A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Neo

Ha Ha Ha! It's me Interesting Ian Just using a sock puppet.

LOL! Ya got me!

Worst part about it is, I knew that; I just forgot (*adds more caffeine*).

 

[Titus Rivas]

No irreducible feelings of heat in the brain

Dymanic:

Physical pain might also be reduced to neural patterns, but that doesn't mean neurologists can use hotter water than anybody else to wash their dishes

If so, that is a major problem for materialism.

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Materialism rationally leads to nihilism (there can be no intrinsic values, all supposed values reduce to physical patterns devoid of any real value).

I don't agree with you, but I don't understand how postulating a second kind of stuff (consciousness) solves any of this. How does the second stuff confer meaning or purpose or morals or values or spirit or any of these things you want? Why does it do any better at them than the material stuff?

I think the answer is just that you want it to. You've packed up all your spiritual desires and tossed the suitcase into the realm of consciousness, which merely by definition can unpack the suitcase.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

With due respect for Titus, Win & dualists everywhere, how do you dodge Stimpy's Silver Bullet; vis. "If it effects (or affects) the physical it *is* physical"?

I agree that "parallel, exactly-equal-yet-absolutely-unconnected mind/body dualism" is at least logically possible. But why go to that (useless) position -- unless all you're after is "Ego Lives after perceived-as-physical body dies"?

Idealism doesn't answer Big Questions any better than materialism, but at least consciousness (er, "life") does nothing but effect itself -- the only substance that is "what-is"?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

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Physical pain might also be reduced to neural patterns, but that doesn't mean neurologists can use hotter water than anybody else to wash their dishes.
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If so, that is a major problem for materialism.

A dispute about authorship of the rule book is not the same as a dispute about the rules.

 

[BillHoyt]

Idealism doesn't answer Big Questions any better than materialism, but at least consciousness (er, "life") does nothing but effect itself -- the only substance that is "what-is"?

Excuse me? Are you saying rocks are conscious? Or are you saying rocks are me? Or that rocks are imagined?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Idealism doesn't answer Big Questions any better than materialism, but at least consciousness (er, "life") does nothing but effect itself -- the only substance that is "what-is"?

Same is true for "materialism." You just refuse to admit that possibly consciousness is the result of a brain process.

I'm telling you, man, once we get the definitions of idealism and materialism straight, they are going to be equivalent. They both postulate only one existent---how can we possibly tell what that existent actually is?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Same is true for "materialism." You just refuse to admit that possibly consciousness is the result of a brain process.

I'm telling you, man, once we get the definitions of idealism and materialism straight, they are going to be equivalent. They both postulate only one existent---how can we possibly tell what that existent actually is?

~~ Paul

Don't be ridiculous Paul.

 

[Mercutio]

Ah! I was under the impression you subscribed to the existence of a material reality. But even if you do reject the existence of such a reality, you haven't explained why consciousness exists rather than us all being p-zombies? (...)

If you will recall, Neo/Ian, I do claim to be a p-zombie. Given the definition and my own perception, I cannot see any way to prove I am not one... You've seen my spiel on consciousness a few times already; no need to repeat it here. Suffice it to say that I think "explaining why consciousness exists" is premature--we need to show that it does, in a meaningful sense, exist separately from thinking, feeling, remembering, and all the things my physical body does.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Don't be ridiculous Paul.

Aw come on, Ian. If you're going to avoid the whole issue of how we can possibly know whether the stuff is consciousness, material, or furious green dreams, why bothering posting at all?

You get mad at Stimpy for saying that your only support for the fundamental nature of consciousness is that you feel like it's a fundamental thing. But that is your only support. That and saying things like "don't be ridiculous."

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

.....it..... is your only support. That and saying things like "don't be ridiculous."

~~ Paul

Ian is tired of mentioning things like HPC & quale.

I still prefer the material/mind boundary problem as the starting point for which "substance" is more likely imo.

Does idealism have it's own problems? Of course, but I find fewer logical connundrums choosing mind in the binary, is/is not, mind/matter choice. That, and *I* continue to think".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian can mention HPC and qualia all he wants. But the only support for the idea is "I really think they are not material."

As I say: Fine, everything is consciousness instead of material. So what? What problems does that solve except that you now feel better about your feeling that consciousness is not material? Instead of having to deal with obtaining consciousness from matter, you have to deal with obtaining a consistent external world from consciousness. Nothing gained.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

Hamme, do idealists draw a line between life and non life?

