The Future of Moral Science

[angrysoba]

I think that's an important point, and it mostly goes back to people searching for a label or explanation for why they feel something should or should not be done, that goes deeper than a logical reason.

It's easy to see why one needs to set one's alarm clock, but why not kill fatally ill babies, for example? Well, you just shouldn't do that. But why? Well, it's immoral. (Or the other common explanation: God forbids it.)

Yet the actual reason for that opinion may only be because we have a strong inborn urge to care for our offspring no matter what, because those who didn't, didn't have offspring live to maturity and pass on their genes. But that's not how it feels.

If morality is based on a combination of natural urges that have been inbred into us and are expressed in a certain way in a particular society, those urges may feel as if they're greater than ourselves, or greater than any need to justify them with a logical reason, or the logical reason may be after-the-fact reasoning to justify what we "just know" is wrong.

People need to label those feelings with something greater than the alarm clock example, so we've invented the term morality.

In another society, of course, killing unhealthy babies may feel morally right. We've got that urge inborn in us too, because it saves limited resouces for those with the best chance of living, which is why even in first world countries there's a debate about whether it's moral to abort fetuses who have devastating abnormalities. But again, an individual might argue that it's "just wrong" to force a baby to be born only to live a short, suffering life, with a sensation that it's greater than logic--it's morally wrong.

Well, I don't doubt that there are "strong in-built urges" towards all kinds of behaviour.

Yes, one of those is surely towards caring for offspring to the extent that parents will subordinate their own needs to those of their children, and yet it may serve as both an important pre-requisite for moral decision-making and yet could also cloud rational judgement.

And yes, as you point out, there are cultures which practice infanticide and not only for sick babies, but even for healthy babies. If we look at evidence for "proto-morality" in other primate species, which is useful from a descriptive point of view, it appears that some male primates kill the offspring of rival males before mating with the female whose children he has just murdered (to put it into emotive terms).

This is why I have said that from a descriptive point of view, morality can be explained by empirical science - or at least we have been able to come up with some plausible theories for the origins of morality - but that it is still not enough to jump from description to prescription.

In fact, there is a lot of perfectly good evidence that "strong in-born urges" don't always work out in ways that we intuitively call moral. As we have already talked about, attitudes towards race and rape have changed over time, and the same goes for treatment of animals.

Similarly it could be argued that our in-born urges prejudice us towards members of our family over strangers. In most Western countries what is considered nepotism might be considered perfectly normal behaviour in other societies. I think Pinker came up with the rhetorical question, "What kind of guy would give a job to a complete stranger over his own brother?"

Our in-born urges also prejudice us towards people who are attractive over ugly people, or people who have shared some of our experiences, or simply well-defined people over a mass of undifferentiated people. An example I have brought up before which Tassman often talks past is the question of whether I should buy my son an expensive Christmas present or donate the money to repair an orphanage's leaky roof in a far away country. Empirically I think we know that most people choose something like the former rather than the latter. Again, evolutionary traits are not helping us out.

And in the example of the Hedonist that I outlined before, in my example I was clear to point out that the person behaving that way was not doing anything illegal (or if he was then the authorities would reliably turn a blind eye) and then asked how evolved human nature helps us out. Tassman has a Panglossian answer:

As to how we derive such a code our moral decisions will be based, as they have been through all of human history, by a combination of factors ranging from tribal traditions, social acculturation, philosophical arguments, scientific knowledge and general consensus regarding the best interests of the community. If you choose not to conform to the rules of the group then you will be considered anti-social and, in the event of criminal action against the group, incarcerated.

Yet this is platitudinous at best and false at worst. It is circular reasoning if you say that what is moral is that which is what society lets you get away with. If you have some unexpressed idea about what genuinely is moral behaviour, on the other hand, it is wishful thinking (or even theistic thinking on Tassman's part) to think that transgressors will always get their comeuppance in the end.

 

[Pup]

This is why I have said that from a descriptive point of view, morality can be explained by empirical science - or at least we have been able to come up with some plausible theories for the origins of morality - but that it is still not enough to jump from description to prescription.

I think that's the biggest problem with a scientific investigation of morality, because morality will always depend on a particular society. It's like asking what's the best size for a finch's beak. The answer changes constantly depending on circumstances. The finches' beaks are genetic (physical) changes, but morality is due to behavioral changes based on changed environment in the long run probably, but sort of a random walk in the short run.

 

[angrysoba]

I think that's the biggest problem with a scientific investigation of morality, because morality will always depend on a particular society.

It's certainly true that different societies do have different norms; that's trivially true from a descriptive point of view. The problem comes in if you are making the further move that what people ought to do is what their society deems correct. This is a logical error and for various reasons it leads to an incoherent principle called normative moral relativism. It cannot really work because within societies individuals within societies rarely have homogeneous ideas about what is right and wrong, not to mention the fact that these societies change over time. Presumably they change through transgressions of particular norms. We would also be forced to embrace what most people would find an unsatisfactory acceptance of slavery within slave-owning societies for those societies if not for ours, which seems absurd to most people and also we are forced to have a universal principle of tolerance for competing ethical systems which contradicts relativist prescriptions.

From that point of view, I can understand why some people would want to come up with a "scientific" theory which would prove that slavery is bad for society. But this has two further problems. One of those is that such ideas lead us to be hostages to empirical findings. We may yet discover that Repugnant Thing X actually creates a Utilitarian Goal Y. Does this mean we would be morally obliged to do Repugnant Thing X? It seems to me that Sam Harris commits himself to this view, from I can see, and yet this goal of Utilitarian Goal Y does not seem to be arrived at through science but is rather the a priori principle on which he grounds his project. That's the main thing at issue - that we cannot use science to determine moral ends or moral principles.

