To what extent does: Science=Faith ?

I am embarrassed for you who volunteer to guard Randi's fine forum from heresy to your own religious beliefs. I do not see anything resembling that which I thought was the spirit of being a skeptic, amongst you few.

To those of you who are observers of this, and not just those who haven't gotten the opportunity yet to get in your 'kick', note the anger and other immature emotional responses from so-called-skeptics.

I am here to see what people think. Many times they do not want to reveal even to themselves what conclusions they must draw. That is when their limbic system answers for them.
 
Drkitten said:
Water chestnuts? I've never encountered that before. I associate those mostly with Asian cooking.

How well do they work in Italian?
Gives the lasagna some nice texture. Also, of course, water chestnuts and black olives together are orgasmic.

~~ Paul
 
Gives the lasagna some nice texture. Also, of course, water chestnuts and black olives together are orgasmic.

~~ Paul
Well put. And I might add the following observation:
Chin-up%20Kitten.jpg
 
Can any of us prove that what we sense is "real" and not just a dream? Could it be more like a computer simulation?

By definition, Science is constrained in scope to that which can be empirically demonstrated. A relationship that can be demonstrated between what our senses send to our brain, our observations, and an external objective reality, must be performed via the same observation mechanism. So can we validate objectively?

We humans accept on faith, because we have to, that we individually exist and that the Real World really exists external to us. So is it not an illusion or a preferred paradigm, this idea, that only those things are real which can be Scientifically proven?

If we think it valid to accept this fundamental level on faith, then we must remember that every Scientific construct lies on that foundation. I am curious what others think about this.

VonNeumann,

I'm very sorry to see the level of derision and unwarranted dismissiveness that your post has met with so far. Personally I've been struggling with this and similar issues for a while now, and while I still hold out some hope that the scientific method can ultimately be rationally justified, I haven't found the way to do it yet. To those who dismissively point out that this is an issue that has been raised before (it goes way back before The Matrix, in case some of you were unaware), that's certainly true, but it keeps arising because unfortunately no one has yet offered a satisfactory response to it. (Or maybe someone has, and I'm just unaware of it).

The short answer to your question is, yes, the scientific method does rest on faith in the reality of our perceptions that cannot be (or has not yet been) rationally justified. Descartes struggled with this problem, and thought he had solved it by arguing that God would not permit us to be so deceived by our senses as to hold false beliefs about the nature of reality. Unfortunately that solution doesn't work for anyone who does not accept a priori the existence of God. So you're absolutely right that every scientific conclusion rests on faith to the extent that we assume that our observations reflect some external reality. This is problematic, of course, because most skeptics criticize the religious for their acceptance of certain beliefs on nothing more than faith, with no empirical evidence to justify that belief. The unfortunate irony is that skeptics do the same thing, by resting belief on a faith in empirical observations.

Unfortunately, the problem of the logical invalidity of scientific inquiry doesn't end there. I had a few posts a couple of weeks ago in the Enlightenment re-start thread about this, but it's relevant here too. Hume came along and proved pretty convincingly that, to use an example cited by both Hume and strathmeyer, we have no logically valid reason to believe that the sun will come up tomorrow. The argument proceeds as follows: All of our scientific knowledge (i.e., anything relying on empirical observation, excluding only mathematics and geometry) relies on inductive reasoning-- the process by which we draw general conclusions from a series of specific instances. The sun has come up every morning of my life so far, so I naturally expect that it will rise again tomorrow at about the same time. Inductive inference, however, relies on the premise of the uniformity of nature: i.e., that things will behave in the future in the same way that they have in the past. The last hundred times that I've dropped a pencil, it has fallen to the floor. Therefore I expect that if I drop this pencil, it will also fall to the floor. This only works if I have reason to believe that the same forces will act on the pencil in the future as have acted on it in the past.

