The Hard Problem of Gravity

[westprog]

Ah, but the simulated CO2 will behave exactly like the real stuff within the bounds of the simulation. As far as the simulation is concerned, it IS the real stuff.

It will not, however, be real CO2. We all know this. We can all tell the difference between made up stuff and reality. Except in the case of consciousness, where we just assume that the simulation will be in some sense, "real".

Pixy at least is addressing this issue, even if it by the favoured method of blind assertions.

 

[cyborg]

We can all tell the difference between made up stuff and reality.

Not really - since what we call "reality" is all "made up stuff" inside our heads.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It will not, however, be real CO2. We all know this. We can all tell the difference between made up stuff and reality. Except in the case of consciousness, where we just assume that the simulation will be in some sense, "real".

Um, there is a difference between an action, which is a relation of parts, and an actual existent which comprises those parts.

Actions may only be defined in functional terms. Consciousness, whatever else you want to say about it, is an action and not a thing.

What is being simulated in a computer is the actual existents. When we simulate running, the "thing" in the simulation is running. We can't define the action -- running -- except in function terms, as a relation of the parts of the body running and its translational motion (relative to the rest of the environment). That is what 'running' means. The same is true of any simulation of consciousness. If we simulate neuron action, the simulated neurons will not be actual neurons, but the action is real; it is still a relation of the simulated parts.

This isn't true of only consciousness. It is true of all actions. Consciousness is simply one type of action.

The examples you continue to cite involve the inability of simulations to produce things, actual existents. No one thinks that simulations can do such a thing. Actions, however, are not things.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Actions, however, are not things.

I'm not clear about what you mean by actions. Would inertial velocity count as an action?

In addition, simulations do require a functional component (though a model may not need one), but their functions need only be isomorphic to the thing being simulated in some way. In the simplest example, our number system is isomorphic to number; in a digital analog, in order to count to 1000, you only need 10 bits (namely, you don't need actual number to count--but rather, some scheme--some "number system"--that can be mapped to number).

Given this, it's not so much what is being carried out that makes A simulate B, but rather, an isomorphism of what is being carried out.

And given this... what is it you mean exactly by action?

 

[rocketdodger]

Would inertial velocity count as an action?

Yes.

What wasp refers to as actions are what I refer to as relative properties.

There is no such thing as inertial velocity unless there is a reference frame to measure it from. Thus saying "X has such and such inertial velocity" is meaningless in a formal sense. What people mean when they say it are "X has such and such inertial velocity relative to Y," where Y is usually implicitly understood.

Note that at a fundamental level all properties are relative, but in practice it is easiest to treat many as being absolute. For instance, if we want to say "X is spherical in shape" that actually defines the relative properties of each point on the surface of X in terms of some point -- the center of the sphere -- which must itself be defined using relative properties. This is also implicitly understood.

Thus at a fundamental level there is no distinction between action and thing, since both are defined entirely by relative properties. This agrees with the materialist stance that both "things" and "actions" are merely "sets of properties."

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm not clear about what you mean by actions. Would inertial velocity count as an action?

In addition, simulations do require a functional component (though a model may not need one), but their functions need only be isomorphic to the thing being simulated in some way. In the simplest example, our number system is isomorphic to number; in a digital analog, in order to count to 1000, you only need 10 bits (namely, you don't need actual number to count--but rather, some scheme--some "number system"--that can be mapped to number).

Given this, it's not so much what is being carried out that makes A simulate B, but rather, an isomorphism of what is being carried out.

And given this... what is it you mean exactly by action?

Sure, inertial velocity is an action -- it can only be represented in relational terms.

The easiest way to describe it would be to say that which is represented in our language by a verb (most of the time).

Say, for instance, that we want to simulate a person calculating. We create the simulation. Whatever we can say about the "person" in the simulation, the calculation still occurs because it can only be defined in terms of its functions, its action.

There is no "real" person in the simulation; but I don't know how we could say that there was no "real" calculation going on.

Isomorphic functions do the same things, so in their action they cannot be separated. We can speak of differences in the actors -- simulated person vs. "real" person.