I see no place to put one.

Just a different problem of course, perhaps less so if space IS infinitely divisible.

If space is not infinitely divisible, what is the tiniest "what-is" (err, what a concept: a sentient "string" -- for lack of a better term???) embedded in (if you catch my drift)?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Pain or physiological response

A dispute about authorship of the rule book is not the same as a dispute about the rules.

Right, Dymanic, but the point is WHY do the same rules apply to all of us. Because we all feel pain if the water's too hot, or because we all share the same purely physiological and computational processes. I assumed you referred to pain as commonly understood.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Begging the question?

Paul:

I don't agree with you, but I don't understand how postulating a second kind of stuff (consciousness) solves any of this. How does the second stuff confer meaning or purpose or morals or values or spirit or any of these things you want? Why does it do any better at them than the material stuff?

Quite simple. It's because intrinsic values are linked to consciousness. You won't find any values in a purely physical world without conscious experients. So the link is not arbitrary but logical.

I think the answer is just that you want it to. You've packed up all your spiritual desires and tossed the suitcase into the realm of consciousness, which merely by definition can unpack the suitcase.

I can understand that you see it like that from your own viewpoint. But as I've said before, there is no inherent conflict between rationality and any spiritual philosophy. Such a conflict does exist between materialism and spirituality. But then again, I don't regard materialism as rational

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Dualism vs. Idealism

With due respect for Titus, Win & dualists everywhere, how do you dodge Stimpy's Silver Bullet; vis. "If it effects (or affects) the physical it *is* physical"?

Quite simple, Hamme, I don't agree with him. His conclusion can only be logical if you don't accept the existence of an irreducible non-physical consciousness. As soon as one accepts such a consciousness, his equation is nonsensical, as we should not primarily determine the ontological status of an entity by its effects, but by its inherent characteristics. Consciousness cannot be defined in terms of quantifiable physical processes and that's what makes it non-physical, regardless of its effects on the physical world.

I agree that "parallel, exactly-equal-yet-absolutely-unconnected mind/body dualism" is at least logically possible.

I don't, as you can read in this paper .

But why go to that (useless) position -- unless all you're after is "Ego Lives after perceived-as-physical body dies"?

Again, I don't go to that position (I'm an interactionist), and survival of the experient is also compatible with idealism.

Idealism doesn't answer Big Questions any better than materialism, but at least consciousness (er, "life") does nothing but effect itself -- the only substance that is "what-is"?

I mainly have intuitive problems with idealism. First of all, physical reality does seem quite real. Besides, not all of physical reality seems endowed with consciousness. But I agree that certain types of subjective idealism are in principle coherent. It certainly seems a matter of intuitive preference, not of empirical evidence or logical proof. I've a very hard time believing that matter is really nothing more than a type of mind. Which proves again that Paul and others are very wrong saying that it doesn't really matter what label you use for matter. Mind and matter are radically different conceptual categories.
Materialism is the only absurd system. Both dualism and idealism are coherent, and their mutual disagreement has nothing to do with one of them being incoherent.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Dualism vs. Idealism

I mainly have intuitive problems with idealism. First of all, physical reality does seem quite real. Besides, not all of physical reality seems endowed with consciousness. But I agree that certain types of subjective idealism are in principle coherent. It certainly seems a matter of intuitive preference, not of empirical evidence or logical proof. I've a very hard time believing that matter is really nothing more than a type of mind. Which proves again that Paul and other are very wrong saying that it doesn't really matter what label you use for matter. Mind and matter are radically different conceptual categories.
Materialism is the only absurd system. Both dualism and idealism are coherent, and their mutual disagreement has nothing to do with one of them being incoherent.

Titus
[/B]

Well you know there is really one excellent reason to subscribe to subjective idealism, or at least Berkeley's version of it. This is that A.J. Ayer described it as an "excursion into fairyland".

 

[Titus Rivas]

Fairyland

Ian said:

Well you know there is really one excellent reason to subscribe to subjective idealism, or at least Berkeley's version of it. This is that A.J. Ayer described it as an "excursion into fairyland".

Such an excursion is also possible within dualism, but I understand what you mean
By the way, did you know that Ayer had an NDE?

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

With due respect for Titus, Win & dualists everywhere, how do you dodge Stimpy's Silver Bullet; vis. "If it effects (or affects) the physical it *is* physical"?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Quite simple, Hamme, I don't agree with him. His conclusion can only be logical if you don't accept the existence of an irreducible non-physical consciousness. As soon as one accepts such a consciousness, his equation is nonsensical, as we should not primarily determine the ontological status of an entity by its effects, but by its inherent characteristics. Consciousness cannot be defined in terms of quantifiable physical processes and that's what makes it non-physical, regardless of its effects on the physical world.

