A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[Interesting Ian]

Dr Kitten,

The 2nd post in this thread is by PixyMisa. I merely pasted it in from the other thread.

And I'm sure now you would like to reconsider your disagreement with it!

 

[Mercutio]

Peoples' arguments thus far are begging the question by simply assuming reductive materialism is true. What is required is that people first of all suppose consciousness to be conceptually distinct from physical processes, and then demonstrate how this leads to an inconsistency. Otherwise no justification will have been forthcoming to justify the assertion that p-zombies are logically impossible

But you are also begging the question, Ian. For instance you say:

A p-zombie doesn't know anything. Necessarily it doesn't because to know something requires consciousness.

Have you considered that you might be able to know something without consciousness, even if to know other things might require consciousness? Mightn't the p-zombie (I still prefer the "m-zombie") know all the things it is possible to know without consciousness, and only not know the things it is impossible to know w/o consciousness? That would no longer beg the question, and would return the question to "what exactly are the things that consciousness provides that materialism does not?"

 

[Interesting Ian]

But you are also begging the question, Ian. For instance you say:
Have you considered that you might be able to know something without consciousness, even if to know other things might require consciousness? Mightn't the p-zombie (I still prefer the "m-zombie") know all the things it is possible to know without consciousness, and only not know the things it is impossible to know w/o consciousness? That would no longer beg the question, and would return the question to "what exactly are the things that consciousness provides that materialism does not?"

I meant to know something as in the sense of being presently in consciousness. A boulder or river do not know anything, but, in a sense, neither do I when I am asleep or unconscious.

Of course I can say I know something when it is not presently in my consciousness, and even act upon such knowledge. But to know something means it has to be potentially accessible to consciousness, otherwise we would have to say non-conscious things can know things too.

This is all irrelevant anyway since I was responding to PixyMisa's statement:

"The p-zombie itself knows perfectly well that it is conscious, just as you and I do".

We know that we are conscious simply because we are conscious. But since a p-zombie is not conscious it could not possibly know it is conscious in the very same way as we know we are conscious. In other words it can't be its consciousness which makes it "know" it is conscious. Basically to suppose a p-zombie knows it is conscious is to rule out the logical possibility of p-zombies. The justification for ruling out the logical possibility of p-zombies has been entirely unforthcoming. Presupposing reductive materialism is of course viciously circular.

I'm still awaiting PixyMisa's response.

 

[drkitten]

The 2nd post in this thread is by PixyMisa. I merely pasted it in from the other thread.

And I'm sure now you would like to reconsider your disagreement with it!

No. It's still an assertion without proof.

 

[Mercutio]

"The p-zombie itself knows perfectly well that it is conscious, just as you and I do".

We know that we are conscious simply because we are conscious. But since a p-zombie is not conscious it could not possibly know it is conscious in the very same way as we know we are conscious. In other words it can't be its consciousness which makes it "know" it is conscious. Basically to suppose a p-zombie knows it is conscious is to rule out the logical possibility of p-zombies. The justification for ruling out the logical possibility of p-zombies has been entirely unforthcoming. Presupposing reductive materialism is of course viciously circular.

I'm still awaiting PixyMisa's response.

But, see, as you know from previous conversations with me, I don't know that I am conscious, separate from the sensory data I am taking in and the automatic (or at least, I have no reason a priori to suppose that it is anything but automatic) associations I form from those data. I don't know the difference between seeing a tree and being conscious of seeing a tree, so I do not, by my understanding of your argument, know that I am conscious. Perhaps I am a p-zombie; I see things, feel things, think things...but I would be hard-pressed to say that not only do I do all those things, but in addition I am doing them "consciously".

I know that I see things because I see them. I do not know what it adds to say that I do this "consciously".

 

[Z]

If it acts in every way as if it is conscious, it is conscious. P-Zombies are illogical and self-contradictory, under any assumption.

 

[drkitten]

If it acts in every way as if it is conscious, it is conscious.

Proof?

 

[Z]

Proof?

Definition.

 

[drkitten]

Definition.

I must have missed that definition -- and I admit, I regard it as a pretty poor one.

 

[Mercutio]

Dunno of this will help, doc, but consider the way in which you learn the word "conscious" itself. Those who teach you to label your conscious experience have no access to it. You have no access to the conscious experience of those who would demonstrate it to you. The only thing you have is the observable behavior of these people, and they of yours. Unless you posit some sort of ESP connection, you learn the word "conscious"--even as a label of your own private experience--only by association with the way you and others act. "If it acts in every way like it is conscious, it is conscious" is not a bad summary of how you (or I, or anyone else) learned the word.

