A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Quite simple. It's because intrinsic values are linked to consciousness. You won't find any values in a purely physical world without conscious experients. So the link is not arbitrary but logical.

That doesn't answer the question. It simply assumes that consciousness is not a product of physical processes.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Being

That doesn't answer the question. It simply assumes that consciousness is not a product of physical processes.

Paul, though I've said this more than once before, let me repeat that being (partially or even totally) a -hypothetical- product of physical processes does not equal being a physical process itself. Is that really so hard to understand? If it is, can you explain why?

Titus

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Fundamental disagreement

The problem is that you fail to recognize the importance of our introspective knowledge of irreducible qualitative and subjective characteristics of consciousness. I recognize that all of these characteristics are necessarily efficacious, including regarding effects on the physical world. What I don't recognize is that qualia are physical.

I think this reads much more accurately if we substitute "assume" for "recognize". I cannot see these things as you do, and I can see that their "existence" is infered from a particular belief system. My experience is likely very similar to yours. My interpretation is vastly different. Our fundamental assumptions differ, not our [experiences].

The problem is that we all tend to fail to recognize our assumptions.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Recognition

Our fundamental assumptions differ, not our [experiences].

You're right, Mercutio, at least if I follow my intuition that you're not really a zombie
However, to call my view just another assumption next to yours, is to deny that we can't rationally doubt the existence of our own consciousness. That's why I talk about recognizing this, not just about assuming this. As Descartes realized, our own inner life is the only thing we can be rationally absolutely sure about. Our opposing interpretations aren't arbitrary; mine is right, yours is wrong. We don't infer anything about the existence of consciousness. Either we recognize its irreducible existence (my position) or we don't (yours). There isn't anything so indubitable as the reality of our own subjective experiences. It's the archimedal point of any rationality.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Recognition

You're right, Mercutio, at least if I follow my intuition that you're not really a zombie
However, to call my view just another assumption next to yours, is to deny that we can't rationally doubt the existence of our own consciousness. That's why I talk about recognizing this, not just about assuming this. As Descartes realized, our own inner life is the only thing we can be rationally sure of. Our opposing interpretations aren't arbitrary; mine is right, yours is wrong. We don't infer anything about the existence of consciousness. Either we recognize its irreducible existence (my position) or we don't (yours). There are few things (if any) so indubitable as the reality of our own subjective experiences.

Best wishes,

Titus

Deny that we can't rationally doubt consciousness? Before I reply, is that what you meant?

Oh, and I'd (of course) say Descartes "assumed" rather than "realized". And (of course) I'd say I disagree.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Can't

Deny that we can't rationally doubt consciousness? Before I reply, is that what you meant?

Yes, as we cannot rationally doubt the existence of consciousness.

Oh, and I'd (of course) say Descartes "assumed" rather than "realized". And (of course) I'd say I disagree.

Let's just say I expected that already

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

. I submit that it is impossible for you to know anything about any characteristics of consciousness other than those which have effects on the physical world.
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I obviously disagree. We don't know what we know about our own consciousness because of its effects on the physical world, but because we observe it with out very minds, i.e. through introspection (and retrospection).

Irrelevant. The fact that you know about it implies that it has an effect on the physical world. If it doesn't have an effect on the physical world, you don't know about it. This means that unless you are going to claim that it does not function according to natural laws, every single aspect of consciousness that you could possibly know you have, can be explained scientifically.

The only alternative is supernaturalism.

Subset A consists entirely of characteristics which can be inferred from the physical effects that consciousness has. In effect, set A is everything that science could ever potentially try to study. If consciousness functions according to natural laws, then this subset of characteristics can be understood scientifically, and would be considered by a materialist to be all there is to consciousness.
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Again, the error you make lies in your lack of recognition of the role of first person introspection. Our primary knowledge of consciousness is that of our own consciousness. This knowledge is the basis of a science of consciousness. Without it, there could be no science whatever of consciousness. Just a denial of we understand by consciousness from our first-person perspective.

