The Inspections Are Working

[joobz]

The United Nations made the policy and left it to the IAEA to carry it out.

Funny. I didn't read the phrase.
Removal/disposal of yellowcake. We've been down this road.

 

[joobz]

He was shining the inspectors on from 1991 until 1995 when a defector spilled the beans and even then he was uncoorporative:

WHere is the evidence of these nuclear efforts? We've been in Iraq since 2003. Why haven't they surfaced?

 

[Texas]

Interesting, your quote demonstrates that while Saddam had possessed the cake for at least 22 years, he was unable to use it for anything.

Seems to be an even better indication that the sanctions and inspections were working.

There is no indication of the date Saddam procured the yellowcake.

 

[joobz]

You can do a hell of a lot of things other than invasion. What good is an agency like the IAEA if it is completely ineffectual.

The IAEA would be worthless if they were completely ineffectual, but it seems in Iraq that they were useful. Did you notice how now WMDs were found in Iraq? did you notice how no nuclear enrichment program was found in Iraq?


If WMDs were the big problem in Iraq (like was claimed) why wasn't there efforts to go after NK?
I could say that Bush's military policy to limit nuclear poliferation has been completely ineffectual. Afterall, he squandered our military's might in a country which had no nuke program and missed the boat on NK's.

If IAEA was worthless, so is the current administration
.

 

[Texas]

WHere is the evidence of these nuclear efforts? We've been in Iraq since 2003. Why haven't they surfaced?

550 tons of evidence was just sold to Canada, almost that many tons of documents of his program have been discovered post invasion. The UN itself admits that he had the technical know how, the completed research and absolute motivation to continue the effort. He also had ample access to items from countries like North Korea and Pakistan to jump start his program. The Syrian reactor that North Korea supplied is a good example of that.

 

[joobz]

550 tons of evidence was just sold to Canada, almost that many tons of documents of his program have been discovered post invasion. The UN itself admits that he had the technical know how, the completed research and absolute motivation to continue the effort. He also had ample access to items from countries like North Korea and Pakistan to jump start his program. The Syrian reactor that North Korea supplied is a good example of that.

Yet, suprizingly, he didn't have any WMDs, any nuclear reactors, any enrichment activities. (btw, nuclear secrets aren't that secret these days)

I'm not foolish enough to believe that he wasn't trying, but I also do not believe that invasion was required. Again, it looked like our prior policies were working.

 

[Texas]

Funny. I didn't read the phrase.
Removal/disposal of yellowcake. We've been down this road.

So for it to mean yellowcake it had to say yellowcake. I saw no mention of centrifuges, raw uranium, or any other specific component either. You are now reduced to finding loopholes, much like Saddam did, and that means the debate has reached the point of diminishing returns.

 

[Texas]

I'll post this final item about the Aluminum tubes since it ties in with the yellowcake story insofar as Iraq was not allowed to have them and that one use for them was use in gas centrifuges that use yellowcake to enrich uranium.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_aluminum_tubes

In 2000, Iraq ordered, via a company in Jordan, 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes manufactured from 7075-T4 aluminum with an outer diameter of 81 mm, and an inner diameter of 74.4 mm, a wall thickness of 3.3 mm and a length of 900 mm, to be manufactured in China. These tubes were classified as controlled items by the United Nations and Iraq was not permitted to import them.[2]
The order was placed with an Australian company, International Aluminum Supply (IAS), which was associated with Kam Kiu Propriety Limited, a subsidiary of the Chinese company that would do the manufacturing. Concerned that the tubes might be related to Iraqi efforts to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, Garry Cordukes, the director of the company, contacted the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). In turn, ASIS notified U.S. intelligence services.

ASIS also asked Cordukes to obtain a sample of the tubes for examination. He obtained one and handed it over to the ASIS.

