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Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

I do admit that Henri has a point. Dead people were remarkably lax in taking any action against the Nazis.
 
This is what Churchill wrote about the Polish guarantee and what Peter Hitchens thinks about it:

http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2013/10/the-polish-guarantee-churchill-speaks-.html

<snip>

Churchill surrounds these remarks by restating his belief that a war over Czechoslovakia would have been feasible and possibly won by Britain and France. I do not think this is true, as it overestimates France’s aggressive capacity, and the defensibility of Czechoslovakia after the Anschluss.

<snip>


This is the only part of either of your posts that is relevant to the topic under discussion. And, yet again, we have a journalist, and not a historian, who as usual has an agenda (debunking British participation in World War II). Further, as in the other such journalist quotes you've posted, many issues are ignored, and the few that aren't are oversimplified. Fail.
 
With what? I remember reading a book once about the artist Dora Carrington which said her arty group were conscientious objectors in the First World War, but in the second world war they all joined up to fight.

There is an internet article on that Oxford Union debate about not fighting for King and Country in 1933, which indicates the sort of thing Chamberlain was up against trying to persuade the public and the British Empire to go to war. The public and the House of Commons did not want to go to war over the Sudetanland, mainly because they had never heard of it. They had to work it out for themselves:

Are you claiming that Chamberlain was trying to persuade the British public/Empire to go to war and failed to do so? If so you can add this to the list of claims you need to provide evidence for. That evidence will have to be compelling as everything else presented in this thread suggests Chamberlain did the exact opposite, encouraging the public to believe war could be avoided.
 
Like the peace ballot of '34-'35? (your link)
It says that the people wanted peace, but were also willing to fight if a country (now which country did they mean there?) attacked another country.

People did clearly see the evil of Nazi germany. Unfortunately not Chamberlain.

It was also an old custom of the Oxford Union to pick really outrageous topics for debates.
 
So, Henri, when are you planning to answer the questions you've been asked?

Specifically, please explain:

  • how Germany was going to bomb Britain into submission in 1938
  • how Germany was going to invade Britain in 1938
  • how Germany was going to conquer France (and Belgium) in 1938, or failing that, in the spring of 1939
Please be as specific as possible, and be sure to discuss how this was going to be accomplished with far fewer Wehrmacht resources than in 1940, especially while fighting Czechoslovakia, or while recovering from having conquered Czechoslovakia.


Bump.

And while we're at it, we're still waiting for you to explain why Chamberlain ceded the Treaty Ports back to Ireland in 1938.
 
To add to erwinl's point about the Peace Ballot, which I imagine you'll ignore, if Chamberlain believed that Britain and the Empire and Commonwealth wouldn't go to war over the Sudetenland, yet, as you have claimed, he also knew that war with Hitler was inevitable, then why was there any need for appeasement at all? Why not just let Czechoslovakia fight Germany, possibly with Soviet backing? As has been pointed out to you several times, such a war would have resulted in the expenditure or destruction of large amounts of both German and Czech war materiel, which would have made Germany significantly weaker when the conflict with the Western Allies did come.

That was a Czech problem, not Chamberlain's problem. Neither Britain or France stopped the Czechs from taking on Germany over the Sudetanland dispute. It's just that they did not give the Czechs a guarantee, like the Polish guarantee. Chamberlain's problem was military weakness which could have been a catastrophe if war was declared in 1938.

There is some background to the Czech point of view at this website, which would be understood by those who do not have little military knowledge and no strategic ability:

https://www.quora.com/Why-didnt-the-Czechs-fight-Nazi-Germany-instead-of-giving-in
 
That was a Czech problem, not Chamberlain's problem. Neither Britain or France stopped the Czechs from taking on Germany over the Sudetanland dispute. It's just that they did not give the Czechs a guarantee, like the Polish guarantee.

France was allied to the Czechs, Chamberlain conspired to give away Czech territory without so much as consulting them, in the face of such betrayal are you surprised the Czechs didn't fight?

And it most assuredly was Chamberlain's problem, or rather Britain's problem as he threw an ally under the bus and massively strengthened a potential enemy, one that according to you he knew we would have to fight?

