Personality and Copies

[seayakin]

Rather than sidetrack the thread on JW I thought I'd start a new thread.

SOdhner wrote:

Actually, that was my first thought. I've been in some EXTREMELY nerdy arguments where I assert that the Star Trek* transporters murder you and then make a new person that is the same as you in most ways but doesn't have continuity and is, in a very real sense, a new and distinct person.

This has the same problem. If I die and then someone uses my blueprints to make another SOdhner, it's not of any real use to me except in the sense that I guess I would want my memories to live on even if it is in the form of some creepy sci-fi clone that thinks it is the original.

* - I'm not a big Star Trek fan but so far my understanding of the way the transporters work hasn't been disputed so I think I got it right.

I responded with:

I don't see how this makes a difference for a materialist. Every moment in time I'm technically just a different arrangement of molecules that create my personality for that point in time. It seems to me it is only an issue if you think that there is some magical energy (aka a soul) that hold some or all of your personality. Is it any different if you were able to freeze me for 100 years and then thaw me out undamaged or incinerate me and recreate me exactly down to every last subatomic particle in 100 years unless you think there is something imbued in the molecules of my body at this point in time other than matter itself.

SOdhner responded:

Yeah, but most of us like to take personal responsibility and associate ourselves with the things we've done in the past. Having a brand new body with someone else's memories is a disturbing idea to me. Slow replacement is another thing entirely; having cells die and get replaced bit by bit doesn't disrupt continuity.

So I do this thing, this "re-create you from memory or whatever" thing, and now I have another of you. But I've done it prior to the original you dying. Now you can see that there's another one of you in the next room and I point a gun at your head and say "Don't worry, I made a backup!" ... well, that's not reassuring to most people.

If I made 10 copies of myself and then each went off having different experiences then you have 1 seayakin person then suddenly 10 different seayakins so that there can be no single seayakin with each iteration as valid as the other.

 

[SOdhner]

If I made 10 copies of myself and then each went off having different experiences then you have 1 seayakin person then suddenly 10 different seayakins so that there can be no single seayakin with each iteration as valid as the other.

I'll be honest, I'm having some trouble reading that sentence. I think it's just me. I am reading that to say that you feel that if you made ten copies there would be eleven of you that would all be equally you, and that no individual would separately be seayakin...?

I hope I got that right. Here's a question for you: how do you define having met someone in person? We meet at a party, shake hands, whatever. Then you have a copy made. I meet the copy and I think it is the same one that I shook hands with previously. It, in turn, has the memory of shaking hands with me. In reality, the one I shook hands with is across town somewhere. I would say that I am meeting this person for the first time even if neither of us know it.

 

[seayakin]

I'll be honest, I'm having some trouble reading that sentence. I think it's just me. I am reading that to say that you feel that if you made ten copies there would be eleven of you that would all be equally you, and that no individual would separately be seayakin...?

I hope I got that right. Here's a question for you: how do you define having met someone in person? We meet at a party, shake hands, whatever. Then you have a copy made. I meet the copy and I think it is the same one that I shook hands with previously. It, in turn, has the memory of shaking hands with me. In reality, the one I shook hands with is across town somewhere. I would say that I am meeting this person for the first time even if neither of us know it.

I was having trouble getting things in the little box but let me draw out the scenario in a time line.

10 AM - Seayakin and SOdhner meet shake hands and say hello
11 AM - Seayakin uses the exact duplicating machine to make 2 copies of himself (we will now refer to them as SeayakinV0 (original) and then the two other Seayakins [SeayakinV1A and SeayakinV1B].
12 PM - SeayakinV0 trips and falls off a cliff and dies.
SeayakinV1A is in a car accident and breaks his left leg.
Seayakin1B has a coffe at Starbucks.
1 PM - Seayakin1B meets SOdhner and remembers the earlier conversation and proceeds on through life.

If SeayakinV0 had lived to shake your hand and stopped for coffee as Seayakin1B, it would have been no different than when Seayakin1B had done it. As far as Seayakin1B is concerned, he is Seayakin and simply has two dopplegangers with different experiences. The same can be said for SeayakinV0 and SeayakinV1B.

