Personality and Copies

[ThunderChunky]

This argument has been around for awhile, and it is quite stupid.

"I" refers to the system of particles typing this statement.

Clearly, "I" exists.

Try again?

That does not demonstrate a self any more than pointing to a gust of wind does.

 

[ThermionicScott]

When a cell divides, which one was the original?

 

[SOdhner]

When a cell divides, which one was the original?

A good question, and one that may or may not have a good answer - if someone more knowledgeable than I in biology doesn't answer soon I will look into it and let you know my thoughts. Whether or not there is an "original" in that case it is different from what started the conversation here.

A concept that is, in a way, the midpoint between that and the clone issue is the science fiction concept of a gradual transfer. Let's say you hook my brain up to a new one (a prosthetic brain, whee!) and start a transfer. If this were just a mindless copy of information in one direction I would say that it has the same problem as the clone in the original conversation - it's not me.

If instead it is a two-way thing... you could conceivably have it so you use more and more of the prosthetic brain and less and less of the original until the original eventually dies off. There's a tricky question of how fast is too fast, but at some point I would say that I would count the new one as still being the original me. If you replace something gradually and maintain continuity I have no issue with it.

 

[rocketdodger]

That was a question you posed in place of an answer. You keep avoiding addressing the points I make, either by re-phrasing it into something you deem "stronger" that isn't the same anymore or by waxing philosophical about stories when that's not relevant to the question I asked.

I posed that question in place of an answer because -- as we can see from your response here -- saying anything more just confuses you. I have been arguing about this stuff for a long time and I know the kinds of things people get hung up on. Such as the two rock thing.

Is it the same story? Depending on how you define it, yeah.

When the definition of "story" aligns with any commonly accepted definitions, yes, it is the same. So you don't really need to throw that disclaimer "depending on how you define it."

Does that have ANYTHING to do with what I was asking? Nope. Your very own logic says that the books are the same one. Not just the stories - the books themselves. After all, you define things by the particles that make them up (and by extension the relationship between those particles). That's why I asked about the rocks.

But then you said the rocks weren't the same. Hmm.

If, as you say, the rocks are two separate items despite having the same arrangement of particles then clearly you can distinguish between two separate but identical items. .

I specifically said that I think what is important about personhood is the behavior of the particles rather than the particles themselves.

I also said that I don't think about rocks this way -- thats why I still consider two rocks to be not the same even if their particles behave the same.

My logic does not say that the books are the same book, it says that the stories are the same story even though the books are distinctly different physical objects.

By trying to make sense of all the things you think I might say that I didn't say -- such as whether or not I consider books like rocks or books like brains -- you have gotten confused about what I am simply trying to get you to think about, which is that perhaps a consciousness is more like a story written in a book than a book itself.

Apply the same to a brain. Two brains that are alike in physical makeup are still TWO brains. I can still, correctly, refer to them individually.

Again -- I am not talking about the brain, I am talking about what the brain does.

The destruction of one brain is not changed by the existence or non-existence of another identical brain. It is still destroyed. To say otherwise requires the consciousness to be based on something like a soul, and further requires that that soul either runs off and attaches to the other brain or is somehow already linked to it through some arcane means.

Or, it requires consciousness to be based on something like a number.

So sleeping is proof of the divinity of man? Or…? Consciousness is a function of the brain. It is based off of the meat in your skull, which is in turn influenced by other stuff. It is dynamic, but it generally has continuity. The idea that another consciousness could, somewhere, briefly match a state my own was in at some point does not somehow make them the same consciousness any more than two identical rocks are the same rock.

I am making another thread about a scenario that will hopefully get you to rethink that position. See you there.

 

[rocketdodger]

A good question, and one that may or may not have a good answer - if someone more knowledgeable than I in biology doesn't answer soon I will look into it and let you know my thoughts. Whether or not there is an "original" in that case it is different from what started the conversation here.

A concept that is, in a way, the midpoint between that and the clone issue is the science fiction concept of a gradual transfer. Let's say you hook my brain up to a new one (a prosthetic brain, whee!) and start a transfer. If this were just a mindless copy of information in one direction I would say that it has the same problem as the clone in the original conversation - it's not me.

If instead it is a two-way thing... you could conceivably have it so you use more and more of the prosthetic brain and less and less of the original until the original eventually dies off. There's a tricky question of how fast is too fast, but at some point I would say that I would count the new one as still being the original me. If you replace something gradually and maintain continuity I have no issue with it.

lol, this is exactly what the new thread is about -- how fast is too fast?

