The Future of Moral Science

[phiwum]

We've touched on this question, but I don't think it's been brought up specifically. Are morals intrinsically human-based? In other words, if it's good for the human species, is it objectively good? Can there be morals in a world without humans (where other primates show some sense of fairness, for example)?

The heating the hut example fails immediately if one defines morals as what's best for the ants living in the cold fireplace. Ants cooperate for the good of their society, so they must have some moral sense, if humans do.

How can one approach, scientifically, the answer to whether morals are based on human needs/wants? Or is the scientific approach only able to answer what humans think is moral, based on their needs/wants?

The "heating the hut" example is not about moral reasoning. It is an example of non-moral practical reasoning.

And, no, I don't think that the fact that the behavior of ants enhances the welfare of the nest is quite enough to conclude that ants have some "moral sense". It seems to me that ants do not have the capacity of rational deliberation that would be required to count as having any moral sense at all.

For what it's worth, as far as I can tell, most moral realists do not believe that morality is about specifically human needs or wants. Rather, they tend to identify the capacity to be moral with something like the capacity to be rational (i.e., one is morally responsible only if his actions are the result of rational self-determination), and the category of morally relevant beings (beings who we may have moral duties towards) are either also the rational beings (for Kant, for instance) or perhaps any being capable of feeling pleasure and pain (for many utilitarians, for instance).

As for how "science" can answer this question: the only contribution I can see science making is purely descriptive. A careful observation may be able to tell us whether the moral rules humans tend to adopt are fundamentally human-based or not, or perhaps that there is no universal tendency as far as this goes. But, of course, telling us the opinions that people tend to have is rather different than giving an answer to the question: what beings are morally responsible/relevant? (Unless, of course, you are a moral relativist, in which case a survey may be an appropriate way to determine the content of morality.)

 

[Manopolus]

I guess I'm not really getting your point.

Everyone agrees that science has an essential contribution for practical deliberation. The question is whether science can derive (by itself) moral norms, or prudential practical norms, for that matter. And the start of practical deliberation is, roughly speaking, the adoption of an end, an intention to bring something about, and that intentional act is not part of the scientific process.

I agree completely -- I was just giving the asked for clarification. I think I may have misunderstood something you said that sounded like you were arguing differently initially.

 

[Pup]

And, no, I don't think that the fact that the behavior of ants enhances the welfare of the nest is quite enough to conclude that ants have some "moral sense". It seems to me that ants do not have the capacity of rational deliberation that would be required to count as having any moral sense at all.

I don't necessarily disagree with your definition. My sense of morality is certainly human-centric. But those who believe that morals are absolute things outside human definitions need to take that into consideration. The morals they seek are human-centric, usually, even if they also include compassion for "lesser" species.

Just like those who found it inconceivable that the earth wasn't the center of the universe, it seems that many people find it inconceivable that morals don't have the welfare of humans as a primary goal. I mean those who believe morals are external, eternal things that can be discovered.

For what it's worth, as far as I can tell, most moral realists do not believe that morality is about specifically human needs or wants. Rather, they tend to identify the capacity to be moral with something like the capacity to be rational (i.e., one is morally responsible only if his actions are the result of rational self-determination)...

And yet, that's a definition that nicely defines morality as human-centric.

I agree that it makes no sense to expect other species to be morally responsible the way humans define morality. If a lioness kills a human, that's not morally the same as if a human kills a human.

But here's the human-centricity in the equation. A lioness is acting under its own set of "morals" i.e. urges about what it's good and bad to do. If the lioness sees a tasty human and has cubs to feed, she will get negative feedback in her brain if she does not kill the human and bring it back to the den, in the same way we'll (usually) get negative feedback in our brains if we kill an innocent fellow-human.

The main difference is that humans, being introspective, feel a need to explain where these negative feelings come from, and call it morality, and even sometimes say it's from outside the brain.

 

[phiwum]

I agree completely -- I was just giving the asked for clarification. I think I may have misunderstood something you said that sounded like you were arguing differently initially.

Well, I apologize if I didn't express myself clearly.

But, no matter. It's clear now that you and I have no disagreement on this point.

 

[phiwum]

I don't necessarily disagree with your definition. My sense of morality is certainly human-centric. But those who believe that morals are absolute things outside human definitions need to take that into consideration. The morals they seek are human-centric, usually, even if they also include compassion for "lesser" species.

Just like those who found it inconceivable that the earth wasn't the center of the universe, it seems that many people find it inconceivable that morals don't have the welfare of humans as a primary goal. I mean those who believe morals are external, eternal things that can be discovered.

I think that you're right that humans will have a natural bias for seeing themselves as the center of their own discussion, and that this poses a potential problem for realist theories.

But in practice, I don't think that's how it has turned out in the academic literature. The question of who counts (as a moral agent, or as a morally relevant being) is a central and well-discussed question, and I've never seen an article suggesting that the answer is "humans". What I've seen most often is something like "rational beings", and (most) humans are the only non-controversial examples of rational beings. Of course, we could question whether this is a species-centric bias disguising itself, but at least explicit arguments are given.

(I'll have more to say about this, perhaps, later in the semester when I read some articles on this issue.)

And yet, that's a definition that nicely defines morality as human-centric.

I agree that it makes no sense to expect other species to be morally responsible the way humans define morality. If a lioness kills a human, that's not morally the same as if a human kills a human.

But here's the human-centricity in the equation. A lioness is acting under its own set of "morals" i.e. urges about what it's good and bad to do. If the lioness sees a tasty human and has cubs to feed, she will get negative feedback in her brain if she does not kill the human and bring it back to the den, in the same way we'll (usually) get negative feedback in our brains if we kill an innocent fellow-human.

The main difference is that humans, being introspective, feel a need to explain where these negative feelings come from, and call it morality, and even sometimes say it's from outside the brain.

First, I think it's reasonable to try and figure out what context we have in mind when we're discussing this issue. The answer "Who is bound by morality?" really depends, I think, on whether we are taking a relativist, realist, emotivist, etc., approach.

It seems to me that what you've said above makes sense only as a relativist account. You've explained our moral claims as an objectification of whatever negative feedback we are evolved to experience. But if this is the presumption you're starting with, then I suppose it makes little sense to discuss the arguments of moral realists, because from a relativist's perspective, they are just so much rationalization.

If there is no objective moral norms, then it makes very little sense to ask what class of beings are bound by these non-existent norms.

And if there are such objective moral norms, then we're interested in the scope of real, objective moral norms, independently of whatever emotional reaction we've evolved to experience in various situations.

 

[Tassman]

Addressed to Manopolus:

I guess I'm not really getting your point.

Everyone agrees that science has an essential contribution for practical deliberation. The question is whether science can derive (by itself) moral norms, or prudential practical norms, for that matter. And the start of practical deliberation is, roughly speaking, the adoption of an end, an intention to bring something about, and that intentional act is not part of the scientific process.

I don’t think anyone, including Harris, is claiming that “science can derive (by itself) moral norms” just as philosophy cannot (by itself) derive moral norms - or do you disagree with the latter?

In his response to Ryan’s claim that Harris’ “proposed science of morality cannot offer scientific answers to questions of morality and value, because it cannot derive moral judgements solely from scientific descriptions of the world”, Harris rightly says: “But no branch of science can derive its judgements solely from scientific descriptions of the world. We have intuitions of truth and falsity, logical consistency, and causality that are foundational to our thinking about anything.”

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

I don’t think anyone, including Harris, is claiming that “science can derive (by itself) moral norms” just as philosophy cannot (by itself) derive moral norms - or do you disagree with the latter?

In his response to Ryan’s claim that Harris’ “proposed science of morality cannot offer scientific answers to questions of morality and value, because it cannot derive moral judgements solely from scientific descriptions of the world”, Harris rightly says: “But no branch of science can derive its judgements solely from scientific descriptions of the world. We have intuitions of truth and falsity, logical consistency, and causality that are foundational to our thinking about anything.”

What is truth?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I don’t think anyone, including Harris, is claiming that “science can derive (by itself) moral norms” just as philosophy cannot (by itself) derive moral norms - or do you disagree with the latter?

In his response to Ryan’s claim that Harris’ “proposed science of morality cannot offer scientific answers to questions of morality and value, because it cannot derive moral judgements solely from scientific descriptions of the world”, Harris rightly says: “But no branch of science can derive its judgements solely from scientific descriptions of the world. We have intuitions of truth and falsity, logical consistency, and causality that are foundational to our thinking about anything.”

We already have an area of inquiry where we make foundational assumptions about what is moral and explore the consequences. It's called philosophy.

What do you think science is bringing to the party again? I think it's just more stone soup.

 

[phiwum]

I don’t think anyone, including Harris, is claiming that “science can derive (by itself) moral norms” just as philosophy cannot (by itself) derive moral norms - or do you disagree with the latter?

In his response to Ryan’s claim that Harris’ “proposed science of morality cannot offer scientific answers to questions of morality and value, because it cannot derive moral judgements solely from scientific descriptions of the world”, Harris rightly says: “But no branch of science can derive its judgements solely from scientific descriptions of the world. We have intuitions of truth and falsity, logical consistency, and causality that are foundational to our thinking about anything.”

That's not quite what I mean when I say "science derives morality by itself."

What I had in mind was this: that the argument for any given moral norm consists only of what we may call scientific facts: either direct observations of the world around us or conclusions reached from direct observations using the scientific method (including drawing deductive consequences using the scientific theories of the day). If each premise is, broadly speaking, scientific in this sense, then I'd say that the argument itself is scientific.

I do not regard, for instance, the claim that I desire to attain some end as one given by science. Rather, I feel that desire immediately, rather than observing it as a third party or deducing it using scientific theories.

I do not, for that matter, regard any value judgment or normative statement as something available via science, since science yields only descriptive theories.

As for your question: can philosophy derive moral norms all by itself? The jury is out. I don't regard any of the arguments for this or that moral theory as settling the issue, so I don't see how I can answer this question with any certainty. Some arguments for the most fundamental moral norms use only reflection on the nature of rationality itself and hence do not require anything like science. Once we settle the most fundamental moral norms, any derived norms (what to do in various situations) certainly require some basic data about the effects of our actions, I would think.

By the way, your response surprised me. I thought you were arguing that science can develop morality in some deep sense, not merely in the sense that knowing about the world around you is essential for discovering what you ought to do. Can you state your thesis in one or a few sentences so that it is clear what you're arguing for?

Thanks.

 

[Tassman]

That's not quite what I mean when I say "science derives morality by itself."

What I had in mind was this: that the argument for any given moral norm consists only of what we may call scientific facts: either direct observations of the world around us or conclusions reached from direct observations using the scientific method (including drawing deductive consequences using the scientific theories of the day). If each premise is, broadly speaking, scientific in this sense, then I'd say that the argument itself is scientific.

I do not regard, for instance, the claim that I desire to attain some end as one given by science. Rather, I feel that desire immediately, rather than observing it as a third party or deducing it using scientific theories.
I do not, for that matter, regard any value judgment or normative statement as something available via science, since science yields only descriptive theories.

