Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Henri McPhee]

Nevertheless, in the final analysis, fears about the Luftwaffe probably were not decisive in molding the British response to German threats before Munich. In fact, by September 1938 many leading appeasers felt that the West could beat Germany in a war,⁹² while the British military in late September came around to the view that "the latent resources of our Empire and the doubtful morale of our opponents under the stress of war give us confidence as to the ultimate outcome [of a war]." But the terrible costs of World War I lingered in British minds and tempered the response. . . .

​

The fact is that the "latent resources of our Empire" were not there in 1938. Australia and Canada and New Zealand were opposed to war in 1938. Roosevelt in America congratulated Chamberlain on his Munich so-called agreement. Pro-German Ireland remained neutral. South Africa only declared war a year later with the narrowest of parliamentary majorities. Most Afrikaan people were pro-Nazi. Most people in the world had never heard of Sudetanland, and they certainly didn't want to go war over it.

I don't know about the doubtful morale of our opponents. Hitler had a lot of public support in Germany.

In 1941 the German Army which faced the Russians was probably the finest military machine that has ever been produced. Nothing had been spared to make it as perfect and as efficient as possible. This army had been training at full strength for many years before the war and it had now won two great campaigns against Poland and France respectively.

 

[Dave Rogers]

The fact is that the "latent resources of our Empire" were not there in 1938.

I think you need to look up the word "latent".

Dave

 

[Border Reiver]

I don't know about the doubtful morale of our opponents. Hitler had a lot of public support in Germany.

In 1941 the German Army which faced the Russians was probably the finest military machine that has ever been produced. Nothing had been spared to make it as perfect and as efficient as possible. This army had been training at full strength for many years before the war and it had now won two great campaigns against Poland and France respectively.

Lets review this ONCE again. 1941 is not 1938.

In 1938, the German military had NOT won three campaigns (the anonymous author of your quote forgot about Norway and Denmark) and was NOT the force that launched Barbarossa in '41.

In 1938, the Kriegsmarine was not ready for offensive operations with an inadequate U-Boat force to deal with British shipping or the British Navy, let alone the combined British and French navies. It was the match of the Czech navy, which I believe consisted of three rowboats commanded by the good soldier Svjiek....

In 1938, despite the lack of Spitfires , the RAF was not outclassed by the Luftwaffe in overall striking ability. Combine the RAF with the French and Czechoslovakian air forces and the Luftwaffe is severely outmatched in overall combat power. The Luftwaffe is unable to significantly attack the UK.

In 1938, the panzer arm of the Heer is small, and equipped primarily with vehicles that are inferior to those used by Britain, France and Czechoslovakia. The vast majority of the Heer used horses for transport, while Britain is completely mechanized and France is far more mechanized than Germany.

The quote you selected is objectively wrong on a number of counts and I suspect was written by some sort of fanboy.

 

[Andy_Ross]

And another quote about 1941.

 

[SpitfireIX]

The fact is that the "latent resources of our Empire" were not there in 1938.

What Dave said.

Australia and Canada and New Zealand were opposed to war in 1938.

Everyone except Hitler and his most fanatical supporters was opposed to war; that doesn't mean they wouldn't have gone along with Britain. Further, Australia and New Zealand had no say in the matter, as those countries had not yet ratified the Statute of Westminster. Had Britain declared war in 1938, that declaration would have automatically included every British colony and dominion except South Africa and Canada, just as the 1939 declaration did. Fail.

Roosevelt in America congratulated Chamberlain on his Munich so-called agreement.

You are assuming that FDR did this because he thought it was a good thing, rather than for domestic political consumption, or simply as a matter of form.

Pro-German Ireland remained neutral.

Ireland was not "pro-German"; the Irish were simply "anti-British," for perfectly understandable reasons. This is a moot point, however, as Ireland was no longer a part of the British Empire in 1938, and of course remained neutral throughout the war (though, despite much bad blood, they were tacitly supporting Britain).

South Africa only declared war a year later with the narrowest of parliamentary majorities.

No. Eighty to 67 is not "the narrowest of parliamentary majorities." (source)

Further, you conveniently omitted to mention that the Parliament of Canada, the only other part of the Commonwealth that wasn't automatically at war, voted overwhelmingly to support Britain (and France) by declaring war on Germany; I couldn't find an authoritative source, but I believe the motion passed the Commons by unanimous consent, and the Senate with only two dissenting votes. So there's no reason to believe that Canada wouldn't have declared war in 1938.

Most Afrikaan people were pro-Nazi.

Even if this were true, which is debatable, the Afrikaners only made up 60% of the white population of South Africa. The other 40% were Anglo South Africans, who were overwhelmingly pro-Britain. Further, I strongly suspect that German support in South Africa declined significantly after Hitler invaded the Netherlands.

