A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

[Dark Jaguar]

The apple analogue is pretty close, but let me improve on it so there can be no arguments.

Let us say we have an apple that in every physical way, from maturement to chemical composition, is just like a red apple, but it is a green apple. It appears to be green even though every other physical aspect of it is identical to a red apple. Bounce light off of it (talking to it) and it responds by reflecting only mostly red light, but it is a green apple.

That seems a slightly better analogy, and if you ask me, illustrates very well how totally illogical a p-zombie is.

 

[uruk]

Possibly, but then why shouldn't everyone be a p-zombie apart from me? In which case, should this be true and I were able to psychologically embrace this fact, then it's an awful lonely world I find myself in!

If a P-zombie behaves exactly like a human being, how would you know the difference?

 

[Q-Source]

I'm not sure if I got PixyMisa argument right but I think it goes like this:

the concept of a p-zombie is like an object that looks, smells, and tastes just like an apple. It grows on trees just like an apple and is exactly just like an apple in every concievable way except that it is not an apple. The statement makes no sense or rather it is contradictory. How can that object be just like an apple in every concievable way but yet not be an apple? It assumes that there is something that is not percieveable or detectable in any way that differentiates the object from being an apple dispite having the exact same qualities of being an apple. As if the things which defines and makes up what an apple is is different from actually being an apple. Just like Ian is assuming that "conciousness" is somehow different from that which defines or what makes conciousness conciousness.

Do I have this right, or have I buggered it?

Interesting point. I think this is what Ian is arguing about that undetectable property that distinguishes a conscious human being from a p-zombie.

Just because a p-zombie tells you over and over that it feels like he is conscious, it does not make him conscious, there is still something missing.

Mary

 

[PixyMisa]

Why? That isn't in the proof.

Yes it is.

It must have internal physical states in order to produce the appropriate behavior.

Physical? Who said anything about physical?

If you say it must have internal mental states, you're just assuming what needs to be proved.

Who said anything about mental states either?

I'm talking about information here. By definition, the p-zombie can answer any question involving consciousness. That requires information, and information processing. This is clearly not external; it's a property of the p-zombie. The p-zombie has internal states.

Er ... the p-zombie will make sounds. As for it "telling" me anything, again, that's what needs to be proved.

No.

You ask it a question, it answers, in exactly the same way as a conscious being. That's the definition of a p-zombie. It doesn't merely "make sounds"; it answers questions.

So far all this "proof" shows is that the external behaviors are generated by internal physical processes. Great. So what?

I never mentioned physical processes at all. Stop making things up.

The proof shows that p-zombies have internal processes that are exactly the same in every respect as consciousness. What those processes are, how they work, where they come from, the epistemological basis of the whole thing - that's irrelevant. It doesn't matter if consciousness comes from an immaterial soul that operates through the pineal gland; p-zombies have something that produces exactly the same results in every respect.

 

[PixyMisa]

The apple analogue is pretty close, but let me improve on it so there can be no arguments.

Let us say we have an apple that in every physical way, from maturement to chemical composition, is just like a red apple, but it is a green apple. It appears to be green even though every other physical aspect of it is identical to a red apple. Bounce light off of it (talking to it) and it responds by reflecting only mostly red light, but it is a green apple.

That seems a slightly better analogy, and if you ask me, illustrates very well how totally illogical a p-zombie is.

I like that one.

green
red

 

[Dark Jaguar]

And while the philosopher would probably make some quip about that being proof of some esoteric thing, in the end the only conclusion we can reach from this is there is no difference, and therefor the p-zombie is illogical.

And by the way, that redish green and greenish red will destroy us all! You know what that did to me? When I got done staring at thsoe words, I established the colors but now the WORDS HAVE LOST ALL MEANING! By that I mean I know the meaning of the words, but you seperated the internal response I have looking at those words! Thanks a bunch! Green... green... greeeeeen.... now it sounds weird!

 

[dougsmith]

Yes it is.

No it's not.

Physical? Who said anything about physical?

Who said anything about mental states either?

