A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[hammegk]

You keep saying that consciousness is irreducibly subjective. If so, how can it have a physical effect? If it does have a physical effect, then the term "irreducibly subjective" is incorrect. (I understand you're talking ontologically.)

~~ Paul

One trouble I suspect is our struggle with words. To me "is it objective -- that is 'actually exists'" has one single indisputable fact, viz. *I* think. Ergo, I know *I* exists.

To me, everything else is subjective, including my perceived-by-*I* (and *you*)-body(which *I* characterize as *me*.

Interesting papers, Titus, but they don't escape the Stimpy Dilemma for me. However, neither can his subset B exist (that is dualism imo). The only choice is in subset A -- and the choice is is "physical matter" primary, or is "something non-physical -- say life which at homo sap level expresses itself via the world of perception as "consciousness" primary.

Stimpy seems at times to waffle on this choice, but so far I class him on the "physical matter" side of the choice. I take the other side, and find fewer logical hurdles to jump; just my opinion of course.

 

[Dancing David]

Re: Common misconceptions

By the way, have you ever heard of Penfield's research? Take a look at this paper, to see how inevitable drawing materialist conclusions from brain research really is. If you were right, all dualist neurologists would be just plain stupid. Let's reserve that title for Stimpson.

Titus

I read your citation but I don't really understand your point. Just because some scientists hold a belief does not make it a scientific belief.

Are you saying that by studying the physical brain we are led to materialist conclusions.

You still haven't really responded to the point that introspection can lead to verifiable methods in the scientific sense. It seems that you are going for the 'consiousness as priviledged' argument. I again state that useful material can be garnered from introspection, and put to the scientfic method.

Respectfully
David

PS Qualia are learned.

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
Well you're just saying here that if consciousness is not physical, then it is supernatural.
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Stimpy
Exactly. If X has physical effects, then X is either physical or supernatural. This is a tautology.

What complete stupidity is this?? The physical is an ontologically self-subsistent reality which somehow logically necessitates consciousness. You do not understand what the word physical means! Under your definition of materialism then dualism and idealism must be incorrect, not because of the overall unintelligibility and incoherence and non-cogency of the worldview they provide, but because they would be false by definition!

Titus
It's even quite simple. We don't have to act physically on our knowledge of consciousness. Our knowledge can be without specific physical consequences observable by physical science.
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Stimp
Not if it has physical effects, it can't. Overt behavior is irrelevant. If it has physical effects, then those effects can be observed, and consciousness can be described in terms of those effects. To assert that such a description is not complete, is to assert that consciousness has characteristics which have no physical effects.

Everything you say is entirely irrelevant because you keep presupposing the correctness of the materialist metaphysic. Consciousness cannot be described in terms of physical effects. Even assuming there are neural correlates for all conscious experiences, you could only ever in principle describe the effects of consciousness, and certainly not consciousness itself. To suppose the latter is to presuppose materialism and this of course begs the question.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I said:

If so, how can it have a physical effect? If it does have a physical effect, then the term "irreducibly subjective" is incorrect. (I understand you're talking ontologically.)

and Titus replied:

Paul, I don't see how! Try to explain your position as I find it incomprehensible. I see little more than another attempt at begging the question.

I suppose it's another problem of definition. You say irreducible, not semireducible or quasireducible. If that means that consciousness cannot be explained in any way by the material brain, then it certainly means that consciousness cannot affect the brain, because otherwise it would need a material interface to the brain, which could presumably be explained. And, as usual, once you have a material interface, the whole project slides down into materialism.

The only other way it could work, I think, is for the affect to be completely magical (supernatural). But that leaves us with both consciousness and its causal mechanism as supernatural. Then it becomes nothing but a matter of faith.

~~ Paul

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Common misconceptions

Then, Hoyt seems to think that a consciousness which is not physical should be a consciousness which can't be affected by anything physical. Another strawman I'd say. As I said before, somatogenic influences are part and parcel of interactionism.

By the way, have you ever heard of Penfield's research? Take a look at this paper, to see how inevitable drawing materialist conclusions from brain research really is. If you were right, all dualist neurologists would be just plain stupid. Let's reserve that title for Stimpson.

Titus

You have claimed consciousness is not physical. I have pointed out that we can stop it at will with chemicals, that we can distort it with chemicals. We can cut out portions of the brain and re-shape it. It clearly is both affected by the physical and effects the physical. With both affect and effect, you conclude that this non-physicality has some interaction with the physical.

