The Future of Moral Science

Actually, I think it has been obvious that I have argued your position is basically not coherent. You cannot simply slide from descriptive to normative morality, for example, and I think much of the problem that has heated up this discussion is in your not understanding the distinction, which I have tried very hard to point out to you.

Oh, and I also think that you have shifted in your position a lot over the various threads that we have discussed this. I seem to remember that you began very stridently and dogmatically asserting that morality was a genetically-coded instinct and that you argued that not only do we follow these instincts but we can do no other. When it was pointed out to you that some evolutionary instincts were not what we might be inclined to call moral, you shifted to talking about dominant instincts etc... Each time you come back to argue your case the case seems to have altered.

However, as it is Christmas and we are preparing to celebrate the birth of our dear sweet Lord Jesus, I shall pray for your soul.

This is a complete misrepresentation of my position. I have consistently argued that, as an evolved social species, we are genetically predisposed to behave in such a way as promote a cohesive society. This includes naturally selected instincts such as altruism and adherence to the rules of the group. And that our moral codes, i.e. our rules of behaviour, are grounded in these instincts.

This is NOT the same as your parody that “morality” itself (i.e. the individual rules of morality) are “genetically-encoded” and that “we can do no other” than follow these rules. There is a significant difference between having a natural tendency to behave in a certain way and being predestined to behave in such a way.

I'll have to look through that more thoroughly, but for now I will only observe that what is being said here may not be what you think is being said. I tend to agree with Smart's ideas of physicalism, but I think he may be making an error to go from there to a moral realist position of act utilitarianism. For me it seems a more likely conclusion is that of moral nihilism. But these are tough questions which I do not have time to resolve for humanity's edification just now.

Interesting that you feel unable, even as an initial reaction, to agree with Smart that the scientific approach even if incomplete at this stage, is ”far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology, say, or the wilder reaches of a more speculative metaphysics…” Thus, by implication, you consider that speculative metaphysics can be placed at least potentially upon an equal or superior footing with science?

Why would you think this?
 
If you have to refer (without any scientific basis) to an axiomatic "well-being of conscious creatures is good" or "suffering is bad" or "human species existence is good" then you have already failed. Like Sam Harris, who shoehorns well-being into his blah-blah. This isn't very complicated. No amount of sub-point 2as or 5fs can counter this. I'd point to the OP's flaws and shoe-horns but think that's already been done.

Any scientific study of what's the "best" moral anything has to initially start with what moral goals are. And that goes back to Is-Ought problem and Hume. Which is what multiple posters have already pointed to as the fundamental and insurmountable flaw.

"A weapon destroys the entire human race"
"A male human rapes all human females and murders all male humans other than himself"
"A hippopotamus develops consciousness and superpowers and makes everyone in the Universe love everyone"


Science doesn't say whether any of these are morally good or bad. Anyone who thinks science does or possibly could is either a) a moron or smart person with a particular giant moron flaw on this subject or b) someone wanting to replace religion with science as their moral compass. Sorry, but that's what it is. Look in the mirror. Again, not complicated.

ETA: Kinda ninjaing in late despite having on-off read the thread... my response is to the OP: "Not merely that science can help us answer such questions, after values are established. My claim is that values, themselves, can be determined by science, as well." Is what I'm responding to. Sorry if this thread doesn't have anything to do anymore with that wild ridiculous claim. Maybe it's gone off-topic with "genetic predisposition" and evolution and neurophysiology, which have nothing to do with whether science can determine moral values.
 
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Interesting that you feel unable, even as an initial reaction, to agree with Smart that the scientific approach even if incomplete at this stage, is ”far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology, say, or the wilder reaches of a more speculative metaphysics…” Thus, by implication, you consider that speculative metaphysics can be placed at least potentially upon an equal or superior footing with science?

Why would you think this?

Not to answer for him/her, but: On moral questions, metaphysics, science, religion, all are not to be trusted because they have nothing to do with the fairy-tale objective morality. This is like begging that my yard's snail is to be far more trusted on moral values instantiation than my yard's raccoon.

"Far more to be trusted"?? "Rival guidance"?? Is this guy currently ice-picking up an ancient mountain about to scale over the ledge and get the True Morality? Maybe Shangri-la really has a big science machine that doles it out and he's inches away...

How about each is equally trusted or mistrusted because each has equally nothing to do with morality. Science can't define moral values. Religion can't. Metaphysics can't. This apparent rivalry amounts to the rivalry between which equals zero: 2-2, or 3-3, or 18-18.
 