Surely you’re not claiming to have risen above your biological nature. Whatever you “desire to attain” can only be derived (in an ultimate sense) from your underlying instincts which – in principle at least – can be investigated and understood by the cognitive sciences. Then and only then can they form the basis of a philosophical argument.

As for your question: can philosophy derive moral norms all by itself? The jury is out. I don't regard any of the arguments for this or that moral theory as settling the issue, so I don't see how I can answer this question with any certainty. Some arguments for the most fundamental moral norms use only reflection on the nature of rationality itself and hence do not require anything like science. Once we settle the most fundamental moral norms, any derived norms (what to do in various situations) certainly require some basic data about the effects of our actions, I would think.

The jury’s not out. Without the fundamental facts as arrived at by the sciences a philosophical argument has no means, by itself, to derive a reliable premise for a moral argument. This may seem a trivial observation, but it’s necessary in order to counter the proponents of unevidenced God-based moral laws. Or to counter the unevidenced mystical notion deriving from Natural Law that morality exists beyond the observable laws of science and is universal.

By the way, your response surprised me. I thought you were arguing that science can develop morality in some deep sense

This has never been my argument - although it has been misrepresented as such by the more unscrupulous among us.

not merely in the sense that knowing about the world around you is essential for discovering what you ought to do.

“Knowing about the world around you”, as opposed to a priori metaphysical speculation, is what’s essential in arriving at the best way to to achieve a desirable end.

Can you state your thesis in one or a few sentences so that it is clear what you're arguing for?

Thanks.

What I’ve been arguing for should be clear from the umpteen pages of this discussion, I’m sorry if you think this is not the case.

 

[phiwum]

Surely you’re not claiming to have risen above your biological nature. Whatever you “desire to attain” can only be derived (in an ultimate sense) from your underlying instincts which – in principle at least – can be investigated and understood by the cognitive sciences. Then and only then can they form the basis of a philosophical argument.

I'm puzzled by this. First of all, it's not clear to me what you mean when you say that my ends are ultimately derived from my "underlying instincts". Obviously, there are in this world many people and these people have often very different desires, so either "underlying instincts" are fundamentally individualistic, or our desires are not determined solely by our instincts.

More amazing, I think, is the highlighted bit. So, if I understand you correctly, we cannot really reason about what we ought to do until cognitive science has developed to the point that it can determine and understand my desires by analyzing my "underlying instincts".

If so, this is a truly remarkable discovery. All my life, I had mistakenly believed that I choose my actions based on my desires and beliefs, but evidently I am unqualified to determine those desires on my own. Rather, I ought to wait until cognitive science determines my desires and lets me know what they are and what I ought to do.

This is, I'm sure you will agree, a very silly concept of the appropriate role of science in practical reasoning, so silly that I presume I have misunderstood you. Perhaps you can explain what you meant by the highlighted bit.

The jury’s not out. Without the fundamental facts as arrived at by the sciences a philosophical argument has no means, by itself, to derive a reliable premise for a moral argument. This may seem a trivial observation, but it’s necessary in order to counter the proponents of unevidenced God-based moral laws. Or to counter the unevidenced mystical notion deriving from Natural Law that morality exists beyond the observable laws of science and is universal.

Since I don't have any commitment to the claim that fundamental moral codes do not require the input of experience (whether based on science or pre-scientific simple observations), I won't argue the point. But for your own education, you should realize that many of those who argue that morality consists of objective, a priori normative claims (at least at the broadest, most fundamental norms) do not do so by basing it on God's pronouncements. If you'd take the time to read even third party sources on classical moral theories (try Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy), you would know that this is not a case of science or God.

This has never been my argument - although it has been misrepresented as such by the more unscrupulous among us.

Well, I'm sorry you've been misunderstood (though I shouldn't complain about scruples of your correspondents just yet -- see below).

“Knowing about the world around you”, as opposed to a priori metaphysical speculation, is what’s essential in arriving at the best way to to achieve a desirable end.

I don't think anyone has said otherwise, though, of course, there remains the question of distinguishing a desirable (or desired) end from other ends.

In any case, if this is your main point -- that it is very useful to have reliable knowledge of causal relations in order to satisfy your desires and achieve your ends -- I'm sure that we have no disagreements. Is this all you're saying?

Can you state your thesis in one or a few sentences so that it is clear what you're arguing for?

Thanks.

What I’ve been arguing for should be clear from the umpteen pages of this discussion, I’m sorry if you think this is not the case.

So, that would be "no", would it?

That's a shame. People tend to misinterpret your claims, the scoundrels. But sometimes, they ask for you to state your primary thesis as clearly as possible, so that they can be certain what precisely you're arguing. Is it so hard to undertake the tedious task of writing a few clear sentences and clear up the matter? Why would you decide it's not worth your while? If you have clearly answered this question before, then just cut and paste the answer here so that I can be sure we understand your central thesis.

Thanks ever so much for the effort required.

 

[Tassman]

I'm puzzled by this.

Are you really “puzzled by this”, Really?

First of all, it's not clear to me what you mean when you say that my ends are ultimately derived from my "underlying instincts". Obviously, there are in this world many people and these people have often very different desires, so either "underlying instincts" are fundamentally individualistic, or our desires are not determined solely by our instincts.

But our underlying instincts are demonstrably not fundamentally individualistic. We are demonstrably a social species requiring mutual cooperation and the restraint of individual selfishness to survive as a species. Or do you disagree?

More amazing, I think, is the highlighted bit. So, if I understand you correctly, we cannot really reason about what we ought to do until cognitive science has developed to the point that it can determine and understand my desires by analyzing my "underlying instincts".

Not quite. Do you really claim to understand the underlying motives for all your decisions and behaviour? I don’t, I don’t think anybody does. Sam Harris is arguing, in his science of morality which as you know is what this thread is about, that our underlying instincts can, in principle at least, be investigated and understood by the cognitive sciences. And he notes that these sciences have already made considerable progress in this area.

If so, this is a truly remarkable discovery. All my life, I had mistakenly believed that I choose my actions based on my desires and beliefs, but evidently I am unqualified to determine those desires on my own. Rather, I ought to wait until cognitive science determines my desires and lets me know what they are and what I ought to do.

This is, I'm sure you will agree, a very silly concept of the appropriate role of science in practical reasoning, so silly that I presume I have misunderstood you. Perhaps you can explain what you meant by the highlighted bit.

Once again, you’d be wrong if you think you fully understand your underlying motivations - i.e. the part of consciousness not in focal awareness. Because beneath the critical thought processes of the conscious mind is the powerful awareness of the subconscious mind at work, which the cognitive sciences increasingly understand. So why, when there's so much data and emerging science in areas like neurobiology, biology, sociobiology, human psychology, evolution, physics, etc. that actually can and will provide answers, should anyone care about the superseded niceties of metaphysical speculation you seem to be peddling?

Since I don't have any commitment to the claim that fundamental moral codes do not require the input of experience (whether based on science or pre-scientific simple observations), I won't argue the point. But for your own education, you should realize that many of those who argue that morality consists of objective, a priori normative claims (at least at the broadest, most fundamental norms) do not do so by basing it on God's pronouncements. If you'd take the time to read even third party sources on classical moral theories (try Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy), you would know that this is not a case of science or God.

I guess you missed the bit about the unevidenced mystical notion deriving from Natural Law that morality exists beyond the observable laws of science and is universal. And, whilst we apparently agree about the non-existence of a God and His moral laws, you still seem to harbour a lingering nostalgia for the days of armchair metaphysical speculation based upon untested a priori assumptions. Admittedly they’re neat and tidy but not really how we decide what is right and wrong behaviour in the real world of the legislature or family unit.

Well, I'm sorry you've been misunderstood (though I shouldn't complain about scruples of your correspondents just yet -- see below).

Not misunderstand, misrepresented; but thanks for your caring.

I don't think anyone has said otherwise, though, of course, there remains the question of distinguishing a desirable (or desired) end from other ends.
In any case, if this is your main point -- that it is very useful to have reliable knowledge of causal relations in order to satisfy your desires and achieve your ends -- I'm sure that we have no disagreements. Is this all you're saying?

I agree. So how do you distinguish “a desirable (or desired) end from other ends”? I've stated my views on this many times, namely the social cohesion which is the evolved predisposition of an altruistic social species such as us with the built-in instincts of cooperation and adherence to the rules of the group.

So, that would be "no", would it?
That's a shame. People tend to misinterpret your claims, the scoundrels. But sometimes, they ask for you to state your primary thesis as clearly as possible, so that they can be certain what precisely you're arguing. Is it so hard to undertake the tedious task of writing a few clear sentences and clear up the matter? Why would you decide it's not worth your while? If you have clearly answered this question before, then just cut and paste the answer here so that I can be sure we understand your central thesis.

Not quite. I suggest you read the entire thread, which apparently you haven’t as yet, in order to properly understand the argument.

Thanks ever so much for the effort required.

Your ongoing sarcasm is not a positive contribution to the discussion phiwum.

 

[phiwum]

Are you really “puzzled by this”, Really?

But our underlying instincts are demonstrably not fundamentally individualistic. We are demonstrably a social species requiring mutual cooperation and the restraint of individual selfishness to survive as a species. Or do you disagree?

I find the notion of "underlying instincts" a bit vague, but I do agree that some of our preferences and desires seem to be widely shared by others and it's likely that some of these have a biological basis.

But you wrote that, "Whatever you 'desire to attain' can only be derived (in an ultimate sense) from your underlying instincts," and this appears to be far too broad. I have desires that are subjective, derived from my personal tastes and preferences. I like, for instance, bluegrass/klezmer fusion. My wife decidedly does not. Any account for my desire to listen to such music cannot rest solely on instincts shared by the species as a whole, because we differ on this preference.

I suspect you merely overstated your claim. It's plausible that some values are biologically determined or encouraged, but it cannot be the case that every desire we have is fundamentally a product of our "instincts", unless we interpret the term so broadly as to be nearly meaningless.

Not quite. Do you really claim to understand the underlying motives for all your decisions and behaviour? I don’t, I don’t think anybody does. Sam Harris is arguing, in his science of morality which as you know is what this thread is about, that our underlying instincts can, in principle at least, be investigated and understood by the cognitive sciences. And he notes that these sciences have already made considerable progress in this area.

To answer the highlighted question: no, quite right, some of my own behavior is hard to explain.

But the kind of practical reasoning I'm discussing is not primarily explanatory. Rather, it is the deliberation we undergo when we have a conscious awareness that we aim to accomplish some goal and we are making a conscious effort to choose an appropriate means of attaining that end. At least some of our actions appear to be a product of this sort of reasoning, and this sort of reasoning can either be effective, choosing a means which has good reasons to be chosen, or ineffective, resulting in an action which does not attain the end reliably or else causes unwanted side effects or is otherwise a poor means.

Practical reasoning as studied in philosophy primarily focuses on such conscious deliberation. No doubt, an awareness of the subconscious or greater understanding of the functioning of the brain would give a better description of how the process actually works in humans, but it wouldn't change such judgments as, "Rationality requires that one intend to do the necessary means for the ends one attempts to accomplish." This simple normative judgment expresses a real restriction on rational behavior, even if there are various subconscious features that might make us doubt whether we know all the ends we are pursuing.

