Andy_Ross
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Well, the piece you link states
Again forgetting the most powerful navy in the world at the time.
Split Thread WWII & Appeasement
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Well, the piece you link states
Again forgetting the most powerful navy in the world at the time.
SpitfireIX
Philosopher
So now you've gone from "The Germans could have bombed Britain into submission in a week in 1938" to "it would have been a damn close run thing in 1938."
You're still wrong, but at least you're getting closer to the correct answer.
It is a bizarre comment, how exactly was this fleet of tugs and barges supposed to defend itself? Once the RN destroyers are in amongst them the Luftwaffe isn't going to be much help and that assumes the RN attacks in daylight...
I hadn't noticed that earlier. It is progress, of a sort.
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Andy_Ross
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A link to the Sandhurst Wargame of 1974.
The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.
It grranted the Germans a successful surprise landing of 90,000 troops and over three-quarters of them were killed or captured.
The Royal Navy successfully closed the Channel and the troops ashore ran out of ammunition, and also inflicted heavy losses to the Luftwaffe and to the invasion shipping which had big effects on the war economy as the barges were needed to haul coal and iron ore.
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt
Remember, this was their fleet
The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.
It grranted the Germans a successful surprise landing of 90,000 troops and over three-quarters of them were killed or captured.
The Royal Navy successfully closed the Channel and the troops ashore ran out of ammunition, and also inflicted heavy losses to the Luftwaffe and to the invasion shipping which had big effects on the war economy as the barges were needed to haul coal and iron ore.
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt
Remember, this was their fleet
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ddt
Mafia Penguin
Which one? The contemporaneous article from the Manchester Guardian (the attribution is wrong there), or the memoirs of the German diplomat? The latter focus more on Hitler's love-hate relationship with the UK than anything else.
That's a far cry from "conquer in a week". Do you abandon that claim? Will you formally retract it?
A link to the Sandhurst Wargame of 1974.
The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.
It grranted the Germans a successful surprise landing of 90,000 troops and over three-quarters of them were killed or captured.
The Royal Navy successfully closed the Channel and the troops ashore ran out of ammunition, and also inflicted heavy losses to the Luftwaffe and to the invasion shipping which had big effects on the war economy as the barges were needed to haul coal and iron ore.
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt
Remember, this was their fleet
Meanwhile, this is what a small part of a successful invasion fleet looked like
#
Notice the differences, for example that one has specialised landing vehicles that are more seaworthy and can land tanks and artillery. There is naval supremacy and air supremacy. The only ships or aircraft most Allied or Axis troops saw on June 6th were Allied.
Border Reiver
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Some of those quotes read like the posters have just finished Harry Turtledoves series "The War That Came Early."
Henri McPhee
Illuminator
I appreciate that the official line on all this now is that the Luftwaffe could not possibly have bombed London in 1938, and German troops could not possibly have captured London, but I am not sure about that, and neither was Chamberlain. There is a sensible opinion about this matter on another forum:
http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=374555
http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=374555
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fagin
Philosopher
Your opinion, and that of some unknown person, are immaterial.
Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
Wrong. German bombers could have attacked London in 1938, and some of them might well have got far enough to drop bombs. However, the Luftwaffe simply didn't have the resources to inflict sufficiently severe damage to create the vaguest suggestion that Britain might consider surrendering, and the losses that would have been inflicted on any such raids would have made them stop very quickly.
That one, though, is definite. The idea of strings of barges crossing the North Sea to mount an invasion is simply absurd.
...from someone who doesn't seem to know the difference between a capital ship and a flotilla of destroyers. The RN probably wouldn't have been daft enough to commit battleships and battlecruisers to anti-invasion duties, and destroyers were a lot faster, more manoeuverable, and hence harder to hit.
Dave
Henri McPhee
Illuminator
I don't remember ever saying that. I have said several times that Chamberlain was fully aware of Hitler's intentions to invade Russia. That information was provided to him by our Secret Service, dating back to 1934. Churchill did try to properly warn Stalin by writing to him when he became Prime Minister, but Stalin never believed the British, who may have been informed by Admiral Canaris who was in charge of German military intelligence at the time.
The Germans fooled Stalin into thinking that Hitler would invade Britain in May 1941, and the Luftwaffe launched a huge bombing raid in May 1941 on London to so-call prove it to Stalin. The Russians were conned into a false sense of security, and Stalin was a silly fool to be conned. It's a bit like internet fraud now. He didn't even believe his own Russian intelligence information. The British did manage to delay Barbarossa by overthrowing the pro-Nazi government in Yugoslavia in 1941, which Hitler then repulsed with a huge bombing raid on Yugoslavia, but it took him valuable time.
