Personality and Copies

[westprog]

Wow, complete and utter dodge noted.
The copy could be made from bits on a computer, or perhaps the waves transmitting the information took five minutes to arrive at the destination copying machine.
Of course that's irrelevant, and you know that, which is why you singled that part out of my post while completely ignoring the evidence burden you're accumulating with your wild speculations violating all known physics.

You have made it quite clear this is purely religious, your self-contradictions (The soul is instantiated by the brain, but not dependant on the brain) and this-duck-is-not-a-duck redefinitions (It's not a soul, just a movable instance of self which can change bodies) have made it self-evident that you seek to "win," rather than be correct.

My only question left is why? Is teleportation that important to you?

It's not about teleportation.

 

[SOdhner]

Does that make more sense?

Okay, so you have completely abandoned your original statement about particles. Gotcha.

You know what? I can just cut to the chase here. You are using a different definition of "same" than I am. Okay? Your definition is valid, but has no bearing on this discussion.

I swung past Merriam-Webster.com and got the dictionary definition of 'same' - here are the first two results:

1 a : resembling in every relevant respect b : conforming in every respect —used with as

2 a : being one without addition, change, or discontinuance : identical b : being the one under discussion or already referred to

I would have thought that it was clear from the start that I was using the SECOND definition. You are clearly using the first, which has never been in debate. Does the clone resemble the original? Yes. Does the second rock resemble the first? Yes. Does the second consciousness resemble the first? Yes.

But they aren't the same by the second definition. They are two separate and distinct instances and are therefore not the same one.

So, then, the problem is that when I talk about myself, I only count this particular instance. Any other thing that RESEMBLES me that may or may not come into existence later on is not me. Telling it that it is me, giving it memories of things that happened to a different thing somewhere else, will not make it me any more than giving it totally false memories will make those things true.

Let's go back to our hypothetical teleporter. It scans you, destroys you, and then makes a new person at the other end. You would say you are fine with that. But wait! The receiving end is busy. So now I forget to re-send later, and the scan sits on a hard drive that is eventually put into long-term storage.

Have I murdered you? Are you Schrödinger's Clone, neither alive nor dead but in some sort of superimposed state until I either make you a body or the hard drive becomes corrupted?

I think any rational person would agree that that is absurd - but if not that, what? Ruling out the option of "neither dead nor alive" leaves us with:

1. Dead - so then we agree that the teleporter kills you, and by extension the receiving pad is also a resurrection machine.

2. Alive - so then you think a hard drive counts as alive. Hmm.

 

[rocketdodger]

Okay, so you have completely abandoned your original statement about particles. Gotcha.

You know what? I can just cut to the chase here. You are using a different definition of "same" than I am. Okay? Your definition is valid, but has no bearing on this discussion.

I swung past Merriam-Webster.com and got the dictionary definition of 'same' - here are the first two results:

1 a : resembling in every relevant respect b : conforming in every respect —used with as

2 a : being one without addition, change, or discontinuance : identical b : being the one under discussion or already referred to

I would have thought that it was clear from the start that I was using the SECOND definition. You are clearly using the first, which has never been in debate. Does the clone resemble the original? Yes. Does the second rock resemble the first? Yes. Does the second consciousness resemble the first? Yes.

But they aren't the same by the second definition. They are two separate and distinct instances and are therefore not the same one.

So, then, the problem is that when I talk about myself, I only count this particular instance. Any other thing that RESEMBLES me that may or may not come into existence later on is not me. Telling it that it is me, giving it memories of things that happened to a different thing somewhere else, will not make it me any more than giving it totally false memories will make those things true.

Let's go back to our hypothetical teleporter. It scans you, destroys you, and then makes a new person at the other end. You would say you are fine with that. But wait! The receiving end is busy. So now I forget to re-send later, and the scan sits on a hard drive that is eventually put into long-term storage.

Have I murdered you? Are you Schrödinger's Clone, neither alive nor dead but in some sort of superimposed state until I either make you a body or the hard drive becomes corrupted?

I think any rational person would agree that that is absurd - but if not that, what? Ruling out the option of "neither dead nor alive" leaves us with:

1. Dead - so then we agree that the teleporter kills you, and by extension the receiving pad is also a resurrection machine.