So, we could, as you point out simulate consciousness that does not follow exactly the same rules that our brains use as long as the functions map isomorphically, and this would still be a type of consciousness that would allow us to explain human consciousness. Or we could try to devise a computer that carries out exactly the same functions as interacting neurons. Either would do the trick.

RD got there first.

 

[rocketdodger]

You are ignoring the entire issue as to whether the simulation is digital or analogue.

No, I am not. There is no way to know whether the difference between digital and analogue even matters.

Let us assume our universe is a simulation. Can you determine if it is a digital or an analog simulation? No.

Let us assume our universe is not a simulation. Can you determine if physical properties are discrete or not? No.

Let us assume our universe is not a simulation and that physical properties are not discrete -- they are continuous. Can you determine if a change in a given property will result in a measurable behavior within the systems that property affects? Yes. This is all any entity can do.

So really, the only argument of yours that is even logically valid is that the phenomenon of consciousness requires precision that only an analog system can provide.

That is a decent argument, but the evidence we have about the way neurons work -- in particular, the fact that every molecule in the brain is in constant motion relative to all the others -- doesn't do much to support it.

And if the universe is a simulation, we have no way to know if consciousness as we experience it is the same as some kind of meta-consciousness outside the simulation. It is unlikely that it is.

Yet, you consider both to be a consciousness. You just label one with extra words, "meta."

Kind of like how Pixy and I say certain programs are conscious, but not "human" - conscious.

Now, you could argue that the meta-conscious beings of the outer universe don't consider us to be conscious -- that there are probably rocketdodger and westprog analogs arguing about the same issue we are arguing about.

And my response to that -- we know we experience, plain and simple. Who are they to doubt us? If we create a silicon system complex enough to be able to assert the fact of it's own experience in a non-trivial way, then who are we to doubt it?

 

[rocketdodger]

Even if the universe is discrete, that does not mean that it is equivalent to a digital simulation. It doesn't mean, for example, that it is equivalent to the stones-on-the-sand example, even if the simulation is exact.

That depends on what you mean be equivalent.

If you mean equivalent in the identity sense, then yes I agree. But I don't agree with the assumption that equivalent in the identity sense is important in general. It is only important if you are concerned with identity.

If you mean equivalent in the isomorphic sense, then you are incorrect, clearly if the same properties are present in two systems the two systems are isomorphic.

 

[Belz...]

It will not, however, be real CO2.

Irrelevant. It will be real in the simulation, and the dynamics will be identical to those of reality.

Besides, when describing actions, what is "real" ?

How real is "running" ?

We can all tell the difference between made up stuff and reality.

Not all of us. Some of us still believe in souls, apparently.

 

[Third Eye Open]

If I were to use a 'replicator' type device (such as on Star Trek) and build an orange out of nearby atoms, would it be a 'real' orange or a 'simulated' orange?

It would have all the properties and behaviors of an orange, and if mixed into a box of 'real' oranges, no one would be able to pick it out as the 'simulated' one.

If 'A' has all the same properties and behaviors as 'B', then A is B, there is no reason to differentiate.

My guess though, is that westprog would say the orange is not real, that it is missing some undefined 'essence' of orange-ness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

And when it comes to consciousness there is the entire body to consider. It's all a system -- the whole body -- not just the brain. Brains-in-vats are fine to talk about, but if anyone gets close to human-style consciousness my bet is that it's going to be in a robot and not in a desktop.

Granted. The processes of the entire body are a necessary requisite for generating our conscious experience. But the thing is, as far as our consciousness is concerned, almost all of those processes are beyond the periphery. While necessary, the background processes of the body seem to be incidental to consciousness.

The actual experience of conscious goins-on appears to take place only within the context of a specific range of neural activity and it would behoove us to figure out exactly what in this activity is IAOI conscious. It could be that consciousness can only be generated by biological entities of a certain composition or that it can be reproduced on any material medium. We'll never know for sure until consciousness, as a physical process, is sufficiently distinguished from other bodily processes can we speak seriously of simulating or reproducing it on some other medium.

