The Future of Moral Science

[angrysoba]

Oh, but I don't doubt that Dr Carrier, assuming he is sentient, can demolish Dr Shermer's arguments. I think a pocket calculator could do that.*











*This is hyperbole; please do not assume this is serious.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

It is not my claim that whatever we have evolved to do is morally good and nowhere have I implied that. Are you being deliberately obtuse? We have evolved as social creatures in order to restrain individual selfishness by imposing rules of behaviour (i.e. a moral code) and so building more cooperative groups. For any social species the benefits of being part of an altruistic group outweigh the benefits of individualism.

This is not to say that some individuals or sub-groups won't renege on the social contract and society has devised penalties for such lapses. Every moral system has its renegades.

That's what I thought you would say.

Now to begin with the picture you are painting is still a bit too simple, because sometimes it is evolutionarily or personally advantageous to be part of a cooperative group and be a jerk, getting the best of both worlds. It's not a choice between being 100% lone wolf or 100% (mythical) worker bee, it's a spectrum between willing laying down your life for the social group, or being a total sociopath who pretends to be altruistic while actually being self-serving.

So now how you sort through this mess of conflicting views and behaviours to find your "scientific" morality? What tradeoff is the "moral" tradeoff, where is the boundary with immoral selfishness, and where is the boundary with supererogatory behaviour?

It's just going to turn out that you can't do this scientifically, and in fact science can do very little to inform you about what is "right".

This is “an assertion you keep trying to sneak back in”, namely that there is an absolute ethical viewpoint. This is what I’ve consistently been saying there isn't. There is no absolute, immutable moral code. This is s what you seem to be arguing for from a philosophical basis but which you have yet to elucidate.

You seem to be trying to change the subject. Do you, or do you not, think that given perfect information all rational beings will converge on a unitary moral code?

If so, why do you think this? If not, doesn't that demonstrate that your approach cannot actually answer any moral questions at all?

The basis of ALL Social Contracts is Natural Morality which in common with other higher social animals, has evolved via Natural Selection into the capacity for cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them. Without these qualities being developed within us in the first place there could be NO morality as we know it today.

So suppose I waved a magic wand and created a few million machine intelligences, each with a chassis of roughly human capabilities, each with roughly human processing power, and no built-in drive towards "cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them", but all highly rational.

Now presumably you must think that it's impossible for these machine intelligences to form a society, because you are loudly asserting that without a human-like evolutionary background "there could be NO morality as we know it today."

However it seems to me to fall directly out of game theory developed over sixty years ago that in fact such rational entities would find it in their own best interest to work together as a society with social rules parallel to "morality" whether or not they would call it that. You don't need evolved systems to do that, you just need to be bright enough to realise that cooperation pays off in the universe we live in for human-like beings.

So once again your scientific and philosophical ideas look like they are decades behind the times.

Well gee whiz! What a pity I don’t give a sod about your opinion.

It is indeed a pity. Recognising that someone has something to teach you is an indispensable precondition for learning something.

The ONLY reference to "altruism genes" or "morality genes" is from you dishonestly misrepresenting the argument. To say that we as human beings are genetically predisposed toward altruistic behaviour is well documented. This is NOT to argue for “altruism genes". I can’t believe you thought it was. At NO point was this inferred. Ever hear of ‘concrete thinking’? Google it!

You're the one arguing, despite evolutionary science, game theory and common sense, that a genetic basis for altruism is both the source of all moral behaviour and the thing we should research to lean more about what is moral.

So, once again, you’re saying that you just “know” Dr Carrier’s arguments against Pigliucci and Shermer are wrong even without knowing what his argument is. And you call this scholarship?

No, I call it a kind of heuristic. If you said that the sky was blue where you were, I'd check that. If you say that Pigliucci's arguments about basic moral philosophy and epistemology were "demolished" but avoid stating any details, that's not even plausible enough to be worth checking.

 

[angrysoba]

No "buts"

There is. You said...

There is no immutable universal morality per se other than the universal predisposition of social animals such as us to adhere to a code of behavior congruent with community living and which is accepted by the members of that society.

And I find this type of slipperiness with the plain meaning of words one of the most frustrating things about your style of argument.

 

[Tassman]

Why the scare quotes around the word good?

Sigh! They were quotation marks. I was quoting the word “good” from the questioner in my response.

Is it a reflection of the fact that you want to have it both ways which is to say that you think science can reveal normative ethical standards and yet you do not want to go to the trouble of demonstrating how science can?

Every time you are asked this you trot out some platitudes about evolution that would only, if true, explain descriptive morality and not normative morality. You do it over and over again with more and more bluster each time your fundamental error is pointed out.

The difference s between Descriptive and Normative morality is not as great as you persistently try to make out – to what end I’m not sure. They overlap considerably. “Morality” when used in a descriptive sense has an essential feature that “morality” in the normative sense does not have, namely, that it refers to codes of conduct that are actually put forward and accepted by some society, group, or individual. If one is not a member of that society or group, and is not that individual, accepting a descriptive definition of “morality” has no implications for how one should behave. If one accepts a moral theory's account of rational persons and the specifications of the conditions under which all rational persons would endorse a code of conduct as a moral code, then one accepts that moral theory's normative definition of “morality. ” Accepting a normative definition of “morality” commits a person to regarding some behavior as immoral, perhaps even behavior that one is tempted to perform. Because accepting a normative definition of “morality” involves this commitment it is not surprising that philosophers seriously disagree about what normative definition to accept”.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

All except our very own soba apparently, who is quite certain that “Normative Morality” applies to his arguments and that other people’s arguments can be dismissed an inferior form of “Descriptive Morality”.