You haven’t answered the question:

Do you, or do you not, think that in general terms our rules of behaviour are arrived at by much the same process as that of our forebears of the genus Homo over the past 200,000 years? If not, why not? Are you arguing that we are different in kind to our Cavemen or Hunter/Gatherer predecessors and that we don’t require evolved instincts upon which to base our moral code– on what basis do you argue this?

Of course I haven't answered the question, because the question is merely a distraction tactic.

So, you agree with me that the distinction can only hold true in a deductive argument?

No, that wouldn't follow at all. You can't deduce an ought from an is, but you can't make any inductive or probabilistic argument for an ought from an is either. If you think you can, the you have just misunderstood what Hume was saying.

My views on moral naturalism, i.e. the meta-ethical position I’m arguing, have been outlined by me and (deliberately?) misconstrued by you repeatedly. I see no point in repeating them.

There's a joke argument that goes like this:

"Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis that p is false, on the basis of alleged counterexamples. But these so- called "counterexamples" depend on construing my thesis that p in a way that it was obviously not intended -- for I intended my thesis to have no counterexamples. Therefore p."

Your problem is that you believe your theory to be coherent, therefore you assume that any demonstration of your theory's incoherence must have somehow misconstrued it.

The fact is we understand your argument perfectly well, because it's not new and it's the same incoherent mess we've seen many times before. The problem is not that we don't understand it, it's that we understand it and it is wrong.
 
If you have to refer (without any scientific basis) to an axiomatic "well-being of conscious creatures is good" or "suffering is bad" or "human species existence is good" then you have already failed. Like Sam Harris, who shoehorns well-being into his blah-blah. This isn't very complicated. No amount of sub-point 2as or 5fs can counter this. I'd point to the OP's flaws and shoe-horns but think that's already been done.

Any scientific study of what's the "best" moral anything has to initially start with what moral goals are. And that goes back to Is-Ought problem and Hume. Which is what multiple posters have already pointed to as the fundamental and insurmountable flaw.

"A weapon destroys the entire human race"
"A male human rapes all human females and murders all male humans other than himself"
"A hippopotamus develops consciousness and superpowers and makes everyone in the Universe love everyone"


Science doesn't say whether any of these are morally good or bad. Anyone who thinks science does or possibly could is either a) a moron or smart person with a particular giant moron flaw on this subject or b) someone wanting to replace religion with science as their moral compass. Sorry, but that's what it is. Look in the mirror. Again, not complicated.

ETA: Kinda ninjaing in late despite having on-off read the thread... my response is to the OP: "Not merely that science can help us answer such questions, after values are established. My claim is that values, themselves, can be determined by science, as well." Is what I'm responding to. Sorry if this thread doesn't have anything to do anymore with that wild ridiculous claim. Maybe it's gone off-topic with "genetic predisposition" and evolution and neurophysiology, which have nothing to do with whether science can determine moral values.

…and this is the point. Morals are simply rules of behaviour which serve a purpose - they don’t just exist in splendid isolated perfection in some metaphysical realm far away. They're functional. And the “function” morality serves for an evolved social species such as us, is to reinforce and sustain our “existence as social animals. It’s a survival thing.

To date this has been determined by our evolved instincts for altruism and our naturally selected dependence upon group living. The argument of Sam Harris et al is that science may be able to help this process by determining empirically which behaviours best support this process.

Not to answer for him/her, but: On moral questions, metaphysics, science, religion, all are not to be trusted because they have nothing to do with the fairy-tale objective morality. This is like begging that my yard's snail is to be far more trusted on moral values instantiation than my yard's raccoon.

"Far more to be trusted"?? "Rival guidance"?? Is this guy currently ice-picking up an ancient mountain about to scale over the ledge and get the True Morality? Maybe Shangri-la really has a big science machine that doles it out and he's inches away...

How about each is equally trusted or mistrusted because each has equally nothing to do with morality. Science can't define moral values. Religion can't. Metaphysics can't. This apparent rivalry amounts to the rivalry between which equals zero: 2-2, or 3-3, or 18-18.

So what is "morality" in your view?
 
Of course I haven't answered the question, because the question is merely a distraction tactic.

Well you need to answer the question because it’s the core of the argument. Homo sapiens have had rules about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ behavior (i.e. morality) from the very start. They were necessary to maintain the communal living essential for their survival as a species. All social animals have had to modify or restrain their behaviours to enable group living. Modern humans do it via legislation and social pressure. I’m reasonably certain that our Paleolithic predecessors didn’t sit around contemplating coherent metaphysical arguments in order to determine how to behave and nor do we in practise.