It's like asking what's the best size for a finch's beak. The answer changes constantly depending on circumstances. The finches' beaks are genetic (physical) changes, but morality is due to behavioral changes based on changed environment in the long run probably, but sort of a random walk in the short run.

Possibly, but I am not sure the analogy holds. For a finch there will still be an optimally beneficial size at one time or another, even if it varies from time and place. However, when it comes to human morality we can argue that slavery was very profitable to Mr Slave Trader and to Mr Industrialist. It made them rich. And, notwithstanding some claims about the cohesiveness of society, many societies found that they prospered through slavery if you didn't care too much about the slaves. But when it comes to morality, many people would argue that slavery is wrong regardless of how profitable the slave trade is and regardless of its impact on the cohesiveness of society. In fact, they may go further and say that abolishing slavery on the basis of self-interest is pretty much an immoral position.

 

[Tassman]

How quickly you forget! You are still dodging the issue of whether machine intelligences with absolutely no evolved needs or drives whatsoever, but which are highly rational, would develop a code of behaviour to maintain social cohesion based purely on game-theoretic concerns. It seems to me you have presented no coherent basis at all to rule that out, hence your assertion that the basis of moral thought is in evolved drives is almost certainly false and certainly unsupported.

Machine intelligences will have whatever qualities they are programmed to have. By the time they have developed, as predicted, super-intelligence their decision-making processes will be well beyond our comprehension. Your hypothesis makes no point.

Not at all, that's is simply a straw man which you have beaten on time and time again, to no particular avail. I have advanced no absolutist thesis at all.

I have merely pointed out, as has angrysoba, that your position is incoherent because you refuse to explicate what your fundamental "good(s)" are, which instrumental goods like social equality are "good" because they facilitate. You keep dancing back and forth between the naturalistic fallacy and relativism, and between description and prescription, without ever clearly explaining your position, probably because you know that if you clarify your position it's incoherence will be patent.

No, this is not a naturalistic fallacy. In general terms Descriptive Morality describes how and why a society develops the values it has whereas Nominative Morality rests with the individual who “ought” to adhere to societal values of his community if he wishes to be accepted as a member of said community. And, in case you are disposed to leap in with the so-called “is/ought problem”:

“From the perspective of neuroscience and brain evolution, the routine rejection of scientific approaches to moral behavior based on Hume’s warning against deriving ought from is seems unfortunate, especially as the warning is limited to deductive inferences. The dictum can be set aside for a deeper, albeit programmatic, neurobiological perspective on what reasoning and problem-solving are, how social navigation works, how evaluation is accomplished by nervous systems, and how mammalian brains make decisions” - Patricia Churchland. Cited Wiki.

As for “relativism” I tend towards the views of neuroscientist Sam Harris whereby he posits correct and incorrect answers to moral questions that may one day fall within the grasp of neuroscience - in short, an empirically based moral science founded upon ethical naturalism.

The fact that this approach is in its infancy says no more and about its truth or otherwise than Copernicus’ heliocentric universe, which was correct in principle despite numerous errors of fact requiring subsequent correction. He too was overturning coherent arguments, namely Aristotelian philosophy which, though coherent, were wrong.

 

[Tassman]

Tassman, if you really need to be shown this once again, look here at your post #58 in which you first state that cannot be "'moral' in and of themselves":



So, as I have pointed out, I did not conjure the phrase out of nowhere so you do not need to pretend I have been arguing for the proposition "X is moral in and of itself" and then banging on about holy books which, as I have said, is a ploy to convince other readers that perhaps I am some secret theist who thinks there is some divine law. If that is your aim then you clearly have a low opinion of anyone reading here.

However, the above quoted part has several problems which have already been addressed and which you have not bothered to satisfactorily answer but I only have time to explain, in really simple terms, why I responded by paraphrasing your "moral in and of themselves" line

..and in so doing misrepresented the argument. I specifically said that without qualification the arguments cannot be classified as “moral in and of themselves” and yet in your response you say: “why is it moral in and of itself to create a more equitable society”. It’s not and I didn’t say it was.

You see, at this point you seem to be denying that what is moral can be subjective. I want to know why something cannot be subjective and moral at the same time. Now, if you are saying that something based "solely upon subjective opinion" cannot be said to be moral or immoral then what do you suppose can be said to be moral/immoral? Something objective, perhaps? You don't say it explicitly, but that's what you appear to be driving at.

However, it is the next bit which makes no coherent sense whatsoever and it is here where I wonder how you justify your basis for morality. You seem to throw a lot of sentences together about things which may or may not be true and then follow up with a non sequitur.



First of all, this could work as a basic empirical observation (aside from a few suppressed premises that we can ignore for now):



if you changed it to...



because as a hypothetical imperative it works in a similar way to saying



not all oughts are to do with morality.

It is up to you to explain why "it is moral". If you are not prepared to do that and are only interested in the technical question of creating a more equitable society then you should discard unexplained concepts. You can't just smuggle in the word "moral" willy-nilly and say you have proved something that you haven't. Not if you want to be taken seriously.

Anyway, you seem to try to do that next, with this part:



This is confusing. I don't see where the "because" comes from. Initially you said your aim was to become an "equitable society" but now you have added a second aim, to become a "prosperous society". Surely your original point should have been:



That would make more logical sense, but there is still no need for the use of the term moral, so I want to know where you are getting it from.