Once again, you’d be wrong if you think you fully understand your underlying motivations - i.e. the part of consciousness not in focal awareness. Because beneath the critical thought processes of the conscious mind is the powerful awareness of the subconscious mind at work, which the cognitive sciences increasingly understand. So why, when there's so much data and emerging science in areas like neurobiology, biology, sociobiology, human psychology, evolution, physics, etc. that actually can and will provide answers, should anyone care about the superseded niceties of metaphysical speculation you seem to be peddling?

I suppose we should care about such niceties (metaphysical?) because, of course, on a daily basis we make conscious decisions about what ought to be done to attain our ends. It is possible that sometimes, subconscious desires or a brain that tends towards various practical fallacies will cause us to make choices which are suboptimal from the standpoint of my conscious desires, but nonetheless I would like, as far as possible, to efficiently attain those desires.

I guess you missed the bit about the unevidenced mystical notion deriving from Natural Law that morality exists beyond the observable laws of science and is universal. And, whilst we apparently agree about the non-existence of a God and His moral laws, you still seem to harbour a lingering nostalgia for the days of armchair metaphysical speculation based upon untested a priori assumptions. Admittedly they’re neat and tidy but not really how we decide what is right and wrong behaviour in the real world of the legislature or family unit.

I don't see any need to respond to this, so let's press on.

Not misunderstand, misrepresented; but thanks for your caring.

You cannot complain about misrepresentation when you repeatedly refuse to state your thesis clearly and explicitly.

I agree. So how do you distinguish “a desirable (or desired) end from other ends”? I've stated my views on this many times, namely the social cohesion which is the evolved predisposition of an altruistic social species such as us with the built-in instincts of cooperation and adherence to the rules of the group.

Let me be sure I understand you on this point. Are you claiming that science concludes that it is desirable to act in accordance with our evolved predispositions of altruism, cooperation, etc.? Or is this a claim that is not ultimately determined by the scientific method, but rather you conclude that this is so on some other basis?

Not quite. I suggest you read the entire thread, which apparently you haven’t as yet, in order to properly understand the argument.

Astounding! I am not presently asking for every word you've written in support of your thesis, but the thesis itself. In a nutshell, what do you claim the appropriate role of science is in determining moral norms? Is it to derive actions from broad norms by contributing knowledge of causal relations? (If so, there is surely no disagreement.) Is it to derive broad moral norms themselves? (Presumably no, if I understand your claims so far.) Is it something else?

Very basic intellectual integrity requires a willingness to answer such a simple question so that the conversation can continue with a lesser risk of misunderstanding. You complain about misrepresentation but refuse to tell me what you're trying to prove? I'm afraid that the problem of misrepresentation seems to be your own fault.

Your ongoing sarcasm is not a positive contribution to the discussion phiwum.

Your refusal to clarify exactly what you mean in a few short sentences as best you can is causing rather more harm to the discussion than anything I've written.

 

[Wowbagger]

Wowbagger Returns!

Introduction

I have recently taken the time to read every post in this thread, up through January 31st. And, I have even drafted responses to many of them. However, there are soooo many posts to respond to, at this point, I decided to write this general response first, to address a lot of the issues raised, so far. And, some actual responses will be posted next.

One of my aims, here, is to get back to the root of the opening post: The FUTURE of Morality. Not necessarily debating whether or not science can answer moral questions; but rather: HOW science WILL answer moral questions in the FUTURE, (whether you think it is possible or not)!

So, keep in mind: everything I am about to write here predicts attitudes that I think will dominate the future, a few generations from now. They are not meant to reflect current views of most people today.

More About HOW Science Will Answer Moral Questions - In the Future!

As we humans (especially academics) examine the history of morality and its various mechanisms, we will likely converge on a core of all value systems that have ever existed, and could possibly ever exist, and they will be seen to unify into one framework, that I will refer to as the Prime Value. (This, so far, is "descriptive".)

My best guess as to what the Prime Value will turn out to be, is a form of consequentialism (more about that later). But, whatever form it takes: Once humanity hits upon it, there is no going back. All other values that contradict the Prime one will be recognized as distractions (at best) or destructive forces (at worst). And, no individuals can sway societies away from focusing on the Prime, at least not for very long. (Yes, some of the people can be fooled for some of the time.) There is nothing you can do about it: Humanity will always largely drive towards the Prime Value.

Science will have, for all practical intents and purposes, shown us what our values should be. The descriptive transforms into the prescriptive. And, philosophical concepts such as "normative values" will either transform accordingly, or be ditched entirely.

Granted individuals still have a choice: We can individually decide to what degree we will follow along with the Prime Value. But, those who choose to brush it off too much, or dismiss it entirely will do so at their own peril.



All-Inclusive, Nash-Equilibrium-Style Consequentialism, (Or Whatever You Want to Call It)

As stated, I suspect the Prime Value will take the form of Consequentialism. However, I honestly don't know what to name this form of it, right now. So many people use terms in so many different ways, anything I choose will be stained with someone's views of that term. I used to use the phrase "Wellfare Consequentialism" a lot in the past, but then knowledgeable people talk about its conceptual failings (to which I reply: This form won't have that!), and unknowledgeable people require me to explain what "welfare" means in this case (no, it does not imply putting all of our money into food stamp programs!). And, I am not bombastic enough to invent my own vocabulary term, right now, either. Maybe I will be in the future.

Maybe some of you could help me pick a better term for it. For now, I will use the temporary moniker: "All-Inclusive Consequentialism", which I intend to change to something better, later. This means it will balance ALL things that ALL humans will care about (such as the components of morality worked out by Haidt), and ALL aspects of our well-being (health, wealth, happiness, and so on). And, unlike classic Utility, which has a 'calculus' ("...for the most people"), this form HAS NO SUCH CALCULUS (it is "for ALL people").

If this seems overly broad, understand that some aspects (such as harm/care) will carry more weight than others (respect for authority, for example), but those others won't go away completely, no matter what liberals might want, today. I will try to explain more about how this balance works in a future post, and more about why different facets will carry different weights. But, one thing they all have in common, is that they are some aspect of societal well-being.

This might all start with a baseline, such as: First, do no harm through force or fraud (as Shermer describes). Then, after that, only set policies that will either improve people's lives, or at least keep them at the same level. Never establish policies that will make anyone worse off. No one's lot in life will improve at the expense of someone else. But, EVERYONE'S lot in life can improve, over time, as all-inclusive types of policies are established.

One of the key concepts that will make this happen is one I have not emphasized before, so I will mention it now: The Nash Equilibrium. If we think of morality in terms of game theory: The best strategies you can devise should still work to your benefit even if everyone else knows what your strategy is, and you know that they know what your strategy is, etc. This is why classic utility will not have a future. Whenever you try to do something for "the most people", the ones left behind will protest and cause harm. They know that you know they are going to be worse off.
Once a Prime Value is hit upon, that covers (literally) EVERYONE, you would be stupid to protest it, because EVERYONE includes YOU, plus everyone YOU care about!

Confounding Factors

I will further offer the following bold claim: ALL moral issues were ALWAYS really about Consequentialism (or whatever the Prime Value is), this whole time!! It was just really hard to see it that way, until the future arrives.

Until recently, the entire history of studying morality has been plagued by lots of different confounding factors. (Sam Harris used the phrase "philosophical confusion", but I think that's unfair.)

Examples of confounding factors include, but are not limited to:

* The advent of "principles", "rules", "duty", etc.: All of these things will eventually be recognized as merely approximations of how to acquire good consequences, for everyone in society. They became ingrained into our culture in eras when we had limited information about what our actions could potentially do to others. (They even became somewhat encoded into much of our neurology, apparently.)



* Lack of Divine Intervention: We humans had to stumble through moral issues, to make any progress. We had to painstakingly discover things like Rawls' Original Position, and Singer's Expanding Circle, etc. There was never any true god or prophet to show us the way, all at once.



* Landscaping Issues: Different selection pressures lead some societies to converge on moral values at different rates. Some slower, some faster. Some took more U-turns away from Prime than others, within their history.

(This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. There could be other items we can add to it.)

All of these sorts of factors work together to create the illusion that morality is "subjective", to some people. Or, at the very least, that it can perpetually exist in multiple ways, even if we can objectively measure how. This, in turn, motivates the artificial concept of "normative values" to be taken seriously. Though, it was always largely useless for making any real progress in morality, as it turns out.

(Again, this is how I predict academics will see morality in the future. This is not meant to reflect current views of anyone in particular.)



The Role of Philosophy - In the Future

I doubt philosophy is going to go away anytime within the realm of my predictions (two or three generations worth of humans). But, I don't think it will be as "essential" at answering moral questions, either.

Philosophy's role will be reduced to that of systematics: How we categorize our ideas, and the vocabulary words we use to describe them. This discipline can afford to be somewhat more arbitrary than the discipline of establishing empirical facts. So, in that way, philosophy will be seen as "less important" than science, at establishing moral values.

But, even if it is "less important", that still implies it will be important to some degree, such as to facilitate communication of these ideas.

An Aside About the Role of Evolution in Morality

(This isn't part of my predictions, but since there was a long debate about this in the thread, I figured I would comment on it.)

I hope there will be no controversy, here, over the idea that our evolutionary heritage provides one of the basic foundations for our moral values. (If you disagree, we can argue about it in another thread.) But, I don't think it's accurate to say "all of our values come of evolution", because there are many things we evolved to do, that are not morally acceptable (as has been pointed out in this thread), including some of those confounding factors I mentioned earlier.

Morality is an emergent system. There are many layers of factors that get thrown on top of our evolutionary systems. The environment we find ourselves in, which includes relationships among other entities, shapes our morals a lot more rapidly than DNA.

Morality is not entirely based on evolution. It merely initializes from evolution.

Motivations for Changing Attitudes

What I am predicting is a change in attitude, that will first develop among scholars, and then make its way into the general population. A change that will accept the idea that science can, and will, tell us what our values should be. But, why would anyone want to do that?!

The first motivation is the opportunity to improve the well-being of everyone in the entire world, at least on average, at an accelerated rate. We do not necessarily need science to achieve moral progress. But, science can get us all to a better life, a lot faster and more efficiently.

A second motivation could be found in the opportunity to exploit information. We, as a species, are acquiring more and more information about how our actions could potentially impact other people, over time. The temptation to use this information will become increasingly irresistible to scholars, some of whom dream of being the one who brings about a lasting world peace. This change of attitude that I foresee lends itself to exploiting information a lot more than conventional philosophy on the subject.

For some, this attitude will also better shield them from more types of pseudo-science thinking on the subject, as espoused by Deepak Chopra, and the like. Just because there is lots of information does not mean all of it is good information. Once the element of skepticism, or "information filtering", is more widely accepted, it will become harder for the influence of bad information to prevail.

