William Parcher
Show me the monkey!
- Joined
- Jul 26, 2005
- Messages
- 27,487
But other people besides Howard have spoken about driving it with no hands on the wheel.Probably me misremembering what Howard said.
But other people besides Howard have spoken about driving it with no hands on the wheel.Probably me misremembering what Howard said.
The truck driver said that the Tesla continued for hundreds of feet after going under his truck and even knocked down a pole and ended up in a lawn. It's possible that the car didn't even apply the brakes or properly steer after the roof was sheared off.
Perhaps the interior should be fitted with sensors to count the number of heads per passenger, and if the number becomes unequal at any point it would trigger the car to realize something was wrong.
How does the Tesla work with pedestrians? Will it knock them down like bowling pins? How does it deal with children playing and running around near the road? Does it focus on their potential movements just like a human brain does?
How does it deal with pedestrians in highway situations? Are they bowling pins?This is only intended for use on highways.
*speechless*![]()
How does the cruise control on your car deal with those things now? This is only intended for use on highways. I don't think it can handle red lights or pedestrians.
"Your roof is ajar."
Clark Howard on the radio was talking about his Tesla and from memory he said he took his hands off the wheel, leaned back, and let it drive him down the freeway.
When these self-driving cars arrive, are we going to be sitting in the driver's seat in a state of near panic, ready to take over at the slightest sign of malfunction? I'd just as soon drive.
It is interesting to see that similar fears existed about Cruise Control when that came out. Snopes has the classic myth covered:
http://www.snopes.com/autos/techno/cruise.asp
Said it before, I'll say it again: I want to see the car companies develop their software and install it on a wheelchair to interact with pedestrians before they put it into live traffic.
Because this is what happens when laboratory scale development is prematurely released to the wild.
<cut for irrelevance to this subject>
Are you sure about the highlighted part?
http://www.edn.com/design/automotiv...ler-firmware--Bad-design-and-its-consequences
Barr's ultimate conclusions were that:
Toyota’s electronic throttle control system (ETCS) source code is of unreasonable quality.
Toyota’s source code is defective and contains bugs, including bugs that can cause unintended acceleration (UA).
Code-quality metrics predict presence of additional bugs.
Toyota’s fail safes are defective and inadequate (referring to them as a “house of cards” safety architecture).
Misbehaviors of Toyota’s ETCS are a cause of UA.
Hardware
Although the investigation focused almost entirely on software, there is at least one HW factor: Toyota claimed the 2005 Camry's main CPU had error detecting and correcting (EDAC) RAM. It didn't. EDAC, or at least parity RAM, is relatively easy and low-cost insurance for safety-critical systems.
Other cases of throttle malfunction have been linked to tin whiskers in the accelerator pedal sensor. This does not seem to have been the case here.
Thousands and thousands
The Camry ETCS code was found to have 11,000 global variables. Barr described the code as “spaghetti.” Using the Cyclomatic Complexity metric, 67 functions were rated untestable (meaning they scored more than 50). The throttle angle function scored more than 100 (unmaintainable).
Toyota loosely followed the widely adopted MISRA-C coding rules but Barr’s group found 80,000 rule violations. Toyota's own internal standards make use of only 11 MISRA-C rules, and five of those were violated in the actual code. MISRA-C:1998, in effect when the code was originally written, has 93 required and 34 advisory rules. Toyota nailed six of them.
Further reading here: http://embeddedgurus.com/barr-code/2013/10/an-update-on-toyota-and-unintended-acceleration/
In March 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a $1.2 billion settlement in a criminal case against Toyota. As part of that settlement, Toyota admitted to past lying to NHTSA, Congress, and the public about unintended acceleration and also to putting its brand before public safety. Yet Toyota still has made no safety recalls for the defective engine software.
On April 1, 2014, I gave a keynote speech at the EE Live conference, which touched on the Toyota litigation in the context of lethal embedded software failures of the past and the coming era of self-driving vehicles. The slides from that presentation are available for download at http://www.barrgroup.com/killer-apps/.
Elsewhere in reading about this, it was stated that if a critical bit was flipped the only way of reseting the throttle to stop it accelerating was to set it to full then relax it.
and some more background.
http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1319903&page_number=3
What's next for NHTSA
After the Oklahoma trial, what steps should the NHTSA be taking? Barr made some suggestions:
NHTSA needs to get Toyota to make its existing cars safe and also needs to step up on software regulation and oversight. For example, FAA and FDA both have guidelines for safety-critical software design (e.g., DO-178) within the systems they oversee. NHTSA has nothing.
Also, NHTSA recently mandated the presence and certain features of black boxes in all US cars, but that rule does not go far enough. We observed that Toyota's black box can malfunction during unintended acceleration specifically, and this will cause the black box to falsely report no braking. NHTSA's rules need to address this, e.g., by being more specific about where and how the black box gets its data, so that it does not have a common failure point with the engine computer.
There did also seem to be a mechanical problem with the mats causing the accelerator pedal to stick *as well*.
Clark Howard on the radio was talking about his Tesla and from memory he said he took his hands off the wheel, leaned back, and let it drive him down the freeway.
When these self-driving cars arrive, are we going to be sitting in the driver's seat in a state of near panic, ready to take over at the slightest sign of malfunction? I'd just as soon drive.
Amen.
How does the cruise control on your car deal with those things now? This is only intended for use on highways. I don't think it can handle red lights or pedestrians.
Considering this is the first fatality in 130 million autopilot miles driven when the national average is one fatality for every 93 million miles, that is a good sign the current assist technology is working well (though of course there is always room for improvement, like getting other humans to stop driving their cars into oncoming traffic).