The Hard Problem of Gravity

[Belz...]

Quale is just a name for experiences.

So why use "qualia" when we have a perfectly good other word for it ?

Define what you mean by 'real'. When I use the term I mean any actual phenomena. We experience sense impressions consciously and qualia is a label for that experience. If you don't like the term, feel free to create another synonymous word to label what is being discussed but there is not question that conscious experience [whatever one chooses to call it] is an actual phenomenon.

When defined as a private behaviour, yes. When it's defined as a soul-like thing, no.

Hmm...thats an interesting interpretation. If you think about it every entity is an extension of all others -- the universe, and everything in it, is singular.

In a way, yes. But the information processing occurs in more-or-less defined places i.e. humans, for instance.

I'm not 'assuming' qualia exist; I'm directly observing a phenomenon and choosing to label it qualia.

You're observing qualia ? "Observing experience" sounds like the solipsist observer to me.

 

[Belz...]

So what is it that you suggest the brain does that can't be done algorithmically?

I'd like to see that answered, too, west.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's a moot point anyway. Nobody is proposing a simulation at the level at which the universe may (or may not) be digital. All simulations operate at a much higher level. The idea of making a simulation of a brain that operated at the planck length is quite impossible.

You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.

In any case, even if we did, it would still be a simulation and not an emulation.

You rush a miracle man, you get rotten miracles.

 

[Belz...]

No, they don't. I didn't say that the human mind depends of infinite precision. I said that it's not possible to emulate an analogue system with a digital system. It's possible to simulate it to some extent, but never perfectly.

Why not ? What's preventing us from doing it perfectly ?

 

[westprog]

I expected nothing else from you, westprog. From some other people I'd expect a reasonable amount of effort to try and understand the issue and why language is sometimes inadequate to express these things. Instead, you resort to bad humour.

"O wad some Power the Giftie gie us...". The point is that most of the dictionary is full of so-called "dualist" words, and if we refuse to use them, we are unable to deal with the human experience.

 

[PixyMisa]

"O wad some Power the Giftie gie us...". The point is that most of the dictionary is full of so-called "dualist" words, and if we refuse to use them, we are unable to deal with the human experience.

Human experience? I don't think they exist.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm not talking about the description of the system, I'm talking about the actual system.

It is never possible to emulate any analogue system with a digital system. It is only possible to simulate it.

What possible difference does this make to the situation of explaining how consciousness works? No one is proposing, once again, that a computer functioning is human consciousness, only that it can explain it, describe it.

No description, no simulation is the thing itself, but so what? Who is saying that it is?

Unless you are saying that a simulation is just not enough, that there will always be something more that can't be explained -- and that is full-on dualism -- then what is the point of harping on this?

If you're a dualist just say it and be done with it.

 

[Belz...]

"O wad some Power the Giftie gie us...". The point is that most of the dictionary is full of so-called "dualist" words, and if we refuse to use them, we are unable to deal with the human experience.

I'm not saying we can't use the words, westprog. I'm saying that you use dualistic concepts when talking about consciousness. You say one thing but seem to believe another.

 

[westprog]

I'm not saying we can't use the words, westprog. I'm saying that you use dualistic concepts when talking about consciousness. You say one thing but seem to believe another.

Everybody uses those words. It is impossible to function as a human without using those words. If they imply dualism, then everybody is an implied dualist.

I suggested a list of words that shouldn't be used if we wish to avoid the accusation. Clearly I was being sarcastic. The list would be far too long to be useful.

 

[westprog]

What possible difference does this make to the situation of explaining how consciousness works? No one is proposing, once again, that a computer functioning is human consciousness, only that it can explain it, describe it.

No description, no simulation is the thing itself, but so what? Who is saying that it is?

Unless you are saying that a simulation is just not enough, that there will always be something more that can't be explained -- and that is full-on dualism -- then what is the point of harping on this?

I'm amazed that something very basic and very obvious - that a simulation is not the same as the thing it simulates - is so controversial.

I'll repeat what I said again. It is impossible to emulate an analogue system with a digital process. If consciousness is an analogue system, we can no more emulate digitally than we can generate CO2 with an simulation of the internal combustion engine.

If you're a dualist just say it and be done with it.

I really don't understand this idea that consciousness can't be a physical phenomenon - that it must be associated with some kind of amorphous side effect of data processing. And not to think this is in some way dualist! Where do these ideas come from?
How does insisting on a physical explanation for a physical phenomenon make one a dualist? How can an insistance that consciousness is a non-physical side effect of data processing be compatible with materialism?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm amazed that something very basic and very obvious - that a simulation is not the same as the thing it simulates - is so controversial.

I'll repeat what I said again. It is impossible to emulate an analogue system with a digital process. If consciousness is an analogue system, we can no more emulate digitally than we can generate CO2 with an emulation of the internal combustion engine.

What do you mean controversial? My point is "what difference does it make?" How does that carry any connotation that I think it controversial? I consider it trivial at best.

I really don't understand this idea that consciousness can't be a physical phenomenon - that it must be associated with some kind of amorphous side effect of data processing. And not to think this is in some way dualist! Where do these ideas come from?
How does insisting on a physical explanation for a physical phenomenon make one a dualist? How can an insistance that consciousness is a non-physical side effect of data processing be compatible with materialism?

The point is that if we are trying to understand how consciousness happens and we can simulate it in a digital system, then we probably do understand it. The digital representation, where we re-create essentially what happens with human consciousness, is the demonstration that shows that we have a handle on what consciousness is. The reason that we bother with computer modelling of this is because we can't slowly remove neurons in humans or slowly replace neurons with silicon chips. Computer systems are the best model we have for this.