You then say,



This may well be true, but again, it does not have to have anything to do with morality as far as I can see. And yet you conclude thusly:



????

Do you now see my problem with your claim? Where does this "hence" come from except as an explanation for how a technical matter can be solved? And then what's with "In short, the conduct is moral"?

You seem to be claiming there is a heirachy of good things in the following order:

1. feeding the poor
2. creating an equitable society
3. creating a prosperous society
4. our mutual interests

I can accept that you do not see 1, 2 and 3 as moral in and of itself, but by any reasonable coherent reconstruction of your argument you conclude that what is in "our mutual interests" is the bottom line, and then you sling the word "moral" in there. So I am more than entitled to ask why "our mutual interests" is "moral in and of itself", because you argue that it is.

Well I’m flattered that you take sufficient interest for such a detailed analysis of my post to the extent of teasing and parsing every sentence. But in so doing you are bypassing (deliberately?) the entire thrust of my argument, namely: that of ethical naturalism which bases morality on rational and empirical consideration of the natural world.

Addressed to Pup

That's the main thing at issue - that we cannot use science to determine moral ends or moral principles.

Certainly we can't use science alone to determine moral ends or moral principles (is anyone arguing that?) but nor can we use philosophy uninformed by science to determine these things. And where scientific knowledge conflicts with the philosophical argument (no matter how coherent the philosophical argument may be) it is philosophy that must give way to science.

"J. J. C. Smart's injunction that we take science as our best guide to metaphysical truth (Smart 1996, 6) doesn't require us to treat our current scientific understandings as infallible. It merely invites us to do what good scientific practice itself does in deferring to our present background state of general scientific understanding as the best story we now have about the universe and its furnishings. It is no doubt a flawed, imperfect story still very much in progress, but far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology, say, or the wilder reaches of a more speculative metaphysics as we persist with a philosophical enterprise itself no less fallible and incomplete."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Machine intelligences will have whatever qualities they are programmed to have. By the time they have developed, as predicted, super-intelligence their decision-making processes will be well beyond our comprehension. Your hypothesis makes no point.

You are posting word salad. I specified human-level intelligence and capabilities, so I don't know where you got super-intelligence from. It's not a hypothesis, it's a counter-example. It shows that your thesis that the one true source of moral ideas is evolved social instincts is falsified.

No, this is not a naturalistic fallacy. In general terms Descriptive Morality describes how and why a society develops the values it has whereas Nominative Morality rests with the individual who “ought” to adhere to societal values of his community if he wishes to be accepted as a member of said community.

No, you still aren't using those terms correctly. Both of those things are descriptive, not normative. ("Nominative morality" is not a thing).

And, in case you are disposed to leap in with the so-called “is/ought problem”:

“From the perspective of neuroscience and brain evolution, the routine rejection of scientific approaches to moral behavior based on Hume’s warning against deriving ought from is seems unfortunate, especially as the warning is limited to deductive inferences. The dictum can be set aside for a deeper, albeit programmatic, neurobiological perspective on what reasoning and problem-solving are, how social navigation works, how evaluation is accomplished by nervous systems, and how mammalian brains make decisions” - Patricia Churchland. Cited Wiki.

You realise that what you are quoting is not an argument? It's just an assertion.

As for “relativism” I tend towards the views of neuroscientist Sam Harris whereby he posits correct and incorrect answers to moral questions that may one day fall within the grasp of neuroscience - in short, an empirically based moral science founded upon ethical naturalism.

The fact that this approach is in its infancy says no more and about its truth or otherwise than Copernicus’ heliocentric universe, which was correct in principle despite numerous errors of fact requiring subsequent correction. He too was overturning coherent arguments, namely Aristotelian philosophy which, though coherent, were wrong.

They also laughed at Bozo the Clown.

In fact nothing you have posted here even qualifies as relevant enough to the ongoing conversation to make sense. It's just a string of confident non-sequiturs strung together with no underlying meaning at all.

 

[Pup]

It's certainly true that different societies do have different norms; that's trivially true from a descriptive point of view. The problem comes in if you are making the further move that what people ought to do is what their society deems correct. This is a logical error and for various reasons it leads to an incoherent principle called normative moral relativism.

I see the question as scientifically explaining why people believe some things are immoral, while other things are just a personal preference. So the most one can say is that people believe they ought to do what their society deems correct, and that's what they call moral.

Whether it actually benefits that society is of less interest to me, because as you noted with the slave-owner example, most anything benefits some people and harms others, or benefits in the short run but harms in the long run or vice versa, and one would need to arbitrarily define what harm/benefits we're willing to trade off to decide what's "actually" moral.

It cannot really work because within societies individuals within societies rarely have homogeneous ideas about what is right and wrong, not to mention the fact that these societies change over time.

That is a problem, and the most one can do is narrow down a time frame and either look at big overall morals, or note what factions believe what.

We would also be forced to embrace what most people would find an unsatisfactory acceptance of slavery within slave-owning societies for those societies if not for ours, which seems absurd to most people and also we are forced to have a universal principle of tolerance for competing ethical systems which contradicts relativist prescriptions.

I don't see that. If one society believe slavery was immoral wherever it occurred, that would be their morality, and there would be no need or expectation for them to change it.

If another society was more live-and-let-live, they might not mind having a slave society next door, and that would be their morality.

We may yet discover that Repugnant Thing X actually creates a Utilitarian Goal Y. Does this mean we would be morally obliged to do Repugnant Thing X?

That's about where society is with gay marriage, not that everyone has to marry a person of the same sex, but that we all have to allow and support such marriages. Same thing with interracial marriages a few decades ago. Again, that's an observation about a society, but not a prescription for morality.