Most people in the world had never heard of Sudetanland, and they certainly didn't want to go war over it.

Yet most people in the world had heard of Danzig (Gdansk), and they did want to go to war over it?

I don't know about the doubtful morale of our opponents. Hitler had a lot of public support in Germany.

When the war was going well for Germany he had a lot of public support. But the war was overwhelming likely to have gone badly in 1938. And Italian morale was unquestionably "doubtful."

As for the quotation, what Border Reiver and Captain_Swoop said.

Finally, why did you ignore all of my other points, and only respond to the one you felt you could attack? Is it because you have no answers? And speaking of answers, we're still waiting for you to answer all the questions that have been put to you.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Everyone except Hitler and his most fanatical supporters was opposed to war; that doesn't mean they wouldn't have gone along with Britain. Further, Australia and New Zealand had no say in the matter, as those countries had not yet ratified the Statute of Westminster. Had Britain declared war in 1938, that declaration would have automatically included every British colony and dominion except South Africa and Canada, just as the 1939 declaration did. Fail.

That's not quite correct. Australia, New Zealand and Canada were not colonies in 1938, though thank goodness they were on our side. They were willing to declare war against Germany in 1939, but not in 1938:

https://quizlet.com/139651631/why-did-britain-adopt-the-policy-of-appeasement-flash-cards/

This meant that it was vital to protect this Empire. In the mid 1930s, Chiefs of Staff had warned Britain's leaders that could not afford to fight a war on three fronts- Germany in Europe, Italy in the Middle East and Japan in the Far East. Mussolini tried to stir up trouble in the Empire in 1937 by encouraging the Arab Revolt which threatened the Suez canal, a vital trade route.

Led to appeasement as Britain chose to concentrate their limited armed forces on the defence of the Empire as the threat here was seen as much greater than Hitler's actions in Europe. They therefore had no choice but to appease Germany as they didn't have enough military resources to do both.

At the Imperial Conference in London in 1937, member states of the British Empire, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, made it clear that they would not take part in another war in Europe due the horrors of the first one.

Led to appeasement, as addressing Germany's grievances was seen as a safer option than going to war without military back-up.

 

[Border Reiver]

Henri - you're having temporal issues again.

Protip - 1937 is not 1938. When the conference was happening (May 12-June 28, 1937)the issues at hand was the then recent militarization of the Rhineland and Italy's attacks on Ethiopia- the Anschluss (March 12, 1938) and the Munich Crisis hadn't happened yet.

 

[ddt]

South Africa only declared war a year later with the narrowest of parliamentary majorities.

80-67 is not the narrowest majority, nor do 5 days make a year:

Although there was unanimity between Premiere J. B. M. Hertzog and General Jan Smuts about the right of South Africa to remain neutral in war, their views were not identical as to what would happen if Britain were to be attacked. In a fateful Cabinet meeting of 2 September 1939, Hertzog declared that he was going to remain neutral, and under no circumstances would he allow South Africa to enter the war. Two days later, in the Assembly he repeated that South Africa would not be plunged into a war unless the circumstances of the country itself demanded such action. But by 80 votes to 67 the Prime Minister's neutrality motion was defeated and, consequently, South Africa would, on 6 September, join Britain, France and the other Commonwealth nations in declaring itself to be in a state of war with Germany. Hertzog resigned and Smuts became Premiere.

Most Afrikaan people were pro-Nazi.

No, most were just anti-British due to the Boer Wars and wanted to stay neutral.

 

[Garrison]

That's not quite correct. Australia, New Zealand and Canada were not colonies in 1938

It's pointed out you are factually wrong so you double down and pretend you weren't while avoiding addressing the long list of outstanding questions asked of you. Your claim was that Australia and New Zealand would not have gone to war in 1938, which is plain wrong. Are you incapable of finding any relevant source that discusses the real balance of forces in 1938 or do you just not like what those sources have to say since they utterly contradict your beliefs?

 

[ddt]

Further, you conveniently omitted to mention that the Parliament of Canada, the only other part of the Commonwealth that wasn't automatically at war, voted overwhelmingly to support Britain (and France) by declaring war on Germany; I couldn't find an authoritative source, but I believe the motion passed the Commons by unanimous consent, and the Senate with only two dissenting votes. So there's no reason to believe that Canada wouldn't have declared war in 1938.

According to this Globe and Mail article from 11 Sept 1939, there was no recorded vote. It mentions no dissenters in the Senate, and three in the Commons: two French-Canadians, Liguori Lacombe and Wilfrid Lacroix, who proposed a "non-participation amendment", whatever that may mean (political support but no military support?).

The third dissenter was James Woodsworth, a methodist minister, avowed pacifist and the leader of the CCF, the precursor of the NDP:

In a riveting parliamentary moment, the CCF allowed its leader – ill, failing, demoralized – to present his lonely call for Canadian neutrality. But it was his heir-apparent and by then de facto CCF leader M. J. Coldwell who offered the party's official and, with but one exception, unanimous support for the prime minister's motion of war.