On May 23, 2001, a container load of about 3,000 aluminum tubes left the factory in southern China. It traveled on a barge to Hong Kong. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was watching its progress, as was the ASIS. In July 2001, the tubes were seized in Jordan by the Jordianian secret police and the CIA, according to a CIA presentation later that year.[3]

Iraq also attempted to acquire aluminum tubes of the same type in late 2002 and early 2003, with negotiations still going on with a Syrian company when the 2003 Invasion of Iraq began.[4]

<snip>
In late 2001, a small group of agents from the CIA went to Canada, Britain and Australia, to present information to the intelligence agencies and politicians of those countries. The CIA agents said the tubes were destined to become the rotors in a gas centrifuge program to create enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The CIA agents acknowledged there was another possible use for the tubes - as artillery rocket casings, but argued that the specifications sought by Iraq were far greater than they'd need for rockets
<snip>

French intelligence assessments
A June 4, 2003 article in the Financial Times reported that "French intelligence had seized a separate shipment of tubes to the US, and tested their tolerance by spinning them to 98,000 revolutions per minute, concluding they were too sophisticated to have alternative uses." The Times also reported that Secretary of State Colin Powell was denied permission by French political authorities from using this information in his February 5, 2003 speech before the U.N. Security Council.[19]

In a speech before the New American Foundation American Strategy Program Policy Forum on October 19, 2005, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson (Ret.), a former Chief of Staff for the State Department from 2002-2005, commented on this. According to Wilkerson, "The French came in the middle of my deliberations at the CIA and said, we have just spun aluminum tubes, and by god, we did it to this RPM, et cetera, et cetera, and it was all, you know, proof positive that the aluminum tubes were not for mortar casings or artillery casings, they were for centrifuges. Otherwise, why would you have such exquisite instruments? We were wrong. We were wrong."[20]
<snip>
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
In early October 2002, President Bush was given a one-page summary report of a National Intelligence Estimate on the issue of whether Saddam's procurement of high-strength aluminum tubes was for the purpose of developing a nuclear weapon (the NIE was declassified on July 18, 2003 and presented at a White House background briefing on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.[16]). The report stated that the Department of Energy and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research believed that the tubes were "intended for conventional weapons," while other intelligence agencies, including some at the CIA, believed that the tubes were intended for nuclear enrichment.[17] All the analysts believed that the tubes could be modified for use in a centrifuge.[18]

 

[joobz]

So for it to mean yellowcake it had to say yellowcake. I saw no mention of centrifuges, raw uranium, or any other specific component either. You are now reduced to finding loopholes, much like Saddam did, and that means the debate has reached the point of diminishing returns.

No.
My point is the IAEA set the tone of how the policies were inacted. I do not know if the IAEA demanded removal of the yellowcake, but we have only two options.

Option A: IAEA demanded the barrels disposed/removed. In which case, you are correct and I am wrong.

Option B: IAEA didn't demand the removal of the barrels. In which case, Saddam was in compliance with this demand and the inspections were working.


It seems that since the barrels were sealed by the IAEA, it would seem that they were going on Option B. the fact that you seem to disagree with option B would be completely irrelevant to this thread.

 

[Texas]

No.
My point is the IAEA set the tone of how the policies were inacted. I do not know if the IAEA demanded removal of the yellowcake, but we have only two options.

Option A: IAEA demanded the barrels disposed/removed. In which case, you are correct and I am wrong.

Option B: IAEA didn't demand the removal of the barrels. In which case, Saddam was in compliance with this demand and the inspections were working.


It seems that since the barrels were sealed by the IAEA, it would seem that they were going on Option B. the fact that you seem to disagree with option B would be completely irrelevant to this thread.

It was the UN that demanded that the IAEA remove/destroy/or render harmless all nuclear related material. Placing a seal on the yellowcake containers did none of the three. It was still subject to theft or diversion. If you are saying and I think you are, that the IAEA was content with letting it stand unguarded then yes I agree but that just shows the lack of seriousness that the UN displays every day.

 

[GreyICE]

What the heck does that mean? The IAEA faclitates the develpment of nukes. The entire world knew what NK was doing but the UN insisted that the way to stop them was to send in the IAEA. All that did was give NK decades of unopposed research and development.

Everyone knew North Korea was pursuing it because the IAEA followed through with inspections. Everyone knew they had restarted because they removed the seals.

The IAEA was actually in favor of a tougher, more aggressive strategy than the people who brokered the original production stop deal - the US.

