Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[SpitfireIX]

I don't know what you are on about.

What Hans said.

You seem to think that Hitler could not possibly have defeated France and Belgium and Denmark, and the Czechs and Poland . . .

He couldn't have defeated all those with only three or four weak panzer divisions and fifty-odd infantry divisions (including reserves), almost none of which were motorized. What makes you think he could have? Nazi propaganda??

. . . and that he only had good intentions towards the British and Channel Islands . . .

Straw man. No one said Hitler "only had good intentions" toward Britain. What was said is that he hoped to avoid fighting the British. And of what possible military or economic significance were the Channel Islands?

. . . who could not possibly be bombed or invaded because of the bad state of the German economy, and the RAF Gloster Gladiators and Bristol Blenheims.

Straw man. We said that Britain couldn't possibly be invaded or effectively bombed without ports and airfields along the English Channel, and even with such ports and airfields successful invasion and effective bombing were highly unlikely. And for about the 10th time, the Gladiator was adequate to deal with any unescorted German bombing raids in 1938 or 1939.

Neither were America and Russia in peril.

And what does this have to do with appeasement?

Britain was caught with its pants down in 1938. Chamberlain provided another year to get organised.

Apart from the fact that, as has been pointed out to you so many times, and you have continued to ignore, Germany benefited far more from the extra year than the Allies did, if Chamberlain was really trying to gain time for rearmament, why did he continue to neglect the Army until after Hitler violated the Munich Agreement?

https://www.findmypast.co.uk/1939register/why-britain-issued-gas-masks-ww2

What Garrison said.

 

[jimbob]

I've just realised what this conversation has reminded me of.

 

[SpitfireIX]

I'm not sure if rapidly increasing the war spending was a blessing, and that's putting it mildly, since it had been stalling the German economy for a couple of years at that point. Essentially you had more and more percentage put into army... out of an economy that wasn't growing nearly as fast as that of any of its neighbours. I think Germany would have actually been in a better position even militarily in, say, '41, if it had imported more stuff for the industry instead of diverting all resources into weapons and into feeding a huge army.

This is a good point, but that level of military expenditures probably made the conquests of 1939 and 1940 possible.

 

[Garrison]

This is a good point, but that level of military expenditures probably made the conquests of 1939 and 1940 possible.

It's basically why Hitler was able to persuade his Generals to go along with with war in 1939. The view was that Germany had reached the perihelion of its military strength relative to the western allies and there was no point in delaying any longer. When the Wehrmacht stuck west in 1940 it did so with a ridiculously thin logistical base, it would have been in serious trouble if the French hadn't collapsed so quickly.

 

[SpitfireIX]

When the Wehrmacht stuck west in 1940 it did so with a ridiculously thin logistical base, it would have been in serious trouble if the French hadn't collapsed so quickly.

I recall reading that the Germans had to gamble that the French petrol station owners hadn't removed or destroyed their stocks, otherwise the panzers would have run out of fuel.

 

[Andy_Ross]

I recall reading that the Germans had to gamble that the French petrol station owners hadn't removed or destroyed their stocks, otherwise the panzers would have run out of fuel.

Because they were outstripping their supply. Most of it.y was tangled up in a huge traffic jam in the Ardennes.
Remember they weren't expecting to advance as quickly as they did. In fact more than once the panzers were ordered to halt while the army caught up. Commanders further up the line were aware of how vulnerable their flanks were.
To continue advancing the local commanders got permission for 'reconnaissance in force' and just kept going.
They even out ran their tactical maps and were using Michelin road maps at one point.

 

[Henri McPhee]

There is a reference to British air defence capability, and deficiencies in the air force in1937, and when Chamberlain was Prime Minister in a book called Battle of Britain The Hardest Day published in 1989 by Alfred Price:

The other two single-engine fighter types in Dowding's order of battle, the Boulton-Paul Defiant turret fighter and the Gloster Gladiator biplane were considered unsuitable for combat against modern enemy single-seaters; the three squadrons equipped with them would see no action on 18 August.