So it was Britain that overthrew the pronazi Yugoslav government, for the purpose of delaying Barbarossa? I suppose Chamberlain organised that as well.
Where do you get this stuff from? Did the UK then also permit its army to suffer reverses and losses in mainland Greece and Crete for the purpose of delaying Barbarossa? That was very thoughtful of Churchill, to do that for such an ungrateful rogue as Stalin.
Border Reiver
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See post #74 of this thread.
See the reply in post #75 to see why no one takes you seriously.
Please indicate which post this claim was made in or retract your statement.
First part of that sentence is correct, the second is irrelevant as you have demonstrated your view is not based on any facts or evidence.
And Chamberlain based his assessment of German airpower on what we know to have been a wildly exaggerated estimate of the effectiveness of bombing and the strength of the Luftwaffe. Chamberlain could at least claim not to have been in possession of accurate information, what's your excuse?
No it's an opinion that happens to agree with yours from an anonymous source that could just be you posting under a different name for all anyone here knows. And yet again you ignore all the information posted after your quote that refutes it by pointing out the same factual errors that you have had explained to you in this thread.
More nonsense, by the end of May/beginning of June Stalin was well aware that the German army was massing for an attack in the east and he had excellent intelligence sources confirming this, Philby and Sorge primarily. Stalin failed to react because he seems to have convinced himself it was a provocation, either to get the Soviets to act first and justify war or to put pressure on the USSR to provide more food and materiel to Germany.
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HansMustermann
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I would return to that perception game though, as a partial defense of Chamberlain, as I have done before.
The Christie-X report was WILDLY inaccurate in Germany's favour. Its estimates for the Luftwaffe in '38 were actually higher than what Germany had in '40.
The stupid doctrine in the UK, even though to its credit it wasn't as set in stone as in the USA, not only was that you CAN bomb a country into submission in '38, but remained so untll the end of the war. Even after ample evidence to the contrary.
At the time, the only evidence to the contrary was in the Spanish Civil War, and the only actual report dealing explicitly with the fact that terror bombing actually only strengthens the will to resist of those bombed, was... from the Germans. The UK was also, stupidly enough, completely ignoring the Spanish Civil War air aspect steadfastly. As I may have mentioned before, the ONLY article about it in army journals was a translation from French.The French officers did study it a LOT (although their politicians ignored it anyway) and some US officers did, and surprisingly enough, some actually came to the conclusion that MAYBE strategic bombing isn't that worth it after all (and were told to STHU.) But the Bristish? Nah, they didn't give a rodent's rear about learning anything from that war.
So basically, as you say, Henry should know that it wasn't possible to bomb the UK into submission, but Chamberlain sure as heck didn't. In fact, for all the generals were telling him, as soon as you bomb someone's factories, the owners would be up in arms to depose you, for getting their property ruined. That was how strategic bombing would win the war, after all.
And basically Chamberlain was a politician anyway. Whether or not England would capitulate, for all he knew, the reaction to a bombing would most certainly end HIS career. See above the expected reaction to a strategic bombing.
It also didn't help that, as I keep repeating, the Runciman report was that yes, the Sudeten Germans had actual reasons to be unhappy about how the Czechs rule them. In fact, the best he can say about how the Czechs treat that minority is literally just that it's not outright terrorism. No, really, read the report.
That would make it really hard to justify as position at home where basically, hey, we're getting bombed so the Czechs can get to continue oppressing the Sudeten Germans.
Basically what we have there IMHO isn't a case of derp, Chamberlain was stoopid. It's more like just a case that, well, Chamberlain was a politician, and at that not a dictator. In a democracy your primary goal is to win the votes. Sadly enough. That imposes a certain degree of necessary short-sightedness. You have to do what the voters want NOW, even if in the long run the horribly unpopular option would have been more beneficial. Because if it's horribly unpopular, you'll just get replaced by someone who promises to do the populist thing.
The Christie-X report was WILDLY inaccurate in Germany's favour. Its estimates for the Luftwaffe in '38 were actually higher than what Germany had in '40.
The stupid doctrine in the UK, even though to its credit it wasn't as set in stone as in the USA, not only was that you CAN bomb a country into submission in '38, but remained so untll the end of the war. Even after ample evidence to the contrary.
At the time, the only evidence to the contrary was in the Spanish Civil War, and the only actual report dealing explicitly with the fact that terror bombing actually only strengthens the will to resist of those bombed, was... from the Germans. The UK was also, stupidly enough, completely ignoring the Spanish Civil War air aspect steadfastly. As I may have mentioned before, the ONLY article about it in army journals was a translation from French.The French officers did study it a LOT (although their politicians ignored it anyway) and some US officers did, and surprisingly enough, some actually came to the conclusion that MAYBE strategic bombing isn't that worth it after all (and were told to STHU.) But the Bristish? Nah, they didn't give a rodent's rear about learning anything from that war.