Repeating that war settles nothing, Mr. Woodsworth declared: "I rejoice that it is possible to say these things in a Canadian Parliament under British institutions. It would not be possible in Germany, I recognize that ... and I want to maintain the very essence of our British institutions of real liberty. I believe that the only way to do it is by an appeal to the moral forces which are still resident among our people, and not by another resort to brute force."

[...]

In the end, addressing his own historic motion for war, the prime minister said:

"There are few men in this Parliament for whom I have greater respect than the leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. I admire him in my heart, because time and again he has had the courage to say what lays on his conscience, regardless of what the world might think of him. A man of that calibre is an ornament to any Parliament."

 

[Garrison]

Repeating that war settles nothing, Mr. Woodsworth declared: "I rejoice that it is possible to say these things in a Canadian Parliament under British institutions. It would not be possible in Germany, I recognize that ... and I want to maintain the very essence of our British institutions of real liberty. I believe that the only way to do it is by an appeal to the moral forces which are still resident among our people, and not by another resort to brute force."

A noble, if misguided, sentiment and one which would indeed have gotten you a one way trip to a concentration camp in Germany in 1938. I wonder if Kristallnacht had taken place before Munich rather than after would the outcome of the conference have been different?

 

[Henri McPhee]

80-67 is not the narrowest majority, nor do 5 days make a year:

No, most were just anti-British due to the Boer Wars and wanted to stay neutral.

There is a bit about South African politics at the time in a book called Africa on a Tightrope by Henry Gibbs 1954:

The most formidable opposition came from the Ossewa-Brandwag ("Oxwaggon-Sentinels"), the OB, an organization which sought to evolve a nationalist mystery similar to that of the Nazis and with whom the Nationalists had a working partnership. Other bodies in existence were the Greyshirts, the Volksparty, the Boere Nation, and more overlapping In emotional appeal and directed largely towards younger people. All indicated friendliness to Hitler's Germany.

From the outbreak of war members of each group showed hostility towards those in uniform. Dance-halls, cinemas, and clubs, displayed notices: "Soldiers in uniform not admitted." men and women in uniform were attacked and missiles thrown at their quarters and transports. In Johannesburg, Pretoria, and elsewhere, rowdy elements made a point of picking quarrels with servicemen. These incidents were caused almost without exception by bearded members of the OB; political shirts had been banned and OB members grew beards to demonstrate their feelings. When uniformed men replied in like measure they were accused of violence and misconduct little short of bestiality. Nationalist members delivered many weighty speeches upon the conduct of servicemen.

 

[Garrison]

There is a bit about South African politics at the time in a book called Africa on a Tightrope by Henry Gibbs 1954:

Which in no way supports your previous assertion that:

only declared war a year later with the narrowest of parliamentary majorities

Why can't you simply admit your claim was false? You have offered nothing to support your claim that the likes of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa would not go to war in 1938, instead you have yet again ignored evidence to the contrary and offered more irrelevant twaddle rather than simply conceding you were wrong.

 

[Border Reiver]

A noble, if misguided, sentiment and one which would indeed have gotten you a one way trip to a concentration camp in Germany in 1938. I wonder if Kristallnacht had taken place before Munich rather than after would the outcome of the conference have been different?

Kristallnacht would have needed to take place before June 1937 for it to have had an effect on the Imperial Conference.

 

[Garrison]

Kristallnacht would have needed to take place before June 1937 for it to have had an effect on the Imperial Conference.

Should probably have put that as a separate post but I really was thinking of whether it would have affected Munich.

 

[SpitfireIX]

That's not quite correct. Australia, New Zealand and Canada were not colonies in 1938, though thank goodness they were on our side.

I never said they were colonies. Go back and reread what I wrote.

They were willing to declare war against Germany in 1939, but not in 1938:

Wishful thinking. From the Canadian Encyclopedia:

Canadians wanted nothing to do with another war in Europe, and neither did France and Britain, both desperately seeking to placate Hitler through negotiations and appeasement. In Ottawa, the Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King hoped to steer Canada along a path of neutrality. However, the wily prime minister also knew that English Canadians would never agree to let Britain fight Germany alone without support from Canada and the other dominions.

King, too, had pledged support to Britain as far back as 1923. "If a great and clear call of duty comes, Canada will respond . . . as she did in 1914,” King had said – although he feared such public pronouncements upon his return to power in 1935 would alienate Québec. . . .