But why? Let’s assume I have masses of cash. I am insulated from the kinds of worries that most people in their daily lives suffer from such as the need for a job and a good reputation to get one, so instead I simply indulge my pleasures. For example, I may want to spend all my money on prostitutes and various legal drugs, flying from country to country whenever I am in the mood, feasting on whatever rare and exotic animals I can find, wherever I could. I don’t see any reason why I should do anything productive with the money because we all die and being an atheist as I am I have no need to fear retribution in the afterlife, nor do I have to have concerns for other people in society or in other countries, or animals, or future generations. If I was a woman I would not have kids, but I am a man so impregnating a lot of strange women is not my problem so long as I can get out of the country pronto. I expect there are some countries where people of my wealth can get away with a lot more than the citizens there, if you know what I mean. Now, where is the flaw in my rational plan to conduct myself according to my own pleasures? I can see why some other rational people might not adopt what I do, but that’s because they aren’t rich. I can assume that you have no objections to this whatsoever, but if you do then you need to give a convincing argument for your objections.

Yes some people, if able, choose to live out such a scenario but every single fantasy you've listed is dependent upon other people for fulfilment – whether prostitutes or luxury travel - thus reinforcing our position as members of a mutually interdependent social species. And, as per Jordan Belfort et al, most regard such selfish excesses as unacceptable or immoral. And if such behaviour got to the point of damaging society would very probably be penalised by the community.

Now, it is things like this that, if you will excuse me, make it difficult for me to take any of your claims on face-value. When you say “intelligence (comprising millions of genes)” your claim did not pass the smell test, just as your earlier claim about evolution did not. I am not an expert in these things so I had to go and check it. According to nature magazine in an article titled “Smart genes prove elusive”, the author writes:

and


http://www.nature.com/news/smart-genes-prove-elusive-1.15858

As far as “millions of genes” is concerned, there seems to be a further problem as according to the London Science Museum:


http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/who...ngenomeprojectfind/howmanygenesdoyouhave.aspx

Though I will admit I am no expert and perhaps you have a better understanding of this than I do.

Well Googled! My comment was in response to the attempted put-down regarding a spear-making gene or a wealth-distribution gene, which is clearly not what I was referring to. Both you and your fellow-traveller Kevin Lowe have a similar approach when it comes to (deliberate?) misrepresentation of your opponent's argument.

I have not read Dr Carrier’s arguments attacking plain old Pigliucci’s arguments (I like what you did there by the way; it might not be subtle but if the gallery is as dumb as you take them to be they might be impressed that one of them has credentials - they actually both have PhDs you know – my idol even has two actually so you should in fact refer to him as Dr Dr Pigliucci). However, instead of simply stating that Dr Carrier demolishes Dr Dr Pigliucci, why not present the actual argument. Then we can examine it.

DR. Carrier’s article critiquing both DR. Pigliucci VS DR. Shermer on Moral Science is here:

http://freethoughtblogs.com/carrier/archives/3245

I just have two questions. Is Dr Carrier’s argument a scientific one or a philosophical one? Or both?

Both.

http://www.richardcarrier.info/about.html

There is. You said...

And I find this type of slipperiness with the plain meaning of words one of the most frustrating things about your style of argument.

What you deem "slippery" is merely you missing the point - as you are prone to do. "The universal predisposition [or tendency] of social animals" to behave a certain way is not the same as an "immutable universal morality" applicable to all.

But one notes your Evangelical zeal to argue via ad homs.

 

[Tassman]

That's what I thought you would say.

Now to begin with the picture you are painting is still a bit too simple, because sometimes it is evolutionarily or personally advantageous to be part of a cooperative group and be a jerk, getting the best of both worlds. It's not a choice between being 100% lone wolf or 100% (mythical) worker bee, it's a spectrum between willing laying down your life for the social group, or being a total sociopath who pretends to be altruistic while actually being self-serving.

So now how you sort through this mess of conflicting views and behaviours to find your "scientific" morality? What tradeoff is the "moral" tradeoff, where is the boundary with immoral selfishness, and where is the boundary with supererogatory behaviour?

It's just going to turn out that you can't do this scientifically, and in fact science can do very little to inform you about what is "right".

Nor can philosophy unaided by scientific knowledge.

You seem to be trying to change the subject.

I'm trying to get you to elucidate your view as the source of morality, otherwise the discussion is all very one-sided, but you seem strangely reluctant. I wonder why that is.

Do you, or do you not, think that given perfect information all rational beings will converge on a unitary moral code?

If so, why do you think this? If not, doesn't that demonstrate that your approach cannot actually answer any moral questions at all?

There is no available perfect information outside of the mathematical realm.

Our moral decisions will be based, as they have been through all of human history, by a combination of factors ranging from tradition, philosophy, scientific knowledge and consensus regarding the best interests of the community.

So suppose I waved a magic wand and created a few million machine intelligences, each with a chassis of roughly human capabilities, each with roughly human processing power, and no built-in drive towards "cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them", but all highly rational.

Now presumably you must think that it's impossible for these machine intelligences to form a society, because you are loudly asserting that without a human-like evolutionary background "there could be NO morality as we know it today."

However it seems to me to fall directly out of game theory developed over sixty years ago that in fact such rational entities would find it in their own best interest to work together as a society with social rules parallel to "morality" whether or not they would call it that. You don't need evolved systems to do that, you just need to be bright enough to realise that cooperation pays off in the universe we live in for human-like beings.

Nothing new in any of this! You seem to think you are being very clever.

You are correct regarding social species - whether carbon-based intelligences or machine-based intelligences. Although it's not quite the forgone conclusion you seem to think. Many species are anti-social and it is reasonable to assume that they too had the potential to evolve into highly intelligent creatures following an entirely different scenario.

Regardless, ALL such intelligences have evolved whether via natural selection or via artificial evolution initiated (on this planet at least) by Homo sapiens.

So once again your scientific and philosophical ideas look like they are decades behind the times.

No, your above scenario is based precisely on some form of evolution albeit in computerized/mechanical format. And one notes yet again your need for gratuitous snide comments – feeling threatened are we?

