Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[Kevin_Lowe]

Okay. For no good reason on my part, I thought you were specifically denying that.

If I had been, that would have been pretty silly.

And this confirms for me the correspondence between our study of health and the purported study of morals. At some point, we have assigned intrinsic value to certain outcomes - an ability to walk, life, perceived well-being, an absence of a specific disease - within humans. But these values are as arbitrary as "higher pleasures". Science cannot show us that they are correct or incorrect. Yet we go ahead and use all of them to make statements about which actions improve 'health' as though we have something meaningful to say. And I don't notice endless threads on this forum pointing out that science cannot answer health questions.

That health is good and morbidity/mortality is bad is one of those value judgments that is so widespread that it almost never comes up for discussion. However it is still merely a value judgment.

The debate about when treatment is appropriate for potentially terminal conditions and when it should be abandoned in favour of palliative care, or indeed euthanasia, illustrates that we are dealing with value judgments about how we wish the world to be, not purely factual matters.

Similarly the conflict between those who would label autism a mental disorder and those who would label it "neurodiversity", and the conflict between those who consider deafness a disability and those who do not show that there is also scope for people to disagree about whether certain states of being are pathological or not.

Science can only answer health questions once we have made a prior value judgment of some sort about what kind of states of being are preferable to others. It's uncontroversial because our judgments on these matters almost always line up with those of everyone else, so it's very rare for anyone to pick nits about it. In such discussions I just assume everyone agrees that mortality and morbidity are bad and do not make an issue of it.

"Ebola is something which it is morally good to prevent" is still a value judgment, even if it's a highly uncontroversial one. You can't infer from the fact that nobody picks a fight about a given moral claim, that the moral claim in question is a scientific truth.

 

[fls]

That health is good and morbidity/mortality is bad is one of those value judgments that is so widespread that it almost never comes up for discussion. However it is still merely a value judgment.

The debate about when treatment is appropriate for potentially terminal conditions and when it should be abandoned in favour of palliative care, or indeed euthanasia, illustrates that we are dealing with value judgments about how we wish the world to be, not purely factual matters.

Similarly the conflict between those who would label autism a mental disorder and those who would label it "neurodiversity", and the conflict between those who consider deafness a disability and those who do not show that there is also scope for people to disagree about whether certain states of being are pathological or not.

Science can only answer health questions once we have made a prior value judgment of some sort about what kind of states of being are preferable to others. It's uncontroversial because our judgments on these matters almost always line up with those of everyone else, so it's very rare for anyone to pick nits about it. In such discussions I just assume everyone agrees that mortality and morbidity are bad and do not make an issue of it.

"Ebola is something which it is morally good to prevent" is still a value judgment, even if it's a highly uncontroversial one. You can't infer from the fact that nobody picks a fight about a given moral claim, that the moral claim in question is a scientific truth.

Yeah, we clearly don't really need to be dealing in scientific truths in order to use science to approach an issue. So why do people feel the need to bring this up with regards to moral questions, as though it represents an argument against our ability to use science with respect to morality, or as though it represents a unique situation?

Linda

 

[AlBell]

Yeah, we clearly don't really need to be dealing in scientific truths in order to use science to approach an issue.

Who said there was?

So why do people feel the need to bring this up with regards to moral questions, as though it represents an argument against our ability to use science with respect to morality, or as though it represents a unique situation?
Linda

Or why anyone would ask that question after Kevin's careful explanation?

 

[fls]

Who said there was?

Well, there's five pages to this thread which suggests that at least some people disagree with Sam Harris' contention that science can address moral questions. There's Gould's NOMA, which some people seem to treat as a legitimate distinction. And the issue of values is often raised in these sorts if threads as though it is relevant to whether something can be subject to scientific scrutiny.

Or why anyone would ask that question after Kevin's careful explanation?

I thought his explanation concurred with my observation that the scientific inquiry of health reflected a study of values?

Linda

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Yeah, we clearly don't really need to be dealing in scientific truths in order to use science to approach an issue. So why do people feel the need to bring this up with regards to moral questions, as though it represents an argument against our ability to use science with respect to morality, or as though it represents a unique situation?

Only because Harris made the assertion that he was going to show that the is/ought distinction didn't exist and that science alone could answer moral questions without needing to team up with non-scientific value judgments.

He failed to follow through on this, but his claim to do so is what this thread is all about. Blame him.

 

[AlBell]

Nicely said.

 

[bokonon]

That needs the underlying intrinsic value assignment: life is better than death.

Not really. It really comes down to a different intrinsic value assignment: having a choice about whether one lives or dies is better than not having such a choice.

Seems ok, yet, if you are the terminal cancer patient sceaming in pain, will you agree the assignment is intrinsic?

I think that patient would also appreciate having a choice.

The debate about when treatment is appropriate for potentially terminal conditions and when it should be abandoned in favour of palliative care, or indeed euthanasia, illustrates that we are dealing with value judgments about how we wish the world to be, not purely factual matters.