Even our simian cousins have evolved notions of fairness and unfair behaviour (i.e. good and bad) as tested by Frans de Waal et al. Our genetic predispositions for cooperative living form the instinctive basis for our moral code; this is not in doubt among most evolutionary biologists.

No, that wouldn't follow at all. You can't deduce an ought from an is, but you can't make any inductive or probabilistic argument for an ought from an is either. If you think you can, the you have just misunderstood what Hume was saying.

Moral questions can be pursued using not just philosophy but scientific methodology which frequently relies on inductive reasoning. Science can determine why we are the way we are, do what we do and why we value the things we do. All of these issues have a role in determining what is good and bad behaviour in the context of a social species like us.

There's a joke argument that goes like this:

"Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis that p is false, on the basis of alleged counterexamples. But these so- called "counterexamples" depend on construing my thesis that p in a way that it was obviously not intended -- for I intended my thesis to have no counterexamples. Therefore p."

Your problem is that you believe your theory to be coherent, therefore you assume that any demonstration of your theory's incoherence must have somehow misconstrued it.

The fact is we understand your argument perfectly well, because it's not new and it's the same incoherent mess we've seen many times before. The problem is not that we don't understand it, it's that we understand it and it is wrong.


Until you come up with an alternative argument it is the only one on the table. Surely you are not still plugging your tired old metaphysical arguments – they won't get you very far unless verified by empirical methodology.

Even the great Aristotle, with his well-integrated, coherent philosophical arguments has been shown to be mostly wrong in his conclusions about the physical sciences. Because even the most rigorous, logically consistent arguments will be wrong if they’re based upon incorrect facts as Aristotle's were for the most part. For the correct facts one needs science.
 
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Well you need to answer the question because it’s the core of the argument. Homo sapiens have had rules about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ behavior (i.e. morality) from the very start. They were necessary to maintain the communal living essential for their survival as a species. All social animals have had to modify or restrain their behaviours to enable group living. Modern humans do it via legislation and social pressure. I’m reasonably certain that our Paleolithic predecessors didn’t sit around contemplating coherent metaphysical arguments in order to determine how to behave and nor do we in practise.

Even our simian cousins have evolved notions of fairness and unfair behaviour (i.e. good and bad) as tested by Frans de Waal et al. Our genetic predispositions for cooperative living form the instinctive basis for our moral code; this is not in doubt among most evolutionary biologists.

When cornered on an issue, you keep doing this. You try to reboot the conversation by stating unrelated trivialities, and hope that nobody will notice.

I'll just take it as granted at this point that you have no answer to the machine intelligence point, and hence that you understand that there is no reason to believe that evolved instincts towards cooperation are necessary for moral behaviour or form the basis for all moral behaviour.

To address your derail, primitive people had primitive aerodynamics, too. They needed to know how rocks, spears and arrows would fly through the air. They were able to do this because of traits they had evolved, to be sure, but it would be very strange indeed to think that the way forward in aeronautics was to look at the genes we use to do it with.

Moral questions can be pursued using not just philosophy but scientific methodology which frequently relies on inductive reasoning. Science can determine why we are the way we are, do what we do and why we value the things we do. All of these issues have a role in determining what is good and bad behaviour in the context of a social species like us.

No it can't. Not only are you failing to understand the is/ought distinction but you're mixing up description and prescription again, and seemingly assuming that evolution gives us morally perfect instincts instead of a mishmash of naughty and nice instincts that maximise the selfish interests of our genes.

Science can tell us what we are inclined to do. It can hypothesise about why we are inclined to do it. What it cannot tell us is whether a given inclination is a "good" one (protecting cute little babies) or a "bad" one (raping opportunistically), unless you smuggle in some pre-existing, unscientific moral values.

You can't get around the is/ought problem by using inductive reasoning instead of deductive, and in fact the very idea is absurd on multiple levels.

Until you come up with an alternative argument it is the only one on the table.

There's this discipline called "moral philosophy". It's got a few options on the table besides the horrible mishmash or errors, contradictions and faulty reasoning you call your theory.
 
Tassman, if empiricism is the awareness of the content of your mind, then you got the following problem.
Between the following two sentences there is difference how you are aware :
  • The cat is yellow.
  • Killing a human for fun is wrong.
The first one can be seen; i.e. you know that a cat is yellow by looking at it, where as you can't see that killing a human for fun is wrong. Tassman, you can't see wrong, rather you know wrong based on how you think and/or feel. Wrong is not an observable property of things you can see, but rather a result of internal processes in your brain.
So how do you test using observation as through seeing/sight that killing a human for fun is wrong or that killing a human for fun is right? You don't!!!

