Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[dudalb]

It's an exciting film but don't watch it with a tank enthusiast.

Someone mentioned the Spainish locations that look nothing like the Ardennes.....

"Patton" also was shot in Spain, but they found locations..probably in the Pyranees in Northren Spain...that do resemble the Ardennes for the Bulge segments of the film. I guess the producer of "Battle of The Bulge" could not be botherd to do much location hunting....

 

[jimbob]

Someone mentioned the Spainish locations that look nothing like the Ardennes.....

"Patton" also was shot in Spain, but they found locations..probably in the Pyranees in Northren Spain...that do resemble the Ardennes for the Bulge segments of the film. I guess the producer of "Battle of The Bulge" could not be botherd to do much location hunting....

Well Captain_Swoop mentioned the dusty plains of the Ardennes... and he isn't usually the idiot in this thread...

 

[Henri McPhee]

What I've read suggest that the Blitzkrieg doctrine was really only formally developed after the success of the attack on France. The Ardennes plan was more the product of the limitations of German logistics and the fact that the original plan was compromised.

The Germans and Guderian were developing blitzkrieg tactics way before that:

https://m.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/heinz-guderian-the-father-of-the-blitzkrieg.html

In the following years, he rose up the ranks, earning a General star in 1936. Due to his knowledge on the subject, he was given command over the XVI Army Corps of the Wehrmacht. At the same time, Guderian wrote his first book, titled Achtung – Panzer (Attention – Tank) which proved pivotal in the future development of panzer tactics, especially in the early stages of WWII.

In the book, the author discusses the importance of armored warfare and the extinction of the static trench war that defined WWI. He notes that the Allied superiority in both tanks and aircraft were instrumental in their victory and calls for a radical adoption of this technology. Guderian explored the possibilities of a combined warfare which utilized the use of tanks supported by motorized infantry and airplanes.

 

[Andy_Ross]

The Germans and Guderian were developing blitzkrieg tactics way before that:

https://m.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/heinz-guderian-the-father-of-the-blitzkrieg.html

Very much inspired by the writings of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart commonly known as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart with whome he corresponded in the pre war years (along with Rommel)

and also by Major-General John Frederick Charles Fullers book 'The Foundations of the Science of War' and his 'Nine Principles of War which have influenced much military theory since the 1930s.

 

[jimbob]

Very much inspired by the writings of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart commonly known as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart with whome he corresponded in the pre war years (along with Rommel)

and also by Major-General John Frederick Charles Fullers book 'The Foundations of the Science of War' and his 'Nine Principles of War which have influenced much military theory since the 1930s.

Yes, Dad has his father's 1941 penguin edition of The British Way on Warfare

It's an interesting read.

 

[Garrison]

The Germans and Guderian were developing blitzkrieg tactics way before that:

https://m.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/heinz-guderian-the-father-of-the-blitzkrieg.html

I should have said 'adopted' not developed. Yes Guderian was developing his tactical ideas well before 1940, BUT they were not greeted with any great enthusiasm by the German high command. Up until February 1940 they were going with what amounted to an updated Schlieffen Plan. They changed their minds because that plan was compromised by documents falling into French/British hands and the prospect that Guederian's plan would lead to the quick victory Germany desperately needed.

It was however a massive gamble, if the French had maintained more of a reserve, or their leadership had been even a little more dynamic, it would most likely have ended in disaster. The battle of Arras gave a hint of what could have happened and contributed to the German generals, not Hitler, calling the panzers to a halt to regroup.

After the fall of France Germany formalized 'Blitzkrieg' as their combat doctrine, but they grossly overestimated its utility and when they tried it again in Operation Barbarossa its key flaw was exposed, if the enemy didn't rapidly collapse the Wehrmacht forces soon exhausted their supplies and their logistics train could not resupply them effectively. As with so much else after the war the German Generals did their best to buff their reputations (see earlier claims in this thread about Dunkirk and Operation Sealion) and pretended Blitzkrieg was the product of some coherent program of strategic innovation rather than a flawed necessity based on ideas Guederian refined but did not invent.

