naturally closed, then by the definition of physical, it is also physically closed.
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This is interesting. Before today you have never drawn any distinction between natural laws and physical laws. Now Titus mentions a distinction last night and you act as if you have been aware of such a distinction and have been earnestly discussing it for many years!

This is simply not true. Back when you claimed that the position I hold is not physicalism, but instead naturalism, I pointed out to you that the difference between naturalism and physicalism is that naturalism holds than everything functions according to logical, consistent rules, and physicalism makes the additional assumption that those rules can be determined by studying physical effects. That is exactly what the distinction between natural law and physical law is. A physical law is a natural law which can be determined by observing physical effects.

This has always been my position here. You just weren't paying attention.

Good for you. If this is the case, then your only options are that consciousness is physical, or consciousness is supernatural.
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Well you're just saying here that if consciousness is not physical, then it is supernatural.

Exactly. If X has physical effects, then X is either physical or supernatural. This is a tautology.

You continually try to win by relabelling positions so as to try and convey, by the substituted words, that your position is the more reasonable. You do it all the time and it is infuriating. Can't you win your arguments honestly? Ummmm . . .silly question!

This is not about winning or losing, Ian. It is about presenting our positions logically, and determining if, beneath all of the semantics, there is actually any substantial difference between them.

Metaphysical nonsense. How is this any different than claiming that our scientific descriptions of electrons, in terms of their physical effects, are not what they are? Of course they're not! That is not the point.
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Electrons are more than their physical effects?? What metaphysical unsubstantiated nonsense is this??

That is not what I said, Ian. What I said was that the scientific description of an electron is not an electron. It is a description. The same is true for consciousness. We cannot meaningfully say that there is more to an electron than its physical effects. We also cannot meaningfully say that there is more to consciousness than its physical effects. That is the whole point of my argument.

I don't give a rat's @ss what consciousness, or anything else "is". What I care about is an accurate and reliable description of it.
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You can't describe it if you don't know what it is! This is different of course for the physical realm as its reality is exhausted by a description.

Why is it different, other than that you desperately want it to be?

And by the way, I believe ass is an allowed word.

I know. I just like using the '@' symbol.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Dancing David]

DancingDavid--be careful...calling me reasonable may be going too far out on a limb!

Well spoken, Mercutio is a somewhat cursed character. He also has some of the best lines, and his relationship with Romeo is ... inertesting...

But isn't my feeling that you are reasonable is, well, subjective?