Possibly, but I am not sure the analogy holds. For a finch there will still be an optimally beneficial size at one time or another, even if it varies from time and place. However, when it comes to human morality we can argue that slavery was very profitable to Mr Slave Trader and to Mr Industrialist. It made them rich. And, notwithstanding some claims about the cohesiveness of society, many societies found that they prospered through slavery if you didn't care too much about the slaves. But when it comes to morality, many people would argue that slavery is wrong regardless of how profitable the slave trade is and regardless of its impact on the cohesiveness of society. In fact, they may go further and say that abolishing slavery on the basis of self-interest is pretty much an immoral position.

That's why I think anyone trying to decide if something actually is a beneficial morality, needs to define who benefits or what the goal is. Without that, it's impossible, but the goal can be so arbitrary it's meaningless.

We subconsciously know and agree that the best size for a finch's beak is the size that allows it to get the most food, but there's no easy assumption about slave trading, for example. Is the goal to make a society wealthy? To care about all members and help them, including slaves who want to be free? Once we've defined the goal, it's easy to say what's moral, but defining the goal is arbitrary.

 

[Tassman]

You are posting word salad. I specified human-level intelligence and capabilities, so I don't know where you got super-intelligence from. It's not a hypothesis, it's a counter-example. It shows that your thesis that the one true source of moral ideas is evolved social instincts is falsified.

You (yet again) misrepresent my argument. It is not my thesis that “the one true source of moral ideas is evolved social instinct”. Whilst important we cannot depend upon evolutionary theory alone to determine moral ends or moral principles. But nor can we use philosophy uninformed by science to determine these things. And if there is conflict between the two it will of necessity be the philosophical argument that gives way to science.

No, you still aren't using those terms correctly. Both of those things are descriptive, not normative. ("Nominative morality" is not a thing).

If you do not think that normative morality arises naturally from our evolved altruistic instincts plus the moral values held by the community we are a part of, on what basis you argue for the attitudes and behaviour that we “ought” to have?

You realise that what you are quoting is not an argument? It's just an assertion.

It’s the professional opinion of an eminent philosopher taking on the problem of moral relativism in a way that religious moralists have been unable to successfully do; therefore she deserves to be taken seriously.

http://www.partiallyexaminedlife.co...-neurobiology-of-morality-plus-hume’s-ethics/

If you disagree that an “ought” cannot derive from an “is” under any circumstances, then on what basis do you decide what an individual ought to do in order to be a moral person?

They also laughed at Bozo the Clown.

In fact nothing you have posted here even qualifies as relevant enough to the ongoing conversation to make sense. It's just a string of confident non-sequiturs strung together with no underlying meaning at all.

Yes, Bozo the Clown was well known for his Aristotelian stance and his coherent philosophical arguments.

 

[angrysoba]

I see the question as scientifically explaining why people believe some things are immoral, while other things are just a personal preference. So the most one can say is that people believe they ought to do what their society deems correct, and that's what they call moral.

Sometimes people do such as with the example of Huckleberry Finn who freed a slave but considered himself to have done the immoral thing of ridding someone of their property.

But of course, sometimes people condemn their own societies as immoral such as abolitionists, clearly, or vegetarians, or republicans living under a monarchy, or democrats living under a tyranny, or the temperance movement prior to Prohibition in the US, or people who refused to turn in or fire Jews during the Nazi period etc... Therefore I don't think it is true to say "people believe they ought to do what their society deems correct." Some - perhaps most - people who push a particular normative morality probably believe that no society has ever agreed with them; that all societies that have existed up until now have operated badly. Certainly Peter Singer would be one.

Whether it actually benefits that society is of less interest to me, because as you noted with the slave-owner example, most anything benefits some people and harms others, or benefits in the short run but harms in the long run or vice versa, and one would need to arbitrarily define what harm/benefits we're willing to trade off to decide what's "actually" moral.

Yes, and there are more abstract questions about what liberties we would demand regardless of the destruction such liberties can bring, or a related question of justice - would it be just to hang innocent people if we discovered that it had a deterrent effect on serious crime (this is a hypothetical example for illustration purposes only)? I'm not sure how we can scientifically argue that some people ought to have certain liberties but not others because of the utilitarian deficits that have been empirically demonstrated.

In fact, those that have very confidently predicted that science is just about to provide us with the The One True Morality - at least in principle - have divergent ideas about what this will be. Shermer, for example, seems to think science will demonstrate that his particular political ideology will be shown to be the correct one, which allows all the particular rights that he favours, the eating of meat, and various other self-serving beliefs. Sam Harris is a little more abstract but essentially he's discovered a moral system that allows him to wag his finger at the Muslims and the Christians. Richard Carrier, well, I don't really know what he thinks because Tassman won't tell me, but I know he has thrown a wobbly at Shermer and Harris.

What seems most evident to many of us is that their main disagreements are philosophical, which means they disagree with the very thing they are arguing science can answer. Most of the stuff they say about science is not what I have a problem with (except when they come out with ludicrous "scientific claims" that are just false such as how many genes are required for intelligence or the unit of evolution by natural selection.)

Other philosophers have also asked questions about whether utilitarianism can even be arrived at in principle. Some questions are to what extent we should put future humans into consideration. We often talk about how global warming will affect "our grandchildren" but how about their grandchildren and their grandchildren's grandchildren. Are they any sacrifices that we would be prepared to make for people who are ten generations down the line?

That is a problem, and the most one can do is narrow down a time frame and either look at big overall morals, or note what factions believe what.