Unfortunately, the principle of the uniformity of nature can't be validated by non-circular reasoning. It's not a logical necessity-- we can certainly conceive of, say, the law of gravity suddenly changing. The principle, therefore, can only be justified by inductive reasonining-- nature always has been uniform in the past, therefore it always will be. This, obviously, is circular logic-- we can't justify inductively the principle by which we seek to logically validate inductive reasoning.

Hume concluded that, therefore, we have no logically valid basis for believing that the future will resemble the past, and our practice of drawing conclusions on the basis of experience is simply a matter of custom rather than logic. In other words, it is purely a matter of faith that any of the scientific theories we have derived through observation will hold true in the future.

I don't see how one gets around either of these problems, and I think you're right that there does seem to be something hypocritical in the skeptical insistence that beliefs be founded on evidence rather than on faith, when belief founded on evidence still ultimately rests on faith. I'm still a skeptic, though, because it feels right, and I hope that eventually I'll come across a plausible rebuttal of the problems discussed above. For what it's worth, I agree with you that those who refuse to acknowledge those problems are acting on a quasi-religious belief of the sort they condemn in others.


Edit: Here's the link to my previous discussion of this issue. Start reading at post 15 (the opening post is really, really long, and not entirely relevant to this subject). http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=52936
 
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James, there's an easy answer to this: Conclusions in science are always tentative. [edit: unlike in formal logic and math, where conclusions are absolute (or at least can be).]

Calling belief based on evidence "faith" is, in my opinion, a misuse of the word.
 
James, there's an easy answer to this: Conclusions in science are always tentative.

Calling belief based on evidence "faith" is, in my opinion, a misuse of the word.

I think that works as to the Cartesian existence of external objects problem, but not so much for the induction problem. I agree with you that we can pretty easily just stipulate that science assumes the existence of the external world, we can't test the hypothesis that it is or is not actually there, and still find much value and benefit in scientific inquiry. In doing that, though, I think we have to remain conscious of the fact that this is a limitation on the scientific method, and not simply pretend that the problem isn't there as some on this forum seem to prefer. That said, I don't think it's a terrible abuse of the word "faith" to apply it to a proposition that we choose to believe but have no evidence for.
 
That the sun will rise: not a fact for several reasons, one being that it hasn't happened yet.
That you think the sun will rise: cannot be confirmed by scientific evidence but you can be well convinced of what you think that you think.

I'm confused... you're claiming that we can never know something before it happens? So if I drop a pen, I don't know if it will fall to the ground or fly up to the ceiling because I haven't dropped it yet? How am I supposed to live my life if I can't plan for the future?

Also, if you think that "the sun will rise tomorrow" is not a fact, then I would like to place a bet with you that it will. I will give you any odds.
 
The short answer to your question is, yes, the scientific method does rest on faith in the reality of our perceptions that cannot be (or has not yet been) rationally justified.

No, it doesn't.

The scientific method rests on experience in the reliability of our preceptions -- the rational justification is simply "induction."

Science would work just as well in the universe of the Matrix, assuming that the computer was actually well-enough programmed to avoid obvious inconsistencies. It would simply lead us to conclusions that would not, in point of fact, be accurate -- but they would still be predictive. Scientists -- particularly in physics -- have happily accepted the idea that their theories may be predictive without being "correct" in some metaphysical sense for quite some time.

To address the question of correctness, however, we can turn from the problem of induction to Occam's razor.

Can you justify Occam's Razor? I suspect not. In point of fact, the usual phrasing of Occam's Razor ("Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily") specifically denies the possiblity of "justification' in the usual sense, because it's an instruction, not a statement about the world.
However, given the track record -- evidence -- of success Occam's razor has provided, we've again got a rational basis for its acceptance.

And Occam's razor demands that, absent evidence, we should not believe in an invisible world as well as a visible one. It multiplies the number of "worlds" unnecessarily.
 
Can any of us prove that what we sense is "real" and not just a dream?
If reality were a dream, then whose dream is it? Your dream? Perhaps it is my dream or drkitten’s? I know, it is God’s dream, he/she/it would be able to create the thoughts, feeling, experiences, and interactions between all 4 billion+ people here on Earth within his dream. Not to mention the interaction between all the other life on the planet.