 

[rocketdodger]

We resolved this years ago. It is this simple:

Suppose you see the number 15 written on some paper. Later you see 15 on a monitor.

Are these the same number, or are they somehow different?

Suppose one computer runs a series of instructions that is something like "add x and y together and if the result is greater than z output 1 instead of 0." Later you see another computer that runs the same series of instructions, where x, y, and z are the same values as they were before, but the computer is a different model and the processor is different, etc.

Are these the same algorithm, or are they somehow different?

The teleporter problem is fundamentally the same question as those above, thus it has the same answer.

(note that I don't claim any answer is correct, that depends on the person, but your answers should be consistent at least)

 

[SOdhner]

If SeayakinV0 had lived to shake your hand and stopped for coffee as Seayakin1B, it would have been no different than when Seayakin1B had done it.

"No different" depends on how picky I want to get. But for now, I feel like you didn't answer my question: would you say that I am meeting (in person) Seayakin1B for the first time, or would you say we have met before due to my interaction with SeayankinV0?

Are these the same number, or are they somehow different?

They are different and distinct representations. They both represent the same concept. The word "number" sometimes refers to the representation and sometimes refers to the concept, so I wanted to make the distinction.

12 PM - SeayakinV0 trips and falls off a cliff and dies.

Let's back up to this. Let's say you (V0) and I are in a room and you are tied to a chair. I've got a gun, and am threatening to shoot you. There's a V1 around somewhere, drinking coffee in a Starbucks or whatever. Would you be okay with me shooting you, knowing that V1 will live on, or do you want to stay alive as well? (Let's keep this on terms of life and death and not worry about the cost or inconvenience of replacing a clone.)

I, for one, would object to being murdered. So there's another SOdhner out there. Fine. He's not me, even if he thinks he is. He might be able to pass as me for all external purposes, but that's not comforting to me when there's a gun pointed at my face.

Scenario 2:

Let's say I kidnap you, and overwrite your memories with mine. Are you me now? Can you rightfully claim to have done the things I have because you now remember them? The clone's memories are no more valid.

 

[X]

There is only one book that has ever actually scared me on a primal level.

The Eternity Brigade, by Stephen Goldin, tells the story of a soldier in a military that consists of copies* of the original soldier.
It actually has situations where multiple copies of the same person exist, and where one goes on to lead a different life and meets the soldier-version (does "original" even apply?) later on.

It's an ...interesting... read, and quite appropriate to this thread.

You can download a PDF at the link I provided.



* initially the soldier is cryogenically frozen, but as technology progresses they become information in a computer, with the soldier(s) pumped out like from a production line.


Edit: I can't find any information on ebookstack. I'm hoping they're legit.

 

[rocketdodger]

They are different and distinct representations. They both represent the same concept. The word "number" sometimes refers to the representation and sometimes refers to the concept, so I wanted to make the distinction.

So would you say that about the second question, regarding a series of instructions? Would you say that all the representations refer to the same concept?

Let's back up to this. Let's say you (V0) and I are in a room and you are tied to a chair. I've got a gun, and am threatening to shoot you. There's a V1 around somewhere, drinking coffee in a Starbucks or whatever. Would you be okay with me shooting you, knowing that V1 will live on, or do you want to stay alive as well? (Let's keep this on terms of life and death and not worry about the cost or inconvenience of replacing a clone.)

No offense, but you obviously havent been discussing this much online -- this is a very weak form of the question you really should be asking:

Suppose V1 is tied to a chair somewhere and is kept in total stasis. Furthermore suppose there is an advanced machine that will, in an instant, extract the complete state vector of your (V0) nervous system and imprint it upon the nervous system of V1. Finally suppose that after this "imprinting" V1 is allowed to function normally and go on its merry way.

This is a much more interesting scenario because it gets right to the point. Which is, does one consider "self" to be the actual stuff of V0, or the relationship between stuff in V0? Or in other words, is the number 15 on paper the same, or different than, the number 15 on a monitor?