It goes in part back to David Hume and this example: Imagine observing one human causing the death of another human by the use of a knife. Now explain how you see that it is either right or wrong.

So here is it as science based on Popper:
Prior knowledge: Some people can see.
Hypothesis: Those people can see right or wrong or they will use words not related to sight.
Test: Find a death row inmate, who volunteers to be killed by use of a knife. Film and do the execution in such a manner that it is not apparent by looking at the film, that it is staged and an execution nor are there any indication of reasons for it taking place otherwise. Then show the film to people, tell them that is indeed real and ask them based on what they saw, whether it was right or wrong.
Evaluation: Evaluate the words used to describe whether it is right, wrong or unknown.

Now Tassman, the result is already known by science and if induction holds, then the result is as following - regardless of whether you are dealing with a seeing or blind person, brain scans have shown that morality/ethics does not take place in the vision center of the brain. Humans use other parts of the brains for morality/ethics.

So in short you can't use science for morality/ethics, because you can't see it and thus you have no observations to base the science upon.
...
Until you come up with an alternative argument it is the only one on the table. Surely you are not still plugging your tired old metaphysical arguments – they won't get you very far unless verified by empirical methodology.
...
So what is this empirical methodology?

Please Tassman, explain what you mean by empirical methodology and science?
 
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Interesting that you feel unable, even as an initial reaction, to agree with Smart that the scientific approach even if incomplete at this stage, is ”far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology, say, or the wilder reaches of a more speculative metaphysics…” Thus, by implication, you consider that speculative metaphysics can be placed at least potentially upon an equal or superior footing with science?
Why would you think this?

Ha ha! I don't think that. But keep making up whatever strawmen you think help you out.
 
When cornered on an issue, you keep doing this. You try to reboot the conversation by stating unrelated trivialities, and hope that nobody will notice.

This is your predictable but erroneous response. The fact that Homo sapiens and earlier forbears have had rules about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ behaviour (i.e. morality) from the very earliest days is the core of the argument to which you refuse respond. Furthermore the precursors of such behaviour are to be found in our simian cousins and elsewhere among social species. In short, rule-based behaviour is commonplace in nature.

I'll just take it as granted at this point that you have no answer to the machine intelligence point, and hence that you understand that there is no reason to believe that evolved instincts towards cooperation are necessary for moral behaviour or form the basis for all moral behaviour.

Yes, “evolved instincts towards cooperation are necessary for moral behaviour”. They “form the basis for moral behaviour” in the human animal. Do you have any reason to think otherwise?

Your so-called point about “machine intelligence” has already been dealt with: Again: We don’t know how or if intelligent machines or aliens would develop a moral code as we understand the term. We only know how we humans do.

To address your derail, primitive people had primitive aerodynamics, too. They needed to know how rocks, spears and arrows would fly through the air. They were able to do this because of traits they had evolved, to be sure, but it would be very strange indeed to think that the way forward in aeronautics was to look at the genes we use to do it with.

No one is arguing for the existence of “aerodynamic genes”. We are looking at the evolved tendency of curiosity about how the world functions; the more we know the better our chance of survival. The development of better and more aerodynamic spears via trial and error is essentially the same in principle, albeit less sophisticated, as what we do today re aircraft.

No it can't. Not only are you failing to understand the is/ought distinction but you're mixing up description and prescription again,

Nope! Once we understand that we are an altruistic social species, it is perfectly simple via induction to establish codes of behaviour based upon this knowledge. This was instinctively so for our most primitive forebears. I’m sure they weren't concerned with the “is/ought” problem in the Paleolithic era.

and seemingly assuming that evolution gives us morally perfect instincts instead of a mishmash of naughty and nice instincts that maximise the selfish interests of our genes.

Of course evolution does not give us “morally perfect instincts instead of a mishmash of naughty and nice instincts”. Where did I say otherwise? But, for any social species, the benefits of being part of an altruistic group outweigh the benefits of individualism and to this end we restrain individual selfishness and promote the building of more cooperative groups. The genes that survive will be the components of the beings who best integrate within a cohesive society.

Science can tell us what we are inclined to do. It can hypothesise about why we are inclined to do it. What it cannot tell us is whether a given inclination is a "good" one (protecting cute little babies) or a "bad" one (raping opportunistically), unless you smuggle in some pre-existing, unscientific moral values.