 

[AkuManiMani]

You mean, like self-referential information processing?

As in the kind of information processing that goes on even during unconsciousness? No.

 

[blobru]

If I were to use a 'replicator' type device (such as on Star Trek) and build an orange out of nearby atoms, would it be a 'real' orange or a 'simulated' orange?

It would have all the properties and behaviors of an orange, and if mixed into a box of 'real' oranges, no one would be able to pick it out as the 'simulated' one.

If 'A' has all the same properties and behaviors as 'B', then A is B, there is no reason to differentiate.

My guess though, is that westprog would say the orange is not real, that it is missing some undefined 'essence' of orange-ness.

Sticking with the Star Trek theme, my guess is westprog would be ok with the reality of replicator oranges: it's holodeck (hologram-generated) oranges he would be reluctant to call "real".

Of course, our guesses are likely very poor simulations of the real westprog's real response.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I'll get to the rest as I have time since I don't have time to read through it all right now, but this caught my eye.

I would say that they have to feel like something or they would be nothing. To think about this issue, we need two bits of info: (1) nature only works with what its got; and (2) we must ask ourselves what an emotion or a feeling *is* or what it does.

From an evolutionary perspective, emotions and feelings came before language and complex calculation ability, so we are stuck with old ways of solving problems. Emotions and feelings are ways of solving social and environmental problems (mostly emotions) and ways of providing value to what goes on out there. Emotions motivate us toward certain actions. For them to do so they must take some form -- that is why we feel them. That is simply the form they take. Same with feelings, but feelings are much more complex cognitive processes than simple emotions.

They feel like something because that *is* the motivation and orientation toward action that they do.

I would imagine that we could recreate the same thing in a computer system, but since emotion and feeling are only "movements toward some action" or action tendencies, the resulting computer would not work the way that we want computers to work. Instead of doing precisely what we tell it to do, it would act in a less predictable fashion. That is how we are set up -- with behavioral tendencies rather than set programs. Consciousness is the process of sifting through those behavioral tendencies.

I would agree with you on this if it weren't for that fact that biological entities can, and do, sift and process behavioral tendencies without actually experiencing subjective correlations with them. As I mentioned earlier, even in humans behavioral and informational impulses are in constant feedback even during states of unconsciousness, like sleep. Its clear from such examples that impulses [biological or otherwise] can be [and almost always are] processed without them taking the form of any conscious experience(s).What is it about our conscious state that causes us to experience some impulses subjectively as emotions, sensations and thoughts?

I think the big problem here is that people are attempting to answer this question via a the a priori method. We know a priori that each of us are 'conscious'; the questions as to the nature of said consciousness [what it is physically, and why it is] can only be answered a posteriori [i.e. via scientific investigation].

 

[AkuManiMani]

Whatever about the relation between the simulated car and the simulated man, the relation between the real man and the simulated car is quite different. And the relation between the simulated man and the real man is unlikely to be a close one.

Even if the universe is discrete, that does not mean that it is equivalent to a digital simulation. It doesn't mean, for example, that it is equivalent to the stones-on-the-sand example, even if the simulation is exact.

In so far as 'simulation' vs. 'actual' I'd have to say that, at a certain degree of precision, I don't think that its justified to consider a 'simulated' object as anything other than a reproduction of the 'actual' object. Using rocks to carry out some computation of another physical process is not so much a simulation as it is a symbolic modeling of said process. This not much different than the way written language is merely a means of describing things, IAOI and not necessarily exemplars of the things being described.

What is at issue here is not whether consciousness can be synthetically reproduced or modeled [in principle it should be possible], but whether or not we know enough to go about synthesizing it. As of now, there is no such knowledge available. The next step to solving the 'hard problem' is determining accurately 'what' consciousness is. Then, all that will be left is the 'why' which, for all intents and purposes, will be the same as the 'why' of existence in general

 

[AkuManiMani]

True, but I do not think we have to simulate an entire universe to simulate, emulate, or create consciousness in a non meat based machine. I was pointing out that, at a very low level, there are good reasons to assume that there are no analog systems, only discrete ones that look analog because we are unable to analyze them at a sufficient level of detail.