Now, let's not be sophistic here. The proof mentioned behavior and internal states of processing, which are physical in character. It also mentioned being "under the illusion" and "knowing pefectly well", which are mental states.

I'm talking about information here. By definition, the p-zombie can answer any question involving consciousness. That requires information, and information processing. This is clearly not external; it's a property of the p-zombie. The p-zombie has internal states.

To be fair (that is, not to assume what we need to prove) the zombie can produce certain behaviors which are identical to those of a thinking being. You say "The p-zombie has internal states". I've already said, the p-zombie has internal physical states; as to mental states, that has yet to be shown.

You ask it a question, it answers, in exactly the same way as a conscious being. That's the definition of a p-zombie. It doesn't merely "make sounds"; it answers questions.

It makes sounds. That's (sorry) the physical matter-of-fact. It sounds like it's answering questions. If I see written in seaweed the words "God Exists", it looks like someone has written me something. But maybe it's just all fallen together by chance. In that case, nobody has told me anything, even though it looks like it.

The irony here is that I agree with the original hypothesis that mental states supervene on physical ones. But this is seems a bad proof.

 

[Q-Source]

Consciousness is, like sunrise, close enough for common speech. The problem, as you imply, comes when physics tries to describe how the sun literally rises over our immobile earth, or when neurology tries to find the underlying processes that "generate consciousness". Phrasing it that way implies a special status to consciousness--if not dualism, close enough. It leaves something undiscovered and undiscoverable in our consciousness research, because it assumes an a priori existence of something to find.

I love Wittgenstein. He is my favourite philosopher. You know why?, because he said that confusion arises when different areas of knowledge use the same concept with different connotations.

O.k. I don´t see a problem with dualists, idealists or any other methaphysical belief using the word consciousness to describe what we all know. They do assume that the existence of a non physical property that is missing and need to be found. My confusion comes from materialists using this word when in reality they are talking about physical processes in our brain that are objective and replicable. Why not just call things by their name?, why not just say that there is no consciousness?.

This might seem insignificant, but it isn´t.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

Allow me to point out that the p-zombie's response is going to have to vary based on previous experience, since, as I mentioned elsewhere, it can't respond exactly the same to the exact same input and still be said to be behaving like us.

To do this, it has to have a mechanism for processing data. That process, itself, IS the mental state you seek.

 

[PixyMisa]

No it's not.

Yes it is.

Now, let's not be sophistic here.

Good advice.

The proof mentioned behavior and internal states of processing, which are physical in character.

Why do you claim that internal states are physical?

It also mentioned being "under the illusion" and "knowing pefectly well", which are mental states.

That is true. But you can remove those descriptions, and it still works.

To be fair (that is, not to assume what we need to prove) the zombie can produce certain behaviors which are identical to those of a thinking being.

That's the definition.

You say "The p-zombie has internal states". I've already said, the p-zombie has internal physical states;

Who said anything about physical states? I can claim that the p-zombie doesn't have internal physical states. Makes no difference at all.

as to mental states, that has yet to be shown.

Who said anything about mental states?

Physical states and mental states are irrelevant. What matters is the information. The information is internal.

It makes sounds. That's (sorry) the physical matter-of-fact. It sounds like it's answering questions.

You ask, it answers. By definition, it acts the same as a conscious being in every way.

If I see written in seaweed the words "God Exists", it looks like someone has written me something. But maybe it's just all fallen together by chance. In that case, nobody has told me anything, even though it looks like it.

Baloney. The definition says that it acts exactly the same as a conscious being. If you want to argue that conscious beings cannot answer questions, then fine, but don't be surprised if the entire universe puts you on ignore.

The irony here is that I agree with the original hypothesis that mental states supervene on physical ones. But this is seems a bad proof.

The proof says nothing at all about physical states or mental ones. It only talks about information.

It doesn't matter whether there are internal physical states or internal mental states. What is unavoidable is that there are internal informational states, and internal information processing, and that this processing acts, in all respects, identically to consciousness.

So p-zombies are conscious.

(Oh, and by the way, mental states don't "supervene on" physical states. Mental states are physical states. But that has nothing to do with the proof.)

