A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Loki]

Ian,

And if we could measure the activity in his brain when apparently he feels angry and frustrated, we would see the same activity as we would do if we were to measure the activity in the brain of his real person twin when he is feeling angry and frustrated. He is in everyway identical to a normal person except s/he does not have phenomenal conscious experiences. Not any whatsoever. There's nothing inside, nothing at home

Yet, despite not having them, the P-Zombie insists he does. "You don't experience red"says Ian. "Nonsense, I experience red just as you do" replies the P-Zombie. Brain wave analysis confirms that both Ian and the P-Zombie had exactly the same "measurable activity" when seeing red. Both Ian and Mr P-Zombie confirm they did in fact see red, and that they experienced seeing red. Ian says "but by definition, you didn't really experience red". Mr P-Zombie replies "stuff the definition, I'm telling you I *did* experience red". Why is Mr P-Zombie so sure, Ian? What happened in his head to convince him that he did indeed have this experience?

More importantly, if his subjective view of his own behaviour is that he *did* experience red, and the objective brain measures confirm the usual "seeing red" pattern, then how do *you* know you're not a P-Zombie? Your subjective view? - but he has that also. Your objective measurements? - but he has those also.

How do you know you aren't a P-Zombie? Presumably, your answer is "because I *know* I have qualia".
If I asked a P-Zombie how they knew they *were not* a P-Zombie, they'd presumably answer "because *I know* I have qualia". They'd say that, even though they don't. So much for qualia having an "intuitive" existence.

 

[Mercutio]

I know very little about p-zombies, but I've just read that essay I linked to before, and it is brilliant!. It should answer all your questions.

Read it http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/moody.zombies.html

Thanks, Ian--just read it through once, want to read it again before I comment too much. It answers some of the questions, but raises a lot more. (on first reading, most of the questions are of the pulling-out-the-hair-screaming-"WHY?"-at-the-computer variety. He makes some assumptions, and thus conclusions, that on first reading I can't follow.)

I did find myself saying a lot of the time "It really sounds like I am a p-zombie!" For instance:

Zombie philosophers would be persistently baffled[z] by the fact that we talk about `consciousness' as if it were something more than being the subject[z] of experiences[z]. What more could it be?

yup, that's pretty much me.

and this:

Consider, for example, the phenomenon of dreaming. Could there be a cognate concept in zombie-English? How might we explain dreaming to them? We could say that dreams are things that we experience while asleep, but the zombies would not be able to make sense[z] of this. For them, the word `experience[z]' can have at most a behavioural meaning. Indeed, zombies would understand[z] sleep[z] itself quite differently from the way we do. The word `conscious[z]' could only mean responsive to the environment.

"could only mean" that? Why? and since when is dreaming not a behavior? (again the language problem, where a behavior--dreaming--is phrased as possession of a metaphorical noun--having a dream)


I will think more and read it again--thanks for pointing me that direction!

 

[Win]

Hmm.

Still talking about this topic after all this time, but very little movement in terms of positions.

 

[UnrepentantSinner]

Well hush my mouth! Welcome back Win.

 

[Titus Rivas]

A few responses

I'm afraid there is still a lot of confusion about qualia.

Here's a few reactions. I don't respond to all the comments, because I feel some of them are repetitions of what's been said many times before on this forum.

Why do you assume these can't be quantified?

It is not an assumption or intuition, it's something anyone can experience for himself. It's impossible that any of our qualitative experiences can in the end be exhaustively redefined as something without (non-quantitative) qualities. For example, a feeling of sadness is NOT "really something else".

And this is where we differ Titus for I would ask, where would consiousness lie outside of neurological processing,

You seem to think that the fact that consciousness can be affected by neurology, it must be part of neurology. That does not follow however.

I sort of understand how you might think that qualities are irreducible, although I can't imagine why you think they can't be quantified. I have no idea what it means to say that subjectivity can't be reduced, since it isn't a "thing."

It isn't a physical thing, that's right. But it is very real.

All it is in contradiction with is our intuitive interpretation of our conscious experiences, and that is no problem, because we already know that our intuition is not reliable, and can often times mislead us.

This is a complete non sequitur. We know we can be wrong about specific intuitions on conscious experiences. But that's incomparable to the claim that we are ALWAYS wrong about consciousness. Again, acknowledging the irreducible nature of subjective consciousnes does not depend on arbitrary intuitions or preconceptions.

But I'm afraid we simply won't convince one another.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Hmm.

Still talking about this topic after all this time, but very little movement in terms of positions.