Since you brought up QM already I think it would also be fair to take into account that, according to the principle of the wave/particle duality, the underlying processes of all physical interactions are both digital and analogue.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Aku, you HAVE no answers. It's difficult to like them or not. It's quite obvious that you don't like Dodger's answer, however.

All I've been doing is stating the flat fact that, based upon the evidence, there are no sufficient working models of consciousness -- period. The only way this can be overcome is by gaining a scientific understanding of consciousness, which has not been accomplished yet.

Until then, people like 'Dodger are just deceiving themselves.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Quale is just a name for experiences.

So why use "qualia" when we have a perfectly good other word for it ?

For the same reason why we use terms like 'genes', 'chromosomes', or 'alleles' instead of just saying 'hereditary elements'. Why quail at the term as if its taboo?

Define what you mean by 'real'. When I use the term I mean any actual phenomena. We experience sense impressions consciously and qualia is a label for that experience. If you don't like the term, feel free to create another synonymous word to label what is being discussed but there is no question that conscious experience [whatever one chooses to call it] is an actual phenomenon.

When defined as a private behaviour, yes. When it's defined as a soul-like thing, no.

And what in blue blazes is a 'soul-like thing' anyway???

You're observing qualia ? "Observing experience" sounds like the solipsist observer to me.

To qualitatively experience is qualia; to introspect is to directly observe qualia.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I would agree with you on this if it weren't for that fact that biological entities can, and do, sift and process behavioral tendencies without actually experiencing subjective correlations with them. As I mentioned earlier, even in humans behavioral and informational impulses are in constant feedback even during states of unconsciousness, like sleep. Its clear from such examples that impulses [biological or otherwise] can be [and almost always are] processed without them taking the form of any conscious experience(s).What is it about our conscious state that causes us to experience some impulses subjectively as emotions, sensations and thoughts?

I think the big problem here is that people are attempting to answer this question via a the a priori method. We know a priori that each of us are 'conscious'; the questions as to the nature of said consciousness [what it is physically, and why it is] can only be answered a posteriori [i.e. via scientific investigation].

To ensure that we are using language in the same way could you provide a few examples? I know of many examples in which we decide amongst different behaviors unconsciously, but that is a slightly different issue.

I realize that "behavioral tendency" is a thoroughly vague term.

 

[blobru]

I'll get to the rest as I have time since I don't have time to read through it all right now, but this caught my eye.

I would say that they have to feel like something or they would be nothing. To think about this issue, we need two bits of info: (1) nature only works with what its got; and (2) we must ask ourselves what an emotion or a feeling *is* or what it does.

From an evolutionary perspective, emotions and feelings came before language and complex calculation ability, so we are stuck with old ways of solving problems. Emotions and feelings are ways of solving social and environmental problems (mostly emotions) and ways of providing value to what goes on out there. Emotions motivate us toward certain actions. For them to do so they must take some form -- that is why we feel them. That is simply the form they take. Same with feelings, but feelings are much more complex cognitive processes than simple emotions.

They feel like something because that *is* the motivation and orientation toward action that they do.

I would imagine that we could recreate the same thing in a computer system, but since emotion and feeling are only "movements toward some action" or action tendencies, the resulting computer would not work the way that we want computers to work. Instead of doing precisely what we tell it to do, it would act in a less predictable fashion. That is how we are set up -- with behavioral tendencies rather than set programs. Consciousness is the process of sifting through those behavioral tendencies.

Wasp, by "feelings" do you mean: vague or mixed emotions, as in "I feel sort of anxious, sort of detached", or "this just doesn't feel right"; embodied / "kinesthetic" feeling (general sense of your own body, sense of balance, muscle fatigue); feelings from touch (coarse, smooth, etal); pain and pleasure (which some propose as a basis for the rest); classic 70's love ballad by Morris Albert [scratch that, sorry]; or all / some / none of / + other than the above?