No, I think it is logically insoluble to argue for normative moral relativism.

I don't see that. If one society believe slavery was immoral wherever it occurred, that would be their morality, and there would be no need or expectation for them to change it.

If another society was more live-and-let-live, they might not mind having a slave society next door, and that would be their morality.

Yes, but I am saying that normative moral relativism requires universal tolerance. But what if one Society X did not tolerate the norms of Society Y? We would have to tolerate the fact that Society X was intolerant while demanding it was tolerant. This is surely a contradiction because we are not tolerating their intolerance which normative moral relativism demands we do.

That's about where society is with gay marriage, not that everyone has to marry a person of the same sex, but that we all have to allow and support such marriages. Same thing with interracial marriages a few decades ago. Again, that's an observation about a society, but not a prescription for morality.



That's why I think anyone trying to decide if something actually is a beneficial morality, needs to define who benefits or what the goal is. Without that, it's impossible, but the goal can be so arbitrary it's meaningless.

We subconsciously know and agree that the best size for a finch's beak is the size that allows it to get the most food, but there's no easy assumption about slave trading, for example. Is the goal to make a society wealthy? To care about all members and help them, including slaves who want to be free? Once we've defined the goal, it's easy to say what's moral, but defining the goal is arbitrary.

Well, I don't want to commit to calling it "arbitrary" but it is most certainly the sticking point which science cannot come up.

Arguably we can use some form of a priori reasoning to determine what must be a moral goal but I don't have much hope for that either.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

You (yet again) misrepresent my argument. It is not my thesis that “the one true source of moral ideas is evolved social instinct”. Whilst important we cannot depend upon evolutionary theory alone to determine moral ends or moral principles. But nor can we use philosophy uninformed by science to determine these things. And if there is conflict between the two it will of necessity be the philosophical argument that gives way to science.

So who was it said "The basis of ALL Social Contracts is Natural Morality which in common with other higher social animals, has evolved via Natural Selection into the capacity for cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them. Without these qualities being developed within us in the first place there could be NO morality as we know it today."? Oh yes, it was you.

Just so we're on the same page, have you now abandoned that claim? Or do you still think that rational beings without evolved drives for cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them would be incapable of acting morally?

If you do not think that normative morality arises naturally from our evolved altruistic instincts plus the moral values held by the community we are a part of, on what basis you argue for the attitudes and behaviour that we “ought” to have?

You are changing the subject again. This has nothing to do with whether you were using the terms "prescriptive" and "descriptive" correctly. (Your question is also nonsensical, but that's a different problem).

It’s the professional opinion of an eminent philosopher taking on the problem of moral relativism in a way that religious moralists have been unable to successfully do; therefore she deserves to be taken seriously.

http://www.partiallyexaminedlife.co...-neurobiology-of-morality-plus-hume’s-ethics/

If you disagree that an “ought” cannot derive from an “is” under any circumstances, then on what basis do you decide what an individual ought to do in order to be a moral person?

I do not disagree that an "ought" cannot derive from an "is", as Hume put it. I think you will also find that your "eminent philosopher" has completely failed to convince the general population of eminent philosophers that they have done anything whatsoever to solve the is/ought problem so as appeals to authority go this is doubly bad.

Yes, Bozo the Clown was well known for his Aristotelian stance and his coherent philosophical arguments.

Can you reference the post number of any post whatsoever in which you have made anything resembling a coherent philosophical argument?

 

[angrysoba]

Now that Tassman has hopped from appealing to the authority of Richard Carrier, without explicating Carrier's argument, to appealing to the authority of Patricia Churchland, is Tassman going to explain what her argument is?

Tassman, have you read her book Braintrust? If so could you let us know, in your words, what the central argument is?

By the way, here is a blogpost on one of her talks in which she apparently skirts round the very thing as issue "Can science tell us right from wrong?" to saying that science can tell us much about morality. Which has never been in dispute:

First, in response to a Sam Harris-esque type of “science can give us answers to moral questions because values are a kind of fact,” Churchland explicitly states that neuroscience cannot answer questions such as “When can organs be donated?” or “When is an inheritance tax fair?” or “When is a war a just war?” On questions of this sort, neuroscience has nothing to say directly. To get some answers, we have to talk to each other, consider other points of view, see what kinds of consequences follow what sorts of actions, etc. Morality is a practical problem-solving endeavor, and to solve problems we must balance various considerations against each other to produce suitable — albeit not perfect — solutions.

Second, in response to a tendency to attribute universal moral intuitions to an innate moral sense or biological foundation (à la Marc Hauser or Jonathan Haidt), Churchland warns us to proceed with caution. Just because something is very common it doesn’t mean it’s innate. Making boats out of wood is common in all sorts of cultures across the world — does its universality make it fundamental to our biology? Of course not, people make boats out of wood because it floats, is available in many places, and is pretty easy to work with; it’s a good solution to a common problem. Moral problems may be solved in a similar fashion, without the necessity for an innate grammar or specific moral foundation.

If you want a much more detailed (and slightly more coherent) explanation of Churchland’s thoughts on the matter, I would definitely take a look at Braintrust. It makes abundantly clear just how much science has to say about the roots of morality, but also, just how much more work needs to be done on that scaffolding.

 

[angrysoba]

..and in so doing misrepresented the argument. I specifically said that without qualification the arguments cannot be classified as “moral in and of themselves” and yet in your response you say: “why is it moral in and of itself to create a more equitable society”. It’s not and I didn’t say it was.

Then why do you keep demanding I explain the phrase?