IAEA inspections, to date, have been very effective. No country has developed significant material production capacity under the IAEA inspections, no NPT signatory has developed a weapons program without notice in the early stages.

As for the aluminum tubes, here's how 'incompetent' the IAEA is:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intel...rpt/iraq-wmd_intell_09jul2004_conclusions.htm

The IAEA found that Iraq's claims that the aluminum tubes were intended for artillery rockets was completely consistent with the evidence on the ground in Iraq. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responded to the IAEA's analysis by producing intelligence reports which rejected the IAEA's conclusions. Without giving many details of the IAEA's findings, CIA's analysis suggested that the IAEA was being fooled by Iraq, and reiterated CIA's assessment that the tubes were to be used in uranium centrifuges.

(U) Conclusion 29. Numerous intelligence reports provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was trying to procure high strength aluminum tubes. The Committee believes that the information available to the Intelligence Community indicated that these tubes were intended to be used for an Iraqi conventional rocket program and not a nuclear program. (U) Conclusion 30. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) intelligence assessment on July 2, 2001 that the dimensions of the aluminum tubes "match those of a publicly available gas centrifuge design from the 1950s, known as the Zippe centrifuge" is incorrect. Similar information was repeated by the CIA in its assessments, including its input to the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) over the next year and a half.

(U) Conclusion 31. The Intelligence Community's position in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that the composition and dimensions of the aluminum tubes exceeded the requirements for non nuclear applications, is incorrect.

 

[Texas]

Everyone knew North Korea was pursuing it because the IAEA followed through with inspections. Everyone knew they had restarted because they removed the seals.

The IAEA was actually in favor of a tougher, more aggressive strategy than the people who brokered the original production stop deal - the US.

IAEA inspections, to date, have been very effective. No country has developed significant material production capacity under the IAEA inspections, no NPT signatory has developed a weapons program without notice in the early stages.

As for the aluminum tubes, here's how 'incompetent' the IAEA is:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intel...rpt/iraq-wmd_intell_09jul2004_conclusions.htm

The IAEA found that Iraq's claims that the aluminum tubes were intended for artillery rockets was completely consistent with the evidence on the ground in Iraq. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) responded to the IAEA's analysis by producing intelligence reports which rejected the IAEA's conclusions. Without giving many details of the IAEA's findings, CIA's analysis suggested that the IAEA was being fooled by Iraq, and reiterated CIA's assessment that the tubes were to be used in uranium centrifuges.

LOL, the IAEA defends Iraq when it tries to import proscribed material denied to it by the UNITED NATIONS. Wild and crazy guys. Please provide a link to IAEA demanding tougher actions against NK. You are prone to make assertions without proof.

 

[GreyICE]

LOL, the IAEA defends Iraq when it tries to import proscribed material denied to it by the UNITED NATIONS. Wild and crazy guys. Please provide a link to IAEA demanding tougher actions against NK. You are prone to make assertions without proof.

You are prone to making assertions without facts.

Care to defend your assertion that the tubes were for a nuclear program?

What are your specific complaints with the Senate report?

What is your specific complaint that with the IAEA in regards to their determination that the tubes were most likely not for a weapons program?

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&ct=r...WYWmqR7M6Ex7Bk6yg&sig2=s_JxTB0UY2Uk3FktCuqUFQ

 

[joobz]

LOL, the IAEA defends Iraq when it tries to import proscribed material denied to it by the UNITED NATIONS. Wild and crazy guys. Please provide a link to IAEA demanding tougher actions against NK. You are prone to make assertions without proof.

I'm curious as to why you keep mentioning NK?
based upon evidence in Iraq, the only conclusion we can draw is that the inspections/sanctions were working. This is what this thread is about.

 

[Texas]

I'm curious as to why you keep mentioning NK?
based upon evidence in Iraq, the only conclusion we can draw is that the inspections/sanctions were working. This is what this thread is about.

