A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

Oh, and one more thing: These arguments, even if they are correct, do not prove that p-zombies and qualia do not exist, merely that the concepts are nonsensical. I have no proof as yet that the universe is required to make sense.

Ture words. There is the universe, maybe, which we apparently percieve. There are thoughts and words used to decribe the universe. In science there is an idea that there are concepts and words which can approxiamate the way the universe appears to behave. In philosophy an attempt is made to deliniate the ways that humans can describe and explore the thought structures of humans. In literature an effort is made to deliniate the nature of experience.

As a nihilist I say that it is all nonsense, it is only which area of possible communication you wish to focus upon that makes the non existant difference.
 
Okay. :)

Qualia are internal, subjective experiences, unconnected with the objective world, right? Pure essence; pure information.

They are not pure essence as they derive from a very comlpex phycical struce sture that they are products of?

They are psrt of the objective world, how are they disconnected from objectivity, they can be generated through false stimulation of the brain, if you press you eye ball, preferably with the eyelid closed you can create qualia, they are dependant upon physical perception.

Can you demonstrate the free standing nature of qualia, or is it speculation, which may convey meaning in a literary sense or a philosophical sense?
 
They are not pure essence as they derive from a very comlpex phycical struce sture that they are products of?
Well, no. Given the assumption of materialism, the concept of qualia is simply contradictory. We have experiences, yes, but not qualia.

Can you demonstrate the free standing nature of qualia, or is it speculation, which may convey meaning in a literary sense or a philosophical sense?
Neither. That's how they are defined; my point is just that the definition makes no sense.
 
His first one, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus .
That makes sense now. Yes, but as you say:
I do know later in life he admitted that much of what was in his first book was a philosophy he no longer held. But I find his first book to be the best to me personally. The problem of pain came in a later writing, I don't remember which but promise to look it up.
His later work in the Brown & Blue books is what, to me, is the most accessible and convincing deconstruction of language and learning "mental concepts" (not his words, I don't think). Much, much better read (personal bias alert!) than the Tractatus. Different writing than any philosophy I have ever encountered--and I mean that in a very good way.

eta: sorry for not responding to the rest of your post. I am getting ready to leave for work...
 
I agree completely. In fact, I am, myself, color-anomalous; I see all the ishihara plates that "normals" see, and those that "color-blind" see. Learning color is absolutely another example of learning from those who have no access to your private experience.

Note that, in learning color, we do have a publicly available referent, which is easily agreed upon. Even though you and I do not know, and cannot know, that our experience is the same, we both label the same things "red" or "green" or "shade 1426 in this booklet". We literally cannot know what our perceptions are, and so the only thing we can agree on is that we, behaviorally, label this particular thing "red". Our own personal, subjective experience, is more accurately described by this external thing. It is, after all, how we learned to label our internal experience. Because of this, "red" is the public thing that we all agree to call red, whether or not it is the exact same for you and me.

Same with "consciousness". Quite literally, the thing we call consciousness is better described by the public, behavioral referents. We have nothing else. If it behaves as if it is conscious in every way, it is conscious. If everybody agrees that this sign appears red, it is red. By every measure we have available--even to ourselves--the public referent is the meaning of "red". Anything beyond that is idle speculation, and cannot even in principle be investigated.

Yes, all this is perfectly correct -- from the scientific perspective.

But if someone experiences differing colours from me eg what I call "red" they call" blue" and vice versa, then although we can never in principle scientifically discover this fact, it certainly doesn't make it meaningless. The same goes for whether other people have inner qualitative conscious experiences.
 
Others have perhaps said it better, but maybe one more dose of the obvious will help illustrate why the concept of p-zombies is circular.

Their definition could be restated as, "P-zombies satisfy every single definition we have to describe and verifiy consciousness, yet we define them as unconscious."

Yes that's right. But then of course consciousness is impossible to define. That is to say we cannot scientifically define it because all we're doing is defining behaviour or physical activity in the brain.
 
So, if I'm capable of dressing up like and behaving like Humphrey Bogart, does that make me Humphrey Bogart?
 
Well, here we may be getting into semantic issues. I think we can agree that our ostensive definition of "red" -- the set of things we label as "red" -- can be the same while our internal percepts and qualia related to "red" are completely different.

So the question is : is "red" defined ostensively, or perceptively?

I'd just like to say that I define it perceptively.