It is a fact that 15 is the same regardless of how it is represented because the number 15 is really a relationship rather than an actual thing and these relationships are always the same. That is, 15 rocks is 1 more rock than 14 and 15 eggs is 1 more egg than 14 -- same relationship. 15 is always 1 more than 14 any way you slice it and every 15 in the universe will always be the same number because of this.

Now some of us -- like myself -- think that the things going on in our heads are the same way. We think what is important about it is the "relationships" between the stuff, or you could say the "behavior" of the stuff, not the stuff itself. And we think that -- like numbers -- if there are two sets of stuff, but each of them satisfies the same relationships (displays the same behavior), then they are the same with regard to those relationships. In other words, I am nothing more than an equivalence class of behaviors and any material in the universe within this equivalence class is me. We tend to think that this equivalence class of behaviors just happens to be so specific that right now there is only a single set of stuff out there that satisfies it -- our physical bodies.

Other individuals don't see it this way. Many people think that they are not just an equivalence class of behaviors but the actual physical matter than is doing the behaving.

There is no right or wrong answer because there is no logical way to determine the right or wrong answer. But hopefully you can see where people like me are coming from on this issue.

Scenario 2:

Let's say I kidnap you, and overwrite your memories with mine. Are you me now? Can you rightfully claim to have done the things I have because you now remember them? The clone's memories are no more valid.

Again, you are using a weak form of this question.

The strong form would be when the full state of my nervous system is overwritten with yours. Then am I you? I say absolutely. And why shouldn't I be?

 

[Soapy Sam]

We resolved this years ago. It is this simple:

Suppose you see the number 15 written on some paper. Later you see 15 on a monitor.

Are these the same number, or are they somehow different?

Suppose one computer runs a series of instructions that is something like "add x and y together and if the result is greater than z output 1 instead of 0." Later you see another computer that runs the same series of instructions, where x, y, and z are the same values as they were before, but the computer is a different model and the processor is different, etc.

Are these the same algorithm, or are they somehow different?

The teleporter problem is fundamentally the same question as those above, thus it has the same answer.

(note that I don't claim any answer is correct, that depends on the person, but your answers should be consistent at least)

To one way of looking at this, you just chose precisely the wrong analogy.

The two numbers are indeed the same number. Number is the only property "15" has, so any "15" is the same number. The representations of 15- one on a monitor, one on paper, are clearly different, as 15 cows differ from 15 cats- but what they share in common, is number. The quantities on the other hand, are radically different, as you will find if you try to milk the cats.

The algorithms, being physical instantiations, are different.
(Different switch settings etc.)

But there is only one "fifteen".

Not that I'm trying to confuse this thread more than it already is, you appreciate.

 

[SOdhner]

this is a very weak form of the question you really should be asking:
[ ... ]
Again, you are using a weak form of this question.

I like that you change my questions to totally different ones while being condescending about it. That's a neat trick.

You know what, I'll go ahead and use a completely different scenario. Let's see if you can answer this one.

I have a machine that I refer to as a teleporter. What it actually does is scans someone completely, down to the smallest detail, and then reproduces them perfectly at the other end a nanosecond later. Fifty percent of the time, it will destroy the original as soon as it is finished scanning it in. Fifty percent of the time, it will fail to create a copy. Clearly, there are still some bugs to work out. This creates four scenarios:

1. Sending version destroyed, receiving version created. (This is the standard Star Trek transporter)
2. Sending version destroyed, no receiving version created.
3. Sending version not destroyed, receiving version created.
4. Sending version not destroyed, no receiving version created.

Answer this before reading further: Which of the four would you be okay with? I'm guessing you'll say all but #2 based on your previous comments.

Okay, so now let's further say that the sending and receiving ends of the "teleporter" are on different sides of a wall that divides two warring countries. No communication is allowed. Because of this, #1 and #3 look the same to the newly-created bodies on the receiving end, and #3 and #4 look the same to the original on the sending end. They can't ever confirm if they are the only one or if there is another somewhere.

(To an observer at the sending end, #1 and #2 are the same - as are #3 and #4. To an observer at the receiving end it's 1/3 and 2/4 instead, but the idea is the same.)