2. Alive - so then you think a hard drive counts as alive. Hmm.

Apparently the only statement of my last post that you read and understood is the single one you quoted -- and also the only one devoid of content.

Congratulations.

I think I spelled out my position pretty clearly. If you are incapable of reading the post and making sense out of it, there is nothing more I can do. And no, I have not abandoned my original statement about particles. Not that you would have any idea ...

 

[SOdhner]

I think I spelled out my position pretty clearly. If you are incapable of reading the post and making sense out of it, there is nothing more I can do.

I read it. I understood it. I explained why it is not relevant to my position or the original discussion. You then ignored my entire post. Again.

And no, I have not abandoned my original statement about particles.

You totally did though. Remember this?

If the relative behavior of all the particles is the same, then I think they are the same consciousness.

How does that allow for a human and a hard drive to be the same? The relative behavior of the particles are completely different. Here, I'll replay the conversation for you:

Fergeson: In order for the soul to transfer to the copy, it would have to "continue in the void," no? Where did your thetan stay while waiting for it's new brain?

rocketdodger: If the original is destroyed prior to the copy being made, and there is no physical stuff where the information resides in-between, then how is the copy made?

Fergeson: The copy could be made from bits on a computer, or perhaps the waves transmitting the information took five minutes to arrive at the destination copying machine.

rocketdodger: There you go!

So the soul transfers to the hard drive. Got it. Where do the particles figure in?

 

[Ferguson]

The fact that "The Fountainhead" still exists, even if I burned that book on my shelf, is pretty good evidence that a story is not just a book on my shelf.

The fact that you can -- and do, every night -- loose consciousness while your brain remains the same physical object is pretty good evidence that you are not just "your brain."

No, I am one of the lucky few who doesn't sleep in an incinerator. See, my brain remains functioning all night. If it didn't, I'd be dead. When I go to bed, while I'm sleeping, and when I wake up the next morning, I am still just "my brain."

You can continue the mental gymnastics of the word, "same," but I'm interested in keeping the selfsame consciousness alive, not a duplicate with its own consciousness based on mine.

Suppose the information needed to reconstruct the brain is stored in a compressed form, and/or on multiple hard-drives. If the information is on 50 different hard-drives and transmitted in parts to the new location, are you still conscious during that time?

All of this is a waste of time until you can present evidence for the independent soul your hypothesis requires, and the mechanism by which a copy would co-opt some old consciousness across space and/or time rather than having its own consciousness.

 

[Third Eye Open]

How does that allow for a human and a hard drive to be the same? The relative behavior of the particles are completely different. Here, I'll replay the conversation for you:



So the soul transfers to the hard drive. Got it. Where do the particles figure in?

Wow, this really isn't that hard. The INFORMATION about the position of the particles is stored on the hard drive. That INFORMATION is used to make the copy, with all the particles in the correct position. The information about the particles and their locations is not actually those particles.

And all this snarky stuff about souls just makes you sound like an ass.

 

[SOdhner]

The INFORMATION about the position of the particles is stored on the hard drive. That INFORMATION is used to make the copy, with all the particles in the correct position. The information about the particles and their locations is not actually those particles.

Agreed. But he was saying that it persists during this time, not just before and after.

ETA: It would help to clarify his position if he would respond to the questions I ask, but he has so far refused to do so.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Agreed. But he was saying that it persists during this time, not just before and after.

What persists? Consciousness? I have not understood that to be his position from reading other threads.

The way I understand it you would be unconscious until the copy is made, then your consciousness would start up again.

 

[SOdhner]

The way I understand it you would be unconscious until the copy is made, then your consciousness would start up again.

This is still insisting that there is a persistent consciousness. "You would be unconscious until..." So there is a you, then, that exists during this time? Does the data count as you? "your conciousness would start up again." Well, why do you say "your"? To whom does this consciousness belong? And why say again, rather than "for the first time"? Everything about how you phrase this point to the idea that there is some sort of (for lack of a better term) soul.

Try this:

Let's go back to our hypothetical teleporter. It scans you, destroys you, and then makes a new person at the other end. You would say you are fine with that. But wait! The receiving end is busy. So now I forget to re-send later, and the scan sits on a hard drive that is eventually put into long-term storage.

