A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

. . . seemingly monadic property of a sense-datum.

Since this probably doesn't refer to protozoa, I take it to mean that the property is (seemingly) elementary and singular? I really don't know what that means, but maybe that is where some of the confusion lies. As seemingly hints, perhaps the property is really complex and multi-faceted. Perhaps it is a convolution of brain processes.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

I think it was quite clear from the rest of my post, which you cleverly failed to mention, that the answer is no, and that this doesn't matter, since nothing about the claim that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain, implies that the answer should be yes.

I don't suppose you have anything to add to this discussion?


Dr. Stupid

Only that this to me implies there *is* a fundamental difference, and I note that "quale" is a term used to describe it.

Has anyone actually mentioned why Ian's boulder rolling down the hill is not "conscious"?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk asked:

Has anyone actually mentioned why Ian's boulder rolling down the hill is not "conscious"?

I don't know, but I do want to know why no one is interested in what it is like to be a boulder. Surely it is subjective and qualitative and all like that.

~~ Paul

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

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If any such laws could be described, they would certainly be fundamental. Can you be more specific?
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Well, we would have to postulate laws of the kind: if a certain physical process takes place this evokes a certain non-physical mental process, and vice versa.

Er... right. That's basically a simple restating of the question:

If a non-physical event produces a change in the physical brain, how does it do this? It gets worse, actually; the question really is "How in principle can this be possible? You're claiming that something non-physical can influence something physical; but in the instant that it does so, it becomes a physical phenomenon itself. Psychokinesis, ESP, whatever; I don't see how this contradiction can be avoided.

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Qualia again

Stimpy, the problem is that introspection reveals completely different characteristics of consciousness than you can find if you study the brain 'objectively'. Characteristics usually called qualia.

Titus

I'm sorry, did you say introspection? As in Wundt, James, and the crew from the founding days of a science of psychology? I have not heard the term used except as a bit of history, for quite some time. This is, of course, consistent with a definition of quale from 1929, which you also share. The introspective study of qualia, for psychology at least, died long ago, and not just because of the behavioral revolution. Even cognitive psychologists, who love mentalisms, no longer use introspection. It is, for reasons Stimpy has alluded to, a fatally flawed methodology. Even in its heyday, expert introspectionists were at arms with one another because one group could not help but introspect a sense of a perceiving self (Mary Calkins's studies) while others saw only qualia, with no "self as perceiver". The reliability, let alone the validity, of introspection has been laughable for ages. Of course, this may only be true within psychology, but we certainly continue to study sensation, perception, consciousness...but sorry, introspection? Please tell me (I'm quite serious) of any studies within the last decade that use introspection experimentally (I would love to talk about it in class if it is still being done!). An understanding of consciousness as a set of behaviors (or brain processes, to be consistent with stimpy) has opened up quite a good many research lines that would not have been conceived of it we still thought of qualia as mental "things".

 

[Interesting Ian]

I'm not a dualist but I'll have a stab at answering your questions.

Er... right. That's basically a simple restating of the question:

If a non-physical event produces a change in the physical brain, how does it do this?

It would just be a basic fact about the world presumably. It makes no more sense in asking how it acheives this than asking how anything physical effecting anything else physical is acheived.

It gets worse, actually; the question really is "How in principle can this be possible? You're claiming that something non-physical can influence something physical; but in the instant that it does so, it becomes a physical phenomenon itself. Psychokinesis, ESP, whatever; I don't see how this contradiction can be avoided. [/B]

Easily. By simply rejecting your definition of the physical! It would make the notion of the physical too broad and essentially useless to include in it the self. If you did, then you would have to say that there are physical things which exist (ie selves), which have no mass, no momentum, cannot be converted to energy, are not composed of anything else least of all electrons protons etc, are not subject to entropy, are unchanging and as (libertarian) free will partially dictates their behaviour, are not subject to physical laws!

Oh yes, and also they would be the only physical thing which has an inner mental life, indeed is defined by its inner mental life.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Colour perception

The rest I shall have to continue to ponder. The experience itself is what is learned not the label.

How can you be so sure, David? Can you see what Mary is seeing?
As long as she isn't blind or colour blind there is no reason to suppose she wouldn't be able to see the color red just because she hasn't learnt how to label it.
I've read there are cultures with other colour labels. Would you really believe they see other colours than are seen in the West? And what evidence can you provide to show that the differences are based on different qualia rather than different conceptions of qualia?

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Why?

t gets worse, actually; the question really is "How in principle can this be possible? You're claiming that something non-physical can influence something physical; but in the instant that it does so, it becomes a physical phenomenon itself.