An Experimental Proposal

I don't know how we would ever get the resources to actually do what I am about to describe, nor the ethic board approvals, but the following would work in principle. (Perhaps, some day, we’ll be able to run this sort of experiment on a sophisticated life-simulation program, if not actual living entities.):

We can set up a wide variety of different societal systems, all isolated from each other. Into each one we would "inject" a different starting set of moral principles, then we would leave them alone to watch what happens. Some would be initiated with more modern sentiments about liberty and freedom. Others would get ancient, biblical standards to work with, etc. Still other systems might even get weird and bizarre principles that never naturally arose on Earth. And, of course, some would be seeded with "All-Inclusive Consequentialism" I described earlier.

I predict ALL of these various variations of societies would eventually converge on the same Prime Value, which I predict will be All-Inclusive Consequentialism, even if they started nowhere near that concept. Though, of course, some will get there faster than others. And, even the ones that start off with the Prime Value might experiment with other concepts for a little while, before they come back to Prime, and will stay there indefinitely afterwards.



An Aside About Shermer's Book

I will briefly mention a few things about The Moral Arc, by Michael Shermer, since I am recommending the book on this thread. Though a larger discussion about it probably deserves its own thread.

Although the book is not perfect, it does a very good, comprehensive job describing how science and reason (and not religion) have lead to moral progress, and how we can continue that trend in the future. His arguments are written, here, better than they are communicated in his presentations. (Shermer is not such a great public speaker.) And certainly a lot better than his debates on the subject. (He is an even worse debater, in general, though at least he keeps his enthusiasm up). He has chapters on slavery, various forms of rights, how evil transpires, and justice, among others.

Shermer does not use the same terminology I do. He does NOT use the phrase "Prime Value". But, in speaking with him, we seem to agree on almost everything: That consequentialism is the way of the future, etc. Shermer's own predictions, in the last chapter, focus on how governments and corporations will change: The role of national governments will be diminished, as mayors become more powerful, and corporations will recognize that they need to be good citizens to stay successful, to their customers, employees, and even their competition. (I can't say I disagree with Shermer's predictions. But, the ones I choose to focus on are more fundamental.)

Conclusion

Classic ideas are not always as useful as some of our newer ones. It is not always easy to tell which concepts should live or die, while you are in the moment. However, as new generations of philosophers arrive, with their larger volumes of sheer information on these subject: The way in which we think about morality will need to change. The current crop of philosophers will probably kick and scream and drag their fingers along the way. But, the opportunity to improve the lives of EVERYONE (literally) is too tempting to ignore. Especially after EVERYONE finds themselves better off, including those older philosophers.

I do NOT have any good evidence for any of my claims, here. This, after all, merely a prediction about the future!

And, if anyone disagrees with my predictions, I would like to know what YOURS are!

 

[Wowbagger]

Responses Part 1 of 2

Here I will post some actual responses. I chose to respond only to things that are not too repetitious to what I just posted above. So, please read that, first.

If you feel I missed an important post to respond to, please let me know. My approach started with many drafts of a LOT more responses. But, I eliminated a whole bunch that seemed too redundant, and I might have accidentally ditched a few good points along the way. But, I am way too busy, now to go back and check again!

Also, all of these are responses to posts as of January 31st, 2015. I will try to respond to posts made in February, soon.

An attitude change towards science that has no science to support the attitude change.

This is more like an attitude change among philosophers, based on how far science is progressing in what they philosophized about.

This is NOT weakening science. This is about adding some of the empirical strength to formerly philosophical ideas.

Ultimately, "quaintness" and "outdatedness" might not have anything to do with morality per se. Some people think my accent is "quaint" - but does that make it wrong or immoral?

That is correct! You are not necessarily immoral for being outdated. Just recognized as less efficient at morality than others. You can still be a good person, though.

How about presenting some arguments or advocating some serious research instead of making these "predictions" which are really not anything like the types of scientific predictions that can actually be tested?

We can test this idea, at least informally, by seeing how many more books are published in the likes of Sam Harris and Michael Shermer, etc. And, how well they become accepted in academia, vs books that try to counter them, perhaps by Massimo Pigliucci and the like. I predict the Harris/Shermer like attitude will win out, within a couple of generations of scholarly turnover.

(I might also be able to iron out more formal ways of measuring this, in case anyone wants to take me up on any monetary bets. But, it will be a while before I can finish a draft of the rules.)

Unfortunately most of these pop scientific (or pseudoscientific to put it less charitably) attempts at a science which answers moral questions, tend to smuggle in the moral assumptions to begin with and then proceed to explain how these assumptions can be best realized.

Some people might, in fact, be doing this. But, my own arguments are much more general than that.

Some ideas are going to start with pop-sci, which could be wrong. But, you do need to start somewhere. And, these ideas are going to be self-correcting over time.

You state that science can answer moral questions. In order to better understand what you're claiming, can you provide a couple of examples of the types of questions science is/will be able to answer? How would you formulate those questions?

We already went over many examples of how science can help us answer moral questions, in this and other threads, once values are "otherwise established". My prediction is that this will eventually be seen as the SAME THING as science directly answering moral questions. There will be no other morally acceptable answer than those that head towards the Prime Value I describe in the previous post.

If one were to dispute your claim that there is a historic trend of violence and poverty going down, how would you back them up?

Pinker's "Better Angels" book covers most of this quite well, with lots and lots of data. Shermer's book summarizes the trends as well.

Let's say that the science had found the opposite. Kids subjected to corporal punishment had slightly better outcomes in terms of academic performance and personal discipline. How would a parent weigh those long term outcomes against the pain experienced by their child and the possible emotional negative consequences?

I think children would have likely evolved a different emotional response to such things, if the world worked that differently. But, even if that was not the case: Morality would evolve around achieving the long term results. It happens that we do not live in such a world, apparently. So, this is nothing to worry about.

Describe the scientific study that will answer exactly what the exchange rate should be between increased GPA, physical pain, emotional closeness lost, increased personal discipline etc. These are all facets of well-being. How will we objectively value any one against the others? Those are moral questions.

We do NOT necessarily need to value any one of those against the other. Improvements to a few of them will likely yield opportunities to improve the others. They all get roughly bundled together, in the end.

...ultimately we are all products of evolution but it doesn't follow from this that everything anyone does is as moral as each other. This is known as the naturalistic fallacy; it's natural therefore it is good.

I just wanted to point out a key difference between the naturalistic fallacy and my approach to this subject: My approach is more along the lines of: Not only is it natural, but it is not a trend we can ever hope to reverse! Our only choice is to either go along with it, and have a better chance at thriving; or ignore it with a better chance at being miserable. You can no more reverse the trend of morality towards "Prime" than you could reverse the spin of the Earth! (Though, to be fair, morality is a softer science than physics.)

Human evolution has selected against rape at both a genetic level and, to some extent, on a sociological level. Societies in which rape is prevalent do not survive.

Unfortunately, those who are proficient at raping have offspring that are also proficient at raping. I think the sociological level has done a LOT more to select against rape than the genetic level.

Situation 1. Here in South Africa we have a president (Zuma) who had R250 million rand spent on renovating his private house by the government. When the newspapers found out, the ruling party said that they were security upgrades. Since he spent time at his house it was national security point.

There are lots of cases like this. Even more where business owners steal money from investors to directly enrich themselves. It is stolen money, whether the victims are manipulated into accepting it or not, and clearly morally wrong.

Science would show us how that entrusted money could have been better spent getting the people of South Africa into better positions, to become more prosperous. And, ironically, Zuma could have had the ability to make all of those enhancements legitimately, eventually, if he had more forethought.

In the future, that approach would likely be considered a scientific answer to the moral question, since it analyzes how to get the population closer to the so-called "Prime Value" I described in my previous post.

Situation 2. The police are corrupt and collect fines by any means that can. They photograph your vehicle and then send a ticket with a false speed on it. Is it moral to ignore the fine? (You cannot argue it in court. You must pay the fine first, and it just never gets a hearing date).

First of all, this sort of thing is getting more difficult to get away with, as we collect and analyze more information about the ticketing system. If you suspect your ticket is false, it has a better chance of being verified or not.

But, in the old days, systematic problems like this were not unusual. So, the cost/benefit analysis might have favored not fighting the ticket in some cases, which would seem morally wrong to those outside the decision. But, that is precisely why the game had to change! The fewer excuses we have for putting up with morally worrisome decisions, the less likely we will tolerate them or try to justify or rationalize them.

Situation 3. In Zimbabwe Mugabe claimed that the colonial whites stole the land from the black natives. So he says that the government can take the land from the successful white farmers and give it out to poor blacks. Is that moral? (It is not successful as he has ruined the economy).

Since there are better ways to do this, more legitimately, than through force, I would say it was largely immoral. And, it would be easy to predict how such force could ruin the economy, as you are replacing experienced farmers with largely inexperienced ones.

The better way would be through strategies to guide the "white farmers" to care more about the "black natives", to the point where they would voluntarily allow them to manage some of the land, and guide them into making it productive. Show the "white farmers" the economic advantages, etc.

Mugabe did not have the foresight to do such things. Though, I do not know enough details about him to determine if he ever had the opportunity to even gain such foresight. But, today there is no excuse: It is MUCH easier for government officials can see the power of proper government, and the dire consequences of systematically corrupt ones. Hence these problems become less frequent over time.

Situation 4. You accept cash to avoid value added tax. You do so because "every body does it". Also the government spends exorbitant amounts of money on themselves, and wastes the taxes, so you feel "justified". When found out do you admit it, or do you lie?

This is a very typical cone-of-silence cycle, disguised under "business-as-usual" excuses. It is similar to doping in sports: Not legally allowed, yet everyone does it.

Since these cones can be very fragile the minute someone breaks the cone, the better strategy is to keep a clean record, so when the day comes, you can stand out as the model business person. And, you could have the opportunity to make EVEN MORE money than the others because of that reputation.

You mean that science is the only way to introduce the necessary data to help answer moral questions, or you mean that science is the only way to directly answer those moral questions?

More like the first. Science is NOT the only way one could try to directly answer moral questions. But, it is the most reliable way to analyze the situation, introduce the data, and come up with an answer that will stand up to the most scrutiny, over time.

the historic trends you refer to have happened without a "moral science" to directly answer moral questions. Science is certainly improving at being able to inform us of the outcomes of certain actions, and surely has influenced these historic trends.

This is correct. These trends largely happened through a form of proto-science: We stumbled and bumbled our way to discovering better answers to moral questions. Formalizing the science will improve our answers at an accelerated rate.

I might be wrong, but I think what Sophronius was trying to ask is if you meant descriptive as opposed to normative. From what I gathered, you're making the stronger claim, so in a way you're really saying "chosen", but that's probably not the best term to use in this context.

No, I am really saying "discovered" by science. Moral trends are going to go off in a particular direction, according to theory, that science can discover; we could say science is "discovering moral answers". Individual, on the other hand, can "choose" to be part of that or not.

How would you collect that type of data when consequentialism would be a priori in the method you're proposing? In other words: how would you falsify the idea that consequentialism is the only approach if consequentialism is embedded in your method? An example of how you would solve this?

I describe an experimental approach at the end of my previous post.

I will add, here, that if academia significantly shifted to something else, other than consequentialism, for example: "duty to a higher deity"; then I could still be correct about Prediction #1, but not Prediction #2.

