Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[SpitfireIX]

I'd like to offer a big vote of thanks to Spitfire IX and Captain Swoop for clarifying and correcting my post.

I was in a rush, so chose Wikipedia - but now I have a much better source!

I just recently discovered that web site. From their home page:

"Welcome to HistoryOfWar.org. We aim to make our site your first call for information on any aspect of military history."

 

[jimbob]

. . . I found this from what appears to be an official historical monograph from 1957, The Defence of the United Kingdom, digitized on Gawdzilla's website . . .

I just noticed I forgot to list the page numbers for the quotation; it's from pp. 65-66.

As an aside, he's still over on Badscience...

 

[SpitfireIX]

So now let's examine Henri's claim that Britain would have been bombed into submission in a week in the fall of 1938.

I found the following stats on the Luftwaffe's strength in September 1938, copied from a Czech aviation magazine (source). One or two of these are questionable, but overall they provide a good starting point; I'll correct them if and when I find better information.

Heinkel He 111B.....................219
Heinkel He 111E.....................141
Heinkel He 111F ......................30
Heinkel He 111J.......................78
Junkers Ju 86A/D/G................200
Dornier Do 17E/M...................300^*Junkers Ju 87A.......................120^*Henschel Hs 123A...................150^*Messerschmitt Bf 109B/C.........510
Messerschmitt Bf 109D...............0
Arado Ar 68E/F.......................400^*Dornier Do 17F/P....................180^*Heinkel He 45M......................150^*Heinkel He 70F.........................49
Henschel Hs 126A-O.................42
Totals .................................2500^*
*approximate

In general, the totals for bombers and fighters fit reasonably well with a table in the official British monograph I linked above; 1128 and 773 respectively. That table also lists 226 dive bombers and 195 "ground attack" aircraft; I suspect the latter refers to the Hs 123A, a biplane dive bomber.

It seems unlikely to me that there were no Bf 109Ds in squadron service by September, as they were first sent to fight in Spain with the Condor Legion in June, but I suppose it's possible. I'll have to do some more research on that.

To be continued . . .

 

[Garrison]

So now let's examine Henri's claim that Britain would have been bombed into submission in a week in the fall of 1938.

I found the following stats on the Luftwaffe's strength in September 1938, copied from a Czech aviation magazine (source). One or two of these are questionable, but overall they provide a good starting point; I'll correct them if and when I find better information.

Heinkel He 111B.....................219
Heinkel He 111E.....................141
Heinkel He 111F ......................30
Heinkel He 111J.......................78
Junkers Ju 86A/D/G................200
Dornier Do 17E/M...................300^*Junkers Ju 87A.......................120^*Henschel Hs 123A...................150^*Messerschmitt Bf 109B/C.........510
Messerschmitt Bf 109D...............0
Arado Ar 68E/F.......................400^*Dornier Do 17F/P....................180^*Heinkel He 45M......................150^*Heinkel He 70F.........................49
Henschel Hs 126A-O.................42
Totals .................................2500^*
*approximate

In general, the totals for bombers and fighters fit reasonably well with a table in the official British monograph I linked above; 1128 and 773 respectively. That table also lists 226 dive bombers and 195 "ground attack" aircraft; I suspect the latter refers to the Hs 123A, a biplane dive bomber.

It seems unlikely to me that there were no Bf 109Ds in squadron service by September, as they were first sent to fight in Spain with the Condor Legion in June, but I suppose it's possible. I'll have to do some more research on that.

To be continued . . .

Those numbers go a long way to explaining why the Luftwaffe concluded a bombing campaign against the UK couldn't be carried out in 1938. The Bf 110 wasn't in service so the bombers would have been plodding across the North Sea without any fighter cover whatsoever.

 

[Hans]

Those numbers go a long way to explaining why the Luftwaffe concluded a bombing campaign against the UK couldn't be carried out in 1938. The Bf 110 wasn't in service so the bombers would have been plodding across the North Sea without any fighter cover whatsoever.

I think Henri will tell us about the top super secret plan to disguise German bombers using moustaches. The British fighters would not recognize them.

 

[SpitfireIX]

The anti-aircraft system in 1938 seems to me to have been woefully inadequate. In 1938 it was just assumed that any air attack would come from Germany in the east. . . .

There is a bit about the matter in the Battle of Britain book 1989 by Alfred Price:

The part played by the heavy anti-aircraft gun batteries during the Battle of Britain has usually been neglected. The task of the heavy gun defences was four-fold: first, to shoot down or damage enemy aircraft; secondly to split up the enemy formations so that the fighters could engage the bombers more easily; thirdly, to indicate the position of enemy aircraft to the fighters; and fourthly, to prevent or hinder accurate bombing. And while they were rarely successful in achieving the first three of these, the gunners were consistently able to achieve the fourth.