And again you fail to realize that even if I were to agree with this, it would be completely irrelevant. There is no characteristic of consciousness that you know about that does not have a physical effect on the world. You can speculate all you want about such characteristics, but none of those hypothetical characteristics can possibly be what you directly experience as consciousness.

Subset B consists entirely of characteristics which do not have any effects on anything physical.
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In my view, all characteristics, including qualia have an effect on the physical world, namely through our knowledge of them via introspection, which is reflected in our actions.

Great. Then you need to explain how there are more than the two following options:

1) Consciousness functions according to natural laws. Since all characteristics of consciousness have effects on the physical world, those natural laws can be inferred by observing the effects consciousness has on other things. This is exactly how we scientifically study any other phenomenon. Thus consciousness can be understood scientifically, in exactly the same manner as any other physical phenomena.

2) Consciousness does not function according to natural laws.

If you select option (1), then consciousness meets all of the criteria for being "physical" that any other physical object or process meets. That is materialism. If you choose (2), then that is supernaturalism.

I think you should be able to see the problem here. If you agree that consciousness functions according to natural laws, then you are left with epiphenomenalism, and all of its problems.
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A clear case of putting up a straw man. You already know I don't equate natural law with physical law.

You don't have to. All a physical law is, is a natural law which can be determined from observation of physical interactions. If, as you claim, all characteristics of consciousness have physical effects, then it necessarily follows that any natural laws they follow are, by definition, physical laws.

A law can be natural and non-physical at the same time. That's the whole point of interactionism.

Not if the laws can be determined from physical interactions. The only way to maintain that consciousness functions according to non-physical natural laws, is to claim that those laws can not be inferred from observation of physical interactions. And the only way to claim that is to claim that consciousness has characteristics which do not have any physical effects.

supernatural spiritualism (all of consciousness is in set A, but it doesn't function according to natural laws),
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Leaving a hypothetical absolutely free will aside, how can anything not function according to a natural law? You probably mean according to physical laws.

No, I mean according to natural laws. If you claim that consciousness has characteristics which have no physical effects, then you can have non-physical natural laws. If you do not, then the natural laws are physical laws, by definition.

The problem is that you fail to recognize the importance of our introspective knowledge of irreducible qualitative and subjective characteristics of consciousness.

As I said, this issue is completely irrelevant to my argument. To claim that there are characteristics of consciousness which are irreducibly subjective, is to claim that those characteristics have no physical effects. This is self-contradictory, because such characteristics cannot be subjective at all, since you could not possibly know about them. Irreducible subjectivity is self-contradictory.

I recognize that all of these characteristics are necessarily efficacious, including regarding effects on the physical world. What I don't recognize is that qualia are physical.

What does that mean? If all of their characteristics have physical effects, then in what sense are they not physical? Certainly they meet every criteria that anything else which is physical meets.

It seems to me that there are only two ways to claim that X is not physical:

1) X does not meet the requirements for being physical.

2) X has characteristics beyond those required for being physical.

Neither of these can apply to your conception of consciousness. Since all the characteristics of consciousness have physical effects, consciousness meets the requirements for being physical. And since consciousness does not have any characteristics which do not have physical effects, the second possibility is ruled out to.

So in what sense is it non-physical?

If you want to tackle my position, you should focus on that point. But then again, you've already made your point, namely that you're an eliminative materialist. That's the main problem, Stimpy, your logic seems pretty sound, but one of your main premisses is seriously ill-founded.

Which one? As near as I can tell, our premises are pretty much the same. We both think that all of the characteristics of consciousness have physical effects, right? We both think that consciousness functions according to natural laws, right? So what, other than semantics, is it that we disagree about? Do you think that consciousness can be understood scientifically, by studying the effects it has on the physical world? If so, then we are in agreement about everything but the definition of the word "physical", which is irrelevant to the actual content of our positions. If you do not, then why not?


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus,



But therein lies your problem. I submit that it is impossible for you to know anything about any characteristics of consciousness other than those which have effects on the physical world.

You submit incorrectly. Let's skip the metaphysical behaviourism nonsense should we?

The proof of this is simple. If you know something about a characteristic of consciousness, then that knowledge can affect your actions.