Because it is the best example of the futility of relying on the IAEA and the UN when it comes to Nuclear proliferation. The fact is that had we not attacked Iraq in 1991, Saddam's nuclear program would have gone unhindered. All the IAEA is capable of is kicking the can down the road. he following is a long excerpt of the sad story of IAEA's failure in North Korea and how the IAEA is used to buy time: It covers 5 years during which the IAEA was led around by the nose.

http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nuc/iaea7789.htm

11-16 May 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix arrives in Pyongyang prior to the IAEA inspection team to meet with North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong-muk, Minister of Atomic Energy Choe Hak-kun and first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju. He is reassured that the inspectors will be allowed access to any site in North Korea regardless if it is listed in the initial report submitted on 4 May 1992 to the IAEA.
In the course of the meetings, Blix visits the unfinished nuclear reprocessing laboratory at Yongbyon. After seeing the site, he reports that North Korea is building a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility capable of processing spent uranium into plutonium. He says that North Korea has already produced a "tiny quantity" of plutonium. However, the quantity is much less than what is required to build a nuclear weapon. According to the North Koreans, the reprocessing plant will be used to produce mixed-oxide fuel for future fast-breeder reactors. North Korea also expresses interest in building gas-graphite reactors because it can do so indigenously.
David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp.36-40; IAEA Newsbriefs, June-July 1992, p.3; Ann Maclachlan, Nucleonics Week, 21 May 1992, pp.7-8; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.79; T.R. Reid, Washington Post, 17 May 1992.

15 June 1992
According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, the North Korean technology that the IAEA saw at Yongbyon was "30 years old." Therefore, the IAEA disagrees with CIA reports that North Korea will be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the very near future. However, before making an accurate assessment, the IAEA must conduct additional inspections.
Reuters, 15 June 1992; Roland Prinz, Washington Times, 16 June 1992, p.A7.

August 1992
IAEA Director General Hans Blix testifies before the US Congress that North Korea has "emphatically denied" separating additional amounts of plutonium.
Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1993, pp.16-17

18 September 1992
According to IAEA Director General Hans Blix, North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities. Regardless, verification that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program will be difficult to attain. The IAEA believes that construction at an alleged nuclear reprocessing plant has been stopped. However, the IAEA Board of Governors says that "suspicion of nuclear development remains."
Yonhap (Seoul), 19 September 1992.


31 March 1993
North Korea refuses to allow inspections of two suspected sites at Yongbyon. According to the North Korean envoy in Vienna, Kim Gwang-sop, North Korea cannot accept the resolution because "it is too prompt and unreasonable" and it "cannot but take far stronger and more effective self-defense measures." The IAEA Board of Governors approves a resolution to call for the UN Security Council to intervene. China, however, does not believe that the United Nations should become involved and insists that a compromise can be reached with North Korea given more time. After the Board’s vote, the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom issue statements asking North Korea to comply with the safeguards agreement.
Reuters, 1 April 1993.
14 September 1993
The IAEA informs North Korea that if it does not allow ad hoc inspections, the IAEA will report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council.
KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 14 September 1993.

17 October 1993
IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that since North Korea has continued to delay IAEA access to check monitoring equipment, any assurance that North Korea is not diverting nuclear materials to weapons purposes has been diminishing. In the spring of 1993, the IAEA's main concern was the presence of undeclared plutonium and North Korea's non-acceptance of special inspections. The concern now is that the declared facilities and materials could also be diverted from peaceful purposes.
Korea Herald (Seoul), 20 October 1993.

1 November 1993
The UN General Assembly passes a nine-point resolution urging North Korea to "cooperate immediately with the IAEA in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement." The resolution is passed with 140 in favor, North Korea voting against, and nine abstentions.
Korea Times (Seoul), 3 November 1993.
2 November 1993
The IAEA announces that the Agency will not send an inspection team to North Korea following the latter's refusal to permit full-scope inspections. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that a country "cannot pick and choose which aspects of inspection programs it would permit to go ahead." He informs the UN General Assembly that "it remained possible that [North Korea] was trying to build a nuclear bomb."
AFP (Paris), 3 November 1993.