You are back to claiming that “good” and “bad” are qualities in and of themselves. How do you decide what “inclinations” are “good”?

In practice behaviour is deemed good or bad depending upon whether or not it enhances social cohesion. Thus protecting babies and penalizing rape is likely to enhance the welfare of the tribe. This is why societies throughout history devise codes towards these ends.

You can't get around the is/ought problem by using inductive reasoning instead of deductive, and in fact the very idea is absurd on multiple levels.

We do it all the time. We base our notions of good and bad upon what we understand to be the essential nature our species.

There's this discipline called "moral philosophy".

Well “moral philosophy”, in dealing with the content of morality and meta-ethical concerns, is dependent upon an understanding of who and what we are in order to formulate a premise for its arguments. And this is what we get from science.

It's got a few options on the table besides the horrible mishmash or errors, contradictions and faulty reasoning you call your theory.

It’s the theory of evolutionary biology, not mine per se, and its concept of morality is grounded in what we factually know about evolved human nature NOT in some academic philosophical conclusions deduced from assumed axiomatic premises.
 
Tassman, if empiricism is the awareness of the content of your mind, then you got the following problem.
Between the following two sentences there is difference how you are aware :
  • The cat is yellow.
  • Killing a human for fun is wrong.
The first one can be seen; i.e. you know that a cat is yellow by looking at it, where as you can't see that killing a human for fun is wrong. Tassman, you can't see wrong, rather you know wrong based on how you think and/or feel. Wrong is not an observable property of things you can see, but rather a result of internal processes in your brain.
So how do you test using observation as through seeing/sight that killing a human for fun is wrong or that killing a human for fun is right? You don't!!!

It goes in part back to David Hume and this example: Imagine observing one human causing the death of another human by the use of a knife. Now explain how you see that it is either right or wrong.

So here is it as science based on Popper:
Prior knowledge: Some people can see.
Hypothesis: Those people can see right or wrong or they will use words not related to sight.
Test: Find a death row inmate, who volunteers to be killed by use of a knife. Film and do the execution in such a manner that it is not apparent by looking at the film, that it is staged and an execution nor are there any indication of reasons for it taking place otherwise. Then show the film to people, tell them that is indeed real and ask them based on what they saw, whether it was right or wrong.
Evaluation: Evaluate the words used to describe whether it is right, wrong or unknown.

Now Tassman, the result is already known by science and if induction holds, then the result is as following - regardless of whether you are dealing with a seeing or blind person, brain scans have shown that morality/ethics does not take place in the vision center of the brain. Humans use other parts of the brains for morality/ethics.

So in short you can't use science for morality/ethics, because you can't see it and thus you have no observations to base the science upon. [/HILITE]

This is an argument from incredulity fallacy – especially nonsensical given that there is so much existing data and emerging science in areas like neurobiology, sociobiology, human psychology, emergence, evolution (and biology more generally speaking), physics, etc. upon which to base our understanding.

Besides, what is your alternative to a scientific approach?

So what is this empirical methodology?

Please Tassman, explain what you mean by empirical methodology and science?

The Scientific Method is the acquisition of new knowledge based upon physical evidence using observations, hypotheses and deductions to develop testable, falsifiable theories, which can also make predictions. These theories are reinforced by continuing empirically verifiable experiments from which further technologies and theories can develop.
 
Ha ha! I don't think that. But keep making up whatever strawmen you think help you out.

So you've ruled out the scientific approach to formulating a moral code (as outlined). And you've ruled out metaphysics/philosophy, which are essentially speculative in any event. So I guess we’re left with divine revelation. :)
 
So you've ruled out the scientific approach to formulating a moral code (as outlined). And you've ruled out metaphysics/philosophy, which are essentially speculative in any event. So I guess we’re left with divine revelation. :)

Nope. Guess again. I don't know how many times I have to keep telling you that I am an atheist, mate. I don't believe in God, nor in other gods, nor in some karmic spirit, nor in a conscious universe, nor in some cosmic force or any other type of thing like that.

I have told you well enough that science is a perfectly useful tool for explaining certain foundations of moral sentiments, and from an empirical point of view we can observe that different groups of people and individuals within those groups have different ideas of right and wrong, but science cannot tell us what is right or wrong.

