The Hard Problem of Gravity

[westprog]

Wrong.

Analog systems can be predicted exactly. That is the whole point of using rational and real numbers instead of just decimal approximations.

I pour out 1/3 of a cup. How much is left? 2/3 of a cup. Is that not a perfect prediction?

There's a difference between a real-world system and real numbers. 1 divided by 3 is exactly a third. Dividing the contents of an actual cup by 3 is impossible to do accurately.

It's possible to count atoms, of course - but then we have an effective digital system. Digital measurements - counting - can be exact.

 

[rocketdodger]

There's a difference between a real-world system and real numbers. 1 divided by 3 is exactly a third. Dividing the contents of an actual cup by 3 is impossible to do accurately.

So any real-world system that depends on exactly a third of the cup is **** out of luck.

In other words, real world systems don't depend on infinite precision.

Thank you for defeating your own argument.

 

[nescafe]

There's a difference between a real-world system and real numbers. 1 divided by 3 is exactly a third. Dividing the contents of an actual cup by 3 is impossible to do accurately.

Sure we can -- we can do that to any degree of precision you desire within the limits our technology imposes. 1/3 is a rational number and can be perfectly represented in a digital system.

It's possible to count atoms, of course - but then we have an effective digital system. Digital measurements - counting - can be exact.

To the degree that we can tell, every system found in nature has a discrete number of states. QM strongly implies that it is meaningless to talk about lengths shorter than Planck length and timescales shorter than Planck time, and GR forces us to accept that the speed of light is an upper bound on how fast information can be transmitted. These strongly imply that the universe is quantitized and therefore discrete in nature. If something is discrete, it is countable and can therefore be represented perfectly by a digital system.

 

[rocketdodger]

QM strongly implies that it is meaningless to talk about lengths shorter than Planck length and timescales shorter than Planck time,

In the book Accelerando some uploaded people are able to determine the fidelity of the simulations they inhabit by comparing the planck constants of those simulations.

Kind of a cool thought.

 

[westprog]

In the book Accelerando some uploaded people are able to determine the fidelity of the simulations they inhabit by comparing the planck constants of those simulations.

Kind of a cool thought.

I was talking to Charlie Stross about his cat a couple of weeks ago.

 

[westprog]

So any real-world system that depends on exactly a third of the cup is **** out of luck.

In other words, real world systems don't depend on infinite precision.

Thank you for defeating your own argument.

No, they don't. I didn't say that the human mind depends of infinite precision. I said that it's not possible to emulate an analogue system with a digital system. It's possible to simulate it to some extent, but never perfectly.

 

[westprog]

Sure we can -- we can do that to any degree of precision you desire within the limits our technology imposes. 1/3 is a rational number and can be perfectly represented in a digital system.

We can reduce the imprecision but we can't remove it, if we are dealing with an analogue system. The only way to make it precise is to count atoms i.e. convert to a digital system.

To the degree that we can tell, every system found in nature has a discrete number of states. QM strongly implies that it is meaningless to talk about lengths shorter than Planck length and timescales shorter than Planck time, and GR forces us to accept that the speed of light is an upper bound on how fast information can be transmitted. These strongly imply that the universe is quantitized and therefore discrete in nature. If something is discrete, it is countable and can therefore be represented perfectly by a digital system.

Even if the universe were entirely digital - which is something we don't know - then it would require a system bigger than the universe to simulate it. Whether such a simulation would be equivalent to the universe is something we really don't know.

 

[westprog]

The fundamental tenant of modern materialism is that the only thing which exists are properties.

It is mathematically impossible to show otherwise, since anything you observe about an entity amounts to some kind of property.

So a neuron is a set of properties. You can't really dispute this.

Furthermore, all properties can be emulated / simulated.

You don't quite understand how this could be done, because you still haven't wrapped your brain around the fact that what you call "physical" properties are relative.

The interactions between particles are relative. The interactions between you and your car are relative. The interactions between the neurons in a brain are relative. Location, velocity, momentum, time, even energy -- all relative properties.

When a relative property is simulated, all relevant sides are included. If not, then the property is not being simulated. Plain and simple.

Obviously, when a car is simulated and you are not, you are not included in the simulation. Obviously, the simulated car and the real you can't interact -- the physical properties of the simulated car are not relative to you anymore.
Obviously, if you were simulated as well, then you could interact with the simulated car.

If you disagree with any of this, then feel free to mathematically prove that we do not live in a simulation right now. Or, simply tell me how it might even be possible to figure out whether we are living in a simulation or not.

Whatever about the relation between the simulated car and the simulated man, the relation between the real man and the simulated car is quite different. And the relation between the simulated man and the real man is unlikely to be a close one.

 

[westprog]

I'm afraid that I don't quite understand. First, computer systems are not being proposed as human beings, so what difference does it make that analogue and digital are simply two ways of describing a system.

None of us ultimately know what is going on at a deep level, so the analogue description is just as much an approximation as a digital one is. If we construct a digital representation of the process of consciousness, how have we not understood what consciousness is?

I'm not talking about the description of the system, I'm talking about the actual system.

It is never possible to emulate any analogue system with a digital system. It is only possible to simulate it.

 

[rocketdodger]

No, they don't. I didn't say that the human mind depends of infinite precision. I said that it's not possible to emulate an analogue system with a digital system. It's possible to simulate it to some extent, but never perfectly.

But "perfectly" is impossible to determine, as you just showed. One cannot perfectly determine what 1/3 of a cup of water is.

Which means that in principle it is impossible to determine whether any given analogue system is "real" instead of a "simulation."

Hence, the question you have been avoiding for pages now -- can you show that we are not living in a simulation right now?

