SpitfireIX
Philosopher
Henri, instead of trying to change the subject, why don't you answer the questions you've been asked?
Henri, instead of trying to change the subject, why don't you answer the questions you've been asked?
This is what Churchill wrote about the Polish guarantee and what Peter Hitchens thinks about it:
http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2013/10/the-polish-guarantee-churchill-speaks-.html
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Churchill surrounds these remarks by restating his belief that a war over Czechoslovakia would have been feasible and possibly won by Britain and France. I do not think this is true, as it overestimates France’s aggressive capacity, and the defensibility of Czechoslovakia after the Anschluss.
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With what? I remember reading a book once about the artist Dora Carrington which said her arty group were conscientious objectors in the First World War, but in the second world war they all joined up to fight.
There is an internet article on that Oxford Union debate about not fighting for King and Country in 1933, which indicates the sort of thing Chamberlain was up against trying to persuade the public and the British Empire to go to war. The public and the House of Commons did not want to go to war over the Sudetanland, mainly because they had never heard of it. They had to work it out for themselves:
I do admit that Henri has a point. Dead people wereremarkablylax in taking any action against the Nazis.
Like the peace ballot of '34-'35? (your link)
It says that the people wanted peace, but were also willing to fight if a country (now which country did they mean there?) attacked another country.
People did clearly see the evil of Nazi germany. Unfortunately not Chamberlain.
I do admit that Henri has a point. Dead people wereremarkablylax in taking any action against the Nazis.
I said "dead", not "undead"
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So, Henri, when are you planning to answer the questions you've been asked?
Specifically, please explain:
Please be as specific as possible, and be sure to discuss how this was going to be accomplished with far fewer Wehrmacht resources than in 1940, especially while fighting Czechoslovakia, or while recovering from having conquered Czechoslovakia.
- how Germany was going to bomb Britain into submission in 1938
- how Germany was going to invade Britain in 1938
- how Germany was going to conquer France (and Belgium) in 1938, or failing that, in the spring of 1939
To add to erwinl's point about the Peace Ballot, which I imagine you'll ignore, if Chamberlain believed that Britain and the Empire and Commonwealth wouldn't go to war over the Sudetenland, yet, as you have claimed, he also knew that war with Hitler was inevitable, then why was there any need for appeasement at all? Why not just let Czechoslovakia fight Germany, possibly with Soviet backing? As has been pointed out to you several times, such a war would have resulted in the expenditure or destruction of large amounts of both German and Czech war materiel, which would have made Germany significantly weaker when the conflict with the Western Allies did come.
That was a Czech problem, not Chamberlain's problem. Neither Britain or France stopped the Czechs from taking on Germany over the Sudetanland dispute. It's just that they did not give the Czechs a guarantee, like the Polish guarantee.
That was a Czech problem, not Chamberlain's problem. Neither Britain or France stopped the Czechs from taking on Germany over the Sudetanland dispute. It's just that they did not give the Czechs a guarantee, like the Polish guarantee.
Chamberlain's problem was military weakness which could have been a catastrophe if war was declared in 1938.
There is some background to the Czech point of view at this website, which would be understood by those who do not have little military knowledge and no strategic ability:
https://www.quora.com/Why-didnt-the-Czechs-fight-Nazi-Germany-instead-of-giving-in
Irrelevant, as discussed above. The point is that Czechoslovakia needed to fight, even if they couldn't win by themselves, or they were temporarily conquered.
[citation needed] Further, all of the surviving male members of the Bloomsbury GroupWP were too old for military service in 1939. Fail.
Meanwhile, back at Charleston, David Garnett tried to persuade Julian Bell to stay and fight fascism from home, helping to prepare for war against Hitler. Although Julian Bell was unchanging in his conviction he did make a compromise, deciding to travel to Spain as an ambulance driver instead of as his new-found ideal – expressed in his 1937 talk to the Cambridge Apostles – as a solider.
When he arrived in Spain he longed for action and on the 6 July 1937 was thrown into the thick of battle taking the wounded from the front at Brunete. During this time he wrote his last letter to his mother in which he revealed how Charleston was not far from his mind. He wrote of how he kept his ambulance, of the other men, and then about “the other odd element […] the Charleston one of improvising materials – a bit of carpet to mend a stretcher, e.g. – in which I find myself at home”. These words, “at home”, are especially moving here as he was never to return home again.
On the 18 July his ambulance was hit and he was mortally wounded with a piece of shrapnel to the chest. He was one of the 35,000 men who lost their lives in the battle of Brunete.
The Bloomsbury group is a bit of a vast complex subject, but it does seem that some of the members of it, like David Garnett and the Bells were not quite such pacifists in the second world war:
https://thecharlestonattic.wordpress.com/tag/art/page/2/
The Bloomsbury group is a bit of a vast complex subject, but it does seem that some of the members of it, like David Garnett and the Bells were not quite such pacifists in the second world war:
https://thecharlestonattic.wordpress.com/tag/art/page/2/