If you disagree with that last part, as you seem to be doing, then you will need to come up with a more coherent theory than you have been able to do so far. We have seen a number of failed attempts from E.O Wilson, Sam Harris, Michael Shermer and Wowbagger Mk1, Mk2, Mk3 etc... and no doubt we shall see more. Your latest dalliances have been with Richard Carrier and Patricia Churchland but we have not seen their ideas fleshed out here yet. Feel free to give us something to talk about but I'm going to the pub now to imbibe some of the One True Spirit.
 
So you've ruled out the scientific approach to formulating a moral code (as outlined). And you've ruled out metaphysics/philosophy, which are essentially speculative in any event. So I guess we’re left with divine revelation. :)

You are missing one possibility, which you have to check for. Which one is that?
 
I think I'm just about done. This isn't a joined-up conversation where you respond to what other people post in a meaningful way. You just have a grab-bag of ill-fitting talking points and you pull one out as a response to what other people post with no evident rhyme or reason.

This is your predictable but erroneous response. The fact that Homo sapiens and earlier forbears have had rules about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ behaviour (i.e. morality) from the very earliest days is the core of the argument to which you refuse respond. Furthermore the precursors of such behaviour are to be found in our simian cousins and elsewhere among social species. In short, rule-based behaviour is commonplace in nature.

As is cheating on the rules and benefiting by doing so. This is a point which you seem determined to avoid understanding, possibly because it entirely undercuts the simplistic idea that morality is as simple as doing whatever it is we evolved to do.

Yes, “evolved instincts towards cooperation are necessary for moral behaviour”. They “form the basis for moral behaviour” in the human animal. Do you have any reason to think otherwise?

Yes. Specifically, the staggering variation in human moral ideas. The Taliban have moral ideas, George W. Bush has moral ideas, buddhist monks have moral ideas, Gandhi had moral ideas, suicide bombers have moral ideas... but the differences between them are so enormous and so stark that the idea that they all spring from one unitary, instinctive source is either false or utterly trivial.

Either that's not the fundamental basis of most of our moral ideas at all, or it is such a weak basis that knowing more about it will tell us nothing at all about whether the "right" moral ideas are those of the Taliban or not.

No one is arguing for the existence of “aerodynamic genes”. We are looking at the evolved tendency of curiosity about how the world functions; the more we know the better our chance of survival. The development of better and more aerodynamic spears via trial and error is essentially the same in principle, albeit less sophisticated, as what we do today re aircraft.

You are not addressing the point. What on Earth makes you think that genes are only the basis of our ideas about aerodynamics in the most banal and trivial sense , but simultaneously think that our genes are going to be some amazing source of new insight into our ideas about how to live? Isn't that blatantly idiotic?

Nope! Once we understand that we are an altruistic social species, it is perfectly simple via induction to establish codes of behaviour based upon this knowledge. This was instinctively so for our most primitive forebears. I’m sure they weren't concerned with the “is/ought” problem in the Paleolithic era.

Now once again you are banging your head on the is/ought problem and the naturalistic fallacy. Suppose it did make sense to say that we evolved to behave thus and so, where does that get you? How do you bridge the gap between "I have an evolved instinct to X", where X is defend the community or perhaps to opportunistically rape, and your conclusion "therefore it is morally right to do X"?

Of course evolution does not give us “morally perfect instincts instead of a mishmash of naughty and nice instincts”. Where did I say otherwise? But, for any social species, the benefits of being part of an altruistic group outweigh the benefits of individualism and to this end we restrain individual selfishness and promote the building of more cooperative groups. The genes that survive will be the components of the beings who best integrate within a cohesive society.

We already explained this to you. Your ideas about evolution are both simplistic and false. If one bunch of organisms evolve genes for a social rule in a cooperative group, another bunch will evolve genes to cheat, or to exploit rule-followers, and so ad infinitum. The winner will not be the best integrator, it will be the organism best at gaming the system, by strategically breaking the rules to its own benefit while maximising their enjoyment of the benefits of those rules.

You are back to claiming that “good” and “bad” are qualities in and of themselves. How do you decide what “inclinations” are “good”?

No, I'm just assuming that like most amateur moral philosophers you do eventually sidewind your way back around to endorsing all the usual moral rules, so that if your rules end up endorsing rape it demonstrates a contradiction.

In practice behaviour is deemed good or bad depending upon whether or not it enhances social cohesion. Thus protecting babies and penalizing rape is likely to enhance the welfare of the tribe. This is why societies throughout history devise codes towards these ends.

This is a different soggy spot in your argument which we haven't previously been kicking, but since you bring it up again, you seem to be equivocating between "is deemed" and "is". This highlights your failure to grasp the description/prescription distinction, I think.