It is almost as if such people

1) Know that their approach is not going to work on normative morality

I think it is clear that the attitude of most academics today would feel this way. But, I predict this will change, as we shift towards accepting more and more of science into morality.

2) Can figure out that any hypothetical approach that might work on normative morality would also have to work on descriptive morality

Well, NOT ANY hypothetical approach. That would be arbitrary. Science can do better than that! Science can figure out which way morality will end up going, (a direction I refer to as the Prime Value, in my previous post.)

3) Feel deep down in their bones (and are probably correct) that no such approach can exist, and

We are already on that approach, albeit more haphazardly than we could be.

4) Therefore do their damnedest to try to prevent scientific investigation into descriptive morality.

Good Lord, NO! Where the HELL did you get that from?!!!!

Also, the trend on violence is so new as to be irrelevant, plus the bare numbers don't factor in the reason no major wars have happened since 1945: nukes.

You should read Steven Pinker's "Better Angels of Our Nature" book. He spells out why this attitude is inaccurate. Mutually-Assured-Destruction has played a role, but there are many more factors involved in lowering violence, that drown-out the effect nukes have had.

You seem to be accumulating pieces of evidence that support your theory rather than the more traditional method of examining the evidence properly first.

I am accumulating pieces of evidence, and making predictions about trends based on a theory I am helping to shape (though I am not its originator).

He calls this the Three Mile Island Effect whereby we would not even know if Three Mile Island was a net gain or a net loss from a utilitarian point of view.

There is such a thing as morally neutral. But, in many cases, we are improving how we can analyze the long term impact of things. So, fewer types of events will seem morally neutral over time.

Now forget those words and replace them with this:

Someone: We can explain and do normative ethics with consequentialism and natural science (in regards to all humans as we).

Me: No!

That's just demonstrating that philosophers can be stubborn!

If for example, I decided that feeding starving people was an end in and of itself (because after all sciency research has shown that if you feed starving people then they aren't starving any more) maybe that would be more moral than your idea of feeding starving people in order to make us all richer because of some dappy Rube-Goldberg extemporations built in.

The precise reasons people claim they do something, though sometimes important to know, are less important than the actual outcomes they happen to achieve.



By the way, people can be wrong about why they think they do things. Some innate part of our mind might have evolved to "sense" the opportunities for the "Rube-Goldberg extemporations" to take place. But, we would socially justify it, to others, with the "in and of itself" line (because of "sciency research" or otherwise).

Though, in this case, the Rube-Goldberg is much less intuitive, and unlikely to be a large part of our evolutionary heritage.

Morality is like a spear, or like aerodynamics. It's not hiding in our DNA, it's something we figure out based on our interactions with a complex universe. Looking inside our brains to seek "true morality" is as daft as looking inside our brains to find the best way to build a passenger jet.

I like this line!

We need (and maybe someone has already developed) a better way to analyze why some societies choose certain practices and call them moral, while other societies consider the same things immoral, before we could have a field of hard moral science. But we run into the same problem with physical traits too. One could ask the same types of questions to show that peacocks should never have developed ridiculous tails.

I suggest you read Jonathan Haidt's book The Righteous Mind. He lays out a compelling theory.

This is my thinking as well. Cognitive science can naturalise value by acknowledging that all affective experiences are either positively or negatively valenced - that is - affective conscious experiences are valuable in and of themselves. You simply do not need to appeal to anything more to ground morality - it is the bedrock. So then it becomes an entirely empirical question as to how valuable particular experiences are. This where hedonic psychology is required.

Hedonics is not sufficient for morality. There are other important factors that go into well-being, such as general health, and prosperity.

I agree too that morality is an empirical question. The first thing the science needs to do is measure "well-being". If interested, here's my attempt using the 50 states as the unit of analysis:



http://www.people.vcu.edu/~mamcdani/Publications/Pesta, McDaniel & Bertsch (2010).pdf

I like this, overall! The comparison to g factor is not one I've considered before. (Though, I have likened morality to societal health.) I am curious why you do not delineate various facets of "happiness", or rather: Not suffering through fraud or illegitimate force? And why religion, specifically, was a factor. But, perhaps a longer discussion about this deserves its own thread.

Shermer is completely lost at sea in this debate and doesn't even understand the problem with his arguments. He seems to genuinely believe he is arguing something new and interesting whereas Pigliucci continually has to point out that Shermer is trying to smuggle in value judgments and often they are value judgements that are quite specific to his particular political philosophy which is a kind of libertarianism it seems.

One of the reasons why my approach is in the form of predictions, is that I can avoid some of those same accusations.

It happens that the form of value judgments I am talking about are NOT NECESSARILY my own personal preferences. This is simply how I project morality will go, in spite of anything I might want.

It's funny how the people who make evolution their moral messiah so infrequently understand it. The unit of evolution is the selfish individual gene, not the species, and it competes for reproductive opportunities in an arena defined by both natural and sexual selection. The claim you say is not in question is actually plain empirically false. The Selfish Gene was published in 1976 so at a rough estimate your scientific ideas are about forty years behind the times.

Since that book was published, it has been very well established that evolution could appropriately be said to work on MANY levels. Granted, the gene is the most fundamental one. But, there are times when modeling evolution from a group perspective can be useful. Even Dawkins admits this, now.

Yes some people, if able, choose to live out such a scenario but every single fantasy you've listed is dependent upon other people for fulfilment – whether prostitutes or luxury travel - thus reinforcing our position as members of a mutually interdependent social species. And, as per Jordan Belfort et al, most regard such selfish excesses as unacceptable or immoral. And if such behaviour got to the point of damaging society would very probably be penalised by the community.

Good answer, there.

DR. Carrier’s article critiquing both DR. Pigliucci VS DR. Shermer on Moral Science is here:

http://freethoughtblogs.com/carrier/archives/3245

I do like this Dr. Carrier fellow. I especially like his line, that morality is "what they would want if they were suitably informed". I wonder if he is going to read Shermer's book. It is significantly better than his other writings on the topic.

Predicting that such ideas about morality could change is easy, but predicting that the change in those attitudes would occur in the 1960s would be virtually impossible from, say, the vantage-point of the 1860s. It's chaos theory at work, like predicting the weather 100 years ahead.

I think ideas about morality become more easily predictable, over time, as we acquire more data about the trends. The "moral arc bending towards justice", for example. Anyone who saw that coming 100 years ago would predict the phasing out of racism, and the phasing IN of women's rights and gay rights, etc.

It helps to understand the difference between proximate factors and ultimate factors. The proximate factors are all of the little, nitty-gritty details that go into how trends play out. Those are subject to chaos, and largely unpredictable.

But, the Ultimate factors are the BIG TRENDS we can see. They are easier to predict.

Chaos theory tells us that it would be practically impossible to know exactly what path a droplet of water is going to take, down the side of a mountain, into a lake. But, the Law of Gravity tells us that it will be going in a downward direction, no matter what path it takes, (unless it evaporates, but let's ignore that for now). Proximate details are the exact path. The ultimate factors is the laws of physics playing on it.

It's certainly true that different societies do have different norms; that's trivially true from a descriptive point of view. The problem comes in if you are making the further move that what people ought to do is what their society deems correct.

There can, in fact, be a moral landscape, where different peaks of moral values have to exist in different environments. But, they will all have plenty in common, even if they are not homogenous: There is no need to assume relativism.

We may yet discover that Repugnant Thing X actually creates a Utilitarian Goal Y. Does this mean we would be morally obliged to do Repugnant Thing X?

I already covered this, a little, in my previous post. But, it bears a little more emphasis: "Thing X" might be repugnant to us, but only BECAUSE it would have no genuine hope of achieving "Goal Y". In an alternative universe, where this is different, "Thing X" would no longer be repugnant.

In the long run, our morality developed FOR acquiring good consequences. We think things are repugnant BECAUSE we recognize they do not (even though some are delusional, and think they would).

Our individual morality tends to form backwards: We come up with moral justifications after the fact. But, societal morality tends to emerge in the forwards manner, over the long run.

Someone in Timeframe A might think Thing X is not repugnant, despite its problems, but their kin in Timeframe B would be more likely to think it IS repugnant, since they will grow up with the evidence being more compelling.

In fact, those that have very confidently predicted that science is just about to provide us with the The One True Morality - at least in principle - have divergent ideas about what this will be. Shermer, for example, seems to think science will demonstrate that his particular political ideology will be shown to be the correct one, which allows all the particular rights that he favours, the eating of meat, and various other self-serving beliefs. Sam Harris is a little more abstract but essentially he's discovered a moral system that allows him to wag his finger at the Muslims and the Christians.

This is not true! I've read a lot of material from these folks, and spoken to each a few times. They have a LOT more in common, than how they differ. They tend to focus on different things they like to focus on: Shermer on rights, and Harris on extremist religion. But, notice these are NOT mutually exclusive! One can agree with Shermer and Harris, without contradiction!

There is also the issue of language: Sometimes it appears as though two people have divergent views, simply because they are using their vocabulary words in slightly different ways. You have to read past the actual words, to grasp the general concepts.

Even if they did greatly disagree, that does NOT mean science will not find the One True Morality. It just means that at least one of them would be wrong about its nature.

Any scientific study of what's the "best" moral anything has to initially start with what moral goals are. And that goes back to Is-Ought problem and Hume. Which is what multiple posters have already pointed to as the fundamental and insurmountable flaw.

We can START with what is practically inevitable, what is unlikely to change, in the nature of morality. If we can demonstrate that, empirically, then we have a scientific basis for starting with those as goals.

Hume did not live in an era where that was possible, due to lack of data at the time.

Even the great Aristotle, with his well-integrated, coherent philosophical arguments has been shown to be mostly wrong in his conclusions about the physical sciences. Because even the most rigorous, logically consistent arguments will be wrong if they’re based upon incorrect facts as Aristotle's were for the most part. For the correct facts one needs science.

Almost all philosophers have been wrong about almost everything they ever said.

Granted, the same could be said for scientists. But, at least science is self-correcting. Philosophy needs science to correct itself.

Here is a paper (actually a doctoral thesis) which is fairly interesting, if only as an existence proof that some things can be done in philosophy that aren't pure regurgitation.



http://www.ockhamsbeard.com.au/?page_id=496



There are two elements, I think, to this paper. One involves going against the normative presumptions, and the other is an evolutionary hypothesis. I find the former more compelling, even though it isn't the major portion, because it shows that it can happen.

I have not read the paper, yet, but the extract seems compelling. I will have to get back to this, someday!

Moral ecology looks at morality from the opposite outside-in point of view. This perspective suggests that, despite what our moral language might imply, morality is

created rather than discovered.

page 239 http://www.ockhamsbeard.com.au/wp-co...Dean-Clean.pdf

I will read the paper, when I can.

Morality might be created at the individual level. But, that doesn't mean we can't discover larger trends among groups of people.

In a way, morality could be said to be the result of natural experiments, playing out in several layers: By individual people, for larger groups of people.

(Not sure how relevant that is to the paper. But, I figured I would throw it in.)

Once again your ideas about how evolution and society work are terribly simplistic.