 

[rocketdodger]

Whatever about the relation between the simulated car and the simulated man, the relation between the real man and the simulated car is quite different. And the relation between the simulated man and the real man is unlikely to be a close one.

The relations between the real man and simulated car or the real car and simulated man or the real man and simulated man have nothing to do with anything.

The relations in question are

1) relations between the simulated car and the simulated man
2) relations between the real car and the real man

Now, what you have to show is any mathematical difference between 1) and 2).

Is there any relationship in 2) that cannot, in principle, be present in 1)?

 

[nescafe]

We can reduce the imprecision but we can't remove it, if we are dealing with an analogue system. The only way to make it precise is to count atoms i.e. convert to a digital system.

Even if the universe were entirely digital - which is something we don't know - then it would require a system bigger than the universe to simulate it. Whether such a simulation would be equivalent to the universe is something we really don't know.

True, but I do not think we have to simulate an entire universe to simulate, emulate, or create consciousness in a non meat based machine. I was pointing out that, at a very low level, there are good reasons to assume that there are no analog systems, only discrete ones that look analog because we are unable to analyze them at a sufficient level of detail.

 

[blobru]

In terms of data processing, assuming the brain is the sort of computer covered by the Church-Turing thesis, and that the thesis is correct -- sure; but even then we'd still have to establish that that suffices for consciousness (e.g., consciousness could be a side-effect of the way the data is processed; it may require the neuron as well as the data it contains).

I contend that this is logically incoherent and physically impossible -...

Possibly... just working it out as I go along (I don't find any theory of consciousness, so far as I understand it, very persuasive; albeit, this may say more about my ignorance than the theories).

that consciousness is an informational process and can therefore, by definition, only arise from computational function,

Sure. We need to stipulate though that "informational process" may be necessary but not sufficient for consciousness; also, some informational processes may not be computable (yield a "computational function").

and that there is nothing happening but computational function in the brain that could give rise to anything remotely resembling conscious behaviour; no magical fields or souls or whatnot.

I'm with you on the magical fields and souls. If "whatnot" however refers to the physical changes in the body, especially the nervous system, that accompany the computation -- I'm not ready to rule this out as having a role in generating consciousness.

We know one by definition - consciousness is this sort of process, so it can only be formed by this sort of system.

Agreed. But we don't know if every system of this sort will form consciousness (whether consciousness is substrate-independent).

We know the other by neurobiology, neurochemistry, and neurophysics - there are no magic fields, no shouting neurons, most certainly no souls.

**I'm with you on the "shouting neurons" too. But whether neurons (or close facsimiles) in situ are basic to sensation, as the nervous system not only 'computes' but also filters / translates input from the environment (in a way other substrates may or may not do), and whether it is just these sensations from which consciousness -- the feeling of consciousness, not just the information (assuming that's a sensible distinction) -- emerges, I can't say.**

Quick query: according to Strong AI, which I think you agree with, would a mechanical computer such as Babbage's Analytical Engine that replicated the brain's algorithms [be able to] generate consciousness?


ETA: **Yuck: upon rereading, this 'analysis' is just a lot of vague blather; will think on it and try to come up with some more pointed objection(s) if I can to Strong AI.

 

[PixyMisa]

There's a difference between a real-world system and real numbers. 1 divided by 3 is exactly a third. Dividing the contents of an actual cup by 3 is impossible to do accurately.

It's possible to count atoms, of course - but then we have an effective digital system. Digital measurements - counting - can be exact.

So this so-called "real world" of yours is just what you get when you don't bother to examine the real world closely enough?

After all, you just claimed that dividing the contents of a cup by 3 is both possible and impossible. I have a problem with self-contradictory beliefs, even if you don't.

 

[westprog]

Hence, the question you have been avoiding for pages now -- can you show that we are not living in a simulation right now?

Since I spent a long time arguing exactly that in another thread, I'm clearly not dismissing it. However, the relationship between real and simulated still holds even within a simulation.

 

[westprog]

True, but I do not think we have to simulate an entire universe to simulate, emulate, or create consciousness in a non meat based machine. I was pointing out that, at a very low level, there are good reasons to assume that there are no analog systems, only discrete ones that look analog because we are unable to analyze them at a sufficient level of detail.

It's a moot point anyway. Nobody is proposing a simulation at the level at which the universe may (or may not) be digital. All simulations operate at a much higher level. The idea of making a simulation of a brain that operated at the planck length is quite impossible.

In any case, even if we did, it would still be a simulation and not an emulation.

 

[westprog]

The relations between the real man and simulated car or the real car and simulated man or the real man and simulated man have nothing to do with anything.

The relations in question are

1) relations between the simulated car and the simulated man
2) relations between the real car and the real man

Now, what you have to show is any mathematical difference between 1) and 2).

Is there any relationship in 2) that cannot, in principle, be present in 1)?

It might be possible to simulate any given relationship. However, the simulation will always involve discarding information.

 

[Belz...]

Not really. An experience refers to the notion of a sensation such as the "redness" of red or the "blueness" of blue.

You're going to have to explain:

A) What the hell is "redness" in this context and
B) How is that NOT a private behaviour.

A private behavior would merely be a cognitive process that would have the potential of triggering a public behavior like someone saying, "I see the color red."

And why wouldn't that be what "redness" is ?

 

[Belz...]

"Dualistic words". Perhaps you could make a list of those bad dualistic words which should be avoided. Go through the dictionary with a black marker.

I expected nothing else from you, westprog. From some other people I'd expect a reasonable amount of effort to try and understand the issue and why language is sometimes inadequate to express these things. Instead, you resort to bad humour.

 

[Belz...]

Translation:

Yeah -- I don't like your answers.

Whatever floats your boat.

Aku, you HAVE no answers. It's difficult to like them or not. It's quite obvious that you don't like Dodger's answer, however.