Saying X "is deemed" to be right is a strictly descriptive statement. Anything at all could be "deemed" right. The interesting question is whether it "is" right, which is a prescriptive question.

Science can tell us what is deemed to be moral. It can't tell us what should be deemed moral, and unless you are a full-blown moral relativist it's uncontroversial that not everything which was ever deemed moral is moral.

It’s the theory of evolutionary biology, not mine per se, and its concept of morality is grounded in what we factually know about evolved human nature NOT in some academic philosophical conclusions deduced from assumed axiomatic premises.

Well there's your problem. Without assumed axiomatic premises you'll never get off the ground, you'll just be flapping in circles forever as you are currently doing.
 
Nope. Guess again. I don't know how many times I have to keep telling you that I am an atheist, mate. I don't believe in God, nor in other gods, nor in some karmic spirit, nor in a conscious universe, nor in some cosmic force or any other type of thing like that.

That’s as maybe but, as I’ve said before, your oft-times sneering approach towards those you disagree with is reminiscent of many Evangelical apologists I’ve encountered. The same applies to your fellow-traveller in this discussion.

I have told you well enough that science is a perfectly useful tool for explaining certain foundations of moral sentiments, and from an empirical point of view we can observe that different groups of people and individuals within those groups have different ideas of right and wrong, but science cannot tell us what is right or wrong.

If you disagree with that last part, as you seem to be doing, then you will need to come up with a more coherent theory than you have been able to do so far. We have seen a number of failed attempts from E.O Wilson, Sam Harris, Michael Shermer and Wowbagger Mk1, Mk2, Mk3 etc... and no doubt we shall see more. Your latest dalliances have been with Richard Carrier and Patricia Churchland but we have not seen their ideas fleshed out here yet. Feel free to give us something to talk about but I'm going to the pub now to imbibe some of the One True Spirit.

There is good reason to think that our morality (i.e. our sense of right and wrong) is innate. And given the rapidly emerging areas in the cognitive sciences, such as neurobiology and sociobiology, science is, or will be, the best discipline to inform us of the optimum behaviors required to maintain the social cohesion we require to survive as a species.

Hence, I repeat "J. J. C. Smart's injunction that we take science as our best guide to metaphysical truth (Smart 1996, 6) doesn't require us to treat our current scientific understandings as infallible. It merely invites us to do what good scientific practice itself does in deferring to our present background state of general scientific understanding as the best story we now have about the universe and its furnishings. It is no doubt a flawed, imperfect story still very much in progress, but far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology, say, or the wilder reaches of a more speculative metaphysics as we persist with a philosophical enterprise itself no less fallible and incomplete."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/

Furthermore this seems to be the position of increasing number of scientists and philosophers including the likes of Peter Singer, Steven Pinker, Sam Harris, Patricia Churchland, Simon Blackburn, Richard Carrier and others who are representative of those exploring the nexus between science and morality.

Your mistake is to demand definitive conclusions from what continue to be emerging areas of science. Nor have you offered an alternative approach.
 
Here is a paper (actually a doctoral thesis) which is fairly interesting, if only as an existence proof that some things can be done in philosophy that aren't pure regurgitation.

http://www.ockhamsbeard.com.au/?page_id=496

There are two elements, I think, to this paper. One involves going against the normative presumptions, and the other is an evolutionary hypothesis. I find the former more compelling, even though it isn't the major portion, because it shows that it can happen.
 
I think I'm just about done. This isn't a joined-up conversation where you respond to what other people post in a meaningful way. You just have a grab-bag of ill-fitting talking points and you pull one out as a response to what other people post with no evident rhyme or reason.

Stop whining.

As is cheating on the rules and benefiting by doing so. This is a point which you seem determined to avoid understanding, possibly because it entirely undercuts the simplistic idea that morality is as simple as doing whatever it is we evolved to do.

No, the point being avoided by you is that “cheating” is by definition a breaking of the accepted rules of the community and considered ‘wrong’, i.e. immoral, because, in the long run it is not in the communities best interests.

Yes. Specifically, the staggering variation in human moral ideas. The Taliban have moral ideas, George W. Bush has moral ideas, buddhist monks have moral ideas, Gandhi had moral ideas, suicide bombers have moral ideas... but the differences between them are so enormous and so stark that the idea that they all spring from one unitary, instinctive source is either false or utterly trivial.