It is indeed a pity. Recognising that someone has something to teach you is an indispensable precondition for learning something.

<SNIP>

Edited by LashL: 

Edited to remove breach.

You're the one arguing, despite evolutionary science, game theory and common sense, that a genetic basis for altruism is both the source of all moral behaviour and the thing we should research to lean more about what is moral.

You avoid your nonsense about the "altruism gene" I notice. And “genetic basis for altruism” is NOT "the source of all moral behaviour" as such – it has nothing to say about morality in and of itself. The most one can say is that it predisposes us to altruistic behaviour and provides the foundation upon which to build a code of behaviour congruent with community living.

No, I call it a kind of heuristic. If you said that the sky was blue where you were, I'd check that. If you say that Pigliucci's arguments about basic moral philosophy and epistemology were "demolished" but avoid stating any details, that's not even plausible enough to be worth checking.

Googling it would make more sense than prejudging it as you're doing.

 

[angrysoba]

Sigh! They were quotation marks. I was quoting the word “good” from the questioner in my response.

You are still requested to explain why having a cohesive society is a moral aim which you imply it is.

The difference s between Descriptive and Normative morality is not as great as you persistently try to make out – to what end I’m not sure. They overlap considerably.

And then, to back up this claim, you produce a large quote. Yet the quote only explains the difference between the two, not where they overlap.

“Morality” when used in a descriptive sense has an essential feature that “morality” in the normative sense does not have, namely, that it refers to codes of conduct that are actually put forward and accepted by some society, group, or individual. If one is not a member of that society or group, and is not that individual, accepting a descriptive definition of “morality” has no implications for how one should behave. If one accepts a moral theory's account of rational persons and the specifications of the conditions under which all rational persons would endorse a code of conduct as a moral code, then one accepts that moral theory's normative definition of “morality. ” Accepting a normative definition of “morality” commits a person to regarding some behavior as immoral, perhaps even behavior that one is tempted to perform. Because accepting a normative definition of “morality” involves this commitment it is not surprising that philosophers seriously disagree about what normative definition to accept”.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

All except our very own soba apparently, who is quite certain that “Normative Morality” applies to his arguments and that other people’s arguments can be dismissed an inferior form of “Descriptive Morality”.

I've never made any claim about any heirachy of value regarding descriptive and normative value. I am simply arguing that they are different things and yet you keep confusing them.

A descriptive account of the differences between cricket and baseball need not imply that one is better than the other, and I would argue that descriptive accounts of morality, either from the point of view of how human beings make moral choices or comparative anthropological studies of the morality of different societies (perfectly scientific and worthy endeavours in their own right), are different from normative issues on what people ought to do.

Yes some people, if able, choose to live out such a scenario but every single fantasy you've listed is dependent upon other people for fulfilment – whether prostitutes or luxury travel - thus reinforcing our position as members of a mutually interdependent social species.

Yes, but clearly in the example I am giving we are not really talking about mutual co-operation. We are talking about using people for our own ends and furthermore relegating certain creatures such as animals, or even future generations of humans to not even being worth considering.

And, as per Jordan Belfort et al, most regard such selfish excesses as unacceptable or immoral. And if such behaviour got to the point of damaging society would very probably be penalised by the community.

But now you are imbuing this scenario with two things:

a) first, you have an unsupported claim that this behaviour is "immoral". On what grounds? Why should "selfish" behaviour be considered "immoral" when from the point of view of the person engaging in it, it's really really great! No deus ex machinas please

and

b) your second sentence can only be judged wishful thinking. It is most certainly not a scientific claim and there is no such thing as cosmic justice. I am sure there are many of us who would like to see Bad people punished, but we really need some account of what Bad is, and that, is exactly what normative ethics is about deciding. However, as much as it can be informed by science regarding what effects some person's behaviour may have, science cannot tell me that it is Bad. For example, when did society rise up against Chinghis Khan or Stalin? We can agree that these people are Bad but the laws of nature do not conspire against them like some Cosmic Judge. As Nietzsche pointed out the universe is indifferent, and as Dawkins said:

Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature.

Well Googled! My comment was in response to the attempted put-down regarding a spear-making gene or a wealth-distribution gene, which is clearly not what I was referring to. Both you and your fellow-traveller Kevin Lowe have a similar approach when it comes to (deliberate?) misrepresentation of your opponent's argument.

That's okay, you only have to admit that you got the numbers of genes wrong. I would respect an honest admission.

DR. Carrier’s article critiquing both DR. Pigliucci VS DR. Shermer on Moral Science is here:

http://freethoughtblogs.com/carrier/archives/3245

Thanks for the link, but now I am a little confused. You have argued, I think, that there is no such thing as objective morality, and also that there is no such thing as something which is "moral in and of itself". Does Dr Carrier who you appear to be citing with approval here, agree with you?

I was actually hoping you would give me your synopsis of Dr Carrier's argument actually because you argued that he had written on the same topic in The End of Christianity. Do you have that book and/or have you read this chapter from him?

What you deem "slippery" is merely you missing the point - as you are prone to do. "The universal predisposition [or tendency] of social animals" to behave a certain way is not the same as an "immutable universal morality" applicable to all.

But one notes your Evangelical zeal to argue via ad homs.

That's a rather ironic farrago.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Nor can philosophy unaided by scientific knowledge.

It's a bit of a problem that when you can't defend a point any more, instead of saying something like "Oh I see, actually you are right" you run away on some tangent to try to create a smokescreen.

Nobody ever said philosophy could answer moral questions unaided by scientific knowledge. You are stating a trivially true thing nobody ever contested, to avoid having to discuss anything I said, and avoid having to engage with what I wrote.

I'll take that evasion as an admission that evolved behaviour simply cannot be an even mildly reliable guide to what is "moral", despite the fact that we have evolved to live in social groups, because some life forms have evolved to defect on social contracts strategically.