I fail to see why. Why does anything have to become physical just because it has an effect in the physical world? Isn't that just begging the question?

Interesting Ian has already said what I wanted to say.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Introspection

I'm sorry, did you say introspection? As in Wundt, James, and the crew from the founding days of a science of psychology? I have not heard the term used except as a bit of history, for quite some time. This is, of course, consistent with a definition of quale from 1929, which you also share. The introspective study of qualia, for psychology at least, died long ago, and not just because of the behavioral revolution. Even cognitive psychologists, who love mentalisms, no longer use introspection.

Mercutio, introspection might be another term which has been claimed so much by a particular psychological tradition that the associations are simply too strong. What I mean by introspection is simply the observation of one's own subjective experiences (or subjective private behavior as you would probably call it). The technique in this sense is still used whenever psychologists and other social scientists study subjective experiences such as are involved in pain, colour perception, illusions, imagery, conscious associations, memory, subjective emotions, etc.

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus Rivas,

Why does anything have to become physical just because it has an effect in the physical world?

How do you define "a physical it" that exists in the "physical world"? Isn't the only viable definition something along the lines of "A physical thing is something that affects other physical things"?

You seem to be saying :

Gravity affects the brain.
Consciousness affects the brain.

Gravity is "physical"
Consciousness is "non-physical"

What definition of "Physical" allows you to separate 'gravity' from 'consciousness'?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Non sequitur

How do you define "a physical it" that exists in the "physical world"? Isn't the only viable definition something along the lines of "A physical thing is something that affects other physical things"?

That's part of the definition of a physical thing, Loki, right. But as you know, it would be a total non sequitur if you would conclude: "something that affects other physical things is physical". It's the same fallacy as for example:

a skeptic is somebody who likes James Randi, therefore somebody who likes James Randi is a skeptic.

or

a human being is a mammal, therefore a mammal is a human being.

In other words, we don't need to change the definition of physical to allow for a causal impact by something non-physical on the physical world.

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus Rivas,

But as you know, it would be a total non sequitur if you would conclude: "something that affects other physical things is physical".

No, it's not, and I'm sure if you stop for a moment you'll see why.

In the meantime, and as a little hint, how about answering the questions :

How do you define "a physical it" that exists in the "physical world"? What definition of "Physical" allows you to separate 'gravity' from 'consciousness'?

(Edited to add) : Once you've answered that, I'll probably have a better idea of what *you* mean when you talk about "physical" things, and perhaps I'll even be able to see why you think "affecting physical things" can be done by something that you define as "non-physical". At the moment, that is an empty concept to me.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Category errors

Well, Loki, I've given it several moments and I'm sorry but I can't see how you could be right.

How do you define "a physical it" that exists in the "physical world"?

Anything in the physical world which can be described in purely physical terms.

What definition of "Physical" allows you to separate 'gravity' from 'consciousness'?

Strange question. Gravity is supposed to be a physical force. Consciousness is not a force but an abstract term for all of our non-physical subjective experiences. Consciousness has an impact on the physical world, but it does not thereby become physical.

The brain influences the conscious mind but it doesn't thereby become non-physical either.

Titus

 

[Loki]

Titus Rivas,

Category Errors? Presumably...

Anything in the physical world which can be described in purely physical terms.

Perhaps this is going nowhere fast...without a definition of "physical world" and (more importantly) "physical terms" then this doesn't help much.

Strange question. Gravity is supposed to be a physical force.

Please define gravity (or any "physical force") for me in "physical terms". I'm not being obtuse here - I can't see how you can define gravity as anything but "something which affects other physical objects". Which leads me, inevitably, to good old Franko - a (now departed) poster who maintained that gravity (well, gravitons) were in fact the source of consciousness.

Franko tried to use the similarities between gravity and consciousness to claim they were in fact, basically the same :

The only "physical terms" that describe gravity are the effects it has on other physical things.
The only "physical terms" that describe (your version of) consciousness are the effects it has on other physical things.

 

[scribble]

Hammegk asked:
I don't know, but I do want to know why no one is interested in what it is like to be a boulder. Surely it is subjective and qualitative and all like that.

~~ Paul

I think a fair number of our contributors could tell you what it's like to be stoned, judging from some posts - is that close enough?

 

[Titus Rivas]

The same error

Loki said:

Please define gravity (or any "physical force") for me in "physical terms". I'm not being obtuse here - I can't see how you can define gravity as anything but "something which affects other physical objects". Which leads me, inevitably, to good old Franko - a (now departed) poster who maintained that gravity (well, gravitons) were in fact the source of consciousness.