Whether or not a drug effectively cures a condition may still be a matter of fact. The availability of such a drug increases the range of choices available to someone afflicted with a given condition. Unless there are hidden costs (i.e., creating a dose of the drug requires the sacrifice of twelve virgins to the volcano gods, or the drug is only being made available to young Hitler, etc.), this expansion of choices would seem to be a good thing.

Science can only answer health questions once we have made a prior value judgment of some sort about what kind of states of being are preferable to others. It's uncontroversial because our judgments on these matters almost always line up with those of everyone else, so it's very rare for anyone to pick nits about it. In such discussions I just assume everyone agrees that mortality and morbidity are bad and do not make an issue of it.

"Ebola is something which it is morally good to prevent" is still a value judgment, even if it's a highly uncontroversial one. You can't infer from the fact that nobody picks a fight about a given moral claim, that the moral claim in question is a scientific truth.

An ineffective treatment is still "worse" than an effective treatment, all else being equal. It provides a choice, which can then be used or not, depending on one's values.

 

[fls]

Only because Harris made the assertion that he was going to show that the is/ought distinction didn't exist and that science alone could answer moral questions without needing to team up with non-scientific value judgments.

Oh. That seems very different from what he said in the TED talk referenced at the start of this thread. What are you basing this on?

Linda

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Oh. That seems very different from what he said in the TED talk referenced at the start of this thread. What are you basing this on?

Linda

Now we are going around in circles.

He makes these (philosophically ridiculous) claims right at the start of his talk.

Then he completely fails to back them up and spends the rest of his time talking about the trivially true fact that science can discern facts which we can use with our value judgments to make informed moral choices.

 

[Dragoonster]

Oh. That seems very different from what he said in the TED talk referenced at the start of this thread. What are you basing this on?

Linda

It sounds precisely like his TED talk and his accompanying text (a link to which was provided early in the thread iirc). His presentation is sloppy, amateurish, illogical, arguably biased, and not compelling in any way.

Oh, possibly relevant:

Well, there's five pages to this thread which suggests that at least some people disagree with Sam Harris' contention that science can address moral questions.

The issue isn't with "addressing", obviously science can be a useful tool in addressing morals and consequences, once the morals have been decided.

Harris takes it MUCH further and asserts that science can "decide" such questions. He is completely missing that the scientist (him) enters with a preconceived morality. And/or he has no interest in asking the right "questions" from basic philosophy on--he has settled on a personal arbitrary philosophy and has no interest in exploring (or scientifically justifying) whatever occurred before he reached his personal ethical view.

In this he is absolutely no different than any other human who attempts to spread their subjective morals among the masses. His only difference is in the justification. But a religious justification is just as poor as an "atheistic" or "scientific" justification if both axiomatic justifications are completely irrational and unsupported.

 

[Piggy]

What is an intrinsic good is a value judgment, not something which can be scientifically shown to be correct or incorrect.

That is, if you bother with notions like "intrinsic good".

I think Harris and Pinker are not much concerned about Platonic concepts like that, and I'm sure I'm not.

But science can tell us a lot about human nature, about how people suffer, and about what can be done to ameliorate suffering.

And if you think ameliorating suffering is an arbitrary value, I'd say you're quite wrong.

 

[Piggy]

It's not necessarily inconsistent to hold, for example, that utilitarianism is the best normative moral philosophy but impractical as an everyday decision-making strategy.

I don't know if it would be inconsistent, but if it's impractical then it's useless, so consistency wouldn't even matter.

 

[Piggy]

At some point, we have assigned intrinsic value to certain outcomes - an ability to walk, life, perceived well-being, an absence of a specific disease - within humans. But these values are as arbitrary as "higher pleasures". Science cannot show us that they are correct or incorrect.

I think that's quite wrong, actually. Health and freedom are not arbitrary and need not be assigned to anything. We are hard-wired to suffer by excessive constraint, physical pain, the loss of loved ones, and so forth. That's just reality. And science can show that this is the norm for our species, not just for one group or one race.

Science can also show the very real benefits of human contact, healthy intimate relationships, enjoyment of music, fulfilling sex, and other pleasures.

 

[Dragoonster]

And if you think ameliorating suffering is an arbitrary value, I'd say you're quite wrong.

According to what? Science?

 

[Piggy]

According to what? Science?

Anybody can use a reality-divorced sort of abstract on-paper philosophizing to argue any position at all. But what use is it?

Of course the avoidance of suffering is not an arbitrary value. Look around you. Look at yourself. People don't like suffering.

Life's too short to have to waste time defending the obvious, or arguing with folks who willfully ignore it in favor of bickering over angels on pinheads.

 

[Dragoonster]

Anybody can use a reality-divorced sort of abstract on-paper philosophizing to argue any position at all. But what use is it?

Of course the avoidance of suffering is not an arbitrary value. Look around you. Look at yourself. People don't like suffering.