Well I’m flattered that you take sufficient interest for such a detailed analysis of my post to the extent of teasing and parsing every sentence. But in so doing you are bypassing (deliberately?) the entire thrust of my argument, namely: that of ethical naturalism which bases morality on rational and empirical consideration of the natural world.

So much for assertions. Now where's the "argument"?

Certainly we can't use science alone to determine moral ends or moral principles (is anyone arguing that?) but nor can we use philosophy uninformed by science to determine these things. And where scientific knowledge conflicts with the philosophical argument (no matter how coherent the philosophical argument may be) it is philosophy that must give way to science.

I am not even sure what the last bit is supposed to mean. Could you give an example of what you are talking about and explain how it is that it contradicts anything I have said?

 

[Pup]

Therefore I don't think it is true to say "people believe they ought to do what their society deems correct." Some - perhaps most - people who push a particular normative morality probably believe that no society has ever agreed with them; that all societies that have existed up until now have operated badly. Certainly Peter Singer would be one.

It's certainly an over-generalization to say that all members of a society believe a certain way, but I think one can say that "most people believe they ought to do..."

If one grew up in a middle-class Boston household in the antebellum period, one was more apt to be an abolitionist than one who grew up in a middle-class Mississippi household. Of course there were exceptions, but even they tended to move themselves to a social group that fit them better, like the Grimke sisters or James Birney.

If one grew up in the late 20th century US, even in a former slave state, one is almost guaranteed to be think slavery is morally wrong. On the one hand, that's evidence that people are a product of the society they are a part of, but on the other hand, it's evidence that people can force a society to change as the minority abolitionists did, making their view now the majority.

I'm not sure how we can scientifically argue that some people ought to have certain liberties but not others because of the utilitarian deficits that have been empirically demonstrated.

I think we're looking at this slightly differently. I think it would be easy to make a scientific argument (but hard to make any other kind of argument) that all kinds of heinous things are the "best" way to reach a certain goal.

It seems you're assuming the next step is to promote those arguments as the one true answer to morality. But I'm assuming it's a mere intellectual exercise for different goals, like a table that spits out answers to 2+2 or 3+3.

If the goal of society is to get all members to cooperate, strict punishment for those who refuse to work together would be morally acceptable and all emphasis should be on putting aside one's own goals for goals decided on by concensus.

If the goal is to encourage individualism within a community, encouraging cooperation would be moral but strict punishment of those who want to try their own thing would be immoral and they should in fact be encouraged as long as they seemed happy and successful.

And the same would be true for any initial conditions. You'd set those conditions, and a far more complex outcome than my little examples above would be the scientific result, but it could include anything from eugenics to slavery to free schooling for all, depending on what the pre-chosen goals were. Change the goals, and the morality changes. If part of the goal is freedom for all, or individual rights, eugenics and slavery would become immoral.

In fact, those that have very confidently predicted that science is just about to provide us with the The One True Morality - at least in principle - have divergent ideas about what this will be.

Fortunately, I'm not one of those people. You keep saying that I'm advocating normative moral relativism, but I don't think I am, based on what I've written and the usual definition of normative moral relativism that I've read. For example:

I don't see that. If one society believe slavery was immoral wherever it occurred, that would be their morality, and there would be no need or expectation for them to change it.

If another society was more live-and-let-live, they might not mind having a slave society next door, and that would be their morality.

Yes, but I am saying that normative moral relativism requires universal tolerance. But what if one Society X did not tolerate the norms of Society Y? We would have to tolerate the fact that Society X was intolerant while demanding it was tolerant. This is surely a contradiction because we are not tolerating their intolerance which normative moral relativism demands we do.

It's nice that that's what normative moral relativism requires, but since that's not what I'm saying, it's evidence that I'm not arguing for normative moral relativism. I'm not saying "we" have to do anything; I'm saying that people--we--would do what they believed to be moral, whether it was tolerating or not tolerative other things.

 

[Tassman]

So who was it said "The basis of ALL Social Contracts is Natural Morality which in common with other higher social animals, has evolved via Natural Selection into the capacity for cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them. Without these qualities being developed within us in the first place there could be NO morality as we know it today."? Oh yes, it was you.

Just so we're on the same page, have you now abandoned that claim? Or do you still think that rational beings without evolved drives for cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them would be incapable of acting morally?

To argue that the basis of ALL Social Contracts is Natural Morality is not to rule out other influences such as philosophical input etc. “Basis” in this context means just what it says – it is the foundation upon which moral codes, by which I mean acceptable/unacceptable behavior, have been developed by the genus Homo – for 200,000 years. Do you disagree, why?

You are changing the subject again. This has nothing to do with whether you were using the terms "prescriptive" and "descriptive" correctly. (Your question is also nonsensical, but that's a different problem).

Really! So why did you say in #126 “you still aren't using those terms correctly”? And far from “changing the subject” wouldn’t the obvious response be to demonstrate on what basis you argue for the behaviour that we “ought” to have? I’m waiting for you to set me right.

I do not disagree that an "ought" cannot derive from an "is", as Hume put it.

So you consider that an “ought” can never derive from an “is” under any circumstances – not just when it comes to deductive argument, upon which we are all agreed.

I think you will also find that your "eminent philosopher" has completely failed to convince the general population of eminent philosophers that they have done anything whatsoever to solve the is/ought problem so as appeals to authority go this is doubly bad.

So you indulge in an Argumentum ad populum instead.

Can you reference the post number of any post whatsoever in which you have made anything resembling a coherent philosophical argument?

It is you wittering on about “coherent philosophical arguments”, not I. My argument is based upon the science of morality, as in ethical naturalism, which bases morality on rational and empirical consideration of the natural world.