The last of the types in the Fighter Command order of battle, the twin-engine two-seat Bristol Blenheim, had a maximum speed of only 285 mph and took about 13 minutes to reach 20,000 feet. When the Blenheim had first gone into service as a bomber three years earlier, in 1937, such a performance had been considered impressive enough for some of these machines to be modified and issued to fighter squadrons. In this role the Blenheim carried five Browning machine guns firing forwards and a single Vickers gun in the rear turret for self defence. By the summer of 1940 the Blenheim was clearly no match for any of the German fighters and in Fighter Command it was relegated to the night fighter squadrons where its long endurance was of value - it could fly patrols lasting more than four hours. In the summer of 1940 some of the Blenheims were fitted with the first primitive airborne interception radar sets. A few Blenheims were also operated by Coastal Command as long-range fighters, and from time to time during the Battle of Britain, these would become embroiled in combat with German aircraft.

 

[fagin]

And your point is?

 

[SpitfireIX]

There is a reference to British air defence capability, and deficiencies in the air force in1937, and when Chamberlain was Prime Minister in a book called Battle of Britain The Hardest Day published in 1989 by Alfred Price:

Evasion noted. When are you planning to answer any of the questions you've been asked?

As for the quotation, it's actually about the situation in 1940. The only reference to 1937 in the passage is to the year the Blenheim was introduced. Fail.

 

[Henri McPhee]

More from that book by Alfred Price:

In considering the effectiveness of the British radar system, it should be realised that the device was still in its technical infancy. The plots obtained on the incoming raids, while accurate in range, were considerably less accurate in bearing. Thus a series of radar plots on a formation flying straight for a target, marked on a map, took the form of a zig-zag and often it took several minutes to deduce the line of advance of the raiders. Height-finding was crude and on aircraft flying about 25000 feet unreliable. The least effective aspect of the early radars, however, was the measurement of the number of aircraft if a large formation was being plotted. By the look of the echo on the radar screen and the way it flickered, the man or woman operator was expected to make a 'guesstimate' of the number of aircraft present. The accuracy of this depended on the skill (or luck) of individuals, and such reports could be gross under-or over-estimates ranging anywhere between one half and double the true enemy strength.

 

[Henri McPhee]

And your point is?

The British air force was no match for the Luftwaffe in 1938 and the British Navy could not save the Channel Islands.

 

[Hans]

There is a reference to British air defence capability, and deficiencies in the air force in1937, and when Chamberlain was Prime Minister in a book called Battle of Britain The Hardest Day published in 1989 by Alfred Price:

 

[SpitfireIX]

More from that book by Alfred Price:

And yet the system was still reasonably effective during the Battle of Britain. What's your point?

 

[Hans]

The British air force was no match for the Luftwaffe in 1938 and the British Navy could not save the Channel Islands.

You keep saying that but you keep forgetting that everyone is laughing at you.

You do know that don't you? People have explained why you are wrong but you seem to be pretending to not understand so you don't have to face up to being wrong.

How many more times do you feel you need to say the same thing?

 

[SpitfireIX]

The British air force was no match for the Luftwaffe in 1938 . . .

And how does a quotation about the situation in 1940 prove this?

. . . and the British Navy could not save the Channel Islands.

Begging the question of whether the British government considered attempting to save the Channel Islands to be a worthwhile use of resources.

 

[Henri McPhee]

And yet the system was still reasonably effective during the Battle of Britain. What's your point?

Radar was in its technical infancy in 1938. The Gloster Gladiators would have been blind.

 

[Hans]

Begging the question of whether the British government considered attempting to save the Channel Islands to be a worthwhile use of resources.

It might be worthwhile to ask Henri if he actually knows where the Channel Island are and how far they were from the occupied French coast and the situation in 1940 versus how far it was from Germany to England in the 1938 situation.

I don't think he has any idea of the geography or the difference in the situation between those two years.

 

[Hans]

Radar was in its technical infancy in 1938. The Gloster Gladiators would have been blind.

How did the air defense in WWI work against German attacks coming from occupied Belgium?

 

[Tolls]

... and the British Navy could not save the Channel Islands.

Have you actually looked at a map to see where the Channel Islands are?

 

[erwinl]

Radar was in its technical infancy in 1938. The Gloster Gladiators would have been blind.

And Knickebein, the Luftwaffe's navigation tool, and used in the Luftwaffe's attacks on England was only developed in 1939. So the bombers would have been equally blind.