Can any of us prove that what we sense is "real" and not just a dream? Could it be more like a computer simulation?
By definition, Science is constrained in scope to that which can be empirically demonstrated. A relationship that can be demonstrated between what our senses send to our brain, our observations, and an external objective reality, must be performed via the same observation mechanism. So can we validate objectively?
We humans accept on faith, because we have to, that we individually exist and that the Real World really exists external to us. So is it not an illusion or a preferred paradigm, this idea, that only those things are real which can be Scientifically proven?
If we think it valid to accept this fundamental level on faith, then we must remember that every Scientific construct lies on that foundation. I am curious what others think about this.
VonNeumann,
I'm very sorry to see the level of derision and unwarranted dismissiveness that your post has met with so far. Personally I've been struggling with this and similar issues for a while now, and while I still hold out some hope that the scientific method can ultimately be rationally justified, I haven't found the way to do it yet. To those who dismissively point out that this is an issue that has been raised before (it goes way back before
The Matrix, in case some of you were unaware), that's certainly true, but it keeps arising because unfortunately no one has yet offered a satisfactory response to it. (Or maybe someone has, and I'm just unaware of it).
The short answer to your question is, yes, the scientific method does rest on faith in the reality of our perceptions that cannot be (or has not yet been) rationally justified. Descartes struggled with this problem, and thought he had solved it by arguing that God would not permit us to be so deceived by our senses as to hold false beliefs about the nature of reality. Unfortunately that solution doesn't work for anyone who does not accept
a priori the existence of God. So you're absolutely right that every scientific conclusion rests on faith to the extent that we assume that our observations reflect some external reality. This is problematic, of course, because most skeptics criticize the religious for their acceptance of certain beliefs on nothing more than faith, with no empirical evidence to justify that belief. The unfortunate irony is that skeptics do the same thing, by resting belief on a faith in empirical observations.
Unfortunately, the problem of the logical invalidity of scientific inquiry doesn't end there. I had a few posts a couple of weeks ago in the Enlightenment re-start thread about this, but it's relevant here too. Hume came along and proved pretty convincingly that, to use an example cited by both Hume and strathmeyer, we have no logically valid reason to believe that the sun will come up tomorrow. The argument proceeds as follows: All of our scientific knowledge (i.e., anything relying on empirical observation, excluding only mathematics and geometry) relies on inductive reasoning-- the process by which we draw general conclusions from a series of specific instances. The sun has come up every morning of my life so far, so I naturally expect that it will rise again tomorrow at about the same time. Inductive inference, however, relies on the premise of the uniformity of nature: i.e., that things will behave in the future in the same way that they have in the past. The last hundred times that I've dropped a pencil, it has fallen to the floor. Therefore I expect that if I drop this pencil, it will also fall to the floor. This only works if I have reason to believe that the same forces will act on the pencil in the future as have acted on it in the past.
Unfortunately, the principle of the uniformity of nature can't be validated by non-circular reasoning. It's not a logical necessity-- we can certainly conceive of, say, the law of gravity suddenly changing. The principle, therefore, can only be justified by inductive reasonining-- nature always
has been uniform in the past, therefore it always will be. This, obviously, is circular logic-- we can't justify inductively the principle by which we seek to logically validate inductive reasoning.
Hume concluded that, therefore, we have no logically valid basis for believing that the future will resemble the past, and our practice of drawing conclusions on the basis of experience is simply a matter of custom rather than logic. In other words, it is purely a matter of faith that any of the scientific theories we have derived through observation will hold true in the future.
I don't see how one gets around either of these problems, and I think you're right that there does seem to be something hypocritical in the skeptical insistence that beliefs be founded on evidence rather than on faith, when belief founded on evidence still ultimately rests on faith. I'm still a skeptic, though, because it feels right, and I hope that eventually I'll come across a plausible rebuttal of the problems discussed above. For what it's worth, I agree with you that those who refuse to acknowledge those problems are acting on a quasi-religious belief of the sort they condemn in others.
Edit: Here's the link to my previous discussion of this issue. Start reading at post 15 (the opening post is really, really long, and not entirely relevant to this subject).
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=52936