Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[bokonon]

The problem with utilitarianism is that people don't actually think that way. For certain decisions, sure, but not most of the time, and certainly not as a rule when moral choices are involved.

Whether people actually think that way is somewhat beside the point, the point being that Harris is proposing a more rigorous way of thinking that he claims will lead to better choices.

In some ways I see your "ought arises from biology" as inadequate. Biology has given us vision systems which can be fooled by optical illusions, and I'd argue that our gut reactions (intuitive emotional responses) are similarly fallible. Science is a method for minimizing errors of observation and analysis, and I'm willing to at least consider the possibility that it may prove to be a useful tool for minimizing errors of observation and analysis when making moral choices as well.

 

[Piggy]

Whether people actually think that way is somewhat beside the point, the point being that Harris is proposing a more rigorous way of thinking that he claims will lead to better choices.

In some ways I see your "ought arises from biology" as inadequate. Biology has given us vision systems which can be fooled by optical illusions, and I'd argue that our gut reactions (intuitive emotional responses) are similarly fallible. Science is a method for minimizing errors of observation and analysis, and I'm willing to at least consider the possibility that it may prove to be a useful tool for minimizing errors of observation and analysis when making moral choices as well.

Uh... the argument from biology has nothing to do with following your gut.

The argument is that an understanding of our common biology, informed by science, informs us of universal human nature, and it is that understanding -- not our gut reactions -- that informs our moral choices.

Our gut might tell us "those people are inferior" or "that group doesn't feel pain like we do" or "God hates those folks". Science tells us otherwise.

 

[bokonon]

Pinker identifies another type of morality, which is just built-in. For example, objection to incest, objection to eating a family pet that has passed away (unless you're literally starving to death), repulsion at a person who betrays a family member or close friend for money, anger at political traitors.

While all these objections can be justified rationally, they're primarily gut reactions against acts that most of us would insist are "just wrong" no matter what the contrary argument was.

Some of these are simply inherited in our wiring, like a physical revulsion to eating the flesh of someone you love, even if it's an animal.

Uh... the argument from biology has nothing to do with following your gut.

Whatever you say.

 

[Piggy]

Whatever you say.

How do those cherries taste, bokonon?

Pinker is 100% right to identify a category of "gut reaction" moral responses, such as an objection to eating a pet dog just because you heard dog meat was pretty tasty.

Most people really do feel that way, very strongly, and we can't help it.

But, of course, in citing this the way you do, you're wilfully ignoring the larger argument.

A biologically-based morality accepts the reality of such hard-wired responses. It recognizes that some moral objections are instilled in us by evolution, even though they cannot necessarily be defended by purely logical arguments.

But this in no way justifies simply "going with your gut" as a method of making moral choices.

That kind of approach would justify shooting someone you're angry at because it seemed like the right thing to do at the time.

Pinker's approach rejects such a conclusion because it is narrowly self-centered -- that is, it fails to take all facts into consideration -- and because it ignores the biological fact that people don't want to be shot, that they suffer when they're shot and wounded, and that their loved ones suffer if they are killed.

Just because we recognize a category of moral judgments which are "gut level" -- on a species scale, not on an individual scale (that is the key here) -- does not mean that we then advocate "going with your gut" in making all moral decisions.

Which, of course, is clear from my arguments in that thread.

 

[bokonon]

How do those cherries taste, bokonon?

Not bad, how's the crow?

Just because we recognize a category of moral judgments which are "gut level" -- on a species scale, not on an individual scale (that is the key here) -- does not mean that we then advocate "going with your gut" in making all moral decisions.

So, when you read a statement like "I see your 'ought arises from biology' as inadequate. [...] I'd argue that our gut reactions (intuitive emotional responses) are ... fallible," and you apparently agree that "going with our gut" is not an adequate basis for making all moral decisions, it might be more appropriate to say "I agree, but just to clarify..." rather than "it has nothing to do with following your gut." I don't believe my statement specified or implied an "individual" or "species" scale.