10 January 1994
The IAEA and North Korea hold a second round of "working-level" discussions on the scope and content of inspections. The IAEA submits a "check list" for inspections at North Korea's nuclear facilities. Items on the "check list" include examining the fuel rods at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor, taking samples, and checking seals and surveillance equipment. During the first round of "working-level" discussions held on 7 January 1994, the IAEA and North Korea disagreed on the details of implementing the safeguards.
Yonhap (Seoul), 11 January 1994; Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 8 January 1994; Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 10 January 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994.
4 February 1994
North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin says that "conflicting positions" between the IAEA and North Korea "cannot be merged at the moment" and that "no immediate prospect" exists for allowing the IAEA to administer unconditional inspections of the North's nuclear sites. According to Yun, North Korea "will not accept to clarify everything" and that it has "offered enough to prove the continuity of knowledge [about North Korea's nuclear activities]."
Reuters, 5 February 1994.

28 February 1994
According to Western intelligence sources, the design of North Korea's reprocessing complex being built at Yongbyon is intended specifically for the use of plutonium separation technologies developed by a consortium of 13 European counties called the European Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels (Eurochemic). However, IAEA officials from the Department of Safeguards believe that the plutonium extraction process is "no mystery." Similarly, Russian officials claim that the former Soviet Union furnished North Korea with the reprocessing technology.
Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 28 February 1998, pp

31 May 1994
The IAEA Director General Hans Blix announces that due to continued North Korean non-compliance with IAEA inspections, North Korea is "no longer [officially] in compliance with IAEA safeguards." The IAEA makes a final appeal to North Korea, asking it to stop withdrawing fuel rods from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and to allow international inspections to proceed. IAEA inspectors announce that key fuel rods have already been removed from the original 300 rods that are considered "vital to future measurement." In a telex to North Korea, the IAEA reiterates that it will accept two other methods of measuring the rods that remain, but according to Blix, North Korea has not accepted the proposals due to political constraints. North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin announces that the refueling will continue. Yun says that 40 rods have been withdrawn under IAEA camera surveillance and placed in a storage site "pending an inspection agreement."
Washington Post, 1 June 1994; Guardian (London), 1 June 1994.

10 June 1994
The IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution suspending technical aid to North Korea.

13 June 1994
North Korea submits a letter officially relinquishing its IAEA membership.
Cha Man-sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 15 June 1994.
15 June 1994
The IAEA inspectors leave North Korea because they can no longer account for the 8,000 fuel rods.
Executive News Service, 16 June 1994.

16 June 1994
North Korean President Kim Il-sung, in his talks with former US President Jimmy Carter, reportedly agrees to allow IAEA inspectors to remain at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and promises that the IAEA's monitoring equipment will stay in good condition.
UPI, 16 June 1994; Washington Times, 17 June 1994, pp. A1, A16.


13 September 1994
The IAEA states in a confidential report that inspections of the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon have yielded no evidence that plutonium has been extracted there since 1993. The conclusion is reached by analyzing nuclear samples taken from the radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] at Yongbyon in March and May 1994. There is suspicion, however, that fuel rods were processed at a second facility where inspections were not allowed. The report confirms that North Korea has not permitted inspections of two major nuclear facilities.
Neue Zuericher Zeitung (Zuerich), 15 September 1994.


13 October 1995
IAEA Director General Hans Blix says in a report to the UN Security Council that North Korea has denied the IAEA inspectors permission to evaluate the plutonium levels in the nuclear spent fuel. Blix adds that North Korea has only provided the IAEA with minimal access to its Yongbyon nuclear facilities.
KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 14 October 1995; in FBIS-EAS-95-202, 14 October 1995.
1 November 1995
The UN General Assembly passes a resolution urging North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA to allow the successful implementation of its nuclear safeguards agreement.
Yonhap (Seoul), 2 November 1995; in FBIS-EAS-95-216, 2 November 1995.



16 September 1996
During the IAEA's Annual General Conference in Vienna, IAEA Director General Hans Blix confirms that the 1995 Safeguards Implementation Report states that "the IAEA remained unable to verify the initial declaration of nuclear materials made by [North Korea]...and that this is still the case."
IAEA Daily Press Report, 22 October 1996, pp. 1-3.
17 September 1996
North Korea's representative to the UN agencies in Vienna states that North Korea "will not give the IAEA any information whatsoever" about spent fuel from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor "until the new reactors are finished and begin operating."
NuclearFuel, 23 September 1996, p.3.
19-27 September 1996
The IAEA's safeguards department and North Korea hold negotiations in Vienna. The IAEA fails to persuade North Korea to comply with its bilateral safeguards agreement.
NuclearFuel, 23 September 1996, pp.1-2.