Thus I await with interest your coherent philosophical argument to determine moral values.

 

[Wowbagger]

Just an update: I am NOT abandoning this thread. I am inundated with work-related tasks (some of which require late hours) and holiday parties. I would LOVE to start posting in this thread, again. It will happen, when it happens.

 

[Tassman]

Now that Tassman has hopped from appealing to the authority of Richard Carrier, without explicating Carrier's argument, to appealing to the authority of Patricia Churchland, is Tassman going to explain what her argument is?

Tassman, have you read her book Braintrust? If so could you let us know, in your words, what the central argument is?

By the way, here is a blogpost on one of her talks in which she apparently skirts round the very thing as issue "Can science tell us right from wrong?" to saying that science can tell us much about morality. Which has never been in dispute:

Yes, I’ve read that blogpost and much else of hers, but no I’m not an authority on Patricia Churchland. I didn't claim to be. But I like what I’ve read of her. Do you? If not why not?

Her argument seems to be in keeping with my post #128: “Whilst important we cannot depend upon evolutionary theory alone to determine moral ends or moral principles. But nor can we use philosophy uninformed by science to determine these things".

This has been my position throughout, although one would never know it judging by your responses whereby you attempt to push me into the position of claiming science has all the answers; easier to refute presumably! Furthermore, my position is in agreement with the argument put forward by JJ Smart, among others, already cited:

"J. J. C. Smart's injunction that we take science as our best guide to metaphysical truth (Smart 1996, 6) doesn't require us to treat our current scientific understandings as infallible. It merely invites us to do what good scientific practice itself does in deferring to our present background state of general scientific understanding as the best story we now have about the universe and its furnishings. It is no doubt a flawed, imperfect story still very much in progress, but far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology, say, or the wilder reaches of a more speculative metaphysics as we persist with a philosophical enterprise itself no less fallible and incomplete."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/

So do you, as I do, agree with Smart that the scientific approach is ”far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology, say, or the wilder reaches of a more speculative metaphysics…” Or do you favour the latter (i.e. speculative metaphysics) approach. Why?

Just an update: I am NOT abandoning this thread. I am inundated with work-related tasks (some of which require late hours) and holiday parties. I would LOVE to start posting in this thread, again. It will happen, when it happens.

We await your return with eager anticipation.

 

[angrysoba]

It's certainly an over-generalization to say that all members of a society believe a certain way, but I think one can say that "most people believe they ought to do..."

If one grew up in a middle-class Boston household in the antebellum period, one was more apt to be an abolitionist than one who grew up in a middle-class Mississippi household. Of course there were exceptions, but even they tended to move themselves to a social group that fit them better, like the Grimke sisters or James Birney.

If one grew up in the late 20th century US, even in a former slave state, one is almost guaranteed to be think slavery is morally wrong. On the one hand, that's evidence that people are a product of the society they are a part of, but on the other hand, it's evidence that people can force a society to change as the minority abolitionists did, making their view now the majority.



I think we're looking at this slightly differently. I think it would be easy to make a scientific argument (but hard to make any other kind of argument) that all kinds of heinous things are the "best" way to reach a certain goal.

It seems you're assuming the next step is to promote those arguments as the one true answer to morality. But I'm assuming it's a mere intellectual exercise for different goals, like a table that spits out answers to 2+2 or 3+3.

If the goal of society is to get all members to cooperate, strict punishment for those who refuse to work together would be morally acceptable and all emphasis should be on putting aside one's own goals for goals decided on by concensus.

If the goal is to encourage individualism within a community, encouraging cooperation would be moral but strict punishment of those who want to try their own thing would be immoral and they should in fact be encouraged as long as they seemed happy and successful.

And the same would be true for any initial conditions. You'd set those conditions, and a far more complex outcome than my little examples above would be the scientific result, but it could include anything from eugenics to slavery to free schooling for all, depending on what the pre-chosen goals were. Change the goals, and the morality changes. If part of the goal is freedom for all, or individual rights, eugenics and slavery would become immoral.



Fortunately, I'm not one of those people. You keep saying that I'm advocating normative moral relativism, but I don't think I am, based on what I've written and the usual definition of normative moral relativism that I've read. For example:



It's nice that that's what normative moral relativism requires, but since that's not what I'm saying, it's evidence that I'm not arguing for normative moral relativism. I'm not saying "we" have to do anything; I'm saying that people--we--would do what they believed to be moral, whether it was tolerating or not tolerative other things.

Hi Pup,

Just for clarification, it is not that I am saying you are advocating normative moral relativism but rather that we cannot conclude with that from a descriptive observation that different societies have different norms. Sorry for any confusion.

 

[angrysoba]

Yes, I’ve read that blogpost and much else of hers, but no I’m not an authority on Patricia Churchland. I didn't claim to be. But I like what I’ve read of her. Do you? If not why not?

Well the post is not actually written by Patricia Churchland but by Lena Groeger, and that is the only blogpost I remember reading of hers. As for Patricia Churchland I also don't know enough about her overall philosophy but generally find a lot of what she has to say very interesting. I think I should buy and read Braintrust to find out more on what she is saying. I did listen to a Rationally Speaking podcast in which she appeared and I remember the conversation being interesting. I haven't had time to listen to the Partially Examined Life podcast yet, though.

Her argument seems to be in keeping with my post #128: “Whilst important we cannot depend upon evolutionary theory alone to determine moral ends or moral principles. But nor can we use philosophy uninformed by science to determine these things".