But therein lies your problem. I submit that it is impossible for you to know anything about any characteristics of consciousness other than those which have effects on the physical world.

The proof of this is simple. If you know something about a characteristic of consciousness, then that knowledge can affect your actions. Never mind for now the fact that the brain is what does your "knowing" and "thinking" for you. Even if you assert that there is more to thought and memory than brain processes, the fact remains that everything you know, has an effect on your actions, and thus has physical effects.

This means that you can divide the characteristics of consciousness into two subsets, A and B:

Subset A consists entirely of characteristics which can be inferred from the physical effects that consciousness has. In effect, set A is everything that science could ever potentially try to study. If consciousness functions according to natural laws, then this subset of characteristics can be understood scientifically, and would be considered by a materialist to be all there is to consciousness.

Subset B consists entirely of characteristics which do not have any effects on anything physical.

I think you should be able to see the problem here. If you agree that consciousness functions according to natural laws, then you are left with epiphenomenalism, and all of its problems. In particular, the problem that you could not possibly have any reason to believe that subset B exists at all, because you could never know about it. All of those aspects of consciousness which you are "intimately acquainted with", or "directly experience", or whatever metaphor your prefer, must necessarily be part of subset A.

Interactive dualism is vacuous. When you consider it logically, it ends up being exactly equivalent to either materialism (all of consciousness is in set A, and it functions according to natural laws), supernatural spiritualism (all of consciousness is in set A, but it doesn't function according to natural laws), or epiphenomenalism (there is suff id set B, but you can't know anything about it).


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

Fundamental disagreement

Stimpson said:

. I submit that it is impossible for you to know anything about any characteristics of consciousness other than those which have effects on the physical world.

I obviously disagree. We don't know what we know about our own consciousness because of its effects on the physical world, but because we observe it with our very minds, i.e. through introspection (and retrospection).

Subset A consists entirely of characteristics which can be inferred from the physical effects that consciousness has. In effect, set A is everything that science could ever potentially try to study. If consciousness functions according to natural laws, then this subset of characteristics can be understood scientifically, and would be considered by a materialist to be all there is to consciousness.

Again, the error you make lies in your lack of recognition of the role of first person introspection. Our primary knowledge of consciousness is that of our own consciousness. This knowledge is the basis of a science of consciousness. Without it, there could be no science whatever of consciousness. Just a denial of what we understand by consciousness from our first-person perspective.

Subset B consists entirely of characteristics which do not have any effects on anything physical.

In my view, all characteristics, including qualia have an effect on the physical world, namely through our knowledge of them via introspection, which is reflected in our actions.

I think you should be able to see the problem here. If you agree that consciousness functions according to natural laws, then you are left with epiphenomenalism, and all of its problems.

A clear case of putting up a straw man. You already know I don't equate natural law with physical law. A law can be natural and non-physical at the same time. That's the whole point of interactionism. I'm an opponent of epiphenomenalism, not an epiphenomenalist.

In particular, the problem that you could not possibly have any reason to believe that subset B exists at all

In my system, there is no subset B; all of consciousness is knowable by introspection and therefore efficacious, including qualia.

All of those aspects of consciousness which you are "intimately acquainted with", or "directly experience", or whatever metaphor your prefer, must necessarily be part of subset A.

Correct, and that's my point.

Interactive dualism is vacuous. When you consider it logically, it ends up being exactly equivalent to either materialism (all of consciousness is in set A, and it functions according to natural laws),

Not in my definition of materialism and not if you don't equate natural laws with physical laws.

supernatural spiritualism (all of consciousness is in set A, but it doesn't function according to natural laws),

Leaving a hypothetical absolutely free will aside, how can anything not function according to a natural law? You probably mean according to physical laws.

The problem is that you fail to recognize the importance of our introspective knowledge of irreducible qualitative and subjective characteristics of consciousness. I recognize that all of these characteristics are necessarily efficacious, including regarding effects on the physical world. What I don't recognize is that qualia are physical.
If you want to tackle my position, you should focus on that point. But then again, you've already made your point, namely that you're an eliminative materialist. That's the main problem, Stimpy, your logic seems pretty sound, but one of your main premisses is seriously ill-founded.

Titus