I'm trying to get you to elucidate your view as the source of morality, otherwise the discussion is all very one-sided, but you seem strangely reluctant. I wonder why that is.

I'll tell you why that is. It's because I'm not letting you change the subject. Changing the subject to my own views, whatever they are, is still changing the subject.

You have been presenting a thesis. I have been showing you that your thesis is incoherent. Now you want to change the subject. To quote you: "I wonder why that is."

There is no available perfect information outside of the mathematical realm.

Our moral decisions will be based, as they have been through all of human history, by a combination of factors ranging from tradition, philosophy, scientific knowledge and consensus regarding the best interests of the community.

That seems like another attempt to dodge the question by stating boring trivialities.

Do you, or do you not, think that given perfect information, or as close to it as we fallible humans can practically get, that all rational beings will converge on a unitary moral code?

If so, why do you think this? If not, doesn't that demonstrate that your approach cannot actually answer any moral questions at all?

Nothing new in any of this! You seem to think you are being very clever.

You are correct regarding social species - whether carbon-based intelligences or machine-based intelligences. Although it's not quite the forgone conclusion you seem to think. Many species are anti-social and it is reasonable to assume that they too had the potential to evolve into highly intelligent creatures following an entirely different scenario.

Regardless, ALL such intelligences have evolved whether via natural selection or via artificial evolution initiated (on this planet at least) by Homo sapiens.

Aha! Now you have changed your thesis, and I imagine you hoped we wouldn't notice.

A moment ago you were arguing very specifically that we ONLY exhibit "moral" behaviour (in the popular sense) because we have a built-in, evolved drive towards "cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them".

Now suddenly when confronted with the machine intelligence issue you are trying to bluster your way out of it by changing the scenario and saying that the machine intelligences (which I explicitly specified had no built-in drive for cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them) are the product of "artificial evolution", whatever on Earth that is, and so somehow if they exhibit "moral" behaviour for good game-theoretic reasons that this would not totally falsify your thesis.

Sorry, but "artificial evolution" is not a thing. You just made that up now to get out of a corner. You've admitted for all intents and purposes that your evolution-centric thesis is bunk.

Edited by LashL: 

Edited to remove quote of moderated content and response to same.

Googling it would make more sense than prejudging it as you're doing.

Okay. I read the page you linked and I just don't see where anything Pigliucci says got demolished. I see one bit at the end where Carrier acts like he invented welfarist utilitarianism and that it's a huge insight moral philosophers need to get on board with, which pretty much indicates the scope of Carrier's ignorance of moral philosophy, but I don't see anywhere where he demolishes Pigliucci. He mostly just picks on Shermer, who is a much easier target.

So far my heuristic has actually over-estimated the quality of your evidence. I was expecting something where Carrier addressed Pigliucci's arguments poorly. I wasn't expecting you to link us to a page where he didn't even address them at all!

 

[Pup]

A cohesive society is “good” solely because we have evolved to live in such societies. Our moral code will reflect our needs as a social species and will adapt to changes as our social mores change.

I agree that we think things are good because such behaviors have been successful in passing on our genes, and so natural selection has defined morality. I think there's a pretty broad range of often-conflicting behaviors that we're born with, so different societies can have different--even conflicting--ideas of morality, yet still be basing it on those urges.

But what do you mean "as our social mores change"? What is causing that change? I think that's one of the key problems. There's just not time to explain, with genetic changes, things like why racism was considered acceptable by many people just a couple generations ago, so I don't think it's genetic.

Personally, I think the changes are due to stronger or weaker expressions of urges that have helped us survive in various circumstances. The immorality of racism is widening the definition of "our tribe" and including more within its protection, while racism was based on shunning others unlike us and our relatives.

Predicting that such ideas about morality could change is easy, but predicting that the change in those attitudes would occur in the 1960s would be virtually impossible from, say, the vantage-point of the 1860s. It's chaos theory at work, like predicting the weather 100 years ahead.

Do you think that such changes in social mores are predictable? What do you think causes them?

But such a moral code is not good in and of itself. It is simply a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be adopted by all rational persons.

The problem is that there's no such thing as a rational person. So in practice, there will always be a range of behaviors and, like species adapting to different niches, I think those different behaviors can be successful in a variety of niches.

The hedonistic behavior described by Angrysoba is, ironically, considered immoral by many people while a life's dream by others. I'd say it's because a desire for power and control are useful traits, but an encouragement of responsibility and humility are also useful traits to society--we can't all be leaders. So people are born with a mix of urges and what they consider moral will depend on how those urges are expressed--but again, how can one predict which urges will be expressed in any particular social subset?

 

[Tassman]

You are still requested to explain why having a cohesive society is a moral aim which you imply it is.



And then, to back up this claim, you produce a large quote. Yet the quote only explains the difference between the two, not where they overlap.



http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/



I've never made any claim about any heirachy of value regarding descriptive and normative value. I am simply arguing that they are different things and yet you keep confusing them.

A descriptive account of the differences between cricket and baseball need not imply that one is better than the other, and I would argue that descriptive accounts of morality, either from the point of view of how human beings make moral choices or comparative anthropological studies of the morality of different societies (perfectly scientific and worthy endeavours in their own right), are different from normative issues on what people ought to do.





Yes, but clearly in the example I am giving we are not really talking about mutual co-operation. We are talking about using people for our own ends and furthermore relegating certain creatures such as animals, or even future generations of humans to not even being worth considering.