"going with your gut" as a method of making moral choices [...] would justify shooting someone you're angry at because it seemed like the right thing to do at the time.

Pinker's approach rejects such a conclusion because it is narrowly self-centered -- that is, it fails to take all facts into consideration -- and because it ignores the biological fact that people don't want to be shot, that they suffer when they're shot and wounded, and that their loved ones suffer if they are killed.

I had in mind a "gut" which included such facts (our intuitive emotional response comprehends that wounding and killing causes suffering), and still regard it as inadequate, but no matter...

I haven't read Pinker, and my comment was based on my understanding of your characterization of his ideas. Frankly this exchange has reminded me why I tend to regard these philosophical discussions as a mostly boring hair-splitting waste of time. Whether I go on to read Harris' book or not, I think I may be done with this thread.

 

[Piggy]

Frankly this exchange has reminded me why I tend to regard these philosophical discussions as a mostly boring hair-splitting waste of time.

I'm sorry, but I could not even follow the first part of your post.

As for this, Pinker wasn't writing philosophy, and I am not discussing philosophy.

 

[fls]

Let's say science shows us that the best way to promote maximum social well-being is to have the society entirely made up of women, because of physical traits making them more pacifistic, or their social interactions being better for well-being, or whatever.

Science would suggest we should isolate men to breeding camps, where we extract their semen. And we abort all male fetuses that are not needed to repopulate those camps.

Science would also say we should genetically engineer those women to be lesbians so they wouldn't lose the positive sexual well-being.

That an okay "moral answer" for you?

I don't think that is what is meant when people claim that science can be used to answer moral questions. There is a similarly vague concept which we generally agree science can deal with which has a lot of correspondence with moral questions, and that is 'health'. Part of the definition of health even includes 'well-being'.

"Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." (WHO definition)

Similarly, "science could tell us that the way to maximize health is to euthanize the old and infirm." Yet I don't think anyone would expect this to be a persuasive argument against the use of science to answer health questions. Where do we get the idea that we 'ought' to concern ourselves with the absence of death or disability in relation to 'health'?

Linda

 

[fls]

One kind of (moral) good is an instrumental good. It is good because it helps us achieve a goal, and that goal is seen as good. Money, for example, is strictly an instrumental good. It's good because you can use it to do good things. It is of no value in and of itself. Science is also an instrumental good.

This is distinct from an intrinsic good. An intrinsic good is good just because it is good. It does not depend for its goodness on achieving anything, it is morally desirable just in and of itself.

Instrumental goods are only good because they can bring about some other, intrinsic good.

So far so good.

Science can not tell us what is intrinsically good. Not ever. It can only ever tell us what is instrumentally good.

I don't know if you are still following this thread, but what would be helpful would be an example of an intrinsic good and what it was that told us it was an intrinsic good. The way you've described it, only by indicating what it isn't, it could be an empty category.

Linda

 

[Beth]

I don't know if you are still following this thread, but what would be helpful would be an example of an intrinsic good and what it was that told us it was an intrinsic good. The way you've described it, only by indicating what it isn't, it could be an empty category.

Linda

Intrinsic goods can be consumables - things that you use to live and make life enjoyable. Food and clothing fit into this category. Intrinsic goods can also be intangibles, things like music and justice. Intrinsic goods are valued for what they are.

 

[Paulhoff]

Paul

 

[Wowbagger]

I would like to join this debate, but I would be joining in very late. And, I certainly did not read all (or even most) of the posts in this thread. But, I will say one thing, that I think needs emphasis:

A society's values (morals, ethics, etc.) are based on the needs and interests of that society. As those needs change and adjust, you would expect values to be adjusted along with them, in the long run. Of course, in the short term, there could be resistance, because of the illusion of values being "immutable". But, change is inevitable, as long as the planet is not homogenous across time.

There is no reason why science cannot study the driving forces behind social change, and the shift in values that come with that.