Unfortunately, all the evidence points to any such existent being physical. It is matter or energy. Those are the only things that can interact with the universe. Your "somatogenic influences" constitute something beyond all that is known in the universe. Hence, supernatural. Hence, ghost. Another rendition of the ghost in the machine, and another retreat for the dualists.

The current incarnation of the dualist ghost is so remarkably weak though! I can stop it! I can change it! I can distort it. I can cut it off. I can even split it in two. With every physical thing I do, the ghost retreats and acts more and more like a physical existent. Yet you maintain the ghost is real. That it is non-physical. And somehow so very very important.

And then, after trotting out this 90-lb weakling ghost, you audaciously toss out a link to web article and refer to it as a "paper". It is no paper, sir, and you should be ashamed of this ploy. That is nothing but a book review, and a decidedly Christian one at that. How intellectually dishonest can you get? But wait, there's more! You mention Penfield, who is not the author of either the book or the book review. But wait, there's more! We're supposed "to see how inevitable drawing materialist conclusions from brain research really is. If you were right, all dualist neurologists would be just plain stupid." Okay, so, is Travis (the book reviewer) a neuroscientist? (Not "neurologist", BTW). No. Is Constance (the book's author)? No. Constance uses the usual woo ploy of attempted degree inflation. His MA was in Oriental Languages. Then he cites a PhD, discipline unnamed. This ploy is often used by those who wish to call themselves "Dr." (hey, whaddayaknow, that's exactly what Constance does! How about that?) to attract an air of authority to themselves. Looking at Constance's list of accomplishments, though, it is clear his work was all in the area of engineering. So, is Constance a neuroscientist? No.

That's the hat-trick, sir. A "paper" that turns out to be a book review. The book by an author who attempts degree inflation. And, yes, no actual neuroscientists were harmed in the makiing of either the book or the review. None were even present.

What a joke! *Sniff* *Sniff* You're not passing the smell test here. The odor of sock is wafting past my monitor.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Consciousness and its effects

Stimpson,

This may well be my last attempt to convince you.

If the physical effects do not exhaust consciousness, then that necessarily implies that consciousness has characteristics which have no physical effects. That is epiphenomenalism.

Not at all. Epiphenomenalism is the position that the non-physical characteristics of consciousness can have no effect whatever; i.e. no physical effect nor any intrapsychical effect. My position is that all of the characteristics consciousness can be discussed physically through speech and writing. So every characteristic can have physical effects. However, you mix up the position that a certain characteristic does not necessarily have a specific physical effect but can have a lot of different physical effects, for example in the form of many different words and sentences (my position) with the position that a certain characteristic necessarily does not have any physical (or non-physical) effect (epiphenomenalism).

Do you agree with me that consciousness can be scientifically understood by studying its physical effects? If not, why not?

No, I don't, because studying its physical effects qua physical effects is not the same as studying consciousness. We can study consciousness by examining the content of the physical effects, i.e. mainly the meaning of the spoken and written words or the reference of the non-verbal communicative expressions in animals. Those words are supposed to be based on introspection (and so are to a great extent the non-verbal expressions of animals) and to refer to our subjectivity. It's completely nonsensical to believe that the physical effects of consciousness ARE consciousness and vice versa. What's so problematic about that, other than that it ruins your untenable position?

At the very least, it effects your brain processes, because your brain is thinking about it.

Even if that were true (and you know I don't think so and why I don't think so), those brain processes can't tell you what consciousness is like. By the way, you will understand that thoughts about consciousness aren't that consciousness itself, not even if thoughts about consciousness were physical or if consciousness itself were physical. You can't equate thoughts about consciousness (= supposed physical effects according to your system) with consciousness itself. So even within your own system, it's real nonsense.

In effect, you are claiming to know something which, by construction, is intrinsically unknowable.

Incorrect, I oppose epiphenomenalism in that I believe any part of consciousness can and often does have an effect upon the physical world. The differences are that I don't claim that knowing an effect equals knowing its source as such. Consciousness can only be directly known through introspection.
And introspection is not a physical process, as otherwise there would be no difference between a first person and third person perspective. Only eliminative materialism can hold such a thing.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Introspection and science

Hi David,

I read your citation but I don't really understand your point. Just because some scientists hold a belief does not make it a scientific belief.

No of course not. My point was that if consciousness can be affected by physical processes that doesn't imply consciousness is physical. There even are famous neurologists who recognize that. So I don't meant we should believe them on their word, but just that there is nothing obvious about the equation.