But which certainly isn't identical to our actions.

Never mind for now the fact that the brain is what does your "knowing" and "thinking" for you.

A fact? Presupposing materialist metaphysic. Therefore begging the question. Therefore logical fallacy.

Even if you assert that there is more to thought and memory than brain processes, the fact remains that everything you know, has an effect on your actions, and thus has physical effects.

Even if this is so, this does not establish identity.

This means that you can divide the characteristics of consciousness into two subsets, A and B:

Subset A consists entirely of characteristics which can be inferred from the physical effects that consciousness has. In effect, set A is everything that science could ever potentially try to study. If consciousness functions according to natural laws,

You mean the world is physically closed? What makes you think that?

then this subset of characteristics can be understood scientifically, and would be considered by a materialist to be all there is to consciousness.

So, a materialist thinks we're all p-zombies. I thought so

Subset B consists entirely of characteristics which do not have any effects on anything physical.

I feel there is no such subset

I think you should be able to see the problem here. If you agree that consciousness functions according to natural laws,

No I don't.

Interactive dualism is vacuous. When you consider it logically, it ends up being exactly equivalent to either materialism (all of consciousness is in set A, and it functions according to natural laws),

What a perverse idea of logic you have Stimp.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Clarification

Dr Stupid

The fact that you know about it implies that it has an effect on the physical world. If it doesn't have an effect on the physical world, you don't know about it.

That's where you go astray. I never said that knowing consciousness in itself implies that consciousness has an effect on the physical world. I don't hold that knowing consciousness is a physical phenomenon. I hold that it is a mental, non-physical phenomenon, based on introspection. Introspection is not a physical phenomenon. In my system, the fact that consciousness has physical effects too is not equal to the fact that we know consciousness through introspection or vice versa. These are two distinctly different facts, though both are correct.

This means that unless you are going to claim that it does not function according to natural laws, every single aspect of consciousness that you could possibly know you have, can be explained scientifically.

Not if you mean by natural physical, nor if you mean by scientifically 'via the methods of physical science'. You leave out introspection, which implies subjectivity itself.

You can speculate all you want about such characteristics, but none of those hypothetical characteristics can possibly be what you directly experience as consciousness.

You've clearly misunderstood my position. There is efficacy regarding the mind (through introspection) and there is efficacy regarding the physical world (through action [other than introspection]). Two different things.

All a physical law is, is a natural law which can be determined from observation of physical interactions. If, as you claim, all characteristics of consciousness have physical effects, then it necessarily follows that any natural laws they follow are, by definition, physical laws.

I hope you see now where our views differ regarding the definition of a natural law.

The difference is that you don't recognize irreducible qualities and subjectivity. That's why you're an eliminative materialist and that's why I'm a dualist.

I hope that clarifies it for you.

Titus

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Can't

Yes, as we cannot rationally doubt the existence of consciousness.

Just testing how rational I am...If I do not doubt that I see, do not doubt that I feel, do not doubt that I think, remember, love, doubt, hunger, and all the things that my body does, what is left to make up this "consciousness" that I'm not allowed to doubt? Perhaps I'm rationally defining "existence" differently from you, again each according to our assumptions.

I really think it comes down to assumptions and interpretations, and not to "recognition" of something that you and I both experience but still call something completely different (and interpret completely differently)!

It seems that any time we find something that cannot be doubted ("thus do I refute Berkeley", anyone?), it is immediately doubted by somebody else, and "rationally" at that.

 

[Interesting Ian]

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. I submit that it is impossible for you to know anything about any characteristics of consciousness other than those which have effects on the physical world.
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Titus
I obviously disagree. We don't know what we know about our own consciousness because of its effects on the physical world, but because we observe it with out very minds, i.e. through introspection (and retrospection).
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Irrelevant.

Scarcely

The fact that you know about it implies that it has an effect on the physical world. If it doesn't have an effect on the physical world, you don't know about it.

Is this just because of the way the world is? Or are you insinuating a logically necessary relationship here? You cannot conclude the latter without begging the question.