But now you are imbuing this scenario with two things:

a) first, you have an unsupported claim that this behaviour is "immoral". On what grounds? Why should "selfish" behaviour be considered "immoral" when from the point of view of the person engaging in it, it's really really great! No deus ex machinas please

and

b) your second sentence can only be judged wishful thinking. It is most certainly not a scientific claim and there is no such thing as cosmic justice. I am sure there are many of us who would like to see Bad people punished, but we really need some account of what Bad is, and that, is exactly what normative ethics is about deciding. However, as much as it can be informed by science regarding what effects some person's behaviour may have, science cannot tell me that it is Bad. For example, when did society rise up against Chinghis Khan or Stalin? We can agree that these people are Bad but the laws of nature do not conspire against them like some Cosmic Judge. As Nietzsche pointed out the universe is indifferent, and as Dawkins said:






That's okay, you only have to admit that you got the numbers of genes wrong. I would respect an honest admission.





Thanks for the link, but now I am a little confused. You have argued, I think, that there is no such thing as objective morality, and also that there is no such thing as something which is "moral in and of itself". Does Dr Carrier who you appear to be citing with approval here, agree with you?

I was actually hoping you would give me your synopsis of Dr Carrier's argument actually because you argued that he had written on the same topic in The End of Christianity. Do you have that book and/or have you read this chapter from him?





That's a rather ironic farrago.

Enough of this nonsense and back to basics!

In your post #59 you twice objected to my arguments as not demonstrating why certain behaviour was “moral in and of itself”. You were correct; I didn't claim any behaviour to be “moral in and of itself”. But your arguments indicate that, as far as you’re concerned, true morality can only be characterized as such, i.e. absolute. You have yet to defend this view. How do you determine which behaviour is "moral in and of itself”.

This is a far more productive form of discussion than the song ‘n dance show you and your colleague are staging.

My position, stated several times, is that morals are nothing more than derivatives of self-preservation and procreation and a consequence of natural selection. They are naturally built into us, because those morals were beneficial to the breeding and survival of our species as social animals.

As to how we derive such a code our moral decisions will be based, as they have been through all of human history, by a combination of factors ranging from tribal traditions, social acculturation, philosophical arguments, scientific knowledge and general consensus regarding the best interests of the community. If you choose not to conform to the rules of the group then you will be considered anti-social and, in the event of criminal action against the group, incarcerated.

There's no great philosophical mystique, of the sort you seem to be promoting, in any of this.

 

[Tassman]

It's a bit of a problem that when you can't defend a point any more, instead of saying something like "Oh I see, actually you are right" you run away on some tangent to try to create a smokescreen.

Nobody ever said philosophy could answer moral questions unaided by scientific knowledge. You are stating a trivially true thing nobody ever contested, to avoid having to discuss anything I said, and avoid having to engage with what I wrote.

I'll take that evasion as an admission that evolved behaviour simply cannot be an even mildly reliable guide to what is "moral", despite the fact that we have evolved to live in social groups, because some life forms have evolved to defect on social contracts strategically.



I'll tell you why that is. It's because I'm not letting you change the subject. Changing the subject to my own views, whatever they are, is still changing the subject.

You have been presenting a thesis. I have been showing you that your thesis is incoherent. Now you want to change the subject. To quote you: "I wonder why that is."



That seems like another attempt to dodge the question by stating boring trivialities.

Do you, or do you not, think that given perfect information, or as close to it as we fallible humans can practically get, that all rational beings will converge on a unitary moral code?

If so, why do you think this? If not, doesn't that demonstrate that your approach cannot actually answer any moral questions at all?



Aha! Now you have changed your thesis, and I imagine you hoped we wouldn't notice.

A moment ago you were arguing very specifically that we ONLY exhibit "moral" behaviour (in the popular sense) because we have a built-in, evolved drive towards "cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them".

Now suddenly when confronted with the machine intelligence issue you are trying to bluster your way out of it by changing the scenario and saying that the machine intelligences (which I explicitly specified had no built-in drive for cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them) are the product of "artificial evolution", whatever on Earth that is, and so somehow if they exhibit "moral" behaviour for good game-theoretic reasons that this would not totally falsify your thesis.

Sorry, but "artificial evolution" is not a thing. You just made that up now to get out of a corner. You've admitted for all intents and purposes that your evolution-centric thesis is bunk.



The irony in that statement tickles me quite a lot.



Okay. I read the page you linked and I just don't see where anything Pigliucci says got demolished. I see one bit at the end where Carrier acts like he invented welfarist utilitarianism and that it's a huge insight moral philosophers need to get on board with, which pretty much indicates the scope of Carrier's ignorance of moral philosophy, but I don't see anywhere where he demolishes Pigliucci. He mostly just picks on Shermer, who is a much easier target.

So far my heuristic has actually over-estimated the quality of your evidence. I was expecting something where Carrier addressed Pigliucci's arguments poorly. I wasn't expecting you to link us to a page where he didn't even address them at all!

You’re all over the place with this near Gish Gallop of yours.

I have made clear from the start that for me ’morality’ is nothing more than a code of behaviour arising from our evolved need to maintain social cohesion as social animals. And that this code of behaviour varies over time and is subject to adjustment as our society develops. That’s all. You have said nothing that undermines this position.

Conversely your objection appears, like that of your colleague soba, to be based in a concept of absolutist morality whereby fixed laws of morality are inherent in humanity and that we are subject to absolute standards of conduct which do not change with circumstances. You, quite rightly, argue that my position does not address this issue. It doesn't. It is not my position and I don’t need to defend it. But you do. The world awaits.

 

[angrysoba]

Enough of this nonsense and back to basics!

In your post #59 you twice objected to my arguments as not demonstrating why certain behaviour was “moral in and of itself”. You were correct; I didn't claim any behaviour to be “moral in and of itself”. But your arguments indicate that, as far as you’re concerned, true morality can only be characterized as such, i.e. absolute. You have yet to defend this view. How do you determine which behaviour is "moral in and of itself”.

This is a far more productive form of discussion than the song ‘n dance show you and your colleague are staging.

My position, stated several times, is that morals are nothing more than derivatives of self-preservation and procreation and a consequence of natural selection. They are naturally built into us, because those morals were beneficial to the breeding and survival of our species as social animals.

