Personality and Copies

[Malerin]

If we had such devices the likely response to that situation would be determined by how the technology has entered the culture.

From my viewpoint (formed by my current cultural references) if that was me then there is no way at all I would kill myself because of a malfunction in a machine.

I think the likely response to requests to kill yourself isn't going to change much based on technology.

 

[Malerin]

Why is this any more interesting than the decision a soldier makes when they throw themsleves on a grenade? Or any other selfless act of suicide?

It might not be. You seem to be agreeing here that teleportation is an of killing yourself.

 

[rocketdodger]

I think the likely response to requests to kill yourself isn't going to change much based on technology.

I agree, not just the technology alone.

The real motivator is going to be individuals in the newer and more forward looking generations seeing how much of an advantage people who use the TTP have over those that refuse to.

I mean, we see this kind of thing already. There will always be the Amish.

 

[rocketdodger]

It might not be. You seem to be agreeing here that teleportation is an of killing yourself.

No, because I have said it over and over that you don't need to kill the original if you don't want to.

Although my position is that it doesn't matter. But if you think it matters, there is no reason not to just keep everyone around.

 

[Malerin]

I agree, not just the technology alone.

The real motivator is going to be individuals in the newer and more forward looking generations seeing how much of an advantage people who use the TTP have over those that refuse to.

I mean, we see this kind of thing already. There will always be the Amish.

It's only an advantage if you're still alive. The fact that my duplicate will have a rich and wonderful life will do nothing to persuade me to vaporize myself.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's only an advantage if you're still alive. The fact that my duplicate will have a rich and wonderful life will do nothing to persuade me to vaporize myself.

How about giving the duplicate the power to do the vaporization?

 

[Malerin]

How about giving the duplicate the power to do the vaporization?

I thought about that. I would hope it wouldn't vaporize me. I wouldn't be able to vaporize it. I think we would work something out (dividing up assets, who changes their name, etc.).

 

[marplots]

I want to try it another way. Suppose you are going to take a plane ride to another continent (no fancy-pants transporter needed in this version). And you understand that there is some risk the plane will crash.

So, you undertake to record all the essentials of yourself (more later) so that, in the case of a fatal crash, there will remain a record of you, before you left...

At what level of fidelity would any dilemma arise?
1)If you left detailed writings about your philosophy and beliefs.
2)If you left clear recordings in video of similar material.
3)If you left an entire video record of your whole life (thus far).
4)A full sized clone in a coma with the ability to imprint the brain.
5)Some other, higher level of fidelity?

What should happen to the material left behind if you land safely?

And a related question: If you are moral, should you fulfill a promise you made to someone who is now dead -- to the level you would be bound to fulfill it to someone still alive?

 

[ThunderChunky]

The "self" is an illusion. There is no "YOU" to begin with.

 

[rocketdodger]

The "self" is an illusion. There is no "YOU" to begin with.

This argument has been around for awhile, and it is quite stupid.

"I" refers to the system of particles typing this statement.

Clearly, "I" exists.

Try again?

 

[SOdhner]

If the relative behavior of all the particles is the same, then I think they are the same consciousness.

[ ... ]

If you are holding two rocks, then you are holding two rocks. And they are obviously different rocks.

This still feels like you are contradicting yourself. You are saying that for people they count as the same person, but for rocks it's totally different?

Running, for example. If you have one human body running a certain way, then in an instant you destroy that body and continue the run on another body somewhere else, is the "running" a different "running?"

Yes.

I wouldn't mind changing bodies, because my personhood isn't defined by it -- not even in the slightest.

But you wouldn't change bodies. You would, as you said, be dead. Some other body may or may not end up existing and it may or may not think that it is the same as the original. YOU won't "switch" anything though. Heck, I could make that new one from scratch and just make it THINK there was an original, give it all false memories. That won't magically make that past true, will it? Nope. Likewise, telling a clone it is you doesn't make it so.

Why is this any more interesting than the decision a soldier makes when they throw themsleves on a grenade? Or any other selfless act of suicide?

That strikes me as a really strange comparison. One is done to save others, the other is done to... avoid potential legal confusion for a newly-created being. They don't seem equivalent to me.

From my viewpoint (formed by my current cultural references) if that was me then there is no way at all I would kill myself because of a malfunction in a machine.

Note, though, that you also kill yourself if the machine does NOT malfunction. The proper functioning of the machine involves killing you.

So, you undertake to record all the essentials of yourself (more later) so that, in the case of a fatal crash, there will remain a record of you, before you left...

At what level of fidelity would any dilemma arise?

[...]

What should happen to the material left behind if you land safely?

It seems like good common sense to keep that stuff in case you want it again later. I mean, why destroy all those books and videos? I'm not sure I understand the point of this question.

And a related question: If you are moral, should you fulfill a promise you made to someone who is now dead -- to the level you would be bound to fulfill it to someone still alive?

To put it in terms of this conversation: if you die and they pop out a clone of you, I owe that clone nothing except as declared by the local laws. If I promised you an ice cream cone and then you fell in a volcano, your clone could not collect on that ice cream cone. If, on the other hand, I promised you that I would buy you OR your clone ice cream and then you died I would honor that promise and buy your clone ice cream because I feel a general respect for promises is good for society.

 

[Third Eye Open]

The best thought experiment I've seen to transporter cases is the following:

You step into the machine, and, instead of being whisked off to a faraway place, you get the following message:
Disassembling malfunction. Personal data en route to receiving station. Please press red button to manually vaporize self to avoid duplication.