This means that unless you are going to claim that it does not function according to natural laws, every single aspect of consciousness that you could possibly know you have, can be explained scientifically.

Science only deals with the physical i.e our sensory perceptions. It does not deal with the self which has those perceptions. You are conflating the experienced with the experiencer. Naughty naughty!

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Subset A consists entirely of characteristics which can be inferred from the physical effects that consciousness has. In effect, set A is everything that science could ever potentially try to study. If consciousness functions according to natural laws, then this subset of characteristics can be understood scientifically, and would be considered by a materialist to be all there is to consciousness.
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Again, the error you make lies in your lack of recognition of the role of first person introspection. Our primary knowledge of consciousness is that of our own consciousness. This knowledge is the basis of a science of consciousness. Without it, there could be no science whatever of consciousness. Just a denial of we understand by consciousness from our first-person perspective.
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And again you fail to realize that even if I were to agree with this, it would be completely irrelevant. There is no characteristic of consciousness that you know about that does not have a physical effect on the world.

How often do you need to be told that this is wholly irrelevant??

You can speculate all you want about such characteristics, but none of those hypothetical characteristics can possibly be what you directly experience as consciousness.

Oh but we do experience it. Only a p-zombie could plausibly deny this.

 

[Titus Rivas]

If I do not doubt that I see, do not doubt that I feel, do not doubt that I think, remember, love, doubt, hunger, and all the things that my body does, what is left to make up this "consciousness" that I'm not allowed to doubt?

Mercutio, what you're not allowed to doubt is not whether consciousness exists as anything else than all those subjective experiences. As I've said before consciousness is an abstract term for subjective experiences. What you're not allowed to doubt rationally is that you HAVE those subjective experiences, and that those subjective experiences are subjective and qualitative. Unless you are a zombie after all, it's not a matter of assuming or interpreting that our subjective experiences are subjective and qualitative. It's a matter of recognizing that they are.

Perhaps this will help you out: take an individual subjective experience such as experiencing a headache. Would you say that it would be an arbitrary assumption or interpretation that you're having a headache, or would you agree that it would be a matter of recognition if you said you're having a headache? Got it?

Titus

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Clarification

Not if you mean by natural physical, nor if you mean by scientifically 'via the methods of physical science'. You leave out introspection, which implies subjectivity itself.

You've clearly misunderstood my position. There is efficacy regarding the mind (through introspection) and there is efficacy regarding the physical world (through action). Two different things.

I hope you see now where our views differ regarding the definition of a natural law.

The difference is that you don't recognize irreducible qualities and subjectivity. That's why you're an eliminative materialist and that's why I'm a dualist.

I hope that clarifies it for you.

Titus

What is clear to me is that you simply sweep under the rug the simplest of facts: it is called anaesthesia. This is a simple process in which a physical existent momentarily eliminates consciousness.

Elevating subjectivity as oddly high as you wish to simply invites simple counter-attacks. This false worship is also easily eliminated by the body of facts from many scientific disciplines that clearly put subjective experience into the "not trustworthy" realm. You can't hide this weakness very easily. And "irreducible quantities"? Come off it. What on earth is "irreducible" about something that can be so easily distorted, mistaken, or eliminated?

Cheers,

 

[Titus Rivas]

Response to BillHoyt

Hi BillHoyt,

What is clear to me is that you simply sweep under the rug the simplest of facts: it is called anaesthesia. This is a simple process in which a physical existent momentarily eliminates consciousness.

No sirree. I'm a dualist interactionist, which means I recognize the existence of somatogenic effects upon consciousness.

About the unrealibility of introspection, I'd like to refer to my answer to Mercutio.

And "irreducible quantities"?

I suppose you mean qualities.

Come off it. What on earth is "irreducible" about something that can be so easily distorted, mistaken, or eliminated?