Yeah, perhaps. But, at least his ideas work to an approximate first degree, I think.

I'm going to be vague and philosophical a bit, not because I like it all that much, but because there isn't a lot better. Still, I'll try to keep it to a minimum.

(snip)

I agree with much of your general approach, though not all of your conclusions. Unfortunately, going into details would take too long for me to get to, in this thread. If you'd like to discuss it further, later, perhaps in a separate thread, let me know.

...Simply ask them what moral transgression Bill Clinton did while in office. I absolutely guarantee you that if they are old enough to remember anything about Bill Clinton at all, en masse they will respond with something having to do with Monica Lewinsky. It will not be about any of the other things that Bill Clinton did which cost lives or money or whatever, even though these are the kinds of things that philosophers like to bring up when they are trying to describe morality in books and stuff...

This is an example of the availability heuristic.

You can see Lakoff talk about them here:

That was a good presentation. Very much like Haidt's ideas. Thanks for contributing it!

Peter Singer, not Pete Seeger.

Sometimes even I get them confused!

1. certain behaviour is optimum for enabling the survival of the species

2. science can tell us what that optimum behaviour is.

3. ?????



4. therefore science can tell us what is moral.

3. As optimum behavior becomes more widely known, no force can move humans from thinking it is preferable.


(No other options can be sustained for very long.)

 

[Wowbagger]

Responses Part 2 of 2

I think of morality as a collection of game theory outcomes that are acceptable to a group. In other words, self interest balanced by mutual benefit. Game theory is just the label given to the observed behaviour. The collection is "morality".

This is true enough, to a first degree. This is why I am now emphasizing the Nash Equilibrium more heavily.

1. This one is descriptive and I hope not controversial- The moral issues that are most debated and disagreed on are not the core moral facts that people reason from. What I mean by this is that, for instance, whether torture is moral is not a moral axiom, the same for abortion, charitable giving, corporal punishment, positions on all of these are generally, whether recognized or not, something people derive from much simpler moral axioms.

You should read Haidt's book for what sorts of things morals derive from.

I think your other points are on the right track!

I would furthermore guess that proponents of the abolition of corporal punishment, as well as capital punishment and also slavery and torture are not really basing their beliefs in its wrongness on the lack of efficacy of these practices but the belief that they are simply wrong no matter what outcomes there are.

If the outcomes were different, eventually beliefs would be different.

If, in an alternative universe, freeing slaves made the world worse off, for some reason, then the freedom of slaves would only be a fad. And accepting slavery would eventually come back into favor, and likely stay there longer.

A bit of the internet fighting spirit and the inherent ambiguity of a lot of moral terminology seems to have led us to a point where the things you're arguing about are not actually the things you disagree about.

Happens all the time! All... the... freakin'.... time!!

Also if you actually read and understand Harris you understand that he is pulling what you call a "moral axiom" out of thin air, that moral axiom being welfare utilitarianism, the axiom that what is morally good is to maximise the fulfilment of the preferences persons would have if they were well-informed and rational.

I don't think it's being pulled out of "thin air". It's something that will be recognized (in the future) as something that can not really be effectively argued against, and still be called a form of morality.



Sam Harris is simply bad at communicating this idea effectively, so it only looks like he's pulling it out of thin air.

How does science establish equal rights?

"Everyone Consequentialism" = Equal Rights

It is, after all, for EVERYONE!

It may be true, but I'm suspicious because it seems too close to arguments that whatever "we" are is the pinacle that all previous time has been working toward, like the last upright guy on the evolutionary chart. In fact, we're just yet another midway point. Inequality and slavery have at least appeared to be instinctive for many more years. Our thoughts could just be a temporary glitch, or could be okay but maybe we're missing something even more important that will show up in a century or two.

This is possible. I do not claim we are necessarily at a pinnacle. There may be new heights of moral values we have yet to know about, today.



But, if that's the case, science will most likely get to there, before anything else.

Of course societies and ideas about morality do change, and a sort of tipping point, then normalization of what used to be strange, and a new consensus, is how it occurs. But if one is to say that certain people are right, such as those who argued against slavery on moral grounds, one needs to state it as an arbitrary postulate only. If not, how do you propose we derive it on a scientific basis?

Slavery, as an experiment, failed. It turns out, we are ALL better off, in the long run, without it! Even the kin of slave owners are better off, today, than if slaves were still around: The economy is larger, with more people being able to actively participate in it, giving them the opportunity to become more prosperous.



If that wasn't the case, slavery would have eventually gone back into fashion, and become moral again. Though, of course, we are talking about a different universe, in that case. Not something we need to worry about in this one.

Thus for quite sometime people were standing up for their morality which included the notion that slavery was moral and good. In fact in the period before the Civi8l War their were in the USA, in both the North and South, large numbers of people who defended the morality of slavery and attacked the anti-slavery people and Abolitionists for being immoral and wicked.

Shermer covers slavery quite well in his book. He brings up an important point: That most of the arguments that claimed "slavery was good", were objectively very weak, because they acted on cognitive dissonance. Moral values based on dissonance have a way of dissolving, over time, as more people recognize something is "off" about them, even if they do not actually know what cognitive dissonance is.

A is B and not C.

A is C and not B.



With logic we can know that at least one of them is false, but we can't know if the other is true. It means you can't with logic establish that one of them is true, only that one of them is false. You need another methodology to establish if any of them are true.



So:

Rape is right and not wrong.

Rape is wrong and not right.

How do you know, which one is true and a scientific fact?

The Moon is a satellite of Earth and not a star.

The Moon is a star and not a satellite of Earth.



How can we possibly know which one is true and a scientific fact?!!!!



It might be more difficult to pin down the empirical differences between right and wrong, than stars and satellites. But, it is not impossible.



As I describe in several places, we can start with examining how ideas about morality converge, and why they converge. We can spot trends that are very unlikely to reverse themselves, to any significant degree.




In the future, the process of defining right and wrong might even be better than that. Since this is supposed to be a thread about The Future, I might be so bold as to predict that: Academics will find a way!

Surely if I want to boil an egg or screw in a lightbulb I can follow a particular method. This hardly means that there are moral ways of doing either thing.

I can think of a few immoral ways to do those things, such as forcing a slave to do them.

Is it a scientific fact that the sun will rise tomorrow? NO! Science cannot prove that the sun must rise tomorrow, but it can and does infer from observation and induction that it is overwhelmingly probable that the sun will rise tomorrow.



Similarly, science cannot prove right and wrong behaviour either (neither can philosophy; it lacks the means to establish a true premise or axiom upon which to deduce an argument.) But science can infer via observation and induction how and why humans behave the way they do and thus establish a reasonable moral axiom from which to establish rules of right and wrong behaviour congruent with our known, evolved instincts .

Yes, this is another way of putting it!

Of course, I know what they are getting at. They want people to think about the difference between direct action and lack of action and all that happy hoohah. But the situation is so contrived that it seems useless.

I agree it is very contrived. But these studies are useful for unraveling the individual components of our moral framework.



Each one taken alone is not meant to be a complete picture of morality.

But I'm pretty sure that a lot of people who argue about morality would be disturbed by what was learned, and there would be more sputtering.

I agree with this point, though!

Help!!! There are no true premises. You run into Fries', Münchhausen's and Agrippa's trilemma. Tassman, neither philosophy nor science can establish foundationally true premises. I really don't like this notion that somehow science is special and where philosophy failed, science doesn't because science is not philosophy. I.e. you hand-wave the word science and somehow that means that the epidemiological problem of foundational premises disappears.

Science has a nugget of reliability in empirical demands, that no other form of philosophy has. That's what makes it special!

There's already a term for that: mental health. What's moral about it? Unless the goal is to have "moral" mean anything at all and win by default.

Mental health is very much connected to morality. Most serious attempts to reverse moral progress can probably be traced to acute disorders in the brain.

To take a quick and dirty stab at it: moral well-being is to the mind what health is to the body.

Almost. I think it is more accurate to say: Moral well-being is to society, what health is to the body. The "public health" model tells us more about morality than the mental health one.

Evidence? People love and protect pets, yet they're clearly not genetically related.

Much of pet keeping did have a distinct practical value in the past. Today, it's largely driven by super-stimulation: Our preference for "cute" qualities, normally reserved for our own kin, is getting "fooled" into thinking an unrelated animal is adorable.

But, that appreciation of cuteness might be co-opted into new purposes: Appreciating animals could function as a signal that the person is either not violent, or at the very least, has some bounds to how violent they could be. There could be other purposes, too.

There are lots of things that have a specific usefulness for reproduction, but which get "sloppy" and wind up applied more broadly. I mean, before DNA testing, how do you know someone is truly kin and not adopted? Yet a baby raised as a sibling of another baby would surely behave as if they're siblings, so it's not truly genetics driving the behavior; it's the social relationships that are typical of genetics.

Right. Genes evolved to only approximate rules for raising kin, that work well enough most of the time, but can be "fooled" into raising children that are not our own. This is made easier by all of the various layers of abstraction between our genes and our actual bodily behavior.

Or to put it another way, unless your interest is in the perpetuation of the "structured system or organization ... etc" in and of itself, then the term "social" isn't really doing anything, because I'd hazard that (like most people, I should think) what you're really interested in is the well-being of this person, that person, etc., etc., right on through to all the people that live and are ordinary, decent human beings; and the "structured system or organization" is only worth perpetuating, or even mentioning, insofar as it helps the several well-being of all those real people.

I would change "social" to "societal". Morality makes a lot more sense in that case.

What's doing the trick of "widening the circle" is the (ultimately biologically-derived, but far subtler) process of how the brain distinguishes self from other, and how it can step outside that relative distinction to a more universal perspective.

Ah, yes, the principle of interchangeable perspectives, coupled with more generalized abstract thinking, etc.



Lots of scientific reasons to see how progress gets made in the realm of morality!

I'm neither a sociologist nor an anthropologist but I would guess that with Africa it’s a question of its geological location, the luck of the draw and who had the biggest guns. Africa has been subject to colonization since ancient times and even today is barely recovered from millennia of occupation.

I suggest you read Jared Diamond's classic book: Guns, Germs, and Steel.



He has a neat theory about how horizontally-long continents (Europe) could be more likely to develop technologies, before vertically-long ones (Africa). In part, it has to do with how far crops can spread: Horizontal areas will be within the same temperate zone, thus spread more easily, and establish stable future growth faster. Vertical ones span areas with more variety of climate.



But, it does get more complicated than that, of course.

Wowbagger, all that those of us interested in the topic really need to see is how it is science can arrive at an evaluative premise namely why we should think one thing should be done rather than another.

I hope my longer post, above, made this clearer.



Since science is honing in on what could constitute good morality, and separating it from ideas that are bad; the normative/descriptive distinction diminishes.



The very thing you say "nobody seriously disputes" IS, in fact going to become the answer for what we ARE currently disputing. What else could possibly take its place?



What else could override what science is honing in on?! (Other than more and better science, that is.)