The fact that the existence or non-existence of a body at the receiving end has absolutely zero impact on or relation to the existence or non-existence of someone at the sending end should be evident. So, then, what is the difference between #1 and #2 to the person at the sending end? There is none - either way he is destroyed, it's only a nanosecond later that something may or may not come into existence at the receiving end. How can you say that this hypothetical new being that has no connection to the original is the same person? The original will never even be aware if the new one exists or not.

the full state of my nervous system

What, like the specific alignment of individual nerves in your pinky finger? Whether or not your left earlobe is mildly itchy? That seems extreme, and I have to suspect that's not what you meant but you said it more than once and used italics and whatnot. If I'm overstating it, and that stuff isn't important, what is? What if there's an extremely tiny margin of error and one tiny individual neuron is tweaked ever so slightly? Is that not you anymore?

 

[rocketdodger]

I like that you change my questions to totally different ones while being condescending about it. That's a neat trick.

You know what, I'll go ahead and use a completely different scenario. Let's see if you can answer this one.

I have a machine that I refer to as a teleporter. What it actually does is scans someone completely, down to the smallest detail, and then reproduces them perfectly at the other end a nanosecond later. Fifty percent of the time, it will destroy the original as soon as it is finished scanning it in. Fifty percent of the time, it will fail to create a copy. Clearly, there are still some bugs to work out. This creates four scenarios:

1. Sending version destroyed, receiving version created. (This is the standard Star Trek transporter)
2. Sending version destroyed, no receiving version created.
3. Sending version not destroyed, receiving version created.
4. Sending version not destroyed, no receiving version created.

Answer this before reading further: Which of the four would you be okay with? I'm guessing you'll say all but #2 based on your previous comments.

Okay, so now let's further say that the sending and receiving ends of the "teleporter" are on different sides of a wall that divides two warring countries. No communication is allowed. Because of this, #1 and #3 look the same to the newly-created bodies on the receiving end, and #3 and #4 look the same to the original on the sending end. They can't ever confirm if they are the only one or if there is another somewhere.

(To an observer at the sending end, #1 and #2 are the same - as are #3 and #4. To an observer at the receiving end it's 1/3 and 2/4 instead, but the idea is the same.)

The fact that the existence or non-existence of a body at the receiving end has absolutely zero impact on or relation to the existence or non-existence of someone at the sending end should be evident. So, then, what is the difference between #1 and #2 to the person at the sending end? There is none - either way he is destroyed, it's only a nanosecond later that something may or may not come into existence at the receiving end. How can you say that this hypothetical new being that has no connection to the original is the same person? The original will never even be aware if the new one exists or not.

I can say that because in my view it isn't the particles themselves that dictate personhood, it is the relationship between particles -- their behavior -- that dictate personhood. If two sets of particles behave the same, and each of those is a person, then logically they must be the same person (according to my viewpoint).

You can think of it in terms of a book vs. a story. What makes a book? A story, printed on some paper and bound with a cover. What is important and essential about a book? The story. Can two different books be the same story? Absolutely. If you were a book, what would be important to you, the paper and ink, or the story itself? There is no right answer but again I hope you can appreciate the viewpoint of those of us that think the story is the important part.

What, like the specific alignment of individual nerves in your pinky finger? Whether or not your left earlobe is mildly itchy? That seems extreme, and I have to suspect that's not what you meant but you said it more than once and used italics and whatnot. If I'm overstating it, and that stuff isn't important, what is? What if there's an extremely tiny margin of error and one tiny individual neuron is tweaked ever so slightly? Is that not you anymore?

Yes like that. You can go as far down as you want, even saying that the relative states of individual particles are important.

We don't know what is important, everyone has their own opinion on the matter. Some think that even individual neurons might not matter as much as aggregations of neurons, but I don't go that far -- I would say that individual neurons are important, but as long as they behave the same as far as the rest of the network goes they can be tweaked slightly. I could be wrong though, and nobody will know until we can get a conscious entity up and running in a debugger so we can tweak parts of the system and see what happens. Even then we won't know for sure because it is impossible to access subjectivity unless you are the subject.

But again, think about it like a story -- if you omit letters or words from a story, is it the same story, or a different one? What about whole sentences? Chapters?