Now the trick is in deciding which actions we label "like it is conscious". There, I would argue that we have fuzzy categories, resulting in broad agreement, but enough disagreement to fuel threads like this one.

 

[drkitten]

Dunno of this will help, doc, but consider the way in which you learn the word "conscious" itself. Those who teach you to label your conscious experience have no access to it.

Which doesn't mean that they themselves are naming or labelling the experiences correctly.

We've got a very good, if much simpler, example, in human color perception. Color blind people can often use color names correctly, from contextual cues as well as learned responses about what particular quale corresponds to the word "red." This doesn't mean, however, that anyone who can use the word "red" properly necessarily sees it in the same way that I do -- or even at all.

It gets even better when you look at human tetrachromats. Until relatively recently (the past ten years or so) no one even realized that human tetrachromats exist. It turns out, however, that a relatively large number of women actually have two slightly different sets of genes for color vision, enough to give them tetrachromatic color perception -- and this can now be shown to influence their ability to identify, distinguish, and match colors. These women -- about half of them -- literally don't see "red" the way you do, despite the fact that they use the word in the same way you do.

You have no access to the conscious experience of those who would demonstrate it to you.

I have no access to the color percepts of those who would demonstrate to me, either. That doesn't mean that my color percepts are the same as theirs, even when we agree on the behavioral aspects of color.

 

[Z]

It doesn't matter if your color perception of 'red' is the same or different from someone else's; all that matters is if you can distinguish light in the 650 nm range and if that perception agrees with other being's perceptions.

"Red is that color right there" is as perfect a definition as "Consciousness is what we describe as consciousness". It doesn't matter if what you see as red, I see as what you would call green or what Bob would call chartreuse; it's red, by definition. Consciousness, by definition, can also be defined by observable properties. Ability to process sensory input, memory, self-awareness, distinction between self and other; these are some of the qualities of a thing which are conscious. If they have these qualities, they are conscious; if they do not, they are not. In no case, however, can any dualist or idealist show us something about consciousness that isn't observable (and therefore physical) and isn't present in other things, but present in people.

Therefore, if it acts conscious, it is conscious.

 

[Mercutio]

Which doesn't mean that they themselves are naming or labelling the experiences correctly.

[snip]

I have no access to the color percepts of those who would demonstrate to me, either. That doesn't mean that my color percepts are the same as theirs, even when we agree on the behavioral aspects of color.

I agree completely. In fact, I am, myself, color-anomalous; I see all the ishihara plates that "normals" see, and those that "color-blind" see. Learning color is absolutely another example of learning from those who have no access to your private experience.

Note that, in learning color, we do have a publicly available referent, which is easily agreed upon. Even though you and I do not know, and cannot know, that our experience is the same, we both label the same things "red" or "green" or "shade 1426 in this booklet". We literally cannot know what our perceptions are, and so the only thing we can agree on is that we, behaviorally, label this particular thing "red". Our own personal, subjective experience, is more accurately described by this external thing. It is, after all, how we learned to label our internal experience. Because of this, "red" is the public thing that we all agree to call red, whether or not it is the exact same for you and me.

Same with "consciousness". Quite literally, the thing we call consciousness is better described by the public, behavioral referents. We have nothing else. If it behaves as if it is conscious in every way, it is conscious. If everybody agrees that this sign appears red, it is red. By every measure we have available--even to ourselves--the public referent is the meaning of "red". Anything beyond that is idle speculation, and cannot even in principle be investigated.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Is it just me, or does anyone else wonder what would happen if you put a p-zombie in the Chinese Room?

 

[Ducky]

Here I thought Ian was going to admit he's a p-zombie.

 

[Tricky]

Others have perhaps said it better, but maybe one more dose of the obvious will help illustrate why the concept of p-zombies is circular.

Their definition could be restated as, "P-zombies satisfy every single definition we have to describe and verifiy consciousness, yet we define them as unconscious."

 

[drkitten]

Learning color is absolutely another example of learning from those who have no access to your private experience.

Note that, in learning color, we do have a publicly available referent, which is easily agreed upon. Even though you and I do not know, and cannot know, that our experience is the same, we both label the same things "red" or "green" or "shade 1426 in this booklet". We literally cannot know what our perceptions are, and so the only thing we can agree on is that we, behaviorally, label this particular thing "red". Our own personal, subjective experience, is more accurately described by this external thing. It is, after all, how we learned to label our internal experience. Because of this, "red" is the public thing that we all agree to call red, whether or not it is the exact same for you and me.