I think that if you ponder it long enough you will realize that there is no mathematical reason why any duration is different from any other.

Which means ....

 

[rocketdodger]

That does not demonstrate a self any more than pointing to a gust of wind does.

Well, that is your problem, not mine. If you don't like what I claim is "self," then please provide a definition of "self" to prove me wrong.

Eh? You won't? Of course you won't, because your stupid statement that there is no such thing as self is automatically invalid if you even bother to define self. And you can say "well that isn't self" all you want but it means nothing if you don't provide an alternative.

 

[Ferguson]

When the definition of "story" aligns with any commonly accepted definitions, yes, it is the same. So you don't really need to throw that disclaimer "depending on how you define it."

Yes, the story conveyed by the text is the same, even in a different book, or a different format, or on the internet, or scribbled onto napkins.

A perfect copy of me will tell the same stories, because it will have an identical brain chemistry at first, when the copy is first made. After that, we two seperate individuals will have different experiences and learn different things which may or may not change our personalities.
The copy is still a copy, my brain is still in my head, my consciousness is still a product of my brain, and the copy's consciousness a product of his.

A book is not alive, your analogy is inane.

 

[SOdhner]

I specifically said that I think what is important about personhood is the behavior of the particles rather than the particles themselves.

I also said that I don't think about rocks this way -- thats why I still consider two rocks to be not the same even if their particles behave the same.

Right - as I said, you're clearly arguing for the existence of a soul or something like it. And yet you refuse to admit to it. Interesting. Out of curiosity, does this apply to apes? Cats? Fish? Plants? Clearly you don't think rocks have souls and people do, but where do you draw the line?

I think that if you ponder it long enough you will realize that there is no mathematical reason why any duration is different from any other.

That would depend on the (fictional) technology and the functioning of the brain. At some point there is a difference, and at others there's not. It's likely that after you reach the point where there is a difference there's still a grey area regarding the exact details but, again, since this relies on fictional technology I can't imagine we would be able to pin any of that down.

 

[rocketdodger]

Right - as I said, you're clearly arguing for the existence of a soul or something like it. And yet you refuse to admit to it. Interesting. Out of curiosity, does this apply to apes? Cats? Fish? Plants? Clearly you don't think rocks have souls and people do, but where do you draw the line?

I don't think rocks have souls, but I do think minerals have crystal structures.

Can two distinct portions of quartz have the same crystal structure?

If you want to say my calling consciousness a pattern of information processing that is independent of the substrate it instantiates upon a "soul" then so be it, I don't really care.

The difference is that a soul continues on in the void whereas consciousness only exists on physical stuff. Just because I think different sets of stuff can have the same consciousness doesn't imply that I think consciousness can continue in the void.

 

[ThunderChunky]

Well, that is your problem, not mine. If you don't like what I claim is "self," then please provide a definition of "self" to prove me wrong.

Eh? You won't? Of course you won't, because your stupid statement that there is no such thing as self is automatically invalid if you even bother to define self. And you can say "well that isn't self" all you want but it means nothing if you don't provide an alternative.

The illusion-self is the "conscious self" that people generally refer to in conversations such as this. An illusion is something...just not something that is what it seems to be. You are free to define the self into something real like a gust of wind, just like one can define god into existence as the universe. This doesn't do much good in an intellectual discussion though.

 

[Ferguson]

I don't think rocks have souls, but I do think minerals have crystal structures.

Can two distinct portions of quartz have the same crystal structure?

If you want to say my calling consciousness a pattern of information processing that is independent of the substrate it instantiates upon a "soul" then so be it, I don't really care.

The difference is that a soul continues on in the void whereas consciousness only exists on physical stuff. Just because I think different sets of stuff can have the same consciousness doesn't imply that I think consciousness can continue in the void.

So this "soul" is independent of the physical brain. Evidence?
But then you say your version of the "soul" exists only on physical stuff.
So why would a separate group of physical stuff not instantiate its own "soul?"
Somehow this "soul" can be transferred to another group of physical stuff in another location. Evidence? Mechanism?

Suppose the original is destroyed five minutes before the copy is created. In order for the soul to transfer to the copy, it would have to "continue in the void," no? Where did your thetan stay while waiting for it's new brain?