Franko tried to use the similarities between gravity and consciousness to claim they were in fact, basically the same :

The only "physical terms" that describe gravity are the effects it has on other physical things.
The only "physical terms" that describe (your version of) consciousness are the effects it has on other physical things

Again, it's the same error. You can't say gravity is really the same thing as consciousness just because they both have an impact on the physical world.

By the physical world I mean that part of reality which can be described in exclusively physical terms, without any need for concepts such as subjective awareness or experients.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Franko

By the way, Loki, who is this Franko fellow?

An important difference that is apparently overlooked by him, is that the impact of consciousness is an impact of something external which is not part of physical reality itself, whereas gravity would be immanent to the physical world.

Unless you see gravity as a force coming from the consciousness of a divinity (which may be less absurd than it seems) this difference cannot be overlooked.

Titus

 

[scribble]

Re: Why?

I fail to see why. Why does anything have to become physical just because it has an effect in the physical world? Isn't that just begging the question?

Interesting Ian has already said what I wanted to say.

Titus

You're not the only one missing this point - and I'm sure Stimpy will step in to say it better than I can, but the reason it's physical then is not quite by definition - it's because we can interact with it. As Ian says, we may find ourselves facing a massless, energyless physical object, but it would indeed be physical and available for us to examine, if only by proxy.

The real trouble is that the way the theory is often stated, it would be impossible to distinguish what is a physical process in the brain and what is under the control of this 'mystery mind,' - without the kind of specifics dualists are often unwilling to specify, the theory is in fact unfalsifiable.

In addition, all shouting to the contrary notwithstanding, modern science seems to suggest it 'multiples entities beyond necessity' - any theory of dualism that is not in denial of scientific facts must admit that some mental processes are physical processes in the brain, but then they go on to postualte an additional, unnecessary mechanism for other processes.

-Chris

 

[Titus Rivas]

Keep in mind that it's a complex matter

Hi Chris,

You're not the only one missing this point - and I'm sure Stimpy will step in to say it better than I can, but the reason it's physical then is not quite by definition - it's because we can interact with it.

Well, that sounds like begging the question to me. Why should interaction presuppose ontological identity? I fail to see why. It clearly seems a dogma rather than a logical conclusion.

The real trouble is that the way the theory is often stated, it would be impossible to distinguish what is a physical process in the brain and what is under the control of this 'mystery mind,' - without the kind of specifics dualists are often unwilling to specify, the theory is in fact unfalsifiable.

Actually, I've already pointed out that if you accept that qualia are non-physical, knowledge about qualia is a privilege of the (non-physical) mind as well. So that anything which is related to the knowledge about qualia or consciousness is psychogenic. Besides, there is a lot of evidence for psychokinesis.

In addition, all shouting to the contrary notwithstanding, modern science seems to suggest it 'multiples entities beyond necessity' - any theory of dualism that is not in denial of scientific facts must admit that some mental processes are physical processes in the brain.

Hadn't we been there already? We don't have to admit anything like that. The only thing we need to admit is that the brain may have an impact on consciousness, which is an inherent part of the theory of interactionist dualism.

but then they go on to postulate an additional, unnecessary mechanism for other processes.

It's as unnecessary as acknowledging the existence of consciousness. Very necessary in fact.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

hammegk,

I think it was quite clear from the rest of my post, which you cleverly failed to mention, that the answer is no, and that this doesn't matter, since nothing about the claim that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain, implies that the answer should be yes.

I don't suppose you have anything to add to this discussion?

Dr. Stupid
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Only that this to me implies there *is* a fundamental difference, and I note that "quale" is a term used to describe it.

Once again, that depends on what you mean by "fundamental". I don't think the difference is so fundamental that it somehow precludes consciousness being a physical process. Perhaps you would care to explain why you think it does?

Consider this: There are physical processes occurring in your CPU. One way to get information about those processes is to look at the inputs and outputs of that CPU, and draw inferences about what is going on inside. Another is to study the structure and dynamics of the CPU in extreme detail, to the point where you know everything there is to know about it.

These options are "fundamentally different" too, but so what? The first option isn't going to tell you anything you couldn't, at least in principle, learn by the second option. It's just an easier approach when dealing with something incredibly complicated.

Your self-awareness gives you very easy access to a very small amount of information about your own consciousness. In principle, knowing all the physical facts about the brain, and how it works, would give you that same information, and more. We just can't do that yet. Even so, studying the brain has given us all sorts of information about consciousness which we could not get through simple introspection.

Has anyone actually mentioned why Ian's boulder rolling down the hill is not "conscious"?

Yes, I did. It is not conscious, because the physical processes which are consciousness, are not present anywhere in the boulder. Next stupid question?


Dr. Stupid