EDIT: And, can the same story be told in different languages? Using spoken words instead of written? All of these questions are important to think about.

 

[SOdhner]

I've edited your quote very slightly, bear with me.

If two sets of particles behave the same, [ SNIP ], then logically they must be the same [ thing ]

1. But they're not the same. The original is at best a nanosecond older, and at worst a pile of ashes. The copy (if it even exists) is a newly-created being.

2. Apply this to, say, a rock. Let's say you have two rocks and they have the exact same molecular composition. I'm holding one in each hand. How many rocks am I holding? Which hand am I holding it/them in? What if I carve one rock into a statue of an elephant and another into a statue of a donkey? Are they still the same rock?

3. Going back to people - we are changing all the time. Can I truthfully say that I wrote the previous post by "SOdhner"? My brain has changed since then. But if that's your measure, then your definition is useless to me because we're never the same person from second to second and the entire question is rendered meaningless.

In fact... either the above is true and even if you made a perfect copy the two would instantly diverge and so they still wouldn't be the same person by those standards... or it's not, and no matter how much they change you still say they're the same person which starts to get silly very quickly.

 

[seayakin]

"No different" depends on how picky I want to get. But for now, I feel like you didn't answer my question: would you say that I am meeting (in person) Seayakin1B for the first time, or would you say we have met before due to my interaction with SeayankinV0?

You would not be meeting SeayakinV0 for the first time. By this time, 1B and V0 are two different people. However, from the perception of 1B, it would be as if he met you before. Furthermore, if you did not know about the copies, then by your perception it is the same person as V0.

Let's back up to this. Let's say you (V0) and I are in a room and you are tied to a chair. I've got a gun, and am threatening to shoot you. There's a V1 around somewhere, drinking coffee in a Starbucks or whatever. Would you be okay with me shooting you, knowing that V1 will live on, or do you want to stay alive as well? (Let's keep this on terms of life and death and not worry about the cost or inconvenience of replacing a clone.)

I, for one, would object to being murdered. So there's another SOdhner out there. Fine. He's not me, even if he thinks he is. He might be able to pass as me for all external purposes, but that's not comforting to me when there's a gun pointed at my face.

Scenario 2:

Let's say I kidnap you, and overwrite your memories with mine. Are you me now? Can you rightfully claim to have done the things I have because you now remember them? The clone's memories are no more valid.

It sounds like we both can agree on this. From 1 nanosecond beyond the copying event V0, 1A, and 1B are all distinct individuals because their experience diverge from that point. I think psychologically, if V0 is killed, he may feel ok knowing there is a copy of himself but he may also experience the usually fear and angst while being killed. Regarding the star trek transporter question, this becomes more a question of perception. Even though technically one copy of yourself is destroyed to make a second copy, your copy would not perceive that they died simply that they were on the Enterprise and then a second later they were on Regula 4 but technically, I understand your argument. In the end, I'm not sure what I would be comfortable with. However, if I saw RocketDodger go through it a few times with no change in personality, I'd probably be able to put the death issue behind me.

 

[seayakin]

On an additional note, I almost look at it like a modified Turing Test. If everyone perceived the surviving copy as myself, is it not myself for all practical purposes (unless of course their are many copies of my self then it would be more confusing).

 

[SOdhner]

By this time, 1B and V0 are two different people.

If they count as different people and you can point to one of them and say "That's the original, the one that you actually met in person." then I think we agree on the core issue that I was trying to get at.

I think psychologically, if V0 is killed, he may feel ok knowing there is a copy of himself but he may also experience the usually fear and angst while being killed.

Yeah, there may be a certain comfort in the same way that I might feel good to know my will is in order or something - but it won't take the place of not dying.

In the end, I'm not sure what I would be comfortable with. However, if I saw RocketDodger go through it a few times with no change in personality, I'd probably be able to put the death issue behind me.

You couldn't pay me enough to use one of those deathtraps. Knowing that somewhere, someone that looks just like me and has my memories will appear doesn't make me want to kill myself.

If everyone perceived the surviving copy as myself, is it not myself for all practical purposes

It is for everyone but the original, and that guy is dead so he doesn't get to chime in.