As to how we derive such a code our moral decisions will be based, as they have been through all of human history, by a combination of factors ranging from tribal traditions, social acculturation, philosophical arguments, scientific knowledge and general consensus regarding the best interests of the community. If you choose not to conform to the rules of the group then you will be considered anti-social and, in the event of criminal action against the group, incarcerated.

There's no great philosophical mystique, of the sort you seem to be promoting, in any of this.

I've not promoted any "philosophical mystique". I have simply pointed out that you have failed to see the distinction between descriptive and normative morality and yet that elision is a crucial mistake if you wish to support the thesis that science can answer normative questions of morality.

You have certainly, in the past, championed Sam Harris's arguments that it can be done, and now you have suddenly wheeled out Richard Carrier yet you have not been able to summarize his argument or on what grounds you agree with him.

And you have dodged the questions that I have asked you in the previous post. I would like them answered if you would be so kind, otherwise I have to conclude that you are, as I thought, slippery.

 

[Tassman]

I agree that we think things are good because such behaviors have been successful in passing on our genes, and so natural selection has defined morality. I think there's a pretty broad range of often-conflicting behaviors that we're born with, so different societies can have different--even conflicting--ideas of morality, yet still be basing it on those urges.

Agreed!

But what do you mean "as our social mores change"? What is causing that change? I think that's one of the key problems. There's just not time to explain, with genetic changes, things like why racism was considered acceptable by many people just a couple generations ago, so I don't think it's genetic.

No it can’t possibly be genetic; natural selection doesn't work that fast as I'm sure you're aware. I think societies mature in much the same way that individuals mature. This in part is, I think, driven by the expansion of social horizons, the acquisition of knowledge and the greater interaction within and between communities providing a cross fertilization if idea and values. The social media is playing an ever greater role in all this.

Personally, I think the changes are due to stronger or weaker expressions of urges that have helped us survive in various circumstances. The immorality of racism is widening the definition of "our tribe" and including more within its protection, while racism was based on shunning others unlike us and our relatives.

Yes. Our history as a species has been our development from tribal units to ever larger communities, from allied tribes, to nation states to empires etc. and, in the process, our sense of self in relation to outsiders brings about adjustments of the sort you refer to.

Predicting that such ideas about morality could change is easy, but predicting that the change in those attitudes would occur in the 1960s would be virtually impossible from, say, the vantage-point of the 1860s. It's chaos theory at work, like predicting the weather 100 years ahead.

Do you think that such changes in social mores are predictable? What do you think causes them?

Indeed, one can’t make sound predictions when accurate information about future technological developments is unknown. A recent episode of Downton Abbey, set just 100 years ago, showed the kerfuffle over acquiring a radio - with no notion whatsoever of future TV or the internet etc.

Loved your reference to "chaos theory". Why not?

The problem is that there's no such thing as a rational person. So in practice, there will always be a range of behaviors and, like species adapting to different niches, I think those different behaviors can be successful in a variety of niches.

The hedonistic behavior described by Angrysoba is, ironically, considered immoral by many people while a life's dream by others. I'd say it's because a desire for power and control are useful traits, but an encouragement of responsibility and humility are also useful traits to society--we can't all be leaders. So people are born with a mix of urges and what they consider moral will depend on how those urges are expressed--but again, how can one predict which urges will be expressed in any particular social subset?

I think it’s all to do with the dissemination and acculturation of productive values which promote the interests of society. And, to support your observation regarding the irony of double standards in both condemning and yet desiring something recognised as immoral, it was apparently the dream of many slaves to own slaves of their own rather than to abolish a divisive institution that could only be maintained by brute force to the ultimate detriment of a cohesive society.

 

[angrysoba]

Conversely your objection appears, like that of your colleague soba, to be based in a concept of absolutist morality whereby fixed laws of morality are inherent in humanity and that we are subject to absolute standards of conduct which do not change with circumstances. You, quite rightly, argue that my position does not address this issue. It doesn't. It is not my position and I don’t need to defend it. But you do. The world awaits.

Why do you bring up Carrier and Sam Harris as supporters of your thesis when it appears that they, unlike myself and Kevin Lowe, have argued for absolute and objective morality?

And where do you think Wowbagger and Shermer are on this question?

It seems to me that it is you, Carrier, Harris, Shermer and Wowbagger who argue for scientifically discoverable objective moral truths about morality. And indeed, when asked where Carrier "demolishes" Pigliucci you linked to a blogpost by Carrier in which he said he agreed with Shermer while ridiculing his style of argument.

What you perhaps forgot to link to, I'll be generous and assume it was an honest oversight or perhaps ignorance of the post, was Carrier's post called "What Exactly Is Objective Moral Truth?":

I had even greater problems with Michael Shermer’s attempt to defend the same core thesis Harris does, and I have commented before on how he was simply destroyed by his opponent, philosopher Massimo Pigliucci, even though I think Pigliucci is ultimately wrong and Shermer ultimately right (see Shermer vs. Pigliucci on Moral Science). I expect Harris will get similarly pwned. And that’s sad. Because it hurts their cause. They just aren’t the best defenders of this idea. And they should admit that and stop trying to be lone wolfs and look for and work with expert collaborators. There are several real, even renowned, philosophers who have been defending the same core thesis for years. Harris did not come up with anything fundamentally new here, and they have far more skill and experience dealing with the rigorous philosophical requirements of this debate.

http://freethoughtblogs.com/carrier/archives/4498

Carrier seems to get very frustrated by people who agree with his main ideas but are inept at arguing for these ideas. As a result, he may not appreciate you being a vocal supporter of him especially when you are in such an obvious muddle.