Have I murdered you? Are you Schrödinger's Clone, neither alive nor dead but in some sort of superimposed state until I either make you a body or the hard drive becomes corrupted?

I think any rational person would agree that that is absurd - but if not that, what? Ruling out the option of "neither dead nor alive" leaves us with:

1. Dead - so then we agree that the teleporter kills you, and by extension the receiving pad is also a resurrection machine.

2. Alive - so then you think a hard drive counts as alive. Hmm.

When the teleporter disintegrates you... are you dead? Has it killed you? Is your body dead, but your soul lives on in the hard drive or somewhere? Please explain.

 

[RenaissanceBiker]

3. Sending version not destroyed, receiving version created.

There was a ST:TNG episode where this happened. Riker was the last man transported back from a troubled space station. A malfunction occurred such that the sending version was not destroyed. Years later he was rescued by the Enterprise and met the receiving version. Drama ensued. Rescued Riker was still a lieutenant while Transported Riker was now a commander. Rescued Riker still had romantic feelings for Troi while Transported Riker's feelings had changed to "just friends." I think Rescued Riker ended up resigning from Star Fleet and going off to live his life elsewhere. For us, there would be other problems like personal property. Rescued Riker would say, "I just want to get my favorite trombone and I'll be on my way." Transported Riker would say, "That's my favorite trombone. You can't have it."

RR: "Fine. I'm going back to Earth and staying at my house in San Francisco until I figure out what I'm going to do."

TR: "I sold the house last year."

RR: "Are you at least going to give me half the money? Surely I didn't lose everything I own just because you are here."

Geordi: "Let's try to recreate the accident."

RR and TR (together): "NO!"

 

[rocketdodger]

How does that allow for a human and a hard drive to be the same? The relative behavior of the particles are completely different.

First, I didn't say it allowed "a human and a hard drive to be the same," I specifically said it allowed the consciousness to be the same. If you think human == consciousness then we have nothing to talk about in the first place.

Second, if you understood that post, then you would know that the "relative behavior" I am referring to is the sequence of state transitions.

Third, if you understood that post, then you would know that saying the same sequence of state transitions is necessarily the same consciousness doesn't in any way imply that a different sequence of state transitions is necessarily a different consciousness.

Which all means that if you transfer the information about a consciousness to a hard drive, you can say it is the same consciousness as before, but it obviously isn't doing anything because it is just sitting there on a single state, so it isn't like it is "thinking" or anything, and if you want it to do that, you will have to resume the sequence of state transitions, which would mean getting the particles to start behaving the same as they were before. If you want to resume the sequence using the hard drive as the medium then you will find that the relative behavior of the particles actually is the same at some level, I.E. mathematically isomorphic.

 

[SOdhner]

Rescued Riker would say, "I just want to get my favorite trombone and I'll be on my way." Transported Riker would say, "That's my favorite trombone. You can't have it."

What a mess! And I'm guessing that somehow they never thought about the implications of this enough to feel a sense of impending doom when using the teleporter next time.

As far as the trombone example, I would say that the rescued one has more claim to it than the teleporter one... in theory. In actual practice, when he was "resuced" he was probably teleported and therefore is now the YOUNGER of the two and by my same logic has LESS claim to it. In reality, neither one is the same person that originally obtained the trombone however many years ago, even though they've been programmed to remember it.

 

[SOdhner]

If you want to resume the sequence using the hard drive as the medium then you will find that the relative behavior of the particles actually is the same at some level, I.E. mathematically isomorphic.

You know what? I can just cut to the chase here. You are using a different definition of "same" than I am. Okay? Your definition is valid, but has no bearing on this discussion.

I swung past Merriam-Webster.com and got the dictionary definition of 'same' - here are the first two results:

1 a : resembling in every relevant respect b : conforming in every respect —used with as

2 a : being one without addition, change, or discontinuance : identical b : being the one under discussion or already referred to

I would have thought that it was clear from the start that I was using the SECOND definition. You are clearly using the first, which has never been in debate. Does the clone resemble the original? Yes. Does the second rock resemble the first? Yes. Does the second consciousness resemble the first? Yes.