ETA: Oh and please do respond to Spitfire IX's questions, your refusal to support your claims is becoming tiresome. If you wish you can simply admit you can't support them and withdraw the claims.
 
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That was a Czech problem, not Chamberlain's problem. Neither Britain or France stopped the Czechs from taking on Germany over the Sudetanland dispute. It's just that they did not give the Czechs a guarantee, like the Polish guarantee.


This is completely untrue, and frankly silly. Chamberlain didn't need to fly to Munich and meet with Hitler to avoid giving Czechoslovakia a guarantee. All he had to do was say, "We reserve the right to act as we see fit," or something to that effect, and let everyone wonder what Britain was going to do. Czechoslovakia only backed down after Beneš was told in no uncertain terms that no outside help would be forthcoming. Further, Chamberlain could certainly have held a private meeting with Beneš and explained that it was necessary for Czechoslovakia to fight, even if they lost, in order to guarantee ultimate Allied victory. But he didn't.

Chamberlain's problem was military weakness which could have been a catastrophe if war was declared in 1938.


As Garrison commented earlier, you keep saying this, and it continues not being true.

There is some background to the Czech point of view at this website, which would be understood by those who do not have little military knowledge and no strategic ability:

https://www.quora.com/Why-didnt-the-Czechs-fight-Nazi-Germany-instead-of-giving-in


Irrelevant, as discussed above. The point is that Czechoslovakia needed to fight, even if they couldn't win by themselves, or they were temporarily conquered.
 
Irrelevant, as discussed above. The point is that Czechoslovakia needed to fight, even if they couldn't win by themselves, or they were temporarily conquered.

It's another point Henri keeps ignoring, the question is not could we have saved Czechsolvakia, it's could Britain and her allies have defeated Germany quicker and at lower cost in lives with a war starting in 1938? Based on the evidence I would say yes. Henri keeps saying no in effect, while making untrue claims about the military situation in 1938.
 
[citation needed] Further, all of the surviving male members of the Bloomsbury GroupWP were too old for military service in 1939. Fail.

The Bloomsbury group is a bit of a vast complex subject, but it does seem that some of the members of it, like David Garnett and the Bells were not quite such pacifists in the second world war:

https://thecharlestonattic.wordpress.com/tag/art/page/2/

Meanwhile, back at Charleston, David Garnett tried to persuade Julian Bell to stay and fight fascism from home, helping to prepare for war against Hitler. Although Julian Bell was unchanging in his conviction he did make a compromise, deciding to travel to Spain as an ambulance driver instead of as his new-found ideal – expressed in his 1937 talk to the Cambridge Apostles – as a solider.

When he arrived in Spain he longed for action and on the 6 July 1937 was thrown into the thick of battle taking the wounded from the front at Brunete. During this time he wrote his last letter to his mother in which he revealed how Charleston was not far from his mind. He wrote of how he kept his ambulance, of the other men, and then about “the other odd element […] the Charleston one of improvising materials – a bit of carpet to mend a stretcher, e.g. – in which I find myself at home”. These words, “at home”, are especially moving here as he was never to return home again.

On the 18 July his ambulance was hit and he was mortally wounded with a piece of shrapnel to the chest. He was one of the 35,000 men who lost their lives in the battle of Brunete.
 
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The Bloomsbury group is a bit of a vast complex subject, but it does seem that some of the members of it, like David Garnett and the Bells were not quite such pacifists in the second world war:

https://thecharlestonattic.wordpress.com/tag/art/page/2/


Continuing evasion noted. I renew the questions listed above, and, to expand on my earlier post, please explain why Chamberlain needed to go to Munich if he believed that war with Hitler was inevitable, but also believed that Britain and the dominions would not support war at that time.

As for Julian Bell, he was, a) killed in the Spanish Civil War, prior to the Munich Crisis, b) of the next generation of the Bloomsbury Group, and thus too young to have served (or refused to have served) in WWI, and c) serving in a noncombatant capacity. Fail.

ETA: And the quotation does not support your implication that Julian's family and Garnett wavered in their pacifism.
 
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