If you are saying that we can't simulate this in a computer, then you are saying that there is something more to consciousness than what can be done digitially. If this is merely the trivial notion that a simulation is not precisely the thing itself, then who cares? That's just a trivial observation we already know. If you are saying that we can simulate human consciousness theoretically in a computer, then where is the controversy? That's certainly all that I am saying -- that we should be able to work out many of the details in that sort of system. No one that I know of, again, is saying that computers are human consciousness, only that we can understand human consciousness through analogy with computers.


ETA:

Or, wait a second........are you trying to argue that a simulation is not the-thing-itself, so any simulation of consciousness is not conscious? That would be a category mistake. Simulation of physical objects are not the things themselves, but that doesn't cover consciousness. Consciousness is defined functionally; it is an action. A simulation of an action is the action (in simulation). A simulation of running is running. The action is still being carried out. A simulation of a motor running is a motor running -- the actions still occur within the simulation. They don't produce actual real world consequences, but the actions are still there.

 

[nescafe]

I'm amazed that something very basic and very obvious - that a simulation is not the same as the thing it simulates - is so controversial.

And when you run your simulation on a platform that is capable of interacting with the real world that changes things again. Would it still be simulated consciousness if the robot running the consciousness simulator is capable of talking (via speaker controlled by the computer the consciousness simulator is running on), sensing the world (via cameras, microphones, temperature and pressure sensors, etc), and moving (robotic limbs)?

If it is still a simulation at that point, then your consciousness is just as much a simulation -- after all, it exists as a quasistable pattern of neural activity in your brain.

 

[rocketdodger]

Since I spent a long time arguing exactly that in another thread, I'm clearly not dismissing it. However, the relationship between real and simulated still holds even within a simulation.

Completely irrelevant. The relationship between real and simulated has nothing to do with the reasoning here.

1) You are sure you are conscious.
2) It is possible this is a simulation.
3) By 1) and 2), it is possible your consciousness is a simulation.
4) 3) is directly contradictory to your assertion that simulated consciousness isn't consciousness.

 

[rocketdodger]

It might be possible to simulate any given relationship. However, the simulation will always involve discarding information.

Ah, but you are mincing words here.

A simulation does always involve discarding information, but not necessarily information about the relationship being simulated since, as nescafe brought up, there is evidence that suggests the universe is entirely discrete anyway.

If it turns out that the universe is discrete, or even just effectively discrete, then your entire argument evaporates.

 

[rocketdodger]

Or, wait a second........are you trying to argue that a simulation is not the-thing-itself, so any simulation of consciousness is not conscious? That would be a category mistake. Simulation of physical objects are not the things themselves, but that doesn't cover consciousness. Consciousness is defined functionally; it is an action. A simulation of an action is the action (in simulation). A simulation of running is running. The action is still being carried out. A simulation of a motor running is a motor running -- the actions still occur within the simulation. They don't produce actual real world consequences, but the actions are still there.

Hence the reluctance by some people to agree to a functional definition of consciousness...

 

[westprog]

And when you run your simulation on a platform that is capable of interacting with the real world that changes things again. Would it still be simulated consciousness if the robot running the consciousness simulator is capable of talking (via speaker controlled by the computer the consciousness simulator is running on), sensing the world (via cameras, microphones, temperature and pressure sensors, etc), and moving (robotic limbs)?

If it is still a simulation at that point, then your consciousness is just as much a simulation -- after all, it exists as a quasistable pattern of neural activity in your brain.

If the simulation is an analogue simulation, then it is possible that it can be an exact functional replacement for an analogue process. But just hanging arms and legs off a digital simulation of a brain is not guaranteed to produce something equivalent.

It's possible to emulate any physical process. So if consciousness is physical - which seems at least a plausible explanation - then it should be possible to produce it. The question is how?

 

[Belz...]

I'm not saying we can't use the words, westprog. I'm saying that you use dualistic concepts when talking about consciousness. You say one thing but seem to believe another.

Everybody uses those words.

I think you missed this part of my post:

I'm not saying we can't use the words, westprog. I'm saying that you use dualistic concepts when talking about consciousness. You say one thing but seem to believe another.

 

[westprog]

Completely irrelevant. The relationship between real and simulated has nothing to do with the reasoning here.

1) You are sure you are conscious.
2) It is possible this is a simulation.
3) By 1) and 2), it is possible your consciousness is a simulation.
4) 3) is directly contradictory to your assertion that simulated consciousness isn't consciousness.

You are ignoring the entire issue as to whether the simulation is digital or analogue. And if the universe is a simulation, we have no way to know if consciousness as we experience it is the same as some kind of meta-consciousness outside the simulation. It is unlikely that it is.

 

[Belz...]

I'm amazed that something very basic and very obvious - that a simulation is not the same as the thing it simulates - is so controversial.

A lot of CT proponents also claim that what they say is "basic" and "obvious". It's a good thing that "common sense" is not often used in science.

After all it's "obvious" that the sun rises in the morning.

I'll repeat what I said again. It is impossible to emulate an analogue system with a digital process.

And I'll repeat again: why not ?

If consciousness is an analogue system, we can no more emulate digitally than we can generate CO2 with an simulation of the internal combustion engine.

Ah, but the simulated CO2 will behave exactly like the real stuff within the bounds of the simulation. As far as the simulation is concerned, it IS the real stuff.

I really don't understand this idea that consciousness can't be a physical phenomenon - that it must be associated with some kind of amorphous side effect of data processing.

Which, of course, IS a physical phenomenon.

 

[westprog]

If it turns out that the universe is discrete, or even just effectively discrete, then your entire argument evaporates.

Even if the universe is discrete, that does not mean that it is equivalent to a digital simulation. It doesn't mean, for example, that it is equivalent to the stones-on-the-sand example, even if the simulation is exact.