17 March 1997
IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that talks between the IAEA and North Korea over the suspected North Korean nuclear program have stalled.
AFP (Paris), 17 March 1997; in FBIS-TAC-97-076, 17 March 1997.

 

[GreyICE]

Because it is the best example of the futility of relying on the IAEA and the UN when it comes to Nuclear proliferation. The fact is that had we not attacked Iraq in 1991, Saddam's nuclear program would have gone unhindered. All the IAEA is capable of is kicking the can down the road. he following is a long excerpt of the sad story of IAEA's failure in North Korea and how the IAEA is used to buy time: It covers 5 years during which the IAEA was led around by the nose.

http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nuc/iaea7789.htm

Okay, since you've now decided to focus on NK so much, I have to ask:

What would have been different with no IAEA?

Where exactly did the IAEA cause the stall? When did they advocate no action?

Where did they take half-measures that allowed a weapons program to slip through the cracks while creating the illusion of monitoring?

 

[Texas]

Okay, since you've now decided to focus on NK so much, I have to ask:

What would have been different with no IAEA?

Where exactly did the IAEA cause the stall? When did they advocate no action?

Where did they take half-measures that allowed a weapons program to slip through the cracks while creating the illusion of monitoring?

By consistently underplaying the threat. They snidely stated that NK technology was 30 years old and that NK was no where near a weapon contrary to intelligence reports to the contrary. Blix did it twice in just the excerpts I posted. His entire approach to North Korea mirrored his approach in Iraq, he voices "concerns" but never takes a position. He is the typical bureaucrat that epitomises the UN. Nothing he says is ever firm enough for policy makers responsible for actual lives to act on. His artful CYA statements means that any policy someone such as a president institutes that rely on his statements gives him cover no matter the outcome.

 

[GreyICE]

By consistently underplaying the threat. They snidely stated that NK technology was 30 years old and that NK was no where near a weapon contrary to intelligence reports to the contrary. Blix did it twice in just the excerpts I posted. His entire approach to North Korea mirrored his approach in Iraq, he voices "concerns" but never takes a position. He is the typical bureaucrat that epitomises the UN. Nothing he says is ever firm enough for policy makers responsible for actual lives to act on. His artful CYA statements means that any policy someone such as a president institutes that rely on his statements gives him cover no matter the outcome.

Lets see, according to your own link, they asked the security council for a resolution (remember, the SC is the board that can actually do things like have troops go places).

They then tried to work out an agreement minus a security council resolution, that would allow full inspections. They refuse half-measures, insisting on full and complete inspections.

In september, after limited access, they say that Plutonium is most likely being processed in 2 sites they do not have access to.

This is then followed by the IAEA constantly raising a series of red flags that NK was going for Nuclear bombs, which everyone steadfastly ignored.


What would have been better if they were not there?

 

[Texas]

Lets see, according to your own link, they asked the security council for a resolution (remember, the SC is the board that can actually do things like have troops go places).

They then tried to work out an agreement minus a security council resolution, that would allow full inspections. They refuse half-measures, insisting on full and complete inspections.

In september, after limited access, they say that Plutonium is most likely being processed in 2 sites they do not have access to.

This is then followed by the IAEA constantly raising a series of red flags that NK was going for Nuclear bombs, which everyone steadfastly ignored.


What would have been better if they were not there?

With China and Russia blocking ALL measures. There is really only two options to a rouge state acquiring nukes. Let the have them or take every action to prevent them having them. If it means bombing their facilities then so be it. That is what stopped Syria, and that is what stopped Iraq. Sanctions didn't work, UN resolutions didn't work and inspections sure as hell didn't work.

 

[thaiboxerken]

How can you say the inspections didn't work when Hussein's nuclear and WMD programs were rendered inactive because of them? I guess your cognitive dissonance has your mind in a knot.