Hi Win welcome back I don't know why people want me to explain about p-zombies when I don't know any more than they do! Do you intend joining in the fray? Oh go on!

 

[Mercutio]

Re: A few responses

I'm afraid there is still a lot of confusion about qualia.

Here's a few reactions. I don't respond to all the comments, because I feel some of them are repetitions of what's been said many times before on this forum.

It is not an assumption or intuition, it's something anyone can experience for himself. It's impossible that any of our qualitative experiences can in the end be exhaustively redefined as something without (non-quantitative) qualities. For example, a feeling of sadness is NOT "really something else".

...but do you understand the difference between "feeling sad" (which is not really something else) and "a feeling of sadness" (which reifies the noun "feeling" as a thing--a qualia). I don't deny whatsoever that you feel, or that I feel, or that anyone else does. I absolutely do think you are misled into treating something you do as something that is "had" (as in "I have a feeling of sadness"). This does not, in my opinion, deny your feeling (verb) and call it something else. Or do I misunderstand your point?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Thanks, Ian--just read it through once, want to read it again before I comment too much. It answers some of the questions, but raises a lot more. (on first reading, most of the questions are of the pulling-out-the-hair-screaming-"WHY?"-at-the-computer variety. He makes some assumptions, and thus conclusions, that on first reading I can't follow.)

Hmmmm . . .basically I entirely agreed with it. I read it just before going to bed though, when I was knackered. It's actually given me some ideas! But I'm going to read through it again more carefully before addressing the rest of your points.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

It is not an assumption or intuition, it's something anyone can experience for himself. It's impossible that any of our qualitative experiences can in the end be exhaustively redefined as something without (non-quantitative) qualities. For example, a feeling of sadness is NOT "really something else".

We should pursue this statement in detail, because it is at the heart of the matter. I agree that no amount of scientific description of emotion is going to be "the same as" having the emotion. However, I bet it will be sufficient to allow us to produce the emotion through appropriate electrical stimulation and other mechanical means, correct run-away emotional problems, discuss the causes of emotions, and so forth. In that sense, then, it is a complete description of emotion. But it is not the same as having the emotion.

However, consider any other event, for example, walking across grass. We can develop a complete understanding of everything that contributes to walking across grass: gravity, movement, shoes, grass height and strength, etc. We have a complete understanding, yet the understanding is not "the same as" walking across the grass.

It seems to me that we realize the difference between understanding something and its occurrence, yet for some reason you want to elevate a particular case (consciousness) to a special place. I suspect that's because consciousness is the only case where the understanding and the occurrence are directly accessible.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

Hold on just a durn minute! Are you saying after all these months of discussing consciousness, that the only way to detect your brand of it is through telepathy?

~~ Paul

Is this the first moment you've faced this problem? Two choices: solipsism, or "gentlemens' agreement" (*you* are not a p-zombie, or Turing Machine, either, as *I* am not).

What the heck is telepathy?

 

[Mercutio]

Hmmmm . . .basically I entirely agreed with it. I read it just before going to bed though, when I was knackered. It's actually given me some ideas! But I'm going to read through it again more carefully before addressing the rest of your points.

Haven't re-read it yet...but it does not seem to really address (or intend to) my question of which definition of behavior the p-zombie inventor uses--he seems to switch between definitions that, to me, are very different. But as the p-zombie was intended as an other-person demonstration, I can't expect them to cater to my question. What I'd like to know, I guess, is whether a p-zombie defined as this paper does (purely from the outsider's perspective) would differ from a p-zombie whose "behavior" that is the same as ours follows the Skinnerian definition of behavior, including thinking, feeling, seeing red, etc. This p-zombie (or m-zombie, for Mercutio ) would behave as a regular person, but the definition comes from the perspective of the m-zombie, not the observer. So anything I can *do*, so can he (behavior=anything you do). How are the p-zombies, m-zombies and normal people different?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Feeling sad implies an irreducible feeling of sadness

Mercutio said:

.but do you understand the difference between "feeling sad" (which is not really something else) and "a feeling of sadness" (which reifies the noun "feeling" as a thing--a qualia). I don't deny whatsoever that you feel, or that I feel, or that anyone else does. I absolutely do think you are misled into treating something you do as something that is "had" (as in "I have a feeling of sadness"). This does not, in my opinion, deny your feeling (verb) and call it something else. Or do I misunderstand your point?

I don't think you do but in my opinion reification is not the point. It would be reification if there was nothing but an abstraction. In fact that's the behaviorist and (ontologically) reductionist approach to consciousness.

