But neither does a 1 day old. A 1 day old and a -1 day old are basically the same thing.
I agree with this.
According to you a hunter should be able to maybe hunt small babies like say they would a deer. Or at least if they do only get the same punishment as you would say killing a neighbors dog because you can't stand the barking. After all a dog is much smarter then a baby... So the punishment should actually be much, much more.
Not quite: I think a hunter should be able to hunt deer in all instances where it would be acceptable to hunt small babies. That's a striking comment out of context, but it follows a straightforward consequence of rejecting the sanctity of human life: it implies that infants lives are reduced to the status of animals, or animals lives are raised to the status of infants. I'm personally inclined toward the latter, on the basis that it's not rational to increase suffering when it can be easily avoided.
This view has some interesting implications on abortion, namely that early term fetal life has the same claim to moral value as any other organism which has no mental life to speak of.
2nd I completely disagree a fetus has no mental life to speak of, I wouldn't be for some fetal rights if I didn't think so. Surely maybe very early on that is the case, but not latter on in development.
Out of curiosity, do you think abortions are more permissible if they occur very early in development, prior to a certain degree of mental development?
Dessi said:
Morally speaking, fetuses just don't have a lot going for them; they aren't rational, they don't have a mental life to speak of, they aren't moral agents, they can't see themselves over time, they don't a preference to born rather than aborted, etc.
I don't know what you mean by a fetus has no preference to be born rather then aborted.
You may have misunderstood me. I'm explaining that most theories of human rights are not inclusive to fetuses, as most theories require some important attributes to account for value at all. To spell it out in excruciating detail:
Fetuses aren't rational. This means they are not included in the sphere of moral consideration in any ethic that requires some minimal level of rationality. Social contractarianism, for example, is based on mutual informed agreements between self-interested people; fetuses, unfortunately, lack the rationality to consent to social contracts.
Fetus below a certain level of development have no mental life to speak of. This means their moral value isn't account for in ethical systems which require certain mental capacity, such as a capacity to feel pain in most flavors of consequentialism and rational egoism.
Fetuses aren't moral agents. Think about the implications this has in most interpretations of Kantianism, which assert that people only have direct duties to moral agents.
Fetuses can't see themselves over time. Many ethical theories are concerned with the fate of organisms who see themselves as a distinct entity existing and continuing over time, which is a long-hand way of saying "self awareness".
Fetuses don't have preferences of any sort. This, of course, refers to
preference utlitarianism, one of the more popular flavors of consequentialism in recent decades.
Contrary to intuition, many contemporary theories of human rights aren't actually inclusive to fetuses (or, as you noted, very young infants). This is a problem, because it makes arguments against abortion difficult to frame in the context of human rights. If abortion is wrong, is because the fetus has some inherent moral value, we need to account for that value to make the argument persuasive. All other things being equal, it's easier to account for the value of non-rational humans who can suffer (like very young infants and late term fetuses), than those who cannot (all other fetuses).
So then your in this weird territory, where you treat infant murder the same as say killing someone's cow... and you would have to in your world, because everything is judged by it's moral agentness (not a word) or intelligence, because we can't give any special status to species membership.
I don't see how you actually avoid that "weird territory". The argument for the sanctity of human life is, at best, wishful thinking. It logically follows that, if human life isn't sacred, then human life and non-human life at a similar mental level are moral equals, and hurting one or the other has the same consequence regardless of their species membership.