This has been my position throughout, although one would never know it judging by your responses whereby you attempt to push me into the position of claiming that science has all the answers; easier to refute presumably!

Actually, I think it has been obvious that I have argued your position is basically not coherent. You cannot simply slide from descriptive to normative morality, for example, and I think much of the problem that has heated up this discussion is in your not understanding the distinction, which I have tried very hard to point out to you.

Oh, and I also think that you have shifted in your position a lot over the various threads that we have discussed this. I seem to remember that you began very stridently and dogmatically asserting that morality was a genetically-coded instinct and that you argued that not only do we follow these instincts but we can do no other. When it was pointed out to you that some evolutionary instincts were not what we might be inclined to call moral, you shifted to talking about dominant instincts etc... Each time you come back to argue your case the case seems to have altered.

However, as it is Christmas and we are preparing to celebrate the birth of our dear sweet Lord Jesus, I shall pray for your soul.

Furthermore, my position is in agreement with the argument put forward by JJ Smart, among others, already cited:

"J. J. C. Smart's injunction that we take science as our best guide to metaphysical truth (Smart 1996, 6) doesn't require us to treat our current scientific understandings as infallible. It merely invites us to do what good scientific practice itself does in deferring to our present background state of general scientific understanding as the best story we now have about the universe and its furnishings. It is no doubt a flawed, imperfect story still very much in progress, but far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology, say, or the wilder reaches of a more speculative metaphysics as we persist with a philosophical enterprise itself no less fallible and incomplete."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/

Do you, as I do, agree with Smart that the scientific approach is ”far more to be trusted than the rival guidance we might seek from theology, say, or the wilder reaches of a more speculative metaphysics…” Or do you favour the latter (i.e. speculative metaphysics) approach. Why?

I'll have to look through that more thoroughly, but for now I will only observe that what is being said here may not be what you think is being said. I tend to agree with Smart's ideas of physicalism, but I think he may be making an error to go from there to a moral realist position of act utilitarianism. For me it seems a more likely conclusion is that of moral nihilism. But these are tough questions which I do not have time to resolve for humanity's edification just now.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

To argue that the basis of ALL Social Contracts is Natural Morality is not to rule out other influences such as philosophical input etc. “Basis” in this context means just what it says – it is the foundation upon which moral codes, by which I mean acceptable/unacceptable behavior, have been developed by the genus Homo – for 200,000 years. Do you disagree, why?

Do you, or do you not, think that a community of non-human intelligences of roughly human individual capabilities, with absolutely no evolved drive to "cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them", but which were rational, could act morally?

If the answer is yes, then you must agree that morality could have a different basis entirely, and could even work completely without evolved instincts to "cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them".

If the answer is no, why do you think so?

Really! So why did you say in #126 “you still aren't using those terms correctly”? And far from “changing the subject” wouldn’t the obvious response be to demonstrate on what basis you argue for the behaviour that we “ought” to have? I’m waiting for you to set me right.

You are still trying to change the subject. You have advanced a thesis, and instead of defending it from what seem to me to be very compelling criticisms you are trying to get someone else to advance a thesis for you to attack.

So you consider that an “ought” can never derive from an “is” under any circumstances – not just when it comes to deductive argument, upon which we are all agreed.

I didn't say that, and it seems to me this is a straw man which you are using to once again try to change the subject. I agree with Hume's take on the is/ought distinction.

So you indulge in an Argumentum ad populum instead.

I have a great idea! Instead of you appealing to authority, then trying to bluff when it's pointed out that your authority is not an authority, how about you explain the actual argument your "authority" advanced, and we'll see if they solved the is/ought problem?

My bet is that you won't do that, and that if you did, it would turn out they had not solved it.

It is you wittering on about “coherent philosophical arguments”, not I. My argument is based upon the science of morality, as in ethical naturalism, which bases morality on rational and empirical consideration of the natural world.

Thus I await with interest your coherent philosophical argument to determine moral values.

When the other person freely admits that they are trying to do meta-ethics without making any coherent philosophical argument, it's going to take something pretty good to avoid the conversation reaching total pointlessness.

 

[Tassman]

Do you, or do you not, think that a community of non-human intelligences of roughly human individual capabilities, with absolutely no evolved drive to "cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them", but which were rational, could act morally?

If the answer is yes, then you must agree that morality could have a different basis entirely, and could even work completely without evolved instincts to "cooperation, reciprocity, altruism, the awareness of the social rules of the group and penalties for those not conforming to them".

If the answer is no, why do you think so?

You haven’t answered the question:

Do you, or do you not, think that in general terms our rules of behaviour are arrived at by much the same process as that of our forebears of the genus Homo over the past 200,000 years? If not, why not? Are you arguing that we are different in kind to our Cavemen or Hunter/Gatherer predecessors and that we don’t require evolved instincts upon which to base our moral code– on what basis do you argue this?

You are still trying to change the subject. You have advanced a thesis, and instead of defending it from what seem to me to be very compelling criticisms you are trying to get someone else to advance a thesis for you to attack.

It's been explained repeatedly; you choose not to hear.

I didn't say that, and it seems to me this is a straw man which you are using to once again try to change the subject. I agree with Hume's take on the is/ought distinction.

So, you agree with me that the distinction can only hold true in a deductive argument?

When the other person freely admits that they are trying to do meta-ethics without making any coherent philosophical argument, it's going to take something pretty good to avoid the conversation reaching total pointlessness.

My views on moral naturalism, i.e. the meta-ethical position I’m arguing, have been outlined by me and (deliberately?) misconstrued by you repeatedly. I see no point in repeating them.