I read your citation but I don't really understand your point. Just because some scientists hold a belief does not make it a scientific belief.

I do believe introspection is a scientific method which yields a lot of direct knowledge for the subjects involved and a lot of indirect knowledge for other people. Introspection only gives us direct knowledge if we're the ones who are doing it. Obviously I don't mean that in any trivial sense. I mean that the first person and third person perspectives can never give the exact same answers. In that sense, introspection is a scientific method but not a physical method.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

And introspection is not a physical process, as otherwise there would be no difference between a first person and third person perspective. Only eliminative materialism can hold such a thing.

So introspection occurs when consciousness, completely of its own accord, decides to look at itself? Why does it need to do that? What information about itself does it need to learn?

I have no idea what you mean about first person vs. third person perspective. When I'm thinking with my brain, isn't that a first person perspective?

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Dogma

Paul:

You say irreducible, not semireducible or quasireducible. If that means that consciousness cannot be explained in any way by the material brain, then it certainly means that consciousness cannot affect the brain, because otherwise it would need a material interface to the brain, which could presumably be explained. And, as usual, once you have a material interface, the whole project slides down into materialism.

That's again the same begging the question or dogma.

Hamme,
that's the same problem I have with your conclusion about the strength of Stimpy's argumentation against interactionism.

And Paul again:

The only other way it could work, I think, is for the affect to be completely magical (supernatural). But that leaves us with both consciousness and its causal mechanism as supernatural. Then it becomes nothing but a matter of faith.

How can you really mean that? It is not a matter of faith if we recognize that we're subjective beings with an irreducible, qualitative consciousness. I fail to see why this should be supernatural, as it is really the most natural thing on earth .

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Ian

Even assuming there are neural correlates for all conscious experiences,

Surely we are all in agreement at least on this? ...that something happens in the brain that somehow has something to do with what we call consciousness? Or are you claiming that some experiences are neural-correlate free? Or that all experiences are to some degree neural-correlate free?

you could only ever in principle describe the effects of consciousness, and certainly not consciousness itself.

If provided with a complete and detailed description of a piece of music written to be played on a particular musical instrument, along with a complete and detailed description of that instrument, would you complain that the system possesses a fundamental isness which the descriptions fail to capture?

Thought so.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Dogmatic Hoyt

Hoyt, quite an eloquent fellow, aren't you?

Sorry, I just meant website by my word paper. Obviously it wasn't meant as a hat trick. The point was that there have been and still are neuroscientists such as Penfield who're dualists. Unless you want to deny that, I don't see the point in trying to make anyone believe I'm being dishonest.

Unfortunately, all the evidence points to any such existent being physical. It is matter or energy. Those are the only things that can interact with the universe. Your "somatogenic influences" constitute something beyond all that is known in the universe. Hence, supernatural. Hence, ghost. Another rendition of the ghost in the machine, and another retreat for the dualists.

And that's what I call dogma.

I smell the fear of being wrong about all this. What's your problem?

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

How can you really mean that? It is not a matter of faith if we recognize that we're subjective beings with an irreducible, qualitative consciousness. I fail to see why this should be supernatural, as it is really the most natural thing on earth.

"We recognize that" is (a) a personal opinion; and (b) subject to self-delusion. Regardless, you're defining consciousness and its efficacy as supernatural. Science cannot study it. I guess all the neurophysiologists are in for a surprise.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

....When I'm thinking with my brain, isn't that a first person perspective?
~~ Paul

Better said imo, "When I'm thinking isn't that a first person perspective?" Answer: sure.

*Thinking* is what *you* do (when you think about it, if you catch my drift) to sort through the maximum perceived benefit algorithm the brain runs willy-nilly -- at least at the homo sap consciousness level.

You & I do seem to agree that the "supernatural" stuff just makes no sense whatsoever. If it did, it's Stimpy's Dilemma again.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Repetition of moves

"We recognize that" is (a) a personal opinion; and (b) subject to self-delusion. Regardless, you're defining consciousness and its efficacy as supernatural. Science cannot study it. I guess all the neurophysiologists are in for a surprise.

That's basically what you've said before, Paul. I've given my answers already.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Even assuming there are neural correlates for all conscious experiences,
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Surely we are all in agreement at least on this? ...that something happens in the brain that somehow has something to do with what we call consciousness? Or are you claiming that some experiences are neural-correlate free? Or that all experiences are to some degree neural-correlate free?