Now in the context of this thread several additional problems confront the notion of a autumn 1938/Spring 1939 Blitzkrieg. Firstly obviously Guederian has had much less time to develop his ideas. Secondly Germany lacks the means to put them into practice. Their armour in 1938 is dominated by Panzer Is and IIs which were little more than training vehicles and they have far fewer armour and infantry divisions to put into the field. Blitzkrieg against France is not in an option for the Germans in a 1938 war, even if Guederian could overcome the inertia of the high command and persuade them to adopt his ideas.

 

[Henri McPhee]

The first production Spitfire was on May 14th 1938. Germany could have attacked France through the Ardennes in 1938. The French had done an intelligence assessment of that possibility and concluded it was not possible, but somehow the Germans obtained that information and became very interested in it. The Luftwaffe was strong in 1938 while the RAF was woefully inadequate:

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_...e_czechoslovakia_to_adolf_hitler_seventy.html

First, a look at the military situation. Most historians agree that the British army was not ready for war with Germany in September 1938. If war had broken out over the Czechoslovak crisis, Britain would only have been able to send two divisions to the continent—and ill-equipped divisions, at that. Between 1919 and March 1932, Britain had based its military planning on a “10-year rule,” which assumed Britain would face no major war in the next decade. Rearmament only began in 1934—and only on a limited basis. The British army, as it existed in September 1938, was simply not intended for continental warfare. Nor was the rearmament of the Navy or the Royal Air Force complete. British naval rearmament had recommenced in 1936 as part of a five-year program. And although Hitler’s Luftwaffe had repeatedly doubled in size in the late 1930s, it wasn't until April 1938 that the British government decided that its air force could purchase as many aircraft as could be produced.

 

[Hans]

The first production Spitfire was on May 14th 1938. Germany could have attacked France through the Ardennes in 1938. The French had done an intelligence assessment of that possibility and concluded it was not possible, but somehow the Germans obtained that information and became very interested in it. The Luftwaffe was strong in 1938 while the RAF was woefully inadequate:

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_...e_czechoslovakia_to_adolf_hitler_seventy.html

Still wrong Henri.

A fringe reset huh. The German's didn't have a plan at that time I believe the later Manstein Plan that was later created was an attack with the right flank not the center the center attack came about in 1940.

The Luftwaffe was not strong enough to take on the French, Belgian, Dutch and British Airforce's at that time and - your claim - bomb England into submission in one week was impossible as was an invasion of England.

 

[Henri McPhee]

There is a bit about the Germans and the Ardennes which makes sense to me at:

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/23romr/how_were_the_germans_able_to_so_easily_pass/

The French did not consider it to be a literally impassable area. The French and Belgians had done inter-war year testing and knew full well that tanks could pass through the forest.
The idea that the French thought of the forest as impassable is attributed to the inter-war French General Maxime Waygand, who described it as not requiring defensive fortifications ( to the intensity that the Maginot Line was built), and that if properly defended, the combination of terrain and forest would make the area impassable.
The French were under the impression that it would take the Germans ten days for an armored element to navigate the forest. Especially because they would have to cross a major river where all the bridges were destroyed. They felt the combination of the time and effort involved in moving armor made it an unlikely route of armored attack. As well, they had scouts in villages in the area, which gave them a sense they could see the attack coming.
The French expected, if anything was to be moved through the forest, it would be German light infantry and artillery to move through the forest.
When the Germans attacked, the French scouts were unable to properly communicate what they were seeing to higher headquarters, and the French were unexpectedly attacked by armor (instead of infantry) almost a week earlier than they expected to be physically able. The French high command, without the full reports from scouts were convinced that the reports of German movements in the Ardennes they were receiving were of minor German forces conducting diversions. They sent their limited forces to what they considered more likely routes of attack.
The Germans crossed the rivers especially quickly by deploying pontoons strung along cables to transport their tanks over river crossings. They navigated quickly, with tanks that were able to handle rough terrain better than expected, and in four days had come out of the forest. The communication equipment in their tanks kept the movement organized, and also faster.