Life's too short to have to waste time defending the obvious, or arguing with folks who willfully ignore it in favor of bickering over angels on pinheads.

I accept that moral stance but have no idea what it has to do with Sam Harris' contentions. He seemingly wants to scientifically determine all morals, despite not justifying his morals in the first place. Why should we accept his determinations anymore than an Imam's or Christian's?

Why don't you subscribe to "avoidance of suffering" is an axiom thus supporting Jesus Christ? Just how many "avoidance of suffering"-based morally-certain paradigms have you believed in prior to Sam Harris?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

That is, if you bother with notions like "intrinsic good".

As I have already explained, every moral philosophy (including yours and Harris') absolutely requires one or more things, be they acts, outcomes, virtues or something else entirely, to be judged as good in and of themselves. For no other reason than that you think they are good, and not because they are instrumental in bringing about some other good.

I think Harris and Pinker are not much concerned about Platonic concepts like that, and I'm sure I'm not.

That's okay, as long as you don't want to be entitled to an opinion.

But science can tell us a lot about human nature, about how people suffer, and about what can be done to ameliorate suffering.

And if you think ameliorating suffering is an arbitrary value, I'd say you're quite wrong.

Here's an exercise for you. Specify exactly why you think it is morally good to ameliorate suffering. Is it good in and of itself, or is it solely good because it brings about some other good?

If it's good in and of itself, then it is indeed an arbitrary value. Science cannot prove that it is good in and of itself.

If not, repeat the exercise until you come to that thing or things which is good in and of itself, for no other reason.

I don't know if it would be inconsistent, but if it's impractical then it's useless, so consistency wouldn't even matter.

Careful now - you need to read and respond to exactly what I say. Sloppiness makes good philosophy impossible. I said it might be impractical for everyday problems. That is not at all the same thing as being useless.

Governments, for example, have the luxury of throughly working out the costs and benefits of a new health policy. For them utilitarian calculations are a most useful tool.

I think that's quite wrong, actually. Health and freedom are not arbitrary and need not be assigned to anything. We are hard-wired to suffer by excessive constraint, physical pain, the loss of loved ones, and so forth. That's just reality. And science can show that this is the norm for our species, not just for one group or one race.

We are hard-wired to do, think and feel all sorts of things. Some good, some bad. We are hard-wired to love, hug, rape and commit genocide.

The idea that what we are hard-wired to think is good is good is just one more example of the naturalistic fallacy.

Science can also show the very real benefits of human contact, healthy intimate relationships, enjoyment of music, fulfilling sex, and other pleasures.

I think we managed to figure those out long before science came along actually.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Anybody can use a reality-divorced sort of abstract on-paper philosophizing to argue any position at all. But what use is it?

Of course the avoidance of suffering is not an arbitrary value. Look around you. Look at yourself. People don't like suffering.

Congratulations, you're a hedonistic utilitarian... for the moment anyway. Since you keep espousing mutually contradictory moral theories I can't say what you will be in your next post.

Life's too short to have to waste time defending the obvious, or arguing with folks who willfully ignore it in favor of bickering over angels on pinheads.

For better or for worse, not everyone is convinced that hedonistic utilitarianism is the one true moral theory validated by science. It may appear obvious to you that you are right, but then again it appears obvious to the Taliban that they are right too. That alone proves nothing.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

I haven't seen the video until the end cause it's late and I gotta get up early, but I liked the fact that he started the speech by showing three pictures: a picture of rocks, a picture of an ant and a picture of a monkey; because even though he never actually said this, that is exactly at the core of the moral issue: Empathy. From left to right, you have a consistently increasing line of empathy: We tend to feel more empathy towards bugs than rocks, but more empathy towards mammals than bugs.

Our moral codes are rooted in our genetic structure. The whole history of our ancestors lies in such genetic code, where our deepest, most basic emotional responses are hidden. We have a preference towards the species that are closer to us and this is why you see vegetarians who said they stopped eating meat after seeing pigs getting tortured, but they have no problem making an exception with the occasional shrimp cocktail. Our moral codes are created by us, they concern us and thus, they do not represent anything outside our culture. A human moral code would be significantly different from a martian moral code.... but also, very different from a monkey moral code (Planet of the Apes is all about that principle).

I don't think Sam Harris is saying that science is here to say what's right and what's wrong, but rather that science is here to tell us why we choose certain things as right and certain things as wrong. Science is here to describe how our brain is wired to make us create certain moral codes (And may I remind you, there are thousands of moral codes only within the human species... each one of them contradicting the other one in more than a couple pointers)

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

Science could be used to determine the intrinsic goods that most or all people value.

Science could be used to determine the influence genetics has on the things we select as intrinsic goods and the value we place on them.

Science could be used to estimate the costs and benefits of various courses of action and be used to select which are likely to be in closest alignment with our values.

Science can answer the 'ought...if' question.