Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[The Sparrow]

Dave and Sparrow,
- But, if I wouldn't be brought back to life by this "perfect" replica.

the replica would think it is you and be alive. from its point of view, it would think it is the real you.

-- this perfect replica wouldn't be ME.

It would think it was, and as an exact copy, it would be identical in every respect, including having a sense of self that felt it was the real one.

It would be different in that sense, and
consequently untraceable. I am untraceable.

False.. You are traceable. you are the process that arose from the machine of your brain.

 

[MRC_Hans]

- Whatever it is, it is continuing and it's meaningful. And, according to OOFLam, it never existed before and will never exist again.

Yes, just like your brain, which generates it.

And, whatever it is, it will be missing from the perfect replica of my brain.

No. It will be present in the replica. If you don't tell it that it's a copy, it will believe it is you.

- That's why it's cause and effect untraceable.

False. The self is an effect caused by the brain.

Hans

 

[HighRiser]

Dave and Sparrow,
- But, if I wouldn't be brought back to life by this "perfect" replica -- this perfect replica wouldn't be ME. It would be different in that sense, and
consequently untraceable. I am untraceable.

Under H your self is produced by your brain and the environment that you've evolved in since birth. That's where the evidence leads, so that's what H is based on. Under H conciousnesses is traceable. You can't change H without evidence that it is wrong, and H must change when new evidence shows how previous iterations were wrong.

Anything that can be accepted into science gets accepted into science.

 

[MRC_Hans]

- But, if I had previously died, would I be brought back to life?

Depends on what you mean by "brought back to life". The dead original would stay dead, but the copy would feel like you it would think like you and it would continue your life.

- Like a saved game, which enables you to to continue if you accidentally get yourself killed (in the game).

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

- If YOU are not brought back to life, H is simply wrong.

No. Under the definition of H YOU are not brought back, but YOU.bak is. This is exactly the definition if H.

Again you are trying to change the definition of H.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

- Yeah. But would YOU be brought back to life. That's my basic claim -- that "perfect" replica would be missing something.

And your claim is wrong. It would miss nothing.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

- If it's another person, it's different.

If you insist, you can define it as different, but according to H (materialism) it is not. In materialism, ANY copy of YOU is YOU.

Please Jabba: You don't own the definition of H. You can't change it to fit your argument.

Hans

 

[The Sparrow]

...

- Like a saved game, which enables you to to continue if you accidentally get yourself killed (in the game).

Hans

Awesome analogy!

 

[Belz...]

Argumemnon,
- How am I getting H wrong?

Here, Jabba: there's an example of you getting H wrong:

- If YOU are not brought back to life, H is simply wrong.

And I'm too lazy to explain, so here's Hans' answer:

No. Under the definition of H YOU are not brought back, but YOU.bak is. This is exactly the definition if H.

Again you are trying to change the definition of H.

Hans

See?

 

[Mojo]

If you insist, you can define it as different, but according to H (materialism) it is not. In materialism, ANY copy of YOU is YOU.

Please Jabba: You don't own the definition of H. You can't change it to fit your argument.

Well, he can, but it will only make it worse for his argument, because if he proposes something other than materialism as H, then ~H includes materialism.

 

[Belz...]

If you insist, you can define it as different, but according to H (materialism) it is not. In materialism, ANY copy of YOU is YOU.

Slight correction: any exact copy of you is indistinguishable from you. But it's still a separate entity.

 

[The Sparrow]

See, Jabba, all your statements rest on a presupposed premise that there is a soul ( call it what you like ). We all see it. We don't accept that premise without evidence. You just repeating your conclusions, stomping your foot, using different language, wont work.

you think if we copied you, the copy would be missing your soul. We get you think that.
you need to establish a soul exists independant of the body and is a necessary ingredient in each human.

 

[The Sparrow]

Take an old commodor vic 20 computer. Write a hello world loop program. Execute it. Watch it run.

Take a second commodor vic 20 with the same specs. Write a hello world loop program. Execute it. Watch it run.

Watch both screens running independantly.

That is you and the copy of you. Get it?

 

[JayUtah]

You can't change H without evidence that it is wrong, and H must change when new evidence shows how previous iterations were wrong.

Jabba has already admitted he has no such evidence. He still thinks he's right. This is why he relies on the thought experiment. He seems to think it's ambiguous and hypothetical enough to sneak in straw-man alternations he needs for H to look and feel like it should include a soul but doesn't. Unfortunately H is pretty straightforward in the thought experiment, which leaves Jabba with little recourse but stubborn, insistent question-begging.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Slight correction: any exact copy of you is indistinguishable from you. But it's still a separate entity.

That is not the point. The point is that what Jabba calls "YOU" is present in ANY identical copy of you.

Given the technology, you could make a thousand copies of Jabba (Ed forbid), and you would have a thousand Jabbas. all feeling they were "ME".

Actually, the discussion they would have could be fascinating.

Hans

 

[JesseCuster]

Take an old commodor vic 20 computer. Write a hello world loop program. Execute it. Watch it run.

Take a second commodor vic 20 with the same specs. Write a hello world loop program. Execute it. Watch it run.

Watch both screens running independantly.

That is you and the copy of you. Get it?

No. The second Vic20 computer is missing the Hello World program of the first. It's not the same program, it's only an exact replica of the first program.

Therefore the Hello World program is cause and effect untraceable, is randomly plucked from an infinitely large pool of potential Hello World programs. The odds of a Vic20 running one of these programs from an infinitely large pool is 1 in infinity, which is virtually zero.

It obviously makes more sense to conclude that Hello World programs are therefore immortal.

 

[Belz...]

That is not the point. The point is that what Jabba calls "YOU" is present in ANY identical copy of you.

Given the technology, you could make a thousand copies of Jabba (Ed forbid), and you would have a thousand Jabbas. all feeling they were "ME".

Actually, the discussion they would have could be fascinating.

Hans

We have got to set that up.

 

[Agatha]

- But, it won't be YOU. Your particular sense of self would be missing -- and, untraceable.

No. An identical, perfect copy of a living person (if that technology was possible) would have an identical sense of self. Both the original and the copy would believe themselves to be the original.

A person's sense of self is a process which arises from the brain. The physical structure of the brain is shaped by the combined effect of every experience in every moment of time and space that the person has undergone from conception to the current moment. An identical copy of a person would have that identical structure - every neural connection in just the same configuration.

The sense of self is entirely traceable.

 

[The Sparrow]

No. The second Vic20 computer is missing the Hello World program of the first. It's not the same program, it's only an exact replica of the first program.

Therefore the Hello World program is cause and effect untraceable, is randomly plucked from an infinitely large pool of potential Hello World programs. The odds of a Vic20 running one of these programs from an infinitely large pool is 1 in infinity, which is virtually zero.

It obviously makes more sense to conclude that Hello World programs are therefore immortal.

Aaaaaaahhh! I get it now. Fascinating!

 

[JayUtah]

That is you and the copy of you. Get it?

No. The second Vic20 computer is missing the Hello World program of the first.

This hits the nail pretty much on the head. The hidden premise in Jabba's argument is that there should be an operative difference between bringing the organism into being the first time and bringing a duplicate into existence, such that only the "original" has all the necessary properties. It's tantamount to saying the first 1 in 1+1=2 is somehow magically different than the second 1.

That just isn't how H works.

But then of course Jabba gets around that by saying the analogy is inapt because digits don't have souls.