I just wanted to point out that this applies mainly to tactical bombing, and, to a lesser extent, daylight "precision" bombing. Night area bombing, not so much.

 

[Hans]

I just wanted to point out that this applies mainly to tactical bombing, and, to a lesser extent, daylight "precision" bombing. Night area bombing, not so much.

Both sides ability to find and destroy bombers at night was very limited. But of course both sides bombers would have challenges in finding the target too. The German's did have the advantage of having the Thames pointing to London. Which was used by Zeppelins, Gothas and ZS'ers in WWI.

 

[SpitfireIX]

Those numbers go a long way to explaining why the Luftwaffe concluded a bombing campaign against the UK couldn't be carried out in 1938.

Exactly. A lot of these planes, notably the Do 17E&M and the Ju 86G, couldn't even reach London from Germany, and most of the others could only do so with reduced bomb loads.

The Bf 110 wasn't in service so the bombers would have been plodding across the North Sea without any fighter cover whatsoever.

Worse still, the first Bf 110s couldn't reach England from Germany. The Bf-110D, introduced in 1940, was the first long-range variant, but it had some teething problems, due to its initial use of a conformal auxiliary fuel tank ("dachshund's belly") which adversely affected performance and proved to be both unreliable and dangerous. Only when later production D models were equipped to carry drop tanks did the aircraft finally become effective as a long-range fighter-bomber.

 

[SpitfireIX]

Henri, we're still waiting for you to explain how, with the bomber force listed, Germany was going to bomb Britain into submission in a week in 1938, granting, arguendo as usual, that the Luftwaffe would have assigned all of its bombers capable of reaching London to the task.

Also, please explain why, if the above assertion is correct, Britain didn't surrender despite the Luftwaffe's dropping 24,000 tons of bombs on London during the Blitz?

 

[Garrison]

Henri, we're still waiting for you to explain how, with the bomber force listed, Germany was going to bomb Britain into submission in a week in 1938, granting, arguendo as usual, that the Luftwaffe would have assigned all of its bombers capable of reaching London to the task.

Also, please explain why, if the above assertion is correct, Britain didn't surrender despite the Luftwaffe's dropping 24,000 tons of bombs on London during the Blitz?

He's gone off to the Syria thread to exercise his anti-Semitism there.

If he reappears here we can expect nothing but another fringe reset, but I suspect you knew that.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Henri, we're still waiting for you to explain how, with the bomber force listed, Germany was going to bomb Britain into submission in a week in 1938, granting, arguendo as usual, that the Luftwaffe would have assigned all of its bombers capable of reaching London to the task.

Also, please explain why, if the above assertion is correct, Britain didn't surrender despite the Luftwaffe's dropping 24,000 tons of bombs on London during the Blitz?

There is an interesting posting on another forum about all this which makes sense to me. The RAF were giving Chamberlain advice which contradicts what Garrison is saying on this forum:

Odd how Chamberlain is regularly accused of being duped by Hitler yet Churchill who it can be argued was taken in by Stalin to a greater extent almost never is. The situation in 1938 was a lot more complicated for Chamberlain than Hitler.

Chamberlain had to take into account the situation in the Far East with Japan. Would it strike against Britain and France if they were fighting a major European war? From what happened in 1942 we know that the Japanese would have gone through the British like a knife through butter. There was also the question of which way would Mussolini jump.

The Cz military alliance with the USSR was supposed to come into effect if France went to war over Cz. If my memory serves me I believe Chamberlain said he had no wish to see the Red Army in Vienna.

Britain could only field a small force in 1938 it would be the French who would be doing almost all the ground fighting. He had the impression that they did not want to fight but could not bring themselves to say it.

His Chiefs of Staff were telling him that the RAF could not stop devastating German air raids on Britain. Also that Britain and France could do nothing to prevent the German army overrunning Cz. The country would only be reconstituted after a long war that slowly ground Germany down. He thought that another long war against Germany would ruin Britain and leave it dependent on the USA. He was right.

A war would be over whether the Sudeten land should be given to Germany or whether it should have autonomy within Cz. Churchill supported autonomy. Again if my memory serves me Chamberlain said that he did not give a hoot if the area was in Germany or Cz. He thought that it would be very difficult to get the Commonwealth to support Britain if it went to war over the issue.

He believed that another great war had to be avoided, if that could only be done by letting Hitler have the Sudetenland then so be it. He thought Hitler would keep his word but re-armament never stopped it speeded up. Contrary to what many people think Britain was not poorly prepared for war when it came. Hitler breaking the Munich treaty was a surprise.

That Hitler made demands over Danzig was no surprise he had predicted Germany would want its return over a decade previously. The pass would be held at Poland but he wanted the Poles to make concessions so as to avoid war. Chamberlain and Halifax thought German economic and political dominance of Eastern Europe was inevitable in the long run and they were right. However they were not prepared to see Germany achieve dominance by force.