The term irreducible simply refers here to the fact that we can't reduce the qualities to anything else than themselves without losing their identity. I understand the misunderstanding

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Stimp
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Subset B consists entirely of characteristics which do not have any effects on anything physical.
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Titus
In my view, all characteristics, including qualia have an effect on the physical world, namely through our knowledge of them via introspection, which is reflected in our actions.
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Stimp
Great. Then you need to explain how there are more than the two following options:

1) Consciousness functions according to natural laws. Since all characteristics of consciousness have effects on the physical world, those natural laws can be inferred by observing the effects consciousness has on other things. This is exactly how we scientifically study any other phenomenon. Thus consciousness can be understood scientifically, in exactly the same manner as any other physical phenomena.

Even if consciousness did function according to natural (physical) laws, this is not what consciousness is. You are describing a world of p-zombies, not real people.

2) Consciousness does not function according to natural laws.

If you select option (1), then consciousness meets all of the criteria for being "physical" that any other physical object or process meets. That is materialism.

I'm afraid not as I have explained. I have told you and Dymanic a couple of days ago why consciousness should not be considered physical simply because it has an effect on the world. Are you truly too stupid to understand?

If you choose (2), then that is supernaturalism.

Gosh! Free will is supernatural! Is . .er . . this supposed to constitute some sort of reason or evidence?? LOL

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The problem is that you fail to recognize the importance of our introspective knowledge of irreducible qualitative and subjective characteristics of consciousness.
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As I said, this issue is completely irrelevant to my argument. To claim that there are characteristics of consciousness which are irreducibly subjective, is to claim that those characteristics have no physical effects.

Emmmmm . . .how is it possible that someone could be so stupid as to think this???

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Begging the question?

I can understand that you see it like that from your own viewpoint. But as I've said before, there is no inherent conflict between rationality and any spiritual philosophy. Such a conflict does exist between materialism and spirituality. But then again, I don't regard materialism as rational

Best wishes,

Titus

Titus, only really whacked out definitions of materialism and spirituality are incompatible. There are materialists who parteke of spirittuality.

remember you don't have to believe in electrons to use them, the same rules apply to the spiritual realm.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Titus
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I recognize that all of these characteristics are necessarily efficacious, including regarding effects on the physical world. What I don't recognize is that qualia are physical.
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Stimp
What does that mean? If all of their characteristics have physical effects, then in what sense are they not physical? Certainly they meet every criteria that anything else which is physical meets.

Qualia are not physical because there is absolutely zero commonality between qualia and the physical.

 

[Titus Rivas]

What do you mean, David?

Titus, only really whacked out definitions of materialism and spirituality are incompatible. There are materialists who parteke of spirittuality.

Dancing David, what do you understand by spirituality? Just to see if we're talking about the same issue.

emember you don't have to believe in electrons to use them, the same rules apply to the spiritual realm.

Are you by any chance mixing up agnosticism with materialism here?

Titus

 

[Mercutio]

Mercutio, what you're not allowed to doubt is not whether consciousness exists as anything else than all those subjective experiences. As I've said before consciousness is an abstract term for subjective experiences. What you're not allowed to doubt rationally is that you HAVE those subjective experiences, and that those subjective experiences are subjective and qualitative. Unless you are a zombie after all, it's not a matter of assuming or interpreting that our subjective experiences are subjective and qualitative. It's a matter of recognizing that they are.

I know that these experiences are private and that they differ with differing stimuli. Is that the same as subjective and qualitative? If so, your verb HAVE is still just a metaphor refering to a category. I already said that I see, hear, feel, etc. I keep thinking that you find something more to "consciousness" than this category of behaviors, but I am not getting what that something is. Why is it that we both see and feel and hear and think, but that you "have consciousness" and I cannot find it in the same experiences? (Of course, we both know the answer: I am a p-zombie. )

Perhaps this will help you out: take an individual subjective experience such as experiencing a headache. Would you say that it would be an arbitrary assumption or interpretation that you're having a headache, or would you agree that it would be a matter of recognition if you said you're having a headache? Got it?

Got a headache? No, but keep trying. Actually, feeling a headache and seeing a tree both involve perceiving a stimulus (a vascular event--or perhaps a bullet!, or a tree), and a behavior of perceiving. The headache does not exist in the absence of its stimulus.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Getting a headache

I am a p-zombie.

Perhaps you really are

I've little more to say about this topic.

Titus