I hold that feeling sad cannot be separated from one or more "feelings of sadness". The feeling is a qualitative, subjective event within reality. It is real eventhough it isn't a physical phenomenon.

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Causal understanding vs. phenomenal understanding

Paul said:

However, I bet it will be sufficient to allow us to produce the emotion through appropriate electrical stimulation and other mechanical means, correct run-away emotional problems, discuss the causes of emotions, and so forth. In that sense, then, it is a complete description of emotion. But it is not the same as having the emotion.

Meaning that it is NOT a complete description of emotion, as such a complete description would also have to involve what it is like to have that emotion.

However, consider any other event, for example, walking across grass. We can develop a complete understanding of everything that contributes to walking across grass: gravity, movement, shoes, grass height and strength, etc. We have a complete understanding, yet the understanding is not "the same as" walking across the grass.

I'm afraid you're mixing up understanding of causal factors leading to a sensation with knowing what that sensation is like. In order to know the latter, you need to have knowledge about this particular form of subjectivity as such. For example, by having undergone it yourself, or by being able to relate it to something you've experienced yourself. You can't leave out the irreducible subjective if you study subjectivity.

It seems to me that we realize the difference between understanding something and its occurrence, yet for some reason you want to elevate a particular case (consciousness) to a special place. I suspect that's because consciousness is the only case where the understanding and the occurrence are directly accessible.

Again, it is a matter of definition. The way the physical world is generally defined simply leaves no room for a physical consciousness.

Titus

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus

I hold that feeling sad cannot be separated from one or more "feelings of sadness". The feeling is a qualitative, subjective event within reality. It is real eventhough it isn't a physical phenomenon.

So while 'feelings of sadness' might be explainable in terms of (say) electrochemical states, any such explanations will be missing something essential; there is an additional layer; there are the feelings, and then there is the feeling of the feelings -- the latter being non-physical, and therefore not observable, explainable, or even definable (but nonetheless real).

Right?

 

[Mercutio]

Re: Feeling sad implies an irreducible feeling of sadness

I hold that feeling sad cannot be separated from one or more "feelings of sadness". The feeling is a qualitative, subjective event within reality. It is real even though it isn't a physical phenomenon.

I understand, but disagree. I'd take your first sentence here and reverse it, saying that "feelings of sadness" cannot be separated from feeling sad. The verb, the action, is what is real, and it is physical.

 

[Interesting Ian]

So while 'feelings of sadness' might be explainable in terms of (say) electrochemical states, any such explanations will be missing something essential; there is an additional layer; there are the feelings, and then there is the feeling of the feelings -- the latter being non-physical, and therefore not observable, explainable, or even definable (but nonetheless real).

Right?

What on earth has an electrochemical state have to do with feelings of sadness??

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

Is this the first moment you've faced this problem? Two choices: solipsism, or "gentlemens' agreement" (*you* are not a p-zombie, or Turing Machine, either, as *I* am not).

I guess it is. I didn't realize that we had to rely on one paranormal thing (telepathy) to detect another apparently paranormal thing (consciousness).

What the heck is telepathy?

All right, anomalmouse coginition.

Titus said:

Meaning that it is NOT a complete description of emotion, as such a complete description would also have to involve what it is like to have that emotion.

I agree, I shouldn't have used the word complete. But what do you really mean by "what it is like to have"? The issue of emotion is similar to the Knowledge Argument. If I have never experienced sadness, but know everything there is to learn about it from books, then I still don't have all the information about sadness. But what am I missing? I am missing the neural connections that are formed or modified or activated by actually being sad. So I walk outside my room and get sad. Bam! Now I have all the information in my brain.

You seem to be saying that "what it is like to have" is more than just acquiring these neural connections. What more is it?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian asked:

What on earth has an electrochemical state have to do with feelings of sadness??

It has at least something to do with sadness, or antidepressants and other such drugs wouldn't work.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian asked:
It has at least something to do with sadness, or antidepressants and other such drugs wouldn't work.

~~ Paul

Yeah like listening to certain music might induce a feeling of sadness. Must mean sadness is one and the same thing as certain music

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Yeah like listening to certain music might induce a feeling of sadness

Of course. Responses to external stimuli produce changes in electrochemical states in the brain, and some of these states may be mimicked by introduction of some substances. That's a no-brainer (figuratively speaking).

Alcohol (for instance) affects the nervous system in ways that would cause one under its effects to report differently his internal states (using non-technical terms like 'happy', 'sad', 'playful', angry, etc). If such 'feelings' are independent of events in the underlying neural substrate, how do you explain that?