Well, here we may be getting into semantic issues. I think we can agree that our ostensive definition of "red" -- the set of things we label as "red" -- can be the same while our internal percepts and qualia related to "red" are completely different.

So the question is : is "red" defined ostensively, or perceptively? And more importantly, if you define the word "red" ostensively, what's the word that you use to describe a particualr quale?

The question for consciousness is more or less exactly the same. If you look at Ian's "argument," summarized as "We know that we are conscious simply because we are conscious," then it's obvious that he defines consciousness as identical to the awareness of consciousness, in other words as a quale. Similarly, " [A p-zombie] e says he [has consciousness], he acts as if he does, but those things are not numerically the same as consciousness." But this specifically excludes the possibility of an ostensive definition of consciousness, just as above.

If "consciousness" is a quale, then we have no way of knowing whether p-zombies exist or not, because we have no access to their qualia.

If "consciousness" is not a quale, but defined ostensively, then anything that appears to be conscious may in fact be conscious, but may not necessarily be aware of its consciousness -- i.e. a p-zombie, conscious but unaware.

 

[Mercutio]

Well, here we may be getting into semantic issues. I think we can agree that our ostensive definition of "red" -- the set of things we label as "red" -- can be the same while our internal percepts and qualia related to "red" are completely different.

Agreed, with the quibble that your "are" really means "may be, but we can never know for certain, even in principle." Actually...now that I think about it, the "internal percepts and qualia" presupposes some mentalisms I am not completely comfortable with. The "red" we see is not an inner qualia, it is an external stop sign, or water bottle, or fire extinguisher. Phrasing the question as if there are necessarily inner qualia to explain presupposes a particular answer. But, as you say, this may be semantics; I won't argue too strongly just yet.

So the question is : is "red" defined ostensively, or perceptively? And more importantly, if you define the word "red" ostensively, what's the word that you use to describe a particualr quale?

I am afraid I don't understand. If we define ostensively, is this quale that I am describing presupposed to exist? Again, I see the red stop sign; I do not "perceive the image" of the red stop sign. It is this "image" (or quale) step that leads to confusion.

The question for consciousness is more or less exactly the same. If you look at Ian's "argument," summarized as "We know that we are conscious simply because we are conscious," then it's obvious that he defines consciousness as identical to the awareness of consciousness, in other words as a quale. Similarly, " [A p-zombie] e says he [has consciousness], he acts as if he does, but those things are not numerically the same as consciousness." But this specifically excludes the possibility of an ostensive definition of consciousness, just as above.

Hmmm...the same problem rears its ugly head: how do we learn the phrase "awareness of consciousness". How can we possibly know that we are aware of being conscious? Is there a knowledge of awareness of consciousness? A cognizance of knowledge of awareness of consciousness? And turtles all the way down?

If "consciousness" is a quale, then we have no way of knowing whether p-zombies exist or not, because we have no access to their qualia.

Agreed. And we have no way of knowing whether we are, ourselves, p-zombies, because we have no way of labeling this quale with certainty. If consciousness is only a quale, we cannot know it.

If "consciousness" is not a quale, but defined ostensively, then anything that appears to be conscious may in fact be conscious, but may not necessarily be aware of its consciousness -- i.e. a p-zombie, conscious but unaware.

I think the simpler explanation is that the problems of defining a category of private and public behavior (like "consciousness") through use of public referents is simply a difficult and hazy procedure, much much more varied than trying to define "red". The problem of consciousness is one of how we learn the language we use to describe it.

 

[slingblade]

I've never heard of "p-zombies." What a bizarre little woo theory.
No one seriously thinks these things might be real, do they? Really?

If so, W must be one, since even WE know he's not conscious.

 

[Q-Source]

My take on this is that we all are p-zombies.
I have absolutely no way to know that others are conscious as it is understood here. And noone else can ever know if I am conscious. In fact, I am not even sure that I am "conscious".

It seems that everything I was told about having this unique ability to perceive myself as a conscious being was a lie. In reality, the activity in my brain (our brain) is playing the greatest joke on humans. Why on earth are we still refering to this electrical activity as "consciousness"?. Here , in this forum. Why do materialists still use this definition?, why haven´t they started calling things what they are?.

Mary