The question for consciousness is more or less exactly the same. If you look at Ian's "argument," summarized as "We know that we are conscious simply because we are conscious," then it's obvious that he defines consciousness as identical to the awareness of consciousness, in other words as a quale. Similarly, " [A p-zombie] e says he [has consciousness], he acts as if he does, but those things are not numerically the same as consciousness." But this specifically excludes the possibility of an ostensive definition of consciousness, just as above.

Yeah I don't define consciousness ostensively. Obviously if we did then p-zombies indeed are conscious by definition.

Perhaps this whole debate is because of using 2 differing definitions of consciousness? I've always made it as clear as I can that what I mean by consciousness is phenomenolgoical consciousness, or the inner qualitative feel of what it is like to be conscious.

If "consciousness" is a quale, then we have no way of knowing whether p-zombies exist or not, because we have no access to their qualia.

Indeed.
 
Originally Posted by drkitten :
Well, here we may be getting into semantic issues. I think we can agree that our ostensive definition of "red" -- the set of things we label as "red" -- can be the same while our internal percepts and qualia related to "red" are completely different.

Mercutio
Agreed, with the quibble that your "are" really means "may be, but we can never know for certain, even in principle." Actually...now that I think about it, the "internal percepts and qualia" presupposes some mentalisms I am not completely comfortable with. The "red" we see is not an inner qualia, it is an external stop sign, or water bottle, or fire extinguisher.

I conflate the two too. However, instead of saying there's only the external stop sign, I say there's only the qualia.
 
Yes, all this is perfectly correct -- from the scientific perspective.

But if someone experiences differing colours from me eg what I call "red" they call" blue" and vice versa, then although we can never in principle scientifically discover this fact, it certainly doesn't make it meaningless. The same goes for whether other people have inner qualitative conscious experiences.
I agree. This is why I understood and thought reasonable your position in that endless discussion about that visual illusion with the cylinder and the chessboard. One way or another, the job of science in this case is to try to understand the relationship between the physical stimulus and the perception. It really doesn't matter (although science has chosen its side and stuck with it) whether we assume that the physical stimulus is what is bedrock, or that the perception is what is bedrock. Our job is to see what changes in the one are accompanied by changes in the other. (By one perspective, the squares were the same physically measured color. By the other perspective they were differently perceived colors. Whether we are explaining why they were perceived differently despite being the same, or explaininge why two other squares were measured differently despite being perceived as the same, we are exploring the same question.)

And I should probably retreat from the word "meaningless", and qualify that as "meaningless to scientific study"; science has its strict boundaries, but does not get to choose which things are meaningful within or without that boundary.
 
I conflate the two too. However, instead of saying there's only the external stop sign, I say there's only the qualia.
Again, you are completely consistent on this. I find it easier to go the other way, but cannot fault you yours (although, given the assumptions of materialism, yours is an illusion, of course.) :)
 
My take on this is that we all are p-zombies.

I know with absolutely certitude that I am not.

I have absolutely no way to know that others are conscious as it is understood here. And noone else can ever know if I am conscious. In fact, I am not even sure that I am "conscious".

Maybe.

It seems that everything I was told about having this unique ability to perceive myself as a conscious being was a lie. In reality, the activity in my brain (our brain) is playing the greatest joke on humans. Why on earth are we still refering to this electrical activity as "consciousness"?. Here , in this forum. Why do materialists still use this definition?, why haven´t they started calling things what they are?.

Well I think on a practical level we all need to refer to consciousness and conscious experiences. I agree that reductive materialists cannot believe in the existence of consciousness though.

Mary[/QUOTE]
 
I know with absolutely certitude that I am not.
Which proves that you are.


Well I think on a practical level we all need to refer to consciousness and conscious experiences. I agree that reductive materialists cannot believe in the existence of consciousness though.
"Believe in"? What's this "believe in"? We observe - and indeed measure - consciousness through its interactions.
 
Again, you are completely consistent on this. I find it easier to go the other way, but cannot fault you yours (although, given the assumptions of materialism, yours is an illusion, of course.) :)
Yes, he is consistent in this. The point is - or at least, my point is - that it is not in any way useful. It is not possible to construct a practical understanding of the world based on these concepts. Consistency does not equate with utility; logic not based on evidence still produces answers, but applying them to the real world is ill-advised.
 
Yes, he is consistent in this. The point is - or at least, my point is - that it is not in any way useful. It is not possible to construct a practical understanding of the world based on these concepts. Consistency does not equate with utility; logic not based on evidence still produces answers, but applying them to the real world is ill-advised.

That depends on whether one values consistency more than utility.
 

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