 

[Andy_Ross]

There is a bit about the Germans and the Ardennes which makes sense to me at:

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/23romr/how_were_the_germans_able_to_so_easily_pass/

Very much simplified and misses out key elements such as the Germans using their air force as tactical artillery to support the ground advance. This is one of the key elements that allowed a fast advance through such difficult closed terrain.

French tactical thinking was heavily influenced by the speed at which artillery could advance and emplace to support an attack.
French artillery at the time was horse drawn (as was much of the German artillery) It took up a lot of road and was slow. In the heavily forested Ardennes with narrow meandering roads it would have been unable to keep up with the front line.
British artillery was completely mechanised by the start of the war but even then the 6" guns were nicknamed the 'Divisional Road Block' because of their low speed of deployment and advance.

By using dive bombers as tactical close support artillery the ground units were free to advance without fear of 'outrunning' their guns. It also cut down the logistics required for the advance, even then there was a huge traffic jam and supplies for the leading units were slow in arriving. Some units had to rely on foraging for fuel supplies from roadside garages and captured vehicles to avoid having to halt and wait for the supply to catch up.

 

[Garrison]

There is a bit about the Germans and the Ardennes which makes sense to me at:

Why given you track record in this thread would you think the article making sense to you would be a recommendation? And again you are discussing the Wehrmacht of 1940, the German army of 1938 had neither the means nor the strategy to carry out a 'Blitzkrieg'. We are still waiting for you to support your claims.

 

[jimbob]

The first production Spitfire was on May 14th 1938. Germany could have attacked France through the Ardennes in 1938. The French had done an intelligence assessment of that possibility and concluded it was not possible, but somehow the Germans obtained that information and became very interested in it. The Luftwaffe was strong in 1938 while the RAF was woefully inadequate:

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_...e_czechoslovakia_to_adolf_hitler_seventy.html

During the Battle of Britain, Hurricanes downed more aircraft than Spitfires. The RAF was indeed stronger in 1939 than 1938... However, and this is the bit you seem to be missing, so was the Luftwaffe.

 

[SpitfireIX]

The first production Spitfire was on May 14th 1938.

And the first production Bf 109E wasn't completed until early 1939. At the time of Munich, and for many months after, the Luftwaffe fighter squadrons were mainly equipped with the Bf 109D, which was comparable in performance to the Hurricane, but had only half the firepower. Additionally, the D model lacked a fuel-injection engine, giving the aircraft the same aerobatic performance disadvantage as the early Spitfires and Hurricanes. Fail.

Germany could have attacked France through the Ardennes in 1938. The French had done an intelligence assessment of that possibility and concluded it was not possible, but somehow the Germans obtained that information and became very interested in it.

Yes, they could have attacked, and that attack would have been virtually certain to have been a miserable failure, for a variety of reasons.

First and foremost, what makes you imagine that the Germans would have attacked France without first dealing with Czechoslovakia? If this would have been such a great idea in October 1938, then why didn't the Germans try it in September 1939, when their army was much stronger, and they had a nonaggression pact with the Soviets?

Second, as has been explained to you, ad nauseam as usual, the panzer formations that were so crucial to the German breakthroughs in the west in 1940 were much weaker, and far less numerous, in 1938. Specifically, in May 1940, the Germans had nearly 1000 tanks that mounted 37mm or larger guns. In October 1938 they had fewer than 150, and the majority of these were developmental models with extremely thin front armor, which made them vulnerable to even the the weak French 25mm antitank gun, as, of course, were the earlier panzers. In 1940 the Germans were able to use their heavier tanks to outmaneuver the French tanks and destroy them from the rear; this simply wasn't possible for the lightly armed Panzer Is and IIs.

The Luftwaffe was strong in 1938 while the RAF was woefully inadequate:

We've been over this many times; the Luftwaffe wasn't nearly as strong as you imagine, nor was the RAF nearly as weak as you imagine.

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_...e_czechoslovakia_to_adolf_hitler_seventy.html

Yet another article written by a journalist with the clear agenda of rehabilitating appeasement by rehabilitating Chamberlain. Fail.

