Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

Science could be used to determine the intrinsic goods that most or all people value.

Tick! Well done.

Science could be used to determine the influence genetics has on the things we select as intrinsic goods and the value we place on them.

Tick! Going strong.

Science could be used to estimate the costs and benefits of various courses of action and be used to select which are likely to be in closest alignment with our values.

Tick! You are really doing well.

Science can answer the 'ought...if' question.

Oops, oh well. Three out of four ain't bad.
 
<snip>

Oops, oh well. Three out of four ain't bad.

I haven't made myself clear. By 'ought...if' I meant that science can tell us what we ought to do if we want to achieve a particular outcome or not violate pre-conditions.

But maybe I've got the wrong end of the stick. Is Mr. Harris claiming science can discover absolute moral principles?
 
I haven't made myself clear. By 'ought...if' I meant that science can tell us what we ought to do if we want to achieve a particular outcome or not violate pre-conditions.

But maybe I've got the wrong end of the stick. Is Mr. Harris claiming science can discover absolute moral principles?

(Aha! I thought you had mistyped "ought... is").

That was indeed his claim, that he'd found a watertight way to get from "is" statements to "ought" statements without needing to make any value judgments.
 
So, you think humans are so unpredictable that there can never be a theory to explain morals and how they work.

Paul

:) :) :)
 
Now we are going around in circles.

He makes these (philosophically ridiculous) claims right at the start of his talk.

Then he completely fails to back them up and spends the rest of his time talking about the trivially true fact that science can discern facts which we can use with our value judgments to make informed moral choices.

I'm sorry. I think I am understanding Harris differently than you. He seems to be saying that 'ought' questions are not independent of context, such that they depend upon (or are at least informed by) an understanding of what 'is'. Rather than the trivial observation that facts can act with values, he is pointing out that values are not independent of facts to begin with (not 'facts' as in 'discovered truths about the universe', but 'facts' as in 'a description of the space these values inhabit').

Anyway, it is clear that different ways of interpreting what Harris is trying to say can make his ideas nonsensical or reasonable. I'm not trying to get in your way. :)

Linda
 
I think that's quite wrong, actually. Health and freedom are not arbitrary and need not be assigned to anything. We are hard-wired to suffer by excessive constraint, physical pain, the loss of loved ones, and so forth. That's just reality. And science can show that this is the norm for our species, not just for one group or one race.

Science can also show the very real benefits of human contact, healthy intimate relationships, enjoyment of music, fulfilling sex, and other pleasures.

My statement didn't deny any of what you've just said. Rather than asking whether science can show us that we suffer or are fulfilled, the question becomes (if we want to pretend that we ever apply the ought/is question when we aren't suffering from moral relativism :)), on what basis can human health (suffering and fulfillment) warrant a scientific approach?

Linda
 
I'm sorry. I think I am understanding Harris differently than you. He seems to be saying that 'ought' questions are not independent of context, such that they depend upon (or are at least informed by) an understanding of what 'is'.

To me this is stating the obvious. If Harris thinks this is news to anyone I think he must have slept through most of his philosophy classes.

Rather than the trivial observation that facts can act with values, he is pointing out that values are not independent of facts to begin with (not 'facts' as in 'discovered truths about the universe', but 'facts' as in 'a description of the space these values inhabit').

I'm not clear what you intend to convey by "a description of the space these values inhabit", but the sense of the word "fact" used in the fact/value distinction in perfectly well understood in philosophy, so if he's trying to solve the problem by covertly redefining "fact" then he's not really solving the problem.

Anyway, it is clear that different ways of interpreting what Harris is trying to say can make his ideas nonsensical or reasonable. I'm not trying to get in your way. :)

As I said, the meaning of the terms he uses are perfectly well defined in the field of philosophy, which Harris has a degree in. If he's using them to mean something idiosyncratic that's about as daft as a physicist making up their own meaning for words like "energy" or "electron".
 
To me this is stating the obvious. If Harris thinks this is news to anyone I think he must have slept through most of his philosophy classes.

Then I'm surprised he is getting flak over this.

I'm not clear what you intend to convey by "a description of the space these values inhabit"

Just avoiding equivocation. :)

Stuff like 'conscious beings', 'humans', 'habitable environment', etc.

but the sense of the word "fact" used in the fact/value distinction in perfectly well understood in philosophy, so if he's trying to solve the problem by covertly redefining "fact" then he's not really solving the problem.

As I said, the meaning of the terms he uses are perfectly well defined in the field of philosophy, which Harris has a degree in. If he's using them to mean something idiosyncratic that's about as daft as a physicist making up their own meaning for words like "energy" or "electron".

I didn't see him using them in any way that wasn't ordinary. In fact, his argument (AFAICT) seems to depend upon their usual meaning.

Linda
 
He tries to smuggle utilitarianism (defined one more time for you, the moral theory that good actions are those which maximise desirable consequences for all involved) in as a fact

Another point that straddles the line between trivially obvious and the completely wrong.

Every moral system can be reduced to a form of utilitarianism. It goes something like this:
1) List all possible actions available to an individual.
2) Simulate the universe as it would behave if each of those actions were performed.
3) Apply a moral fitness function to each simulated outcome.
4) Perform the action which maximizes the value of the fitness function.