I do not possess the knowledge to give a definitive declaration.

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you could only ever in principle describe the effects of consciousness, and certainly not consciousness itself.
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If provided with a complete and detailed description of a piece of music written to be played on a particular musical instrument, along with a complete and detailed description of that instrument, would you complain that the system possesses a fundamental isness which the descriptions fail to capture?

Thought so. [/B]

You're talking about music(m) rather than music(e). The music as experienced cannot be understood by a description. One needs to correlate such a description with the actual experience of music. If one had never heard any music ever, a description would be useless. A description does not at all say what music(e) is. Neither consciousness or qualia can be defined in terms of descriptions.

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Dogmatic Hoyt

Hoyt, quite an eloquent fellow, aren't you?

Sorry, I just meant website by my word paper. Obviously it wasn't meant as a hat trick. The point was that there have been and still are neuroscientists such as Penfield who're dualists. Unless you want to deny that, I don't see the point in trying to make anyone believe I'm being dishonest.

And that's what I call dogma.

I smell the fear of being wrong about all this. What's your problem?

Titus

Balderdash. Utter bunk. If you want to cite Penfield, then cite Penfield, not someone reviewing someone's book making a reference to Penfield.

Equally putting the balder in dash is your pap about "dogma". You claim something non-physical that interacts with the physical. This claim is counter to everything we know. It is, therfore, beyond natural and, therefore, in the supernatural realm. If you claim otherwise, you are firmly within the domain of physics and must marshall proof that this lameling ghost of yours can affect the universe.

So, marshall away. And follow the standard rules of citation: papers (not the pap you just pandered) from peer-reviewed scientific journals. Give us something that demonstrates this non-energy, non-matter 90-lb lameling ghost interacts with our energy/matter universe.

BTW, I have absolutely no fear of being wrong. I am amused by your pretense, intellectual dishonesty, and by the smell of socks about you.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Dogmatic Hoyt

Hoyt, quite an eloquent fellow, aren't you?

Sorry, I just meant website by my word paper. Obviously it wasn't meant as a hat trick. The point was that there have been and still are neuroscientists such as Penfield who're dualists. Unless you want to deny that, I don't see the point in trying to make anyone believe I'm being dishonest.

And that's what I call dogma.

I smell the fear of being wrong about all this. What's your problem?

Titus

BillHoyt is just about the most obnoxious poster who has contributed to this board. You know when he's pis*ed off with you when he starts calling you "sir".

 

[Titus Rivas]

Not amused

Well BillHoyt, I can't say I'm very amused by your approach (nor your pretense BTW) and feel no obligation to answer you anymore. I'm glad you didn't have any interesting questions anyway.

Titus

 

[BillHoyt]

Re: Not amused

Well BillHoyt, I can't say I'm very amused by your approach (nor your pretense BTW) and feel no obligation to answer you anymore.

Titus

Sorry to hear you have no evidence for the lameling. Sorry to hear you can only muster deceptive citations.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

Our knowledge can be without specific physical consequences observable by physical science. Note that I'm not talking about possible physical correlates of consciousness, but about the contents of our knowledge of consciousness which as such can't have exhaustive physical correlates.

I'm hoping you meant: contents of consciousness rather than: contents of our knowledge of consciousness, because the latter could start a cascade of references to: contents of our knowledge about knowledge of consciousness, etc. I don't get why knowledge of consciousness should have a privileged physical-correlate free status that distinguishes it from knowledge of (say) spongecake. I won't ask you to repeat this if you feel have already explained it adequately, but I could use a hint as to what page(s) to search.

I might be sympathetic to arguments from unfathomable complexity. For one thing, any attempts at descriptions of the contents of consciousness will immediately encounter severely limiting temporal problems. If you could somehow take a completely detailed snapshot of the electrochemical state of a brain, the results would be very difficult to interpret since they would represent a static slice out of a dynamic system. Sort of a neural uncertainty principle.

I'd like to add that I find your contributions stimulating despite the fact that I do not agree with much of what you have to say, and I have enjoyed some of the links you have posted, despite the fact that some of them contain content that is rather... creative.

Personally, I hate being wrong. A pity, too, because it seems to happen a lot, no matter how hard I try to be right all the time (I love to be right). Coming here is one way of finding out where I am wrong by presenting my thoughts for others to examine. I always seem to learn the most from those I disagree with.