Can anyone think of an example of morality that is NOT, ultimately, about the consequences of everyone's well being, that would:

A. Be sustainable as a strategy, even if everyone knows this is the strategy everyone else is employing?

B. Still be recognized as "morality".



Bear in mind that people can be delusional about such things: Some people might believe (falsely) that suicide bombing will lead themselves and their kin to better well-being. Even though it's wrong, it's still about "consequences".



The science is what separates the fact from delusion.

If you mean that by specifying Consequence X as good and working towards Consequence X will lead to more of Consequence X than if you are interested in something else, then really you are being tautological, are you not?

What is "new" in my argument, is HOW we figure out Consequence X is ultimately going to be the Prime Value. That part is not tautological.

You ask a question about how science can answer moral questions and you get a big grab-bag of the latest pop science, usually on the brain, sex, evolution - because they are sexy subjects, with the tacked on conclusion...



Hence morality!



Thus it's moral!



And that's science!

Anything in that "grab-bag" that turns out to be unreliable, will eventually get replaced with something better. Science is self-correcting. Your accusation, here, makes no sense.

Just to add, I notice that Shermer's book title suggests a possible shift of tone. It is subtitled "How Science and Reason Lead Humanity toward Truth, Justice, and Freedom".

That is part of what makes the book better.

As far as my experience goes, in these debates the whole "science can answer moral questions" is what Dan Dennett would call a deepity. A deepity is a claim that can easily have two interpretations: true, but trivial or earth-shattering, but false.

(Insert photo of Morpheus from "The Matrix" here.)



What if I told you my claim is both earth-shattering AND true?!

If there's not an empirical way, even in principle, to find whatever you're looking for, there's no scientific way to do it (as a reminder for those who might be tempted to defend the wrong side of the "science can answer moral questions" deepity, what you should be looking for is the empirical basis for an objective normative morality).

As I outlined in the larger post above, there IS a way to empirically hone in on what could constitute good morality, in the long run; and for eliminating ideas that don't work.

Some of the misguided arguments that appear again and again in these threads and from the likes of Harris and Shermer seem to amount to "science is the way, we just need to expand the meaning of science to include some philosophy, and voilà".

That is NOT what I am doing!!!! That is, in fact, the very opposite of what I am trying to accomplish!



I am trying to bring scientific rigor to formally philosophical ideas!



I am NOT trying to water down science to fit some fallacious concepts, like some pseudo-scientific creationist!



Philosophy is what is transforming, according to the disciplined findings of science! Not the very nature of science, itself!

Understand?

Science can tell you exactly what is going on in your brain when you post things like this. However science cannot by doing so tell whether you are making a logically sound argument or a fallacious one. You need philosophy for that.

I would argue that science can show you if an idea works or not, regardless of what philosophy is telling you.



(Though, that's not meant to imply philosophy is useless.)

Science doesn't tell us which is better or has more value, blue or yellow, Zappa or Miley Cyrus, a human or a virus. You're making the wrong question for such a rigorous enterprise designed to find empirical facts about the world. Please rephrase it properly so we don't have to expect science to make the decision for us. As Dragoonster said, science doesn't give a yarn about any human preference. It's construed in a way that forbids that, by definition.

Morality is not really like a matter of personal preference.



There is unlikely to be any form of Nash Equilibrium between colors or music artists, or ice cream flavors. It wouldn't make sense to say "I'm going to strategically choose chocolate as my favorite ice cream, because if Mary knows that's my favorite, it can still be my optimal choice! But, if I went with vanilla, I won't end up liking it as much, if Mary ever finds out!"



Morality, on the other hand, is VERY MUCH prone to those sorts of strategies, because they IMPACT other people's lives more DIRECTLY!




Therefore, morality is also more prone to be deduced by science.

Let's say you are in Nazi Germany, and being the good man that you are, you are hiding a Jewish family in your cellar, and a member of the Einsatzgruppen comes to your door and casually enquires if you have noticed any Jewish people in the area. At this point do you, Tassman, say, "Sure, there is a family of Jews hiding in my cellar!" or do you tell a lie which is, according to you synonymous with "needlessly complicates people’s lives, destroys reputations, and undermines trust".

Lies of emergency, such as to protect the lives of innocent people, are moral. Sam Harris has a whole book devoted to this subject called, aptly: Lying. Even if you don't like the author, this book is rather straight-forward and hopefully not very controversial. And, it's short. (Even the expanded version is short.)

Re: Michael Shermer's book, as I have already read Matt Ridley's Rational Optimist and Sam Harris's Moral Landscape, and am currently reading Steven Pinker's Better Angels of Our Nature, is there anything in this Shermer book that I can get there that hasn't been written elsewhere?

The book is NOT one of original research, if that’s what you mean. But, it is a good, concise overview across many factors of the history of morality.

The end also gets into the future. But, your anger towards that will be of a different sort, I guess, than your anger towards my predictions. And, although I agree with his sentiments, I think that stuff probably should have been put into a separate book. But, I do not think anything like it, is in the others you mentioned.

Have you read Pinker's The Blank Slate? I usually recommend it as a primer to his Angels book, for those who have time to read both.

I have not read Rational Optimist, yet. Perhaps I should. What did you think of it?

First, Shermer — defining moral progress as “improvement in the survival and flourishing of sentient beings” — needs to make a case that we humans are, in fact, moving toward such an improvement despite terrorist attacks on cartoonists, Islamic State beheadings, Taliban massacres of schoolchildren and police shootings of innocent civilians, among other seemingly daily atrocities.

Pinker, at least, makes this case. Even if Shermer doesn't quite get there.

But bear in mind that his argument seems to have shifted, or at least the focus appears more on demonstrating what we already know about, that violence has declined, that rights have changed, that freedom is greater now than it was a long time ago. This is different from the claim that science has answered moral questions.

This is a key ingredient for doing so! This is one of the most important ways we establish how right and wrong can be "honed in on" over time, towards some Prime Value.

So it seems that Shermer is opposed to your form of utilitarianism which promotes the group, and he replaces it with a concern for individuals.

I don't think Shermer would completely oppose that. Morality is an emergent system that works at many levels. I think Shermer would agree with that concept.



Ultimately, the individual matters. But, one can't achieve all they can without a healthy society around them. So, morality emerges socially, to effect the well-being of individuals. Etc.

My word, Shermer's a total idiot!







Really? Religions always do the right thing in the end? How for bloody love of bloody Hell is that an empirically objective fact?



Are religions currently doing the right thing?



God, this man is a total prat!

You misunderstand his point. And it is illustrative of your not being charitable enough when evaluating his ideas. Your bias is showing, and it's rather embarrassing.



His point is that religion does, eventually, change. They went from being pro-slavery to against slavery; against interracial marriage to accepting it; etc.



They kick and scream and drag their nails, so to speak. But, eventually their efforts break down, and then two things happen:

1. They accept what is actually the right thing.

2. They will claim (falsely) that they always held that position. (For example, claiming religion was always against slavery, even though that is clearly not true.)



THAT trend is an empirical fact.



And, yes, religions ARE shifting towards the right way, even more, as we speak: Becoming more accepting of gay marriage, for example.



Religions always end up doing the right thing, after they've tried everything else.

As for his one moral principle, why push the arc "just a bit farther"? Surely his one moral principle could be, "push the arc as far as you possibly can". It seems he has, for some reason, accepted that only "a bit farther" is sufficient.

Well, my own position is "as far as you can". But, I also recognize that there are only 24 hours in a day, and people have other priorities. "A little farther" is better than nothing. And certainly a LOT better than "pushing backwards".



Seems like a silly point to criticize. You seem too quick to dismiss anything and everything Shermer says about anything.

As I pointed out, Jeremy Bentham came up with this in the 18th Century, Sam Harris did not discover it by science! Ha ha if you believe that!

Sam Harris did not claim to originate the idea. Why should that even matter?



Harris DID deny, for a while, that it was a form of Utilitarianism, even though it was. (And, I think he admits that now?) But, that's just a semantic quibble, anyway.

Even so, I think it's only an illusion that morality has improved over time, because it's arbitrarily setting our morality as a standard and then saying people have been improving because they've been getting more like us.

I agree with almost all of your entire post, except this part.



We can say morality is improving, over time, because people are becoming more adept at thinking about the consequences of their actions, over time.



It has nothing to do with becoming "more like us". The factors that are said to be improving are far more universal than that. We can predict the patterns that morality will veer off into, no matter what the cultural milieu of the group.



And, those improvements are not an illusion.

Society has advanced due to better technology and more comfortable living conditions for the most part at least in the west as it were. When your immediete concerns are no longer just survival and you can see there is a better way to live I think humans have tended to strive for that.

Yes, this is an important point to emphasize: The ability to plan for the future makes a BIG impact on moral strategy!

Harris specifically argues that the ‘is-ought distinction’ is fundamentally unhelpful and that “normative” as opposed to “descriptive” morality is merely semantics – as I’ve noted several times.

I just wanted to point out that the "is-ought distinction" DOES have its uses, mainly as a defense against the naturalistic fallacy.



But, we can show how science can determine moral values without resorting to the naturalistic fallacy, and THAT'S why making the distinction is useless in this case.



Would be a 'naturalistic fallacy' to claim that the Earth is going to continue orbiting around the Sun for a very long time? It is natural, but it's also a fact we can't do much about, right now. So, therefore, we "should" have the Earth orbit around the Sun.



In a similar way, we can say that "arc" of morality bends towards some Prime Value. It is a natural progression, and also (according to theory) something we can't really do much about, and our ability to change this course will only diminish in the future. Therefore, science is indicating that we "should" veer towards that Value.



Of course, morality is a softer science than physics, and therefore more prone to imperfections in the pattern. So, the analogy is NOT perfect. But, I hope you get the drift, anyway.

I do not think science can reveal normative morality. I don't think that normative reality can be revealed because it doesn't exist. All that exists is our belief that it exists and that our morality is the one true morality, or that a true morality can be discovered which is close to ours (whatever that may be).

Science can show us patterns in normative judgments: The history, and (with some theoretical frameworks) predictions about the future.



I think science can show what our normative values are likely to be, before we even adopt them, if done carefully enough.



That's virtually the same thing as "science revealing normative morality", for all practical intents and purposes.

How can we be sure we're not making that same mistake when we declare our morals to be the goal of all those prevous benighted generations who didn't immediately see it our way?

Science is always provisional. How can we be sure the Earth orbits the Sun? What if we discover some material aspect of the Sun that engulfs the Earth, making it more accurate to say "The Earth is inside the Sun, but it doesn't look that way, because we are only able to see its core in the middle, before."



We don't know, for 100% certainty, that people in the future won't discover better moral goals, than we can devise today. Though, I will argue that we generally get better at this science stuff, over time, anyway!

 

[mijopaalmc]

So you are going to essentially ignore the last 673 posts of discussion and assert what toyouy asserted at the beginning?

 

[Tsukasa Buddha]

I largely have no idea what you are saying, but you seem to be saying that equal consideration negates the need for calculus in consequentialism. I see no reason why that should be the case.

 

[Tassman]

This is true enough, to a first degree. This is why I am now emphasizing the Nash Equilibrium more heavily.

You should read Haidt's book for what sorts of things morals derive from.

I think your other points are on the right track!