But, even as some things change, certain things do not seem to do so, or at least not as much. (Murder, for example, is almost universally reviled by societies.) There is no reason why science cannot investigate how these nearly innate, core values have emerged. The ultimate causes are almost obvious: Survival of the species depends on some of them. But, the proximate, more specific ways in which these are implemented, and how they play out with other factors such as culture, could still be ironed out within the realm of science.

I saw Sam Harris speak in NYC, on Thursday. Although I was never a big fan of his, I do think he could be on the right track. If we accept "bad" meaning the health and wellbeing of nearly everyone is extremely poor, and "evil" as those who would put us there; then there is room for science to shed light on values. Science can turn its magnifying glass on which social policies maximize or minimize the general health and wellbeing for everyone. But, I will say more about that, once I finish reading his book.

 

[AlBell]

I don't know if you are still following this thread, but what would be helpful would be an example of an intrinsic good and what it was that told us it was an intrinsic good. The way you've described it, only by indicating what it isn't, it could be an empty category.

Linda

Intrinsic goods can be consumables - things that you use to live and make life enjoyable. Food and clothing fit into this category. Intrinsic goods can also be intangibles, things like music and justice. Intrinsic goods are valued for what they are.

As I see it any intrinsic value a consumable might have is assigned by the user. A logical nihilist would state that nothing has intrinsic value. Other philosphies might cite 'happiness' or 'pleasure' or 'virtue' as having intrinsic value.

I'd say Gould missed the mark by assigning Religion as the second magisteria; better said it is 'personal choice, or perhaps acceptance' assigning intrinsic value. Religion is a method that can persuade individuals to agree with certain choices as having intrinsic value; Religion and the sword, or just the sword, can achieve that same objective.

I also contend Science cannot by itself assign intrinsic value. Science can of course examine the actual and/or apparent effects specific choices may have or had on the individual and society.

 

[Dragoonster]

I don't think that is what is meant when people claim that science can be used to answer moral questions. There is a similarly vague concept which we generally agree science can deal with which has a lot of correspondence with moral questions, and that is 'health'. Part of the definition of health even includes 'well-being'.

Sure...but health also means (presumably to Sam Harris though he of course never explained why) "humans' health" so there's an implicit moral axiom that human health is to be valued, and/or even more than other species or inanimate objects' "health".

p.s. what "people" mean isn't the big topic here, it's what "Sam Harris" means, and his meaning is laughable.

"Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." (WHO definition)

Similarly, "science could tell us that the way to maximize health is to euthanize the old and infirm." Yet I don't think anyone would expect this to be a persuasive argument against the use of science to answer health questions. Where do we get the idea that we 'ought' to concern ourselves with the absence of death or disability in relation to 'health'?

Linda

It seemingly should be a persuasive argument according to Sam Harris' naive and simplimentary calculus. He's like a 10-year old arguing utilitarianism imo, bolstered by his favorite belief in science, as opposed to a random 10-year old's belief in matchbox cars, or Johnny Depp posters.

Bascially nothing he says in this topic is at all interesting or at all compelling. That's at-best; at-worst he's seeking a new moral religion based on science. Actually, at-worst he's offered no basis for anything he claims. No philosophy, no ethics, nothing.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I don't know if you are still following this thread, but what would be helpful would be an example of an intrinsic good and what it was that told us it was an intrinsic good. The way you've described it, only by indicating what it isn't, it could be an empty category.

Linda

What is an intrinsic good is a value judgment, not something which can be scientifically shown to be correct or incorrect.

Kant would have right acts as being intrinsically good, Bentham would have pleasure, Mill would have "higher pleasures", others would have the satisfaction of preferences, or the satisfaction of only well-informed and rational preferences, or "flourishing", or the cultivation of moral virtues.

Every moral system has to start, or perhaps finish, with some kind of leap of faith where you choose to value something over something else just because. They all have a point where you can no longer answer the question "But why do you value that?" with anything other than "because it seems to me to be good".