King despaired at the prospect of another overseas bloodbath dragging Canada into conflict. Nonetheless, he wrote in September 1938 that “it was a self-evident national duty, if Britain entered war, that Canada should regard herself as part of the British empire.”​

https://quizlet.com/139651631/why-did-britain-adopt-the-policy-of-appeasement-flash-cards/

This meant that it was vital to protect this Empire. In the mid 1930s, Chiefs of Staff had warned Britain's leaders that could not afford to fight a war on three fronts- Germany in Europe, Italy in the Middle East and Japan in the Far East. Mussolini tried to stir up trouble in the Empire in 1937 by encouraging the Arab Revolt which threatened the Suez canal, a vital trade route.

Led to appeasement as Britain chose to concentrate their limited armed forces on the defence of the Empire as the threat here was seen as much greater than Hitler's actions in Europe. They therefore had no choice but to appease Germany as they didn't have enough military resources to do both.

At the Imperial Conference in London in 1937, member states of the British Empire, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, made it clear that they would not take part in another war in Europe due the horrors of the first one.

Led to appeasement, as addressing Germany's grievances was seen as a safer option than going to war without military back-up.

First, this is yet another anonymous online pronouncement you've dredge up, with no sources given. Second, granting that the non-highlited portions are at least somewhat accurate, they still applied in September 1939.

The hilited passage, however, is blatantly false. In addition to King's views about Canada that I mentioned above, Malcolm McKinnon (a real historian), writes, in Interdependence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935:

At the 1937 Imperial Conference, when McKenzie [sic] King of Canada supported appeasement and resisted involvement in war, [New Zealand Prime Minister Michael Joseph] Savage opposed appeasement and offered unqualified support to Britain in the event of war. . . . During the Munich crisis, the prospect of war involving Great Britain, and through it, New Zealand, did temper the government's zeal for speaking out on issues of war and peace. . . . But this did not mean that the government would not be on Britain's side in the event of war--quite the contrary: it was the appeasement of Hitler that caused them anxiety. And the government did not want loyalty to be an issue: 'I think it inadvisable for me to make any statement', Savage was reported saying on 5 September. 'Should Britain become involved in a war the policy of the New Zealand Government is wellknown [sic] to the authorities at Home.' [emphasis original; emphasis added; notes omitted]​

 

[ddt]

There is a bit about South African politics at the time in a book called Africa on a Tightrope by Henry Gibbs 1954:

https://af.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ossewabrandwag:

Teen 1941 het die organisasie reeds ongeveer 350 000 lede gehad.

and in 1942, the Ossewabrandwag was outlawed.

At the time, the Afrikaander population was about 1.2 million, so 350,000 is still no evidence of a majority.

 

[ddt]

A noble, if misguided, sentiment and one which would indeed have gotten you a one way trip to a concentration camp in Germany in 1938.

Indeed. And I think it's admirable how respectful both the CCF and PM King engaged with it.

I wonder if Kristallnacht had taken place before Munich rather than after would the outcome of the conference have been different?

I vote for no.

First, in international law and relations, it's considered worse when you invade even a square meter of foreign soil than that you slaughter millions of your own citizens. The latter is "internal affairs".

Second, the Runciman Report on which Chamberlain relied w.r.t. Sudetenland, wasn't exactly flattering on how the Czechs treated the Sudeten Germans either.

 

[Henri McPhee]

There is a bit about appeasement and Chamberlain, relevant to this thread, in a book by the Prime Minister of Australia at the time, Sir Robert Menzies called Afternoon Light 1967:

Chamberlain's 'appeasement' at Munich was an appeasement from military weakness. He believed that Britain was not capable of a major war, and, in short, that the best must be made of a bad job. I have never been able to convince myself, though I know that better men have disagreed, that if Chamberlain had thrown down the gage at Munich, we would have won the ensuing war.

The real test is - what happened to British armament between Munich and September 1939? Winston Churchill made no secret of his belief that Hitler gained more strength from that fateful year than we did; that his taking over of Czechoslovakia gave him enormous resources of a military kind.. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that British equipment in fighter aircraft-
the development and production of the Hurricane and the Spitfire - grew rapidly under the energetic and imaginative administration of Lord Swinton.

I have not the slightest qualification to decide the issue. If Chamberlain believed not that he had secured a lasting accommodation with Hitler but that he had time to prepare, and if he acted vigorously in the gained period, then the later judgement that he was gulled and quiescent must be revised. Meanwhile, it must be recognized that when war came, and France fell, the House of Commons had no doubts, and rejected Chamberlain, and turned to Churchill.

 

[Klimax]

Indeed. And I think it's admirable how respectful both the CCF and PM King engaged with it.


I vote for no.

First, in international law and relations, it's considered worse when you invade even a square meter of foreign soil than that you slaughter millions of your own citizens. The latter is "internal affairs".

Second, the Runciman Report on which Chamberlain relied w.r.t. Sudetenland, wasn't exactly flattering on how the Czechs treated the Sudeten Germans either.

I guess Henlein knew how to stage things...