So basically, as you say, Henry should know that it wasn't possible to bomb the UK into submission, but Chamberlain sure as heck didn't. In fact, for all the generals were telling him, as soon as you bomb someone's factories, the owners would be up in arms to depose you, for getting their property ruined. That was how strategic bombing would win the war, after all.
And basically Chamberlain was a politician anyway. Whether or not England would capitulate, for all he knew, the reaction to a bombing would most certainly end HIS career. See above the expected reaction to a strategic bombing.
It also didn't help that, as I keep repeating, the Runciman report was that yes, the Sudeten Germans had actual reasons to be unhappy about how the Czechs rule them. In fact, the best he can say about how the Czechs treat that minority is literally just that it's not outright terrorism. No, really, read the report.
That would make it really hard to justify as position at home where basically, hey, we're getting bombed so the Czechs can get to continue oppressing the Sudeten Germans.
Basically what we have there IMHO isn't a case of derp, Chamberlain was stoopid. It's more like just a case that, well, Chamberlain was a politician, and at that not a dictator. In a democracy your primary goal is to win the votes. Sadly enough. That imposes a certain degree of necessary short-sightedness. You have to do what the voters want NOW, even if in the long run the horribly unpopular option would have been more beneficial. Because if it's horribly unpopular, you'll just get replaced by someone who promises to do the populist thing.
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Henri McPhee
Illuminator
That makes sense. There are examples today of politicians making empty promises, and when asked a question A they give an answer B. I agree that Chamberlain talked a lot of empty waffle about peace in our time, and the determination of our two people never to go to war again. The point is that Chamberlain was making a judgment on the military reality in 1938.
There may have been an exaggeration of German air power in 1938, but what is a fact which Chamberlain knew full well, was that there were serious and dangerous deficiencies in the British air force and the army at the time. You can't just declare war with what, as Churchill suggested.
There is a bit of waffle about German air power on a Wikipedia website:
It's a far more cogent defence than Henri has managed, so let me offer a counterpoint:
Firstly it was not the false information that formed Chamberlain's views, but those views that made him willingly to uncritically accept that information. Allow that Chamberlain viewed the Versailles treaty as unnecessarily vindictive and that he regarded the real threat as Soviet Communism (Germany and Italy were after all still capitalist societies even if they were dictatorships) and a stronger Germany is justifiable, things like the Christie-X report just provided a rationale for continuing to do so.
However in continuing appeasement when he became PM Chamberlain was ignoring a fundamental principle of British foreign policy towards the continent, to avoid any one nation becoming over mighty, potentially threatening the channel coast and Britain's vital seaborne trade. If Chamberlain was genuinely alarmed at the strength of Nazi Germany he should have done what his predecessors had done for two centuries, construct alliances to provide a counterbalance and check German expansionism. Instead he further strengthened Germany at Munich and paved the way for Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which almost fatally undermined Britain's position and did prove fatal to France.
As far as the Sudeten Germans go, well Chamberlain was sadly right when he referred to the dispute over the Sudeten as 'a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing'. I seriously doubt the British people would have been any more concerned about the fate of the Sudeten Germans than they were about the fate of the Czech's post Munich.
One last point. Whatever your view of Munich it was not a success on Chamberlain's part, it was the essential weakness of Germany that forced Hitler to take the deal. If Hitler had chosen to simply keep upping the ante until the British and the French simply couldn't meet his demands he could have had his war. It was the internal issues facing Germany that held Hitler back, not Chamberlain's diplomacy.
Except there weren't. As I thought Hans made clear the estimates of German strength were seriously flawed and grossly overstated the strength of all arms of the Wehrmacht, especially the Luftwaffe. That estimate you quote of '1000 aircraft a month' was more than double the real figure. Chamberlain based his judgement on a German propaganda fantasy that was completely removed from reality.
Again the German high command was convinced that war in 1938 would have doomed Germany. Why are you so keen to believe those Generals when they insist the could have pulled off Sealion in 1940, but ignore them when they stated Germany couldn't win in 1938?
HansMustermann
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I would offer the hypothesis that... well, as I was saying, he was a politician. Remember the ovations he got for signing the treaty. It's easy to say that Chamberlain should have done this, or that, but if the general British public wasn't willing to go to war, then that limits the options for aggressive diplomacy in the short run, innit? Is really all I'm saying.
Which works rather in favour of what I was saying, innit? It's hard to sell a war at home to keep the status quo in some area, if the people at home don't really care all that much for keeping the status quo in that area.
That part is rather obvious, I would say. I don't think Chamberlain knew that part at the time, though. And really my argument is all about perception´at the time.
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