 

[rocketdodger]

The illusion-self is the "conscious self" that people generally refer to in conversations such as this. An illusion is something...just not something that is what it seems to be. You are free to define the self into something real like a gust of wind, just like one can define god into existence as the universe. This doesn't do much good in an intellectual discussion though.

What intellectual discussion?

The one where the people like yourself, who happened to pick up a Daniel Dennet book and are all of a sudden experts, insist that the people like myself, who make a living working with self-referential information processing systems, just really don't get it when it comes to what "self" because even if we claim we are not referring to the "illusion-self" when we use the term "self" -- and we ought to know because it is our profession -- we just don't, because only the blind followers of Daniel Dennet somehow magically understand this fundamental truth?

No thanks, we have already had that discussion on this forum, and nobody learned a thing besides the fact that people who pick up Daniel Dennet books and think they instantly know everything are not really productive to argue with.

 

[rocketdodger]

Suppose the original is destroyed five minutes before the copy is created. In order for the soul to transfer to the copy, it would have to "continue in the void," no? Where did your thetan stay while waiting for it's new brain?

If the original is destroyed prior to the copy being made, and there is no physical stuff where the information resides in-between, then how is the copy made?

 

[SOdhner]

If the original is destroyed prior to the copy being made, and there is no physical stuff where the information resides in-between, then how is the copy made?

Encoded in some other form, obviously. In the case of the Star Trek transporters (one of the original reasons for this whole mess) the original is scanned and that scan is stored as data. The original is destroyed, the data is transmitted, and then the device at the recieving end makes a new body.

 

[ThunderChunky]

What intellectual discussion?

The one where the people like yourself, who happened to pick up a Daniel Dennet book and are all of a sudden experts, insist that the people like myself, who make a living working with self-referential information processing systems, just really don't get it when it comes to what "self" because even if we claim we are not referring to the "illusion-self" when we use the term "self" -- and we ought to know because it is our profession -- we just don't, because only the blind followers of Daniel Dennet somehow magically understand this fundamental truth?

No thanks, we have already had that discussion on this forum, and nobody learned a thing besides the fact that people who pick up Daniel Dennet books and think they instantly know everything are not really productive to argue with.

The discussion of the concept of the self. You seem to want to avoid the philosophy completely and simply argue semantics. You are free to do that, but you are not actually making any coherent point...you are exactly the same as the people that argue for the existence of god by defining it into existence.

 

[Ferguson]

If the original is destroyed prior to the copy being made, and there is no physical stuff where the information resides in-between, then how is the copy made?

Wow, complete and utter dodge noted.
The copy could be made from bits on a computer, or perhaps the waves transmitting the information took five minutes to arrive at the destination copying machine.
Of course that's irrelevant, and you know that, which is why you singled that part out of my post while completely ignoring the evidence burden you're accumulating with your wild speculations violating all known physics.

You have made it quite clear this is purely religious, your self-contradictions (The soul is instantiated by the brain, but not dependant on the brain) and this-duck-is-not-a-duck redefinitions (It's not a soul, just a movable instance of self which can change bodies) have made it self-evident that you seek to "win," rather than be correct.

My only question left is why? Is teleportation that important to you?

 

[rocketdodger]

Wow, complete and utter dodge noted.
The copy could be made from bits on a computer, or perhaps the waves transmitting the information took five minutes to arrive at the destination copying machine.
Of course that's irrelevant, and you know that, which is why you singled that part out of my post while completely ignoring the evidence burden you're accumulating with your wild speculations violating all known physics.

You have made it quite clear this is purely religious, your self-contradictions (The soul is instantiated by the brain, but not dependant on the brain) and this-duck-is-not-a-duck redefinitions (It's not a soul, just a movable instance of self which can change bodies) have made it self-evident that you seek to "win," rather than be correct.

My only question left is why? Is teleportation that important to you?

wtf? You specifically asked

In order for the soul to transfer to the copy, it would have to "continue in the void," no? Where did your thetan stay while waiting for it's new brain?

To which I reply

If the original is destroyed prior to the copy being made, and there is no physical stuff where the information resides in-between, then how is the copy made?

It wasn't a dodge, it was an attempt to get you to see what is right in front of you. I see that I expected too much from you, though, and that I have to spell it out for you completely:

If the copy is made after the original is destroyed then OBVIOUSLY there is some physical stuff in-between because otherwise the copy could not be made after the original was destroyed.