Except anyone growing up with this technology would not see it as 'press red button to die' but as 'press red button to complete the process of getting wherever you were trying to teleport to'.

 

[rocketdodger]

This still feels like you are contradicting yourself. You are saying that for people they count as the same person, but for rocks it's totally different?

If you are holding a copy of "The Fountainhead" in each hand, do they count as the same story?

But you wouldn't change bodies. You would, as you said, be dead. Some other body may or may not end up existing and it may or may not think that it is the same as the original. YOU won't "switch" anything though. Heck, I could make that new one from scratch and just make it THINK there was an original, give it all false memories. That won't magically make that past true, will it? Nope. Likewise, telling a clone it is you doesn't make it so.

Again, you are completely ignoring all the statements I have made regarding how I think people are more like the story of a book than the ink and paper of a book.

If you have a novel, and you copy it word for word to produce another book, the story is the same. Exactly the same, for any commonly understood definition of the terms "story" and "same."

Do you disagree with that? Do you honestly think that when a story is printed the story somehow changes each time the press transfers ink to paper?

 

[SOdhner]

Okay rocketdodger, here's the problem.

I don't feel like you are actually addressing the points I'm trying to raise, but I also feel like attempting to press the issue isn't going to get me anywhere because your position is so completely insane from my point of view that we may never get close enough to the same mindset to actually be having the same conversation as each other.

 

[Ferguson]

I've still never seen any depth or gotten the supposed "argument" with this question.
I am my brain. If my brain is destroyed and a copy created, I'm dead. I cease to be. That some other brain is out there with my memory is no consolation.

Some people seem to propose that having a copy out there, my "consciousness" would magically teleport to the other body. Mechanism? Evidence?

That to others, the copy appears identical, and that to the copy, the copy appears identical, is irrelevant to me (whether I'm dead or alive). Destroy my brain, and I'm gone forever, whether there are 1 or 10,000 copies.

 

[Ferguson]

Do you disagree with that? Do you honestly think that when a story is printed the story somehow changes each time the press transfers ink to paper?

It's "the same" in that the appearance is the same. The ink is different, and the paper is different. A story isn't a living conscious thing.

 

[rocketdodger]

Okay rocketdodger, here's the problem.

I don't feel like you are actually addressing the points I'm trying to raise, but I also feel like attempting to press the issue isn't going to get me anywhere because your position is so completely insane from my point of view that we may never get close enough to the same mindset to actually be having the same conversation as each other.

I don't understand why you won't just answer the questions about stories vs. ink/paper.

 

[rocketdodger]

I've still never seen any depth or gotten the supposed "argument" with this question.
I am my brain. If my brain is destroyed and a copy created, I'm dead. I cease to be. That some other brain is out there with my memory is no consolation.

Some people seem to propose that having a copy out there, my "consciousness" would magically teleport to the other body. Mechanism? Evidence?

That to others, the copy appears identical, and that to the copy, the copy appears identical, is irrelevant to me (whether I'm dead or alive). Destroy my brain, and I'm gone forever, whether there are 1 or 10,000 copies.

The fact that "The Fountainhead" still exists, even if I burned that book on my shelf, is pretty good evidence that a story is not just a book on my shelf.

The fact that you can -- and do, every night -- loose consciousness while your brain remains the same physical object is pretty good evidence that you are not just "your brain."

 

[rocketdodger]

It's "the same" in that the appearance is the same. The ink is different, and the paper is different. A story isn't a living conscious thing.

I don't think you understand the definition of "story." The "story" and the stuff the story is written on are very different.

 

[SOdhner]

I don't understand why you won't just answer the questions about stories vs. ink/paper.

That was a question you posed in place of an answer. You keep avoiding addressing the points I make, either by re-phrasing it into something you deem "stronger" that isn't the same anymore or by waxing philosophical about stories when that's not relevant to the question I asked.

Is it the same story? Depending on how you define it, yeah. Does that have ANYTHING to do with what I was asking? Nope. Your very own logic says that the books are the same one. Not just the stories - the books themselves. After all, you define things by the particles that make them up (and by extension the relationship between those particles). That's why I asked about the rocks.

But then you said the rocks weren't the same. Hmm.

If, as you say, the rocks are two separate items despite having the same arrangement of particles then clearly you can distinguish between two separate but identical items. Apply the same to a brain. Two brains that are alike in physical makeup are still TWO brains. I can still, correctly, refer to them individually.

The destruction of one brain is not changed by the existence or non-existence of another identical brain. It is still destroyed. To say otherwise requires the consciousness to be based on something like a soul, and further requires that that soul either runs off and attaches to the other brain or is somehow already linked to it through some arcane means.

The fact that "The Fountainhead" still exists, even if I burned that book on my shelf, is pretty good evidence that a story is not just a book on my shelf.

A copy of The Fountainhead (sadly) exists somewhere, yes. The one you burned still exists in a sense, although it is no longer recognizable since it's all black and crumbly.

The fact that you can -- and do, every night -- loose consciousness while your brain remains the same physical object is pretty good evidence that you are not just "your brain."

So sleeping is proof of the divinity of man? Or…? Consciousness is a function of the brain. It is based off of the meat in your skull, which is in turn influenced by other stuff. It is dynamic, but it generally has continuity. The idea that another consciousness could, somewhere, briefly match a state my own was in at some point does not somehow make them the same consciousness any more than two identical rocks are the same rock.