 

[angrysoba]

By the way, Tassman, have you read Pigliucci's response to Carrier?

http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.jp/2013/10/objective-moral-truth-thoughts-on.html

 

[Tassman]

Why do you bring up Carrier and Sam Harris as supporters of your thesis when it appears that they, unlike myself and Kevin Lowe, have argued for absolute and objective morality?

And where do you think Wowbagger and Shermer are on this question?

It seems to me that it is you, Carrier, Harris, Shermer and Wowbagger who argue for scientifically discoverable objective moral truths about morality. And indeed, when asked where Carrier "demolishes" Pigliucci you linked to a blogpost by Carrier in which he said he agreed with Shermer while ridiculing his style of argument.

What you perhaps forgot to link to, I'll be generous and assume it was an honest oversight or perhaps ignorance of the post, was Carrier's post called "What Exactly Is Objective Moral Truth?":



http://freethoughtblogs.com/carrier/archives/4498

Carrier seems to get very frustrated by people who agree with his main ideas but are inept at arguing for these ideas. As a result, he may not appreciate you being a vocal supporter of him especially when you are in such an obvious muddle.

Anything and everything it seems to divert attention away from the unanswered question I’ve asked you several times: How can certain behaviour be “moral in and of itself”?, which you mentioned twice in your post #59. What do you mean by this – especially when, in opposing a science of morality, you nevertheless behave as if there are moral truths? How, in your view, are these truths arrived at?

For the record, my position on a science of morality, as proposed by the likes of Sam Harris and Richard Carrier is that it is a more positive approach than that of the Aristotelians, which is where Pigliucci is coming from with his Virtue Ethics whereby an act is good or bad depending on whether or not it contributes to our proper human end of happiness. How does this differ in principle to Sam Harris’ scientific yardstick of human well being? Although one notes that the former is merely based upon an axiomatic premise whereas the latter is based upon empirical evidence?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

You’re all over the place with this near Gish Gallop of yours.

That's it? You've been destroyed in detail and all you can do is try to reboot the conversation and try to pretend it didn't happen?

I have made clear from the start that for me ’morality’ is nothing more than a code of behaviour arising from our evolved need to maintain social cohesion as social animals. And that this code of behaviour varies over time and is subject to adjustment as our society develops. That’s all. You have said nothing that undermines this position.

How quickly you forget! You are still dodging the issue of whether machine intelligences with absolutely no evolved needs or drives whatsoever, but which are highly rational, would develop a code of behaviour to maintain social cohesion based purely on game-theoretic concerns. It seems to me you have presented no coherent basis at all to rule that out, hence your assertion that the basis of moral thought is in evolved drives is almost certainly false and certainly unsupported.

Conversely your objection appears, like that of your colleague soba, to be based in a concept of absolutist morality whereby fixed laws of morality are inherent in humanity and that we are subject to absolute standards of conduct which do not change with circumstances.

Not at all, that's is simply a straw man which you have beaten on time and time again, to no particular avail. I have advanced no absolutist thesis at all.

I have merely pointed out, as has angrysoba, that your position is incoherent because you refuse to explicate what your fundamental "good(s)" are, which instrumental goods like social equality are "good" because they facilitate. You keep dancing back and forth between the naturalistic fallacy and relativism, and between description and prescription, without ever clearly explaining your position, probably because you know that if you clarify your position it's incoherence will be patent.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Anything and everything it seems to divert attention away from the unanswered question I’ve asked you several times: How can certain behaviour be “moral in and of itself”?,

As has been explained to you repeatedly, that question is a problem for your position.

Point to a thing which you think is "morally good", under whatever (probably confused) definition you prefer to use. Ask yourself "Is this morally good in and of itself? If not, why is it morally good?". Then repeat the process - have you now found the rock bottom, the thing which you think is morally good just because it is, not because it is a means to some "good" end? If not, repeat until you hit rock bottom, until you find the thing which you think is good, but you cannot think of any deeper reason why it is good, except that to you it just is.

It is logically inescapable that if you would actually sit down for a minute and carry out this process, instead of pounding away at the keyboard without really thinking, one of a few things will happen. You might discover what you think is morally good in and of itself, in which case you need to answer your own question above. You might discover yourself going around in circles, in which case your position is incoherent and circular. Or you might discover that you think nothing is good in and of itself, in which case it logically follows that nothing is good at all and morality is a meaningless concept.

 

[angrysoba]

Anything and everything it seems to divert attention away from the unanswered question I’ve asked you several times: How can certain behaviour be “moral in and of itself”?, which you mentioned twice in your post #59. What do you mean by this – especially when, in opposing a science of morality, you nevertheless behave as if there are moral truths? How, in your view, are these truths arrived at?

Tassman, if you really need to be shown this once again, look here at your post #58 in which you first state that cannot be "'moral' in and of themselves":

But it is reasonable to choose "consequentialism", which is class of normative ethics, as a basis for morality because, unless one is arguing for a non-existent absolute morality, consequentialism argues that the consequences of one's conduct are the ultimate guide for a judgment about the rightness or wrongness of an action. But such decisions must be qualified by a conditional conjunction - they cannot be classified as ‘moral’ in and of themselves.

So, as I have pointed out, I did not conjure the phrase out of nowhere so you do not need to pretend I have been arguing for the proposition "X is moral in and of itself" and then banging on about holy books which, as I have said, is a ploy to convince other readers that perhaps I am some secret theist who thinks there is some divine law. If that is your aim then you clearly have a low opinion of anyone reading here.

However, the above quoted part has several problems which have already been addressed and which you have not bothered to satisfactorily answer but I only have time to explain, in really simple terms, why I responded by paraphrasing your "moral in and of themselves" line

Thus, one cannot simply say it is immoral to let poor people starve, because this is based solely upon subjective opinion whether or not it is wrong to let poor people starve.

You see, at this point you seem to be denying that what is moral can be subjective. I want to know why something cannot be subjective and moral at the same time. Now, if you are saying that something based "solely upon subjective opinion" cannot be said to be moral or immoral then what do you suppose can be said to be moral/immoral? Something objective, perhaps? You don't say it explicitly, but that's what you appear to be driving at.

