The Inspections Are Working

And your evidence is...

If you read my posts in this thread, you'll note I have made no claims that he could or could not make WMDs from yellowcake. I have been asking what legitimate use he could have for yellowcake. And I have not gotten a single reasonable answer.

We do know that you can use yellowcake as an early step in making nuclear weapons - even the naysayers here acknowledge that.

What I am trying to do is to get people to tell me whether there is some legitimate reason for someone to be acquiring yellowcake.

If you see me buying bleach and ammonia at the grocery store, you have evidence that I'm preparing to make poison gas. But you'd have to go a long way from there to conclude for certain that I'm preparing to make poison gas, because there are plenty of legitimate uses I could have for both of those items.

So, what legitimate use could he have had for yellowcake?


You seem to be requireing that he had any use for it. Prove he did.

How come this was not even of the level of the lies about alluminum tubing that was anodized when you would want non anodized alluminum for the gas centrifuges?
 

The wording is vague.

12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;

Yellowcake is not useable in a nuclear weapon, so the quote from Texas does not clearly show that it had been demanded.

It is ambiguous because it say could be refined into non weapons grade but reactor grade material.

It is interesting that you don't have to prove that this was any sort of threat to anyone, but others have to prove it was not.
 

It is not clear that yellowcake fits into the catagory of things he was not supposted to have.
That's an odd use of the word "compliance." If he was complying, why did he still have 550 tons of yellowcake that he was supposed to have destroyed or surrendered?


Can you please show that as this was known about where it was demanded at any point?

This was not a demand I remember from before the invasion, and no one is citing any specific case of a specific demand for this material being turned over. It was not unknown to those making such demands so you should be able to find places where Saddam had a demand for turning this over planced on him and he said "I will not turn my Yellowcake over"
 
The Sanctions were under fire from day one by the French and Russians and were well on their way to being lifted. All the sanctions did was put money in the pockets of Saddam and the corrupt UN officials in charge of the oil for food scam. Resolution 687 specifically stated that Iraq was to have nothing nuclear related and if found it was to be removed or destroyed.
Um that is not the term used though

the term used was "nuclear-weapons-usable materials" not "all nuclear related materials"

Please demonstrate their definition of "nuclear-weapons-usable materials"

You are defining it so that it would include yellowcake, so please provide the evidence that they defined it in that fashion.
 
Um that is not the term used though

the term used was "nuclear-weapons-usable materials" not "all nuclear related materials"

Please demonstrate their definition of "nuclear-weapons-usable materials"

You are defining it so that it would include yellowcake, so please provide the evidence that they defined it in that fashion.
Like I was saying, it seems Texas and Beep's problem is with IAEA's method and not Saddam. Regardless of how much a baddy Saddam was, we can't fault him for complying with what they feel may be a faulty policy.
 
He says "Four hundred n' ninety seven n' a half feet o' rope! Waddaya got that for?"

He says, "Heheh I'm jest carryin' it heheh..."

So he says "It's all right. Go on board, go on board" and he did.

That's ridiculous.


Everybody knows you don't get high off of hemp.
 
The wording is vague.



Yellowcake is not useable in a nuclear weapon, so the quote from Texas does not clearly show that it had been demanded.

.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yellowcake

Yellowcake is used in the preparation of fuel for nuclear reactors, where it is processed into purified UO2 for use in fuel rods for PHWR and other systems using unenriched uranium. It may also be enriched, by being converted to uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6), by isotope separation through gaseous diffusion or in a gas centrifuge to produce enriched uranium suitable for use in weapons and reactors.
 
Evidence?

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htchem/articles/20080709.aspx

The uranium oxide was what remained of Saddam's original 1980s nuclear program, the one that was halted by an Israeli air raid in 1981, which destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor. The uranium oxide has been in storage ever since, and was checked by UN inspectors after the 1991 war. If further refined, the Iraqi uranium oxide could produce enough weapons grade uranium for over 100 nuclear bombs.
 
Interesting, your quote demonstrates that while Saddam had possessed the cake for at least 22 years, he was unable to use it for anything.

Seems to be an even better indication that the sanctions and inspections were working.


On the contrary

This is a very good history of Saddam's nuclear program and shows that the Israeli bombing did not halt the program:

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm


Before the Gulf War, Iraqi scientists had progressed through several design iterations for a fission weapon based on an implosion design (one that is much more difficult to develop than the alternative, gun-type design. Still at the early stages of completing a design, they had successfully overcome some but certainly not all of the obstacles to a workable device. Using HEU, a completed device based on the latest Iraqi design reportedly might have weighed from about a ton to somewhat more than a ton.