Try thinking about how complex the interactions of life really are; try to encompass it all for any given day. How many gazelles were eaten by lions today? How many leaves on trees in Brazil were eaten by insects? How many bacteria were killed by your white blood cells today, or how about the number that were killed by every animal’s immune system today? How many fish were eaten today by people, sharks, dolphins, other fish, bears, birds, etc? Do you believe that all of this stops when you’re not thinking or are aware of it? I think it takes a particularly well trained sense of arrogance to believe that our perceptions create or change the reality we inhabit.
 
Can any of us prove that what we sense is "real" and not just a dream? Could it be more like a computer simulation?

*snip* So can we validate objectively?

We humans accept on faith, because we have to, that we individually exist and that the Real World really exists external to us. *snip*
I am curious what others think about this.

MRC_Hans' practical test of Solipsism .(tm)
Disclaimer: This experiment might not only bruise your ego, but also your body, so you undertake it entirely at your own risk. I will not be held responsible for any consequences, including, but not limited to, loss of pride, peace of mind, teeth, etc.
1) Find a busy city street.
2) Wait for large aggressive looking male to walk by (generally, the more tattoos, the better).
3) Walk up behind said large aggressive looking male and direct a solid kick at the lower, rear portion of his body.
4) When he turns, tell him: "That was because you mother is so ugly".
5) Observe.
You will now have tangible evidence for the following:
a) You exist physically.
b) At least one other entity exists physically.
c) You and that other entity are in communication, both abstractly and physically.
d) The other entity probably has a mother.
You may conclude that all your observations are, after all, part of an illusion, but the experience should convince you that you had better treat the illusion as reality .
Good luck!


Don't thank me, you're welcome!

Hans :biggrin:
 
I think that works as to the Cartesian existence of external objects problem, but not so much for the induction problem. I agree with you that we can pretty easily just stipulate that science assumes the existence of the external world, we can't test the hypothesis that it is or is not actually there, and still find much value and benefit in scientific inquiry. In doing that, though, I think we have to remain conscious of the fact that this is a limitation on the scientific method, and not simply pretend that the problem isn't there as some on this forum seem to prefer. That said, I don't think it's a terrible abuse of the word "faith" to apply it to a proposition that we choose to believe but have no evidence for.
What part don't we have evidence for: the uniformity of nature? We have overwhelming evidence of this. Just no absolute proof. But again, we never have absolute proof. We have plenty of evidence to make reliable predictions, though.
 
The short answer to your question is, yes, the scientific method does rest on faith in the reality of our perceptions that cannot be (or has not yet been) rationally justified.

No, it doesn't.

The scientific method rests on experience in the reliability of our preceptions -- the rational justification is simply "induction."
Did you read the rest of my post? What do we do about the fact that induction itself is not rationally justifiable?

To address the question of correctness, however, we can turn from the problem of induction to Occam's razor.

Can you justify Occam's Razor? I suspect not.
No, I can't, and therein lies the problem. Occam's Razor is a rule of thumb, not a rule of logic. It may hold true in most instances, but it does nothing to negate the logical possibility of exceptions to its rule. So I don't see how you can appeal to Occam's Razor to conclusively establish the reality of the external world. The best it can do is say that we don't have a good reason to believe that we are in fact in the Matrix. It does nothing to preclude the possibility that we might be.

However, given the track record -- evidence -- of success Occam's razor has provided, we've again got a rational basis for its acceptance.

Again, your rational basis rests on induction. How do we justify Occam's Razor in light of Hume's objections to the validity of inductive reasoning?
 
VonNeumann is a mediocre troll who lacks the intellect, honesty, or curiosity to advance in any way.

Ignore him. He is not worth responding to.
 
In doing that, though, I think we have to remain conscious of the fact that this is a limitation on the scientific method.