 

[dougsmith]

Why do you claim that internal states are physical?

Because they are.

You ask, it answers. By definition, it acts the same as a conscious being in every way.

And why is that probative?

Baloney. The definition says that it acts exactly the same as a conscious being. If you want to argue that conscious beings cannot answer questions, then fine, but don't be surprised if the entire universe puts you on ignore.

Not sure what you mean. I am saying that there is a difference between seeming to say something and actually saying something. This "proof" elides the two.

The proof says nothing at all about physical states or mental ones. It only talks about information.

Still assumes a form of behaviorism. That's fine, but it won't convince anyone who wasn't already convinced at the start.

Whether the internal physical/mental states count as "information" is the issue here.

... or, if you prefer, the question is whether all there is to having a mind is having a certain information processing capacity. This is a highly dubious contention, since, for one thing, there is no way of determining malfunction in a swamp-man zombie.

(Oh, and by the way, mental states don't "supervene on" physical states. Mental states are physical states. But that has nothing to do with the proof.)

Well, there we disagree as well. However, in the scheme of things this is a smaller issue.



Leaving the argument aside, what's the point here? You aren't going to convince any dualists that there's nothing to the p-zombie here. If that was the intention ... good luck.

 

[PixyMisa]

Because they are.

Yes, I know that. But it has nothing to do with the proof. The proof makes no such claim, so bringing it up is - as you would have it - sophistry.

And why is that probative?

See my last post.

Not sure what you mean. I am saying that there is a difference between seeming to say something and actually saying something. This "proof" elides the two.

And I am saying that this is total nonsense. What's more, even if it weren't total nonsense, the definition would elide the difference. The proof simply accepts the definition as written. If you claim that conscious beings can say something, then, by definition, p-zombies can say something.

Still assumes a form of behaviorism. That's fine, but it won't convince anyone who wasn't already convinced at the start.

It assumes nothing of the sort.

Whether the internal physical/mental states count as "information" is the issue here.

The proof doesn't discuss physical or mental states, so it is not an issue at all.

... or, if you prefer, the question is whether all there is to having a mind is having a certain information processing capacity.

The point is, this is all that is possible to determine, even in principle, and any distinction made on the basis of properties that are a priori unknowable is a false one.

This is a highly dubious contention, since, for one thing, there is no way of determining malfunction in a swamp-man zombie.

Ask it.

Leaving the argument aside, what's the point here? You aren't going to convince any dualists that there's nothing to the p-zombie here. If that was the intention ... good luck.

Dualism is not even internally consistent, so I don't really care.

 

[stamenflicker]

I don't have access to my notes right now, but if memory serves, one really nice exploration of this issue is phrased around "the pain problem" in behaviorism. Pain, for some who get into this argument, is the ultimate in qualia that cannot be denied.

The problem of pain was expoused by Wittgenstein. I'm not sure if he was the first, but certainly he is the one to which the criticism is ascribed. Witt also had much to say (or really nothing to say) about this thread in general. By putting inference outside of ourselves he concludes that presuppositions are arrived a priori. Group think, or group arrival at a definition is ultimately flawed as any real path to truth, because as he notes, it is nonsensical to say "Socrates is indentical." Indentical holds no real properties in an of itself, yet somehow when we compare the color red, we are saying "You're perception of red is the same as mine." It reality we have said nothing about the object itself, thus we must conclude that... "of that which one cannot speak, one must remain silent." Which in essense, negated much of what he said.

Flick

 

[Dancing David]

A proof by PixyMisa that is, not by myself.

Just to remind or inform anyone who doesn't know. A p-zombie is an apparent person who acts and looks in every way like a normal human being, but who is in fact wholly lacking any consciousness whatsoever.

The proof here is not simply that they do not in fact exist, but that the very concept of a p-zombie is logically incoherent. That is to say that if "someone" acts exactly as if they are conscious, then by definition they are conscious.

Why is this question important? Well it pertains to the whole question of materialism since -- I would argue -- reductive materialists would necessarily have to believe p-zombies are logically incoherent.