But they aren't the same by the second definition. They are two separate and distinct instances and are therefore not the same one.

So, then, the problem is that when I talk about myself, I only count this particular instance. Any other thing that RESEMBLES me that may or may not come into existence later on is not me. Telling it that it is me, giving it memories of things that happened to a different thing somewhere else, will not make it me any more than giving it totally false memories will make those things true.

...

 

[rocketdodger]

What persists? Consciousness? I have not understood that to be his position from reading other threads.

The way I understand it you would be unconscious until the copy is made, then your consciousness would start up again.

Yes.

Exactly like sleeping. We don't worry about loss of identity when we go to sleep (assuminmg zero dreaming takes place) because we know that the brain state we wake up with will have been determined by the brain state we were in at the moment we lost consciousness.

You can say the consciousness persists, but it certainly doesn't "think" during that time, because it is stuck on a single state, so the word is a bit misleading. It is more like existing "on pause."

 

[Third Eye Open]

This is still insisting that there is a persistent consciousness.

This is the opposite of what I am saying.
When you are destroyed by the teleporter you stop. You are not. You are off. You experience nothing, there is no you anymore. However you want to put it.
Then when the copy is created, you are back. You start. You are again. You experience things.

You are the one that insists that consciousness is 'residing' somewhere in between. It is not. It is gone. It comes back when the copy is made, because it is caused by the processes going on within the copy.

If I'm going for a run, and I stop running, you don't ask where the 'running' is before I start jogging again. I'm not running, then I am running. I'm not conscious, then I am conscious.

 

[rocketdodger]

...

So lets say there is some magical device that can just "transfer" your consciousness to another body. It isn't the teleporter, we can't understand how it functions, it just does it. Maybe a God controls it, I dunno.

Would you use that device, or would you have the same objection -- that because your body is different you are not the same person? If you could be absolutely guaranteed that your consciousness would be the same -- using YOUR definition of "same" -- would you still have the same objection?

 

[SOdhner]

Exactly like sleeping.

You sleep funny.

When you are destroyed by the teleporter you stop. You are not. You are off. You experience nothing, there is no you anymore. However you want to put it.
Then when the copy is created, you are back. You start. You are again. You experience things.

Back from where? Why do you say back rather than "newly created"?

You are the one that insists that consciousness is 'residing' somewhere in between. It is not. It is gone. It comes back when the copy is made, because it is caused by the processes going on within the copy.

Comes back from where?

If I'm going for a run, and I stop running, you don't ask where the 'running' is before I start jogging again. I'm not running, then I am running.

Running is a verb, consciousness is a noun. Verbs can't be places.

I'm not conscious, then I am conscious.

You're not conscious, and then something somewhere is. It's not you.

So lets say there is some magical device that can just "transfer" your consciousness to another body. It isn't the teleporter, we can't understand how it functions, it just does it. Maybe a God controls it, I dunno.

Would you use that device, or would you have the same objection -- that because your body is different you are not the same person? If you could be absolutely guaranteed that your consciousness would be the same -- using YOUR definition of "same" -- would you still have the same objection?

No. That sounds fine - vague, but fine.

 

[rocketdodger]

No. That sounds fine - vague, but fine.

Well I am trying to tell you that I sincerely believe that it is the same consciousness -- just as "same" as it would be using the magical machine I described -- if you used the normal TTP.

If you don't object to the body being different, then at least we have something to go on.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Back from where? Why do you say back rather than "newly created"?

Comes back from where?

Maybe I should stay 'stop' and 'start' then.

Running is a verb, consciousness is a noun. Verbs can't be places.

I think consciousness is a process, not a thing. It is something the brain (and possibly other things) does. I think it can stop and start.

 

[Ferguson]

Then when the copy is created, you are back. You start. You are again. You experience things.

You are the one that insists that consciousness is 'residing' somewhere in between. It is not. It is gone. It comes back when the copy is made, because it is caused by the processes going on within the copy.

It "comes back" from where? Where was it? You are proposing the reincarnation of souls.

If you have three clones of yourself made, are you now seeing with eight eyes and controlling four bodies? Or does each brain produce its own consciousness?