If the outcomes were different, eventually beliefs would be different.

If, in an alternative universe, freeing slaves made the world worse off, for some reason, then the freedom of slaves would only be a fad. And accepting slavery would eventually come back into favor, and likely stay there longer.





Happens all the time! All... the... freakin'.... time!!







I don't think it's being pulled out of "thin air". It's something that will be recognized (in the future) as something that can not really be effectively argued against, and still be called a form of morality.



Sam Harris is simply bad at communicating this idea effectively, so it only looks like he's pulling it out of thin air.



"Everyone Consequentialism" = Equal Rights

It is, after all, for EVERYONE!



This is possible. I do not claim we are necessarily at a pinnacle. There may be new heights of moral values we have yet to know about, today.



But, if that's the case, science will most likely get to there, before anything else.

Slavery, as an experiment, failed. It turns out, we are ALL better off, in the long run, without it! Even the kin of slave owners are better off, today, than if slaves were still around: The economy is larger, with more people being able to actively participate in it, giving them the opportunity to become more prosperous.



If that wasn't the case, slavery would have eventually gone back into fashion, and become moral again. Though, of course, we are talking about a different universe, in that case. Not something we need to worry about in this one.



Shermer covers slavery quite well in his book. He brings up an important point: That most of the arguments that claimed "slavery was good", were objectively very weak, because they acted on cognitive dissonance. Moral values based on dissonance have a way of dissolving, over time, as more people recognize something is "off" about them, even if they do not actually know what cognitive dissonance is.





The Moon is a satellite of Earth and not a star.

The Moon is a star and not a satellite of Earth.



How can we possibly know which one is true and a scientific fact?!!!!



It might be more difficult to pin down the empirical differences between right and wrong, than stars and satellites. But, it is not impossible.



As I describe in several places, we can start with examining how ideas about morality converge, and why they converge. We can spot trends that are very unlikely to reverse themselves, to any significant degree.




In the future, the process of defining right and wrong might even be better than that. Since this is supposed to be a thread about The Future, I might be so bold as to predict that: Academics will find a way!

I can think of a few immoral ways to do those things, such as forcing a slave to do them.



Yes, this is another way of putting it!

I agree it is very contrived. But these studies are useful for unraveling the individual components of our moral framework.



Each one taken alone is not meant to be a complete picture of morality.



I agree with this point, though!

Science has a nugget of reliability in empirical demands, that no other form of philosophy has. That's what makes it special!

Mental health is very much connected to morality. Most serious attempts to reverse moral progress can probably be traced to acute disorders in the brain.

Almost. I think it is more accurate to say: Moral well-being is to society, what health is to the body. The "public health" model tells us more about morality than the mental health one.





Much of pet keeping did have a distinct practical value in the past. Today, it's largely driven by super-stimulation: Our preference for "cute" qualities, normally reserved for our own kin, is getting "fooled" into thinking an unrelated animal is adorable.

But, that appreciation of cuteness might be co-opted into new purposes: Appreciating animals could function as a signal that the person is either not violent, or at the very least, has some bounds to how violent they could be. There could be other purposes, too.



Right. Genes evolved to only approximate rules for raising kin, that work well enough most of the time, but can be "fooled" into raising children that are not our own. This is made easier by all of the various layers of abstraction between our genes and our actual bodily behavior.

I would change "social" to "societal". Morality makes a lot more sense in that case.

Ah, yes, the principle of interchangeable perspectives, coupled with more generalized abstract thinking, etc.



Lots of scientific reasons to see how progress gets made in the realm of morality!



I suggest you read Jared Diamond's classic book: Guns, Germs, and Steel.



He has a neat theory about how horizontally-long continents (Europe) could be more likely to develop technologies, before vertically-long ones (Africa). In part, it has to do with how far crops can spread: Horizontal areas will be within the same temperate zone, thus spread more easily, and establish stable future growth faster. Vertical ones span areas with more variety of climate.



But, it does get more complicated than that, of course.

I hope my longer post, above, made this clearer.



Since science is honing in on what could constitute good morality, and separating it from ideas that are bad; the normative/descriptive distinction diminishes.



The very thing you say "nobody seriously disputes" IS, in fact going to become the answer for what we ARE currently disputing. What else could possibly take its place?



What else could override what science is honing in on?! (Other than more and better science, that is.)



Can anyone think of an example of morality that is NOT, ultimately, about the consequences of everyone's well being, that would:

A. Be sustainable as a strategy, even if everyone knows this is the strategy everyone else is employing?

B. Still be recognized as "morality".



Bear in mind that people can be delusional about such things: Some people might believe (falsely) that suicide bombing will lead themselves and their kin to better well-being. Even though it's wrong, it's still about "consequences".



The science is what separates the fact from delusion.



What is "new" in my argument, is HOW we figure out Consequence X is ultimately going to be the Prime Value. That part is not tautological.





Anything in that "grab-bag" that turns out to be unreliable, will eventually get replaced with something better. Science is self-correcting. Your accusation, here, makes no sense.

That is part of what makes the book better.





(Insert photo of Morpheus from "The Matrix" here.)



What if I told you my claim is both earth-shattering AND true?!





As I outlined in the larger post above, there IS a way to empirically hone in on what could constitute good morality, in the long run; and for eliminating ideas that don't work.



That is NOT what I am doing!!!! That is, in fact, the very opposite of what I am trying to accomplish!



I am trying to bring scientific rigor to formally philosophical ideas!



I am NOT trying to water down science to fit some fallacious concepts, like some pseudo-scientific creationist!



Philosophy is what is transforming, according to the disciplined findings of science! Not the very nature of science, itself!

Understand?

I would argue that science can show you if an idea works or not, regardless of what philosophy is telling you.



(Though, that's not meant to imply philosophy is useless.)





Morality is not really like a matter of personal preference.



There is unlikely to be any form of Nash Equilibrium between colors or music artists, or ice cream flavors. It wouldn't make sense to say "I'm going to strategically choose chocolate as my favorite ice cream, because if Mary knows that's my favorite, it can still be my optimal choice! But, if I went with vanilla, I won't end up liking it as much, if Mary ever finds out!"



Morality, on the other hand, is VERY MUCH prone to those sorts of strategies, because they IMPACT other people's lives more DIRECTLY!




Therefore, morality is also more prone to be deduced by science.

Lies of emergency, such as to protect the lives of innocent people, are moral. Sam Harris has a whole book devoted to this subject called, aptly: Lying. Even if you don't like the author, this book is rather straight-forward and hopefully not very controversial. And, it's short. (Even the expanded version is short.)



The book is NOT one of original research, if that’s what you mean. But, it is a good, concise overview across many factors of the history of morality.

The end also gets into the future. But, your anger towards that will be of a different sort, I guess, than your anger towards my predictions. And, although I agree with his sentiments, I think that stuff probably should have been put into a separate book. But, I do not think anything like it, is in the others you mentioned.

Have you read Pinker's The Blank Slate? I usually recommend it as a primer to his Angels book, for those who have time to read both.

I have not read Rational Optimist, yet. Perhaps I should. What did you think of it?



Pinker, at least, makes this case. Even if Shermer doesn't quite get there.



This is a key ingredient for doing so! This is one of the most important ways we establish how right and wrong can be "honed in on" over time, towards some Prime Value.



I don't think Shermer would completely oppose that. Morality is an emergent system that works at many levels. I think Shermer would agree with that concept.



Ultimately, the individual matters. But, one can't achieve all they can without a healthy society around them. So, morality emerges socially, to effect the well-being of individuals. Etc.





You misunderstand his point. And it is illustrative of your not being charitable enough when evaluating his ideas. Your bias is showing, and it's rather embarrassing.



His point is that religion does, eventually, change. They went from being pro-slavery to against slavery; against interracial marriage to accepting it; etc.



They kick and scream and drag their nails, so to speak. But, eventually their efforts break down, and then two things happen:

1. They accept what is actually the right thing.

2. They will claim (falsely) that they always held that position. (For example, claiming religion was always against slavery, even though that is clearly not true.)



THAT trend is an empirical fact.



And, yes, religions ARE shifting towards the right way, even more, as we speak: Becoming more accepting of gay marriage, for example.



Religions always end up doing the right thing, after they've tried everything else.



Well, my own position is "as far as you can". But, I also recognize that there are only 24 hours in a day, and people have other priorities. "A little farther" is better than nothing. And certainly a LOT better than "pushing backwards".



Seems like a silly point to criticize. You seem too quick to dismiss anything and everything Shermer says about anything.



Sam Harris did not claim to originate the idea. Why should that even matter?



Harris DID deny, for a while, that it was a form of Utilitarianism, even though it was. (And, I think he admits that now?) But, that's just a semantic quibble, anyway.

I agree with almost all of your entire post, except this part.



We can say morality is improving, over time, because people are becoming more adept at thinking about the consequences of their actions, over time.



It has nothing to do with becoming "more like us". The factors that are said to be improving are far more universal than that. We can predict the patterns that morality will veer off into, no matter what the cultural milieu of the group.



And, those improvements are not an illusion.



Yes, this is an important point to emphasize: The ability to plan for the future makes a BIG impact on moral strategy!



I just wanted to point out that the "is-ought distinction" DOES have its uses, mainly as a defense against the naturalistic fallacy.



But, we can show how science can determine moral values without resorting to the naturalistic fallacy, and THAT'S why making the distinction is useless in this case.



Would be a 'naturalistic fallacy' to claim that the Earth is going to continue orbiting around the Sun for a very long time? It is natural, but it's also a fact we can't do much about, right now. So, therefore, we "should" have the Earth orbit around the Sun.



In a similar way, we can say that "arc" of morality bends towards some Prime Value. It is a natural progression, and also (according to theory) something we can't really do much about, and our ability to change this course will only diminish in the future. Therefore, science is indicating that we "should" veer towards that Value.



Of course, morality is a softer science than physics, and therefore more prone to imperfections in the pattern. So, the analogy is NOT perfect. But, I hope you get the drift, anyway.

Science can show us patterns in normative judgments: The history, and (with some theoretical frameworks) predictions about the future.



I think science can show what our normative values are likely to be, before we even adopt them, if done carefully enough.



That's virtually the same thing as "science revealing normative morality", for all practical intents and purposes.





Science is always provisional. How can we be sure the Earth orbits the Sun? What if we discover some material aspect of the Sun that engulfs the Earth, making it more accurate to say "The Earth is inside the Sun, but it doesn't look that way, because we are only able to see its core in the middle, before."



We don't know, for 100% certainty, that people in the future won't discover better moral goals, than we can devise today. Though, I will argue that we generally get better at this science stuff, over time, anyway!

Excellent, comprehensive, well thought-out posts, they must have consumed a great deal of your time so thank you. I agree completely with the general thrust of your argument.

 

[Wowbagger]

So you are going to essentially ignore the last 673 posts of discussion and assert what toyouy asserted at the beginning?

I responded to a ton of posts from January. I will eventually get to February.

If you pay attention, these are not mere assertions. I am trying to add various nuances to back them up. I don't see anyone else trying to back up their counter claims with any level of reasoned arguments: Just the same... assertions... over and over again.