<snip>

The "Crash Program"
In April 1991, Iraq’s inventory of safeguarded highly enriched uranium included fresh unirradiated fuel used for the Soviet IRT 5000 reactor, including 68 fuel assemblies of 80% enrichment with a U235 content of 10.97 kilograms and 10 assemblies of 36% enrichment with a U235 content of 1.27 kilograms. In addition, there was a set of fresh fuel plates for the French Tammuz-2 reactor with an enrichment of 93% and a total U235 content of 372 grams. Other highly enriched material included 35.58 kilograms of U235 which had been irradiated but could not be readily used in weapons production since the fissile material would have been difficult to extract quickly from the irradiated fuel. However, it was enriched to 93% which gave it high strategic value. [IAEA April 1992 ] Iraq had accumulated considerable experience in uranium metallurgy, and in January 1991 was ready to commence the recovery of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the safeguarded IRT-5000 research reactor fuel. [S/1997/779]


The crash program which was initiated in the late summer of 1990 had been planned to comprise the chemical processing of both unirradiated and irradiated research reactor fuel placed under IAEA safeguards to recover the highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the fuel; the re-enrichment of part of the HEU through the use of a 50-machine centrifuge cascade which was to have been specially constructed for the purpose; the conversion of the HEU chemical compounds to metal. Had the HEU recovery and enrichment process been successful, it could have resulted in the availability by the end of 1991 of a quantity of HEU sufficient to manufacture a single low-yield nuclear device. Also planned were measures such as the fabrication of the implosion package and the selection and construction of a test site and studies of a delivery system. Assembly of the device could not have been possible, according to the estimate of the Iraqis scientists, before the end of 1992. It is uncertain whether Iraq would have been able to overcome the considerable technical difficulties involved in this project. The plan could not be implemented because of the bombing in January 1991 that destroyed the technical tools at the nuclear research centre at Tuwaitha for processing the highly enriched uranium (HEU) contained in the safeguarded research reactor fuel. [GC 40-13]
Saddam had already made plans to use sealed components to forge ahead. It was the bombing of those facilities during the first war that slowed him down. IAEA safeguards meant nothing to him.
 
On the contrary

This is a very good history of Saddam's nuclear program and shows that the Israeli bombing did not halt the program:

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm



Saddam had already made plans to use sealed components to forge ahead. It was the bombing of those facilities during the first war that slowed him down. IAEA safeguards meant nothing to him.
Then what stopped him from being able to do anything between the first and second Iraq wars?

ETA: The listed mentioned HEU and not the yellowcake. I again fail to see what failure there was of the inspections.
 
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Can any neoconservative who thinks the IAEA is so worthless please provide a list of signatories to the NPT and/or CTBT that have developed nuclear weapons without ample IAEA warning?

I'll sit here waiting...
 
Can any neoconservative who thinks the IAEA is so worthless please provide a list of signatories to the NPT and/or CTBT that have developed nuclear weapons without ample IAEA warning?

I'll sit here waiting...
What the heck does that mean? The IAEA faclitates the develpment of nukes. The entire world knew what NK was doing but the UN insisted that the way to stop them was to send in the IAEA. All that did was give NK decades of unopposed research and development.
 
And? You still have not shown that there was ever a demand made for them to give it up.


From Resolution 684


Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above;

Yellowcake is material that is required to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
 
What the heck does that mean? The IAEA faclitates the develpment of nukes. The entire world knew what NK was doing but the UN insisted that the way to stop them was to send in the IAEA. All that did was give NK decades of unopposed research and development.
So you believe that effective policy would be to invade any country which may be developing nukes?
 
Then what stopped him from being able to do anything between the first and second Iraq wars?

ETA: The listed mentioned HEU and not the yellowcake. I again fail to see what failure there was of the inspections.

He was shining the inspectors on from 1991 until 1995 when a defector spilled the beans and even then he was uncoorporative:


LETTER DATED 27 JULY 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL


Summary

73. The Security Council, in resolution 687 (1991), envisaged that, within fifteen days of adoption of the resolution, Iraq would submit to the Director General of the IAEA a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 12 of the resolution. It further envisaged that the IAEA would carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission, and that the Agency would develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate, of all items listed in paragraph 12 of the resolution. The IAEA was expected to commence to carry out that plan within forty-five days after its approval by the Security Council.

74. It was not possible for the IAEA to follow such a timetable, primarily because Iraq chose to follow a course of denial, concealment and obstruction, rather than meeting its obligation to provide, at the outset, the declaration foreseen by resolution 687. The initial declarations provided by Iraq were totally inadequate and the IAEA's access to designated inspection sites was obstructed. Following the visit to Iraq in July 1991 of a United Nations/IAEA high-level delegation and the personal intervention of the Secretary-General, Iraq modified its initial approach and provided a considerably expanded, though still incomplete declaration. However, Iraq continued to conceal and deny aspects of its weaponization and centrifuge enrichment activities until the revelations which followed the August 1995 departure from Iraq of the late Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel. Since that time, Iraq has been more forthcoming in providing information, although it still continues to limit the scope of information provided in response to IAEA questioning in an effort to understate the capabilities developed within the clandestine nuclear programme.
 
So you believe that effective policy would be to invade any country which may be developing nukes?
You can do a hell of a lot of things other than invasion. What good is an agency like the IAEA if it is completely ineffectual.
 
you keep claiming this, but you keep failing to show that the IAEA made this a policy.


So isalluminum for the tubes.
The United Nations made the policy and left it to the IAEA to carry it out.
 

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