With regard to the Spanish civil war the British preferred Franco to a possible communist government.
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steverodgers801
Member

 

[Henri McPhee]

That posting above came from this forum if anybody is interested:

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=114&t=203870&start=45

 

[Garrison]

There is an interesting posting on another forum about all this which makes sense to me. The RAF were giving Chamberlain advice which contradicts what Garrison is saying on this forum:

Again this is not true. I have clearly stated that Chamberlain was working on the basis of a gross over-estimation of the capability of the Luftwaffe, as have any number of other posters who you have ignored. No one is disputing that. What multiple posters have explained is that the reality was completely different and have provided you with facts that show such a bombing campaign could not be mounted in 1938, a conclusion the Luftwaffe agreed with, something else you keep ignoring.

Asked for facts you return to the thread yet again making up claims about what I have said and instead of evidence for your other claims you simply dredge up yet another anonymous internet poster who repeats the same claims you've posted here without offering one shred of evidence.

Perhaps you would care to address the facts provided by Spitfire IX with some actual evidence?

 

[SpitfireIX]

There is an interesting posting on another forum about all this which makes sense to me. The RAF were giving Chamberlain advice which contradicts what Garrison is saying on this forum:

Continuing evasion noted. Further, as has been pointed out to you, ad nauseam as usual, no one cares that you found some obscure Internet poster who agrees with you, and might even be you, in another guise.

Additionally, you are continuing to attempt to change horses without admitting it, but, frankly, you're doing an extremely poor job. I'll have more on this in a later post.

As for the post you quote, two observations. First, as always, the remark about Churchill is utterly irrelevant, and merely provides you with an opportunity to take a shot, by proxy, at one of your great bêtes noires. And, as has been pointed out to you repeatedly, Churchill and FDR/Truman were in no position to prevent the Soviets from dominating Eastern Europe, so the question of whether they were "taken in by Stalin" is moot.

Second, and far more important, all of the arguments against going to war with Germany in October 1938 still held in September 1939, plus, despite your continuing to deny the point, Britain, France, and Poland were in a much weaker position with respect to Germany, both militarily and politically, than Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia had been a year earlier.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Second, and far more important, all of the arguments against going to war with Germany in October 1938 still held in September 1939, plus, despite your continuing to deny the point, Britain, France, and Poland were in a much weaker position with respect to Germany, both militarily and politically, than Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia had been a year earlier.

I don't go along with this weak little Germany in 1938 argument. Hitler had introduced conscription in 1935 for a start, and so he had a large number of fully trained troops at his disposal, unlike Britain. I have never seen any secret documents by Air Intelligence at the time, but I do know that the RAF advised Chamberlain to delay going to war. The RAF were the professionals and experts.

There is another posting on another forum about the matter which also makes sense to me:

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threa...make-a-difference-to-the-air-war.32311/page-2

Yes, England went so very, very wrong! We're actually quite proud of that!

For your later comments, I believe Germany probably had an advantage - the Bf109 had been in service for some time and, by August 1938, the Bf109D made up roughly half of Germany's fighter force which has been listed as approx 650 total first-line fighters in late 1938. However, the D-model still had difficulties with wing strength, lack of armament etc.

I suspect Germany may have had a harder time had war broken out in 1938, indeed I suspect we'd have seen an extended "Phony War" period through, perhaps, the middle of 1939 as both the Allies and the Germans sought to strengthen forces and get ready for the big fight.

 

[fagin]

..........

There is another posting on another forum about the matter which also makes sense to me:

.............

Good for you.

Continuing evasion noted. Further, as has been pointed out to you, ad nauseam as usual, no one cares that you found some obscure Internet poster who agrees with you, and might even be you, in another guise.

.........

 

[lobosrul5]

I don't go along with this weak little Germany in 1938 argument. Hitler had introduced conscription in 1935 for a start, and so he had a large number of fully trained troops at his disposal, unlike Britain. I have never seen any secret documents by Air Intelligence at the time, but I do know that the RAF advised Chamberlain to delay going to war. The RAF were the professionals and experts.

There is another posting on another forum about the matter which also makes sense to me:

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threa...make-a-difference-to-the-air-war.32311/page-2

Was Britain going to fight Germany alone?

Here is a poster in another forum that I think makes sense!

I'm currently listening to The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich by William Shirer. According to his sources, Czechoslovakia (who had about a million men, of which 800.000 where front line units, and who were relatively well armed) and France together outnumbered Germany by more than 2 to 1.

https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/foru...great-powers-armies-in-september-1938.623701/

 

[Hans]

Why does Henri think the French wouldn't have been in this early war and if the German used any of the useful methods of attacking France so would the Belgian Army would also be thrown into the mix (we'll ignore poor little Luxembourg)

The Belgians and French air forces would have bled away a significant portion of the Lufties.