For this reason I'm pretty sure that you just can't have a moral system with no intrinsic goods, or where the set of intrinsic goods is an empty set. Instrumental goods by definition are good because they let you do something you value, but you have to value something before instrumental goods can even exist. Otherwise they aren't instrumental goods (to you) at all, because they cannot bring about a state of affairs which you value if you are genuinely ambivalent about all possible states of affairs.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

The problem with utilitarianism is that people don't actually think that way. For certain decisions, sure, but not most of the time, and certainly not as a rule when moral choices are involved.

There's a distinction to be made between a normative moral philosophy and a moral decision-making strategy. It's not necessarily inconsistent to hold, for example, that utilitarianism is the best normative moral philosophy but impractical as an everyday decision-making strategy.

The ideal moral theory would of course fulfil both roles perfectly, but such a beast may not exist.

 

[fls]

What is an intrinsic good is a value judgment, not something which can be scientifically shown to be correct or incorrect.

Okay. For no good reason on my part, I thought you were specifically denying that.

Kant would have right acts as being intrinsically good, Bentham would have pleasure, Mill would have "higher pleasures", others would have the satisfaction of preferences, or the satisfaction of only well-informed and rational preferences, or "flourishing", or the cultivation of moral virtues.

Every moral system has to start, or perhaps finish, with some kind of leap of faith where you choose to value something over something else just because. They all have a point where you can no longer answer the question "But why do you value that?" with anything other than "because it seems to me to be good".

For this reason I'm pretty sure that you just can't have a moral system with no intrinsic goods, or where the set of intrinsic goods is an empty set. Instrumental goods by definition are good because they let you do something you value, but you have to value something before instrumental goods can even exist. Otherwise they aren't instrumental goods (to you) at all, because they cannot bring about a state of affairs which you value if you are genuinely ambivalent about all possible states of affairs.

And this confirms for me the correspondence between our study of health and the purported study of morals. At some point, we have assigned intrinsic value to certain outcomes - an ability to walk, life, perceived well-being, an absence of a specific disease - within humans. But these values are as arbitrary as "higher pleasures". Science cannot show us that they are correct or incorrect. Yet we go ahead and use all of them to make statements about which actions improve 'health' as though we have something meaningful to say. And I don't notice endless threads on this forum pointing out that science cannot answer health questions.

Linda

 

[fls]

I also contend Science cannot by itself assign intrinsic value. Science can of course examine the actual and/or apparent effects specific choices may have or had on the individual and society.

I agree. It cannot be said that one drug is 'better' than another simply because one drug cures an otherwise terminal condition while the other does not.

Linda

 

[AlBell]

I agree. It cannot be said that one drug is 'better' than another simply because one drug cures an otherwise terminal condition while the other does not.

Linda

That needs the underlying intrinsic value assignment: life is better than death.

Seems ok, yet, if you are the terminal cancer patient sceaming in pain, will you agree the assignment is intrinsic?

And in your medical drug trials, quality of life issues may again question the 'intrinsic value' assignment.

What does Science say here?

 

[fls]

That needs the underlying intrinsic value assignment: life is better than death.

Seems ok, yet, if you are the terminal cancer patient sceaming in pain, will you agree the assignment is intrinsic?

And in your medical drug trials, quality of life issues may again question the 'intrinsic value' assignment.

What does Science say here?

Again, it doesn't say anything about whether we ought to value quality of life. It only tells us something once we have decided to do so.

Linda

 

[Dani]

The sphere of facts and the sphere of values are intrinsically different.

The sphere of facts (knowledge) explains how things are, while the sphere of values (morals) explains how a subject would like things to be.

This is not a misconception and we shouldn't confuse it with moral relativism.

Of course I agree that, within a moral context, we can rationally or scientifically decide that one action is more objectively correct than another. But this isn't a value, it's just a fact. The value has already been chosen.