What kind of physical stuff? You say it yourself:

The copy could be made from bits on a computer, or perhaps the waves transmitting the information took five minutes to arrive at the destination copying machine.

 

[rocketdodger]

The discussion of the concept of the self.

But you are not interested in discussion, you are interested in telling people they are wrong about their concept of the self, whatever it may be.

And when people aren't wrong about their concept of the self -- people like me -- you regress to telling them that even though they aren't wrong, most other people are still wrong, and so we should discuss how wrong other people are?

You seem to want to avoid the philosophy completely

yes

and simply argue semantics.

err, not quite -- I would prefer to simply argue mechanics.

You are free to do that, but you are not actually making any coherent point...you are exactly the same as the people that argue for the existence of god by defining it into existence.

Alright, fair enough. Lets turn the tables though -- what, exactly, is the point you are trying to make? That somehow the lack of a cartesian theatre has implications for the teleporter scenario? Well, I agree with you. In fact I have already started threads about it over the years. So what now, should we argue again about what the masses think?

 

[SOdhner]

If the copy is made after the original is destroyed then OBVIOUSLY there is some physical stuff in-between because otherwise the copy could not be made after the original was destroyed.

What kind of physical stuff? You say it yourself:

Oh! So this soul you are proposing can live on in things that, contrary to your previous assertions, don't have the same alignment of particles at all. That's a big change in your position. This simplifies things greatly... So now I can scan you, kill you, and be done with it - no copy needed since your soul will be safe on the hard drive. Also that means we wouldn't need to read this nonsense from you because "you" would be completely inert. Score!

ETA:

Wait, wait... I need to get some clarification. Now that hard drives have souls, has this changed for rocks?

 

[rocketdodger]

Oh! So this soul you are proposing can live on in things that, contrary to your previous assertions, don't have the same alignment of particles at all.

My position is that human consciousness is a form of self referential information processing. It is an algorithm -- a series of computation steps -- that knows about itself.

My position is that the steps in the algorithm -- like any other algorithm -- can be thought of as a series of state transitions within the systems the algorithm is instantiated upon. Think about how programs are executed on a computer, how each step in a program represents a set of state transitions in the hardware. Well, my position is that the algorithm of consciousness is the same kind of thing in our brain -- the steps correspond to state transitions in our neural network.

My position is that these state transitions are deterministic, assuming quantum randomness is insignificant. This means the next state is determined by only the current internal state, the current external state, and a deterministic state transition function (which in the physical domain is simply the laws of physics).

My position, then, is that you can model consciousness (any algorithm, actually) as a series of state transitions in some system somewhere. That is, F(Si(t), Se(t), t) --> Si(t+1), where F( ) is the state transition function, Si( ) is the internal state, and Se( ) is the external state. If you looked at time slices of consciousness -- we can use plank time as the duration since then we know we captured any relevant events -- the algorithm would look something like this in the physical domain: S(1)-->S(2)-->S(3)--> ... -->S(current time).

My position is that consciousness is those deterministic transitions between states, the "--->" you see above. It is the algorithm itself, not the physical stuff the algorithm is running on. It isn't your brain, it is the directed "movement" from one state of your brain -- or any brain -- to the next.

My position is that if you take a subsequence of this algorithm -- suppose S(10)-->S(11)-->S(12) -- and split it between multiple systems, or instances, it remains the same algorithm precisely because the deterministic state transitions are exactly the same. In other words, if F(Si(10), Se(10), 10) occurs on system A, and determines state 11 on system B, and if F(Si(11), Se(11), 11) occurs on system B and determines state 12 on system C, the algorithm and hence the consciousness is exactly the same as it would be if everything occured in the same system.

So if your brain is in state 1, and the laws of physics combined with state 1 result in state 2 one planck time later, then the system where state 2 is located should be irrelevant. State 2 is still part of the algorithm, the same algorithm, because it was determined by state 1.

And finally, my position is that if you somehow add an intermediate step in there between determining state 2 and the system actually being set to state 2 -- such as communicating across space to an identical system that it should be set to state 2 -- the algorithm and hence the consciousness is still the same, because state 2 is still determined by state 1. The fact that there was a middleman doesn't change that key element. Nor would it change if that communication took a very, very long time -- if the original was scanned, then destroyed, and the information took a billion years to reach the destination, and only then was the copy made -- it would still be the same algorithm and hence the same consciousness. Because state 2 was determined by state 1

Does that make more sense?