Additionally given the strategy of 1940 would the Germans have had to take Denmark and Norway like they previous did or lose their iron ore source?

 

[SpitfireIX]

I don't go along with this weak little Germany in 1938 argument.

Straw man, along with lame appeal to ridicule. No one said "weak little Germany." We just keep pointing out, and you keep ignoring, the fact that Germany was considerably stronger in September 1939 than October 1938, and gained much more, militarily and politically, by the year's delay, than Britain and France did.

Hitler had introduced conscription in 1935 for a start, and so he had a large number of fully trained troops at his disposal, unlike Britain.

As lobosrul5 pointed out, France and Czechoslovakia, whose combined armies outnumbered Germany's by a wide margin, would have also been fighting alongside Britain. And those two countries had had conscription since well before 1935. Further, the Heer was not "fully trained." The rapid expansion meant that many divisions had one or two regiments of reservists and/or recent conscripts. Fail.

I have never seen any secret documents by Air Intelligence at the time, but I do know that the RAF advised Chamberlain to delay going to war. The RAF were the professionals and experts.

First, as has been repeatedly pointed out to you, even if they were the experts, they were still wrong. Second, I'll renew the question you've repeatedly ducked: Why are you so keen to accept the verdicts of British experts who were working from what we know now were greatly exaggerated estimates of the Wehrmacht's strength and capabilities, but you ignore the pronouncements of the German experts, with access to realistic appraisals, who said that Germany couldn't have won a war in 1938?

Further, as has been repeatedly explained to you, and you have ignored, appeasement had disastrous political consequences, in addition to the disastrous military ones. The military opinions of the Chiefs of Staff do not change that.

Finally, here is a passage from Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945, by Williamson Murray (a real historian), pp. 18-19, again digitized on Gawdzilla's website:

Nevertheless, in the final analysis, fears about the Luftwaffe probably were not decisive in molding the British response to German threats before Munich. In fact, by September 1938 many leading appeasers felt that the West could beat Germany in a war,⁹² while the British military in late September came around to the view that "the latent resources of our Empire and the doubtful morale of our opponents under the stress of war give us confidence as to the ultimate outcome [of a war]." But the terrible costs of World War I lingered in British minds and tempered the response. . . .

What is surprising, given the predilection of some historians to argue that Munich saved Britain from the Luftwaffe, is the fact that the German air force had made almost no preparation to wage war against the British. In August 1938, a staff officer of Luftflotte 2, responsible in 1938 for operations over the North Sea and against the British Isles, suggested that Germany's current capability to attack Britain would amount to pin pricks. In late September, General Felmy, Commander of Second Air Force, warned the high command that "given the means at his disposal, a war of destruction against England seemed to be excluded." In May 1939, Felmy concluded an address by highlighting the lack of preparation for a "strategic" bombing offensive against Britain. He doubted whether the Luftwaffe could achieve more than a limited success in 1940 and admitted that the Luftwaffe would not have one air division fully trained and prepared to attack Britain in the summer of 1939. Considering Second Air Force's equipment, preparations for an air offensive on Britain were totally inadequate (völlig ungenügend). [some notes omitted]
__________

⁹²Neville Henderson admitted that Germany might not last more than "a certain number of months." PRO FO 800/309, Part IV, letter from Henderson to Cadogan, 4.9.38. Halifax told the Cabinet in mid-September 1938 that "he had no doubt that if we were involved in war now, we should win it after a long time." PRO CAB 23/95, Cab 39(38), Meeting of the Cabinet, 17.9.38., pp. 98-99.​

There is another posting on another forum about the matter which also makes sense to me:

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threa...make-a-difference-to-the-air-war.32311/page-2

Just to add to what fagin wrote, this passage actually contradicts your argument. "I suspect Germany may have had a harder time had war broken out in 1938 . . ." Fail.

 

[Garrison]

I don't go along with this weak little Germany in 1938 argument.

We know that you believe this, we also know you have failed dismally to explain how the Wehrmacht were going to defeat Britain in a week.

Hitler had introduced conscription in 1935 for a start, and so he had a large number of fully trained troops at his disposal, unlike Britain.

And yet that army was much weaker in 1938 than 1939, which is what people here keep explaining to you.

I have never seen any secret documents by Air Intelligence at the time, but I do know that the RAF advised Chamberlain to delay going to war.

We know you know that, because you posted the same thing yesterday and then ignored the answer to the next part...

The RAF were the professionals and experts.

..Which is that they based their conclusions on faulty information, why do you refuse to acknowledge this?

There is another posting on another forum about the matter which also makes sense to me:

And no one in this thread cares anymore than we did the last 20 times you found some anonymous internet poster who is as ignorant of the facts as you are.