Either that's not the fundamental basis of most of our moral ideas at all, or it is such a weak basis that knowing more about it will tell us nothing at all about whether the "right" moral ideas are those of the Taliban or not.

ALL your examples have in common the evolved urge to maintain community life within the community. The Taliban have reverted to tribalism (religion tends to have that effect), wherein a strict moral code is maintained within the group whereas outsiders are fair game for rape and pillaging. We were all tribal beings at one point in our history, but many communities have moved beyond that point – especially in the developed world.

You are not addressing the point. What on Earth makes you think that genes are only the basis of our ideas about aerodynamics in the most banal and trivial sense , but simultaneously think that our genes are going to be some amazing source of new insight into our ideas about how to live? Isn't that blatantly idiotic?

You continue to misunderstand Dawkins’ ‘Selfish Gene’. Genes are not the basis of anything other than their natural urge to replicate. It’s the human organism, comprised of those genes, that engages in the development of better and more aerodynamic spears ultimately resulting, millennia later, in the aircraft industry we have today.

Now once again you are banging your head on the is/ought problem and the naturalistic fallacy. Suppose it did make sense to say that we evolved to behave thus and so, where does that get you? How do you bridge the gap between "I have an evolved instinct to X", where X is defend the community or perhaps to opportunistically rape, and your conclusion "therefore it is morally right to do X"?

Not so. It is reasonable to draw ethical conclusions from the natural facts concerning who and what we are as a species. Yet again, your “rape” example fails to take into account that we are naturally predisposed and socially acculturated to obey the rules of the community. As John Donne puts it: “No man is an island, entire of itself, every man is a piece of the continent…”

We already explained this to you. Your ideas about evolution are both simplistic and false. If one bunch of organisms evolve genes for a social rule in a cooperative group, another bunch will evolve genes to cheat, or to exploit rule-followers, and so ad infinitum. The winner will not be the best integrator, it will be the organism best at gaming the system, by strategically breaking the rules to its own benefit while maximising their enjoyment of the benefits of those rules.

And I’ve already explained to you that all this nonsense about human selfishness and exploitation are manifestations of tribalism in action – commonplace with regard to primitive man and universal among the other primates. Human tribes have over history expanded the concept of tribes to encompass chiefdoms, nation states, empires and so on. But “Religion and totalitarian ideologies can cause us to regress to more tribal modes, whereas it is our natural human characteristics that tend bind us to each other”. Hermann Bondi (paraphrased)

No, I'm just assuming that like most amateur moral philosophers you do eventually sidewind your way back around to endorsing all the usual moral rules, so that if your rules end up endorsing rape it demonstrates a contradiction.

See above.

This is a different soggy spot in your argument which we haven't previously been kicking, but since you bring it up again, you seem to be equivocating between "is deemed" and "is". This highlights your failure to grasp the description/prescription distinction, I think.

Saying X "is deemed" to be right is a strictly descriptive statement. Anything at all could be "deemed" right. The interesting question is whether it "is" right, which is a prescriptive question.

Science can tell us what is deemed to be moral. It can't tell us what should be deemed moral, and unless you are a full-blown moral relativist it's uncontroversial that not everything which was ever deemed moral is moral.

No, “anything at all” could NOT be deemed "right". As social animals we do not exist independent from our community. And once again your language implies that the notions of “good” and “bad” are qualities in and of themselves independent of our evolved instincts towards social cohesion. It is the latter that determines what we regard to be right or wrong.

Well there's your problem. Without assumed axiomatic premises you'll never get off the ground, you'll just be flapping in circles forever as you are currently doing.

On the contrary, with “assumed axiomatic premises” you can never show something to be true. All you have are logically consistent deductive exercises – as seen for example with Aristotle, whereby nearly every philosophical conclusion he arrived at regarding the physical sciences has been shown to be wrong.
 
Here is a paper (actually a doctoral thesis) which is fairly interesting, if only as an existence proof that some things can be done in philosophy that aren't pure regurgitation.

http://www.ockhamsbeard.com.au/?page_id=496

There are two elements, I think, to this paper. One involves going against the normative presumptions, and the other is an evolutionary hypothesis. I find the former more compelling, even though it isn't the major portion, because it shows that it can happen.

Most interesting Abstract! I will find time to read the whole paper in due course. I particularly liked:

“I argue that morality can be seen as a kind of cultural technology, the function of which is to help solve the problems of social living in order to facilitate pro-social and cooperative behavior”.

And the qualification:

“However, the optimal solutions to the problems of social living depend on the state of the physical and social environments in which those solutions operate”.
 

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