In science fiction the idea of "backups" comes up a lot. "Yeah, Bob died last week in a car accident so he had to restore from backup. Luckily he had downloaded just a day before so he didn't lose much." This is treated as a minor inconvenience, and nobody is ever sad that their friend Bob died. They have done to themselves what parents have done for years to children: "No, honey, it's the same goldfish. I swear." And for most purposes it is, because goldfish all seem pretty much alike. But it's not the same goldfish, not really, because the other is dead and you flushed it.

They always say "I'll be fine, they'll thaw out a clone". No, the CLONE will be fine. You'll be dead. If this is done by backing up your brain (a common method) then when is it that you count as being actually dead? Is it when you die in that car crash? Is it when I decide I never liked you and don't want to restore you? Is it when I toss the backup tape into an old storage unit somewhere and forget about it? Or when the storage unit and your tape are destroyed by an earthquake? What about in the meantime? Are you Schrödinger's Clone?

 

[rocketdodger]

1. But they're not the same. The original is at best a nanosecond older, and at worst a pile of ashes. The copy (if it even exists) is a newly-created being.

If the relative behavior of all the particles is the same, then I think they are the same consciousness.

Whether or not the "being" is different is another question, and frankly it doesn't interest me -- I don't really care what "being" I am as long as my perception of my consciousness is continuous and consistent.

2. Apply this to, say, a rock. Let's say you have two rocks and they have the exact same molecular composition. I'm holding one in each hand. How many rocks am I holding? Which hand am I holding it/them in? What if I carve one rock into a statue of an elephant and another into a statue of a donkey? Are they still the same rock?

If you are holding two rocks, then you are holding two rocks. And they are obviously different rocks. But that is the end of it, because typically we don't care about anything else when it comes to rocks.

If you hold anything else, though, things get interesting -- again, you keep going back to these weak examples. Try talking about a novel -- if you hold copies of the same novel in each hand, how many stories are you holding?

3. Going back to people - we are changing all the time. Can I truthfully say that I wrote the previous post by "SOdhner"? My brain has changed since then. But if that's your measure, then your definition is useless to me because we're never the same person from second to second and the entire question is rendered meaningless.

In fact... either the above is true and even if you made a perfect copy the two would instantly diverge and so they still wouldn't be the same person by those standards... or it's not, and no matter how much they change you still say they're the same person which starts to get silly very quickly.

Since the concept of "behavior" by definition relies upon causality it is clear that instantaneous states considered in isolation are irrelevant. Of course your brain changes, thats what makes it behave.

The question you have to wrap your head around is what happens when you have a system exhibiting a behavior, then all of a sudden another system picks up where the first left off, continuing the same behavior. Is the behavior different, or the same? Does the fact that it is a different system exhibiting the behavior matter?

Running, for example. If you have one human body running a certain way, then in an instant you destroy that body and continue the run on another body somewhere else, is the "running" a different "running?"

 

[Malerin]

The best thought experiment I've seen to transporter cases is the following:

You step into the machine, and, instead of being whisked off to a faraway place, you get the following message:
Disassembling malfunction. Personal data en route to receiving station. Please press red button to manually vaporize self to avoid duplication.

 

[Aepervius]

I'll repost the same as I did in the other thread.

That's stuff for another thread, but basically as previously said you are only replaced bit by bit, not in a single shot.

But where the heck did you get that to a materialist it would not matter (pun intended) ? On the contrary only a theist (as default of a better name for a soul-o-ist ?) holding the idea there was a soul would see the destruction of the initial body, transport, and reconstruction of the final body at destination at as non-death, as they could hold that the soul is removed from the initial body, transported, and finally reinserted at destination. For a materialist, if you destroy the initial body, you KILL the person. No matter if you reconstitute the body at destination, it will be ANOTHER person.

For a materialist , a tele-transporter is a death machine.

Heck, to see why this is so, ask yourself *WHY* the machine would only be able to reconstitute one person only. If what the machine receive is only data then it can reconstitute more than 1 person. For a theist impossible as a soul is needed and only 1 was initially provided. For a materialist no problem, once you have the initial data, you can make as much copy as you wish, all different individuals with the same memory and morphology.