 

[Hans]

deleted good stuff

Since Henri is actually participating in the discussion...... I have a question on how effective and how much impact did the British anti-aircraft system have on the Battle of Britain and what sort of shape was it in 1938?

 

[Andy_Ross]

Since Henri is actually participating in the discussion...... I have a question on how effective and how much impact did the British anti-aircraft system have on the Battle of Britain and what sort of shape was it in 1938?

AA had very little effect. Very few German aircraft were shot down by A until later in the war when Radar direction and proximity fuses were available.

The guns in London were a big morale booster though.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Since Henri is actually participating in the discussion...... I have a question on how effective and how much impact did the British anti-aircraft system have on the Battle of Britain and what sort of shape was it in 1938?

The anti-aircraft system in 1938 seems to me to have been woefully inadequate. In 1938 it was just assumed that any air attack would come from Germany in the east. As Garrison has said, it was assumed that the Luftwaffe would never reach Northern France because it was assumed there was no possibility of that happening.

There is a bit about the matter in the Battle of Britain book 1989 by Alfred Price:

The part played by the heavy anti-aircraft gun batteries during the Battle of Britain has usually been neglected. The task of the heavy gun defences was four-fold: first, to shoot down or damage enemy aircraft; secondly to split up the enemy formations so that the fighters could engage the bombers more easily; thirdly, to indicate the position of enemy aircraft to the fighters; and fourthly, to prevent or hinder accurate bombing. And while they were rarely successful in achieving the first three of these, the gunners were consistently able to achieve the fourth.

I don't know much about the Royal Observer Corps. There is some waffle about it, and its job in 1938, at this website:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Observer_Corps#Interwar_Period

 

[jimbob]

The anti-aircraft system in 1938 seems to me to have been woefully inadequate. In 1938 it was just assumed that any air attack would come from Germany in the east. As Garrison has said, it was assumed that the Luftwaffe would never reach Northern France because it was assumed there was no possibility of that happening.

There is a bit about the matter in the Battle of Britain book 1989 by Alfred Price:



I don't know much about the Royal Observer Corps. There is some waffle about it, and its job in 1938, at this website:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Observer_Corps#Interwar_Period

Henri, you don't need to preface every statement about your lack of knowledge on the subject - by now I'm taking that as read.

The thing is that the air defences in 1938 were not woefully inadequate for threat they faced in 1938.

The Luftwaffe was not going to fly from airbases that it were in the control of its enemies.

 

[Garrison]

As Garrison has said, it was assumed that the Luftwaffe would never reach Northern France because it was assumed there was no possibility of that happening.

Henri please provide the number of the post where I said that or retract this. I'll be generous and assume this was your poor comprehension skills at work again rather than you outright lying.

All I have ever said was that any attack on Britain in 1938 would have to be carried out without proper fighter cover and that the Luftwaffe concluded in 1938 that they could no carry out such a campaign. I have never suggested they couldn't reach Northern France nor that there was no possibility of this happening.

Retract in your next post or I will assume you did deliberately lie and report you to the mods.

 

[Border Reiver]

The anti-aircraft system in 1938 seems to me to have been woefully inadequate. In 1938 it was just assumed that any air attack would come from Germany in the east.

The questions that would have lead to the state of the AA system in the UK:

1. What was the air threat to the United Kingdom?
2. Where was this air threat likely to come from?
3. What resources do you need to defend against the likely threat?
4. Can said resources be diverted if circumstances require?
5. How easily can said resources be diverted?
6. Who will co-ordinate (strategically and operationally)?
7. Are the resources currently allocated enough to meet the anticipated threat?
8. If not, can we get additional resources (ie. are there higher defence priorities)?
9. When can we get additional resources?

Answer the first 4 questions and you should be able to determine that the AA system in 1938 was adequate for the German threat at the time, but was in need of improvements in light of projected developments in the Luftwaffe (increased numbers of Me109e, and development of longer ranged aircraft).

 

[Henri McPhee]

Indeed, there's a big difference between thinking another 6 months or year would be useful and being sanguine about throwing the Czechs under the bus...

The trouble with you people is that you practically all think Britain should have gone to war in 1938. That's want of judgment, and it's not just me who thinks so either.