But in a more straightforward sense it is important too. How do we know whether a computer is conscious? Well, if p-zombies are logically incoherent, that is to say that if "someone" were by definition conscious should their behaviour be indistinguishable from a person's, then it also follows that a robot, or better still an android, whose behaviour was indistinguishable from a human being's would also by definition be conscious. So presumably would a computer whose responses could not be distinguished from a person's.

PixyMisa's proof follows in the next post.

How long did that take to figure out that?

That is what people having been telling you all along, what is the big deal, if a computer acts as though it is concious then it is conscious, whoopee!

The problem is that the idea of a p-zombie is stupid, more stupid stuff to glorify the word conciousness and pretend that it is like god.

 

[Dancing David]

Yes, I know that. But it has nothing to do with the proof. The proof makes no such claim, so bringing it up is - as you would have it - sophistry.


.

The nature of proof runs the OTHER WAY!

We only know of consciousness that exists in a physical framework.

We can speculate that conciousness does not depend upon a physical state.

Therefore it is the burden on someone making the claim that consciousness is not associated with a physical state to demonstrate that there conciousness not dependant on a physical system.

 

[PixyMisa]

The nature of proof runs the OTHER WAY!

We only know of consciousness that exists in a physical framework.

Yes.

We can speculate that conciousness does not depend upon a physical state.

Yes, but it is mere speculation, as you will agree.

Therefore it is the burden on someone making the claim that consciousness is not associated with a physical state to demonstrate that there conciousness not dependant on a physical system.

Certainly.

My point is that this is not necessary for the proof to stand. The proof derives from the definition of consciousness, not from its origins. If consciousness were immaterial in origin, it wouldn't matter; the concept of p-zombies would still be incoherent.

 

[Interesting Ian]

The nature of proof runs the OTHER WAY!

We only know of consciousness that exists in a physical framework.

We can speculate that conciousness does not depend upon a physical state.

Therefore it is the burden on someone making the claim that consciousness is not associated with a physical state to demonstrate that there conciousness not dependant on a physical system.

There's been a hell of a lot of responses on this thread and I have only skimmed the last page or so and have a lot of catching up to do.

But I felt I had to respond to this post.

David, this thread is not about whether consciousness is dependent on the physical. We are discussing whether a p-zombie is logically coherent. This question directly pertains to reductive materialism. Non-reductive materialism where consciousness merely supervenes on brain processes is not being discussed.

 

[69dodge]

Physical states and mental states are irrelevant. What matters is the information.

[...]

The definition says that it acts exactly the same as a conscious being. If you want to argue that conscious beings cannot answer questions, then fine, but don't be surprised if the entire universe puts you on ignore.

I can answer some questions, somewhat accurately, but I certainly can't unambiguously put into words the totality of my conscious experiences. For example, I am now listening to a Haydn sonata, played on a fortepiano. Do you suppose there is anything I could say to someone who hadn't ever heard the particular piece, perhaps hadn't ever heard anything by Haydn, perhaps hadn't ever heard the sound of a fortepiano, that could let them know precisely what I'm experiencing? Whatever I could say would really be no substitute for them listening to the piece themselves. Since what I can say can't completely capture everything about my conscious experiences, it's not inconceivable that a p-zombie which lacks those conscious experiences could nevertheless say whatever I can say.

It's not clear that all that matters is information. The wiggly groove on a record contains the same information as the sound waves that come out of the speakers when it's played, but would you rather look at the record with a magnifying glass or put it on a turntable and listen to it? Why? What's the difference?

 

[Interesting Ian]

How long did that take to figure out that?

That is what people having been telling you all along, what is the big deal, if a computer acts as though it is concious then it is conscious, whoopee!

They can tell me as much as they like, but that doesn't negate the profound problems with such a notion.

 

[Interesting Ian]

They can tell me as much as they like, but that doesn't negate the profound problems with such a notion.

Just to clarify here. If a p-zombie is logically impossible, then if a computer, robot acts identically to a human being, then by definition it is conscious.

If p-zombies are logically possible, then the question remains open to as whether a computer, robot is conscious.