No more so than we have to remain conscious that because my telephone only lets me talk to distant people, but doesn't make sandwiches, that is somehow a limitation on my telephone. That's not a "limitation" on my telephone, but a statement about what a telephone is. Expecting a telephone to make sandwiches isn't somehow transcendant or striving -- it's just the ravings of a fool.

The scientific method works great -- better than anything else we have -- for describing the visible world.

Navel-gazing works great for.... I'm sorry, what does it work for, again?
 
What part don't we have evidence for: the uniformity of nature? We have overwhelming evidence of this. Just no absolute proof. But again, we never have absolute proof. We have plenty of evidence to make reliable predictions, though.

Sorry, that was unclear. I meant we don't have evidence for the reality of external observations, so, when we stipulate that we're believing the proposition that our observations reflect external reality without evidence for it, it seems fair to me to say that we're taking that proposition as a matter of faith.

I think you may be missing a subtlety of the problem of induction, which is most likely more a matter of my inarticulate exposition of it than your comprehension skills. But to try again: the fact that nature has been uniform up to this point provides no evidence that it will continue to be uniform, because the very idea of prediction on the basis of empirical evidence rests on the assumption of the uniformity of nature, which itself cannot be proved without resort to empirical evidence. This circularity undermines the logical validity of inductive reasoning.
 
I'm confused... you're claiming that we can never know something before it happens? So if I drop a pen, I don't know if it will fall to the ground or fly up to the ceiling because I haven't dropped it yet? How am I supposed to live my life if I can't plan for the future?

Also, if you think that "the sun will rise tomorrow" is not a fact, then I would like to place a bet with you that it will. I will give you any odds.
The "brain in the vat" does not know if there is a sun in the sense that we think the sun exists. Let me try something: what is your idea of 'space'? It is like a 'stage' on/in which objects have a position? If there are no objects, is there still 'space'?
 
Did you read the rest of my post? What do we do about the fact that induction itself is not rationally justifiable?

We do nothing about it, because the "fact" as you stated it is untrue.

Induction is rationally justifiable, via Occam's razor.

You're confusing the notion of "rationally justifiable" with that of "provable." Many things are rationally justifiable without being provable beyond a shadow of a doubt; for example, I have a rationally justifiable belief that investing in lottery tickets is a bad idea, despite the fact that not
only might I be wrong, I can even quantify the (low) probability that I am.

No, I can't, and therein lies the problem. Occam's Razor is a rule of thumb, not a rule of logic.

And so is "justification."

It may hold true in most instances, but it does nothing to negate the logical possibility of exceptions to its rule.

The "logical possibility of exceptions to the rule" do not violate justification.


Again, your rational basis rests on induction. How do we justify Occam's Razor in light of Hume's objections to the validity of inductive reasoning?

Because reasoning need not be "valid" in the formal sense to be useful or justifiable.
 
Unfortunately, the problem of the logical invalidity of scientific inquiry doesn't end there. I had a few posts a couple of weeks ago in the Enlightenment re-start thread about this, but it's relevant here too. Hume came along and proved pretty convincingly that, to use an example cited by both Hume and strathmeyer, we have no logically valid reason to believe that the sun will come up tomorrow. The argument proceeds as follows: All of our scientific knowledge (i.e., anything relying on empirical observation, excluding only mathematics and geometry) relies on inductive reasoning-- the process by which we draw general conclusions from a series of specific instances. The sun has come up every morning of my life so far, so I naturally expect that it will rise again tomorrow at about the same time. Inductive inference, however, relies on the premise of the uniformity of nature: i.e., that things will behave in the future in the same way that they have in the past. The last hundred times that I've dropped a pencil, it has fallen to the floor. Therefore I expect that if I drop this pencil, it will also fall to the floor. This only works if I have reason to believe that the same forces will act on the pencil in the future as have acted on it in the past.

See, this is why I hate Philosophy. I don't only think the sun will come up tomorrow because I experienced that in my every day life. I have also drawn upon the lives and knowledge of others. I understand how a person could draw an incorrect conclusion from their experiences.
 

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