Botom line :You have exactly the position of materialist and theist/soul-o-ist exchanged.

The number things is a false analogy.

A true analogy would be something like this :
suppose you take a lump of coal, in form of a cube. You destroy it, extract all electron and proton annihilate them against anti electron anti proton, and somehow extract the energy out of the neutron, transform all that in photon which you send in another place and use it all to make up carbon, which you then painstakingly put in the same position and spin as the original cube.

It is *a carbon cube* as in a representant of a class of carbon cube having in the same position carbon and the same spins, but it isn't any more your original carbon cube. The cube are identical in composition and non differentiable, but it isn't the original cube. The original cube *was* destroyed irreversibly.

It would be the same for the human.The reason we all go in philosophical question for human being is because we have the knack to be able to present an emergent process of reflection, thought, whereas the cube of carbon do not. But basically it is the same process. The original human thought would *STOP*, he would be DEAD. Then you painstakingly reconstitute another human with the same thought, either by having a copy of the body or copying the thought/central nervous system. It would be a human which incredibly has the SAME thought as the original, but the original is still dead. So de facto it isn't the same person, only a "meta-twin" person with the same morphology and or thought. Unless one pretend there is such things as soul, which would need to be evidenced, from the original point of view, he was killed. End of line. Brain is dead. No more thought. And that *IS* the materialist point of view so far as I can read materialist definition.

 

[rocketdodger]

I'll repost the same as I did in the other thread.



The number things is a false analogy.

A true analogy would be something like this :
suppose you take a lump of coal, in form of a cube. You destroy it, extract all electron and proton annihilate them against anti electron anti proton, and somehow extract the energy out of the neutron, transform all that in photon which you send in another place and use it all to make up carbon, which you then painstakingly put in the same position and spin as the original cube.

It is *a carbon cube* as in a representant of a class of carbon cube having in the same position carbon and the same spins, but it isn't any more your original carbon cube. The cube are identical in composition and non differentiable, but it isn't the original cube. The original cube *was* destroyed irreversibly.

It would be the same for the human.The reason we all go in philosophical question for human being is because we have the knack to be able to present an emergent process of reflection, thought, whereas the cube of carbon do not. But basically it is the same process. The original human thought would *STOP*, he would be DEAD. Then you painstakingly reconstitute another human with the same thought, either by having a copy of the body or copying the thought/central nervous system. It would be a human which incredibly has the SAME thought as the original, but the original is still dead. So de facto it isn't the same person, only a "meta-twin" person with the same morphology and or thought. Unless one pretend there is such things as soul, which would need to be evidenced, from the original point of view, he was killed. End of line. Brain is dead. No more thought. And that *IS* the materialist point of view so far as I can read materialist definition.

Yes, the materialist point of view is that the original human would be DEAD.

And, it is also my (and many others) point of view that I don't care, because I am more than this sack of meaty organic material I call a body. I wouldn't mind changing bodies, because my personhood isn't defined by it -- not even in the slightest.

So no, actually, the "number thing" is not a "false analogy." It is a perfect analogy -- I am a number, and nobody else is that number, because if anyone else is that number they are me, by definition. Get it?

 

[rocketdodger]

The best thought experiment I've seen to transporter cases is the following:

You step into the machine, and, instead of being whisked off to a faraway place, you get the following message:
Disassembling malfunction. Personal data en route to receiving station. Please press red button to manually vaporize self to avoid duplication.

Why is this any more interesting than the decision a soldier makes when they throw themsleves on a grenade? Or any other selfless act of suicide?

 

[Darat]

The best thought experiment I've seen to transporter cases is the following:

You step into the machine, and, instead of being whisked off to a faraway place, you get the following message:
Disassembling malfunction. Personal data en route to receiving station. Please press red button to manually vaporize self to avoid duplication.

If we had such devices the likely response to that situation would be determined by how the technology has entered the culture.

From my viewpoint (formed by my current cultural references) if that was me then there is no way at all I would kill myself because of a malfunction in a machine.