However, it is the next bit which makes no coherent sense whatsoever and it is here where I wonder how you justify your basis for morality. You seem to throw a lot of sentences together about things which may or may not be true and then follow up with a non sequitur.

But we can say: "IF we want a more equitable society then it is moral to feed starving people, because research has shown that an equitable society is a more prosperous society. And it is in our mutual interests to have a prosperous society. Hence, the consequences of such conduct are right!" In short, the conduct is moral.

First of all, this could work as a basic empirical observation (aside from a few suppressed premises that we can ignore for now):

IF we want a more equitable society then it is moral to feed starving people

if you changed it to...

IF we want a more equitable society then it is moral we ought to feed starving people

because as a hypothetical imperative it works in a similar way to saying

If I want to get up early in the morning then I have to set my alarm clock.

not all oughts are to do with morality.

It is up to you to explain why "it is moral". If you are not prepared to do that and are only interested in the technical question of creating a more equitable society then you should discard unexplained concepts. You can't just smuggle in the word "moral" willy-nilly and say you have proved something that you haven't. Not if you want to be taken seriously.

Anyway, you seem to try to do that next, with this part:

because research has shown that an equitable society is a more prosperous society.

This is confusing. I don't see where the "because" comes from. Initially you said your aim was to become an "equitable society" but now you have added a second aim, to become a "prosperous society". Surely your original point should have been:

IF we want a more prosperous society then we should try to become a more equitable society and feeding starving people is a necessary condition of this.

That would make more logical sense, but there is still no need for the use of the term moral, so I want to know where you are getting it from.

You then say,

And it is in our mutual interests to have a prosperous society.

This may well be true, but again, it does not have to have anything to do with morality as far as I can see. And yet you conclude thusly:

Hence, the consequences of such conduct are right!" In short, the conduct is moral.

????

Do you now see my problem with your claim? Where does this "hence" come from except as an explanation for how a technical matter can be solved? And then what's with "In short, the conduct is moral"?

You seem to be claiming there is a heirachy of good things in the following order:

1. feeding the poor
2. creating an equitable society
3. creating a prosperous society
4. our mutual interests

I can accept that you do not see 1, 2 and 3 as moral in and of itself, but by any reasonable coherent reconstruction of your argument you conclude that what is in "our mutual interests" is the bottom line, and then you sling the word "moral" in there. So I am more than entitled to ask why "our mutual interests" is "moral in and of itself", because you argue that it is.

 

[angrysoba]

For the record, my position on a science of morality, as proposed by the likes of Sam Harris and Richard Carrier is that it is a more positive approach than that of the Aristotelians, which is where Pigliucci is coming from with his Virtue Ethics whereby an act is good or bad depending on whether or not it contributes to our proper human end of happiness. How does this differ in principle to Sam Harris’ scientific yardstick of human well being? Although one notes that the former is merely based upon an axiomatic premise whereas the latter is based upon empirical evidence?

Actually, Sam Harris talks of the well-being of conscious creatures and I think deliberately avoids specifying humans and indeed argues against the evolutionary theory of morality which you have proposed, and for very good reasons which have been spelt out already on this and other threads.

And the assumption that the well-being of conscious creatures is a moral yardstick (i.e. moral in and of itself) by Sam Harris is simply not arrived at through empirical science - a major problem for someone claiming that science determines value, as he does.

Now could you please answer whether or not you have read Richard Carrier's argument in The End of Christianity which you imply that you have.

And could you summarize this argument and explain how it demolishes Pigliucci?

By the way, you seem as unfamiliar with Carrier as you have been on a number of other topics that you have referenced in the past.

Looking through the comments section of one of Carrier's blogposts after someone remarked about Pigliucci:

I believe he is a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist, and would reject consequentialist reasoning as the sole arbiter of the moral good.

To which Carrier replies:

I am also a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist, but I also have demonstrated that we can unify all moral theories under that rubric. Even Aristotle’s case for virtue ethics was consequentialist; it is also deontological–and the fact that it can be both is something philosophers miss when they fail to recognize that Kantian ethics is in fact also consequentialist. Both facts I have demonstrated in my work, including in my formal peer reviewed chapter on the subject.

Have you read this "formal peer reviewed chapter"?

 

[Pup]

if you changed it to...

IF we want a more equitable society then it is moral we ought to feed starving people

because as a hypothetical imperative it works in a similar way to saying

If I want to get up early in the morning then I have to set my alarm clock.

not all oughts are to do with morality.

I think that's an important point, and it mostly goes back to people searching for a label or explanation for why they feel something should or should not be done, that goes deeper than a logical reason.

It's easy to see why one needs to set one's alarm clock, but why not kill fatally ill babies, for example? Well, you just shouldn't do that. But why? Well, it's immoral. (Or the other common explanation: God forbids it.)

Yet the actual reason for that opinion may only be because we have a strong inborn urge to care for our offspring no matter what, because those who didn't, didn't have offspring live to maturity and pass on their genes. But that's not how it feels.

If morality is based on a combination of natural urges that have been inbred into us and are expressed in a certain way in a particular society, those urges may feel as if they're greater than ourselves, or greater than any need to justify them with a logical reason, or the logical reason may be after-the-fact reasoning to justify what we "just know" is wrong.

People need to label those feelings with something greater than the alarm clock example, so we've invented the term morality.

In another society, of course, killing unhealthy babies may feel morally right. We've got that urge inborn in us too, because it saves limited resouces for those with the best chance of living, which is why even in first world countries there's a debate about whether it's moral to abort fetuses who have devastating abnormalities. But again, an individual might argue that it's "just wrong" to force a baby to be born only to live a short, suffering life, with a sensation that it's greater than logic--it's morally wrong.