Utilitarianism, Kantianism, Christianity, Objectivism, Nihilism, "Harrisism", or whatever all fit in this framework.

The differences, of course, all arise in the construction of the fitness function, and you dismiss the differences between Mill and Harris as trivial even though they are not as obviously similar as any other two moral philosophies.

- Dr. Trintignant
 
I accept that moral stance but have no idea what it has to do with Sam Harris' contentions. He seemingly wants to scientifically determine all morals, despite not justifying his morals in the first place. Why should we accept his determinations anymore than an Imam's or Christian's?

Why don't you subscribe to "avoidance of suffering" is an axiom thus supporting Jesus Christ? Just how many "avoidance of suffering"-based morally-certain paradigms have you believed in prior to Sam Harris?

Since he explicitly denies that science can answer all moral questions, your first claim is incorrect.

The reason I agree with Harris has nothing to do with accepting proclamations, and everything to do with the fact that it makes perfect sense that science -- our best means of investigating reality -- can inform our moral choices, because it is impossible to argue that any choice is improved by being less informed about reality.

I have no idea why you're talking about Jesus.

But prior to Harris I have understood exactly one fundamental proposition about the importance of avoiding suffering when it comes to moral decisions, and it's the same one I'm discussing here. The one which, to put it bluntly, is rather foolish to deny.
 
As I have already explained, every moral philosophy (including yours and Harris') absolutely requires one or more things, be they acts, outcomes, virtues or something else entirely, to be judged as good in and of themselves. For no other reason than that you think they are good, and not because they are instrumental in bringing about some other good.

Philobabble.

The biological approach does not require any such judgment, because it does not truck in useless Platonic abstractions.
 
Here's an exercise for you. Specify exactly why you think it is morally good to ameliorate suffering. Is it good in and of itself, or is it solely good because it brings about some other good?

Have you stopped beating your wife?

Suffering is bad because in the real world people don't like to suffer.

If you really have a problem wrapping your mind aaround that, then I recommend pulling your nose out of the philosophy book and taking a long walk around town.
 
Careful now - you need to read and respond to exactly what I say. Sloppiness makes good philosophy impossible. I said it might be impractical for everyday problems. That is not at all the same thing as being useless.

Yeah, I heard you the first time, and yeah, if it's impractical for everyday problems, then for all intents and purposes, it's useless.

It's like saying, "This is a wonderful house, the only problem is, you can't actually live in it."
 
We are hard-wired to do, think and feel all sorts of things. Some good, some bad. We are hard-wired to love, hug, rape and commit genocide.

Now you're starting to catch on!

And how do you know these things?

Hint: Two syllables, starts with s, ends in e.

Now, are you going to tell me that knowing those things has no impact on your moral decisions?

If so, then you are engaging in reality-free thinking.
 
Have you stopped beating your wife?

Suffering is bad because in the real world people don't like to suffer.

Why should I care about what other people like? The mere fact that they dislike it is meaningless, unless you also make some kind of value judgment to the effect that it is morally better not to make other people suffer.

If you really have a problem wrapping your mind aaround that, then I recommend pulling your nose out of the philosophy book and taking a long walk around town.

It would be nice if it was that simple, just as it would be nice if we could all prove God's existence for ourselves just by going for a walk and thinking about how amazing the world is.
 
Congratulations, you're a hedonistic utilitarian... for the moment anyway. Since you keep espousing mutually contradictory moral theories I can't say what you will be in your next post.

My moral theories are entirely consistent. If they don't happen to fit nicely into your ism boxes, well, that's not my problem.
 
It may appear obvious to you that you are right, but then again it appears obvious to the Taliban that they are right too. That alone proves nothing.

Nor am I arguing that it proves anything.

The Taliban base their morals on a combination of ancient scripture and a desire for absolute political power.

I base mine on the only method of inquiry and analysis proven to consistently work.
 
Another point that straddles the line between trivially obvious and the completely wrong.

Every moral system can be reduced to a form of utilitarianism. It goes something like this:
1) List all possible actions available to an individual.
2) Simulate the universe as it would behave if each of those actions were performed.
3) Apply a moral fitness function to each simulated outcome.
4) Perform the action which maximizes the value of the fitness function.

Utilitarianism, Kantianism, Christianity, Objectivism, Nihilism, "Harrisism", or whatever all fit in this framework.

Kant was very explicit that you should absolutely ignore outcomes, and focus only on acts. If "moral" acts lead to a completely undesirable outcome, as far as he was concerned that was just tough cookies.

Jesus was pretty clear that you should do unto others as you would have them do unto you (which probably made him a fun guy at singles bars), which excludes all sorts of things like killing people in a just cause which can in theory lead to good outcomes.

Nihilism by definition rejects the very idea of a moral fitness function.

In other words, most of what you are saying is totally wrong.
 
My statement didn't deny any of what you've just said. Rather than asking whether science can show us that we suffer or are fulfilled, the question becomes (if we want to pretend that we ever apply the ought/is question when we aren't suffering from moral relativism :)), on what basis can human health (suffering and fulfillment) warrant a scientific approach?

Linda

Thank you for the clarification.
 

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