The Future of Moral Science

[Tassman]

Apologies in advance for what is a lengthy response. Perhaps we should narrow the discussion to make it more manageable. I've highlighted the points that I think are essential, so that you needn't feel compelled to respond to everything I've said.

It would be pleasant to discuss the points you’ve raised over a glass of fine cognac, but work needs impel me to cut to the chase as you've suggested. Hence I’ll snip to the highlighted passages.

One can infer from accumulated knowledge of what makes huts habitable (i.e. heating) that one needs to heat the hut.[/INDENT]
The use of the term "need" there is instructive. It expresses a practical necessity, i.e., is just another word that means "ought". You need to do this, because it is necessary to attain your end. No difference between that sense of "need" and the corresponding "ought" statement -- but you've said that science doesn't derive normative statements.
Fifth, you've said that your version of the argument is inductive, with a descriptive conclusion (contradicting your justification in terms of the normative restatement above). But what does that mean? All I can guess is this: Because of past observations, I recognize that I usually do what is necessary to attain my ends. Hence, I conclude that I will probably do so here. Right? That's what an inductive argument would look like, yes?

But this kind of argument does not provide any reasons to do something. It merely provides a prediction that I will do it. This is useless in a situation in which I am deliberating about what to do.

Well, no. It’s not. All behaviour is ‘instinctive behaviour’ and socially acculturated behaviour’ - no one deliberates about “what to do” in a vacuum, as you seem to be implying. Thus, if you want a habitable hut the need to heat it to achieve this end is based upon knowledge, implicitly derived from science, and from past experience – either personal or learnt.

We make inferences of this sort all the time and they’re a perfectly valid basis for action. E.g. we can’t prove that the sun will rise tomorrow, but we can infer from observation and induction that it most probably will. And so, “deliberating about what to do” tomorrow can be reasonably based upon the inferred fact that the sun will be there. It is not, as you say, “useless” to base your deliberations upon such a probability.

I want to focus on a couple of narrow points for now, and that point is irrelevant to me. I'm criticizing your argument, not putting forth an original argument as to the nature of morality.

My main interest right now are the following points:

(1) You claim that science does not derive norms (and I don't dispute this claim) but nonetheless science can provide practical arguments about what to do. Since deliberation about what to do is deliberation about appropriateness of action (i.e., normative), this is a contradiction.

(2) You claim that science does not derive norms, but nonetheless can provide a basis for morality, despite the fact that morality is also about appropriateness of action.

(3) You claim that morality, properly viewed, is not normative, although it is a code of behavior (again, a fundamentally normative concept).



You've said that science doesn't derive normative statements. Any system of rules of behavior is a system of norms. By your own declaration, science doesn't derive such claims.

Science doesn’t set the rules of behaviour but it does provide the only available empirical information about how the world functions and our place in it, upon which we can base such behaviour.

Yes, I think science could give an account of how we have come to use this set of rules or that, but that's not what a moral theorist fundamentally wants. He wants to know what set of rules is a good set of rules, to what end should such rules tend. And science can only say that our sets of rules have (allegedly) tended towards social cohesion, not that this is a good aim. So science gives no justification for this set or that, unless an end has been selected.

I’m afraid I’m really not very interested in what your “moral theorist fundamentally wants”. A “set rules” is “good” if the rules achieve the end to which they’ve been devised, namely conformity to the instinctive norms of behaviour within a group.

Our morals are the instinctive derivatives of self-preservation and procreation in every case and a consequence of natural selection. This has been the case throughout the four and a half million history of hominids on this planet. Are you suggesting that Homo erectus or Homo neanderthalensis were unable to devise practical rules of behaviour without the wisdom of moral theorists to tell them what “good rules” were? <sarcasm>

Thus, while science does not determine that social cohesion is necessarily a “good aim”, it does inform us that it is a fundamental component of our evolved biological make-up and, whether we’re aware of it or not, our overall behaviour as a social species is geared towards this end.

Not interested.
For now, I'll grant that codes of behavior have evolved for functional reasons, but dispute whether this is reason enough to abide by or support such codes. That is, I'll grant the historical claim, but question whether this history is reason enough to think these rules are good rules.

I’m sorry phiwum, but this is mostly what I’m interested at this point.

So on what basis would you question whether “these rules are good rules”? Codes of behaviour developed for functional reasons, namely the evolved need to maintain a cohesive society. And yes this is reason enough to abide by or support such rules. They are to our long-term advantage as a species and the predisposition to conform to the rules of the group is instinctive. So such rules are “good rules” if they achieve this goal.

Yes, I think so, too. That's why I wrote explicitly, "though that is, of course, a problem for realist theories in general, as well."

I think, therefore, that this is another digression, off the main point of our discussion. The problem of motivation to be moral when it's not in one's interest isn't limited to your theory of morality, and so needn't distract us here. Let's put the focus on the features that are specific to your claims here.



Well, let's look at your rephrasing.

First, it still includes a normative component. You now have "should" taking the place of "ought", but the meaning is unchanged, so you haven't excised normativity.

Second, it is a conditional statement, in which the "should do X" part occurs in the consequent (i.e., it is what Kant called a hypothetical imperative). By itself, it does not motivate any action at all. Only if I recognize that the antecedent is true do I derive a motive to act, that is, "I should flee."

Now, if science actually tells me that I want to survive (because science tells me this is a drive that evolution has instilled in me), then science has just derived a bald-faced norm: I should flee. Contrary to your claims of science.

Not so. Science tells you that you want to survive because it is the demonstrable instinct of all living creatures to try and survive. This is a factual statement, not a moral prescription. So unless you are suicidal, due to advanced terminal illness or a failed romance etc, science can say that as a general rule the urge of all living creatures is to escape the danger.

Of course, it is silly in the extreme to pretend that science tells me that I want to survive. On the contrary, I feel that desire intimately, without reference to any science texts. Indeed, if I felt the oppression of my troubles so acutely that I found death preferable to life at this moment, no number of scientific references would change my mind. Therefore, to complete the argument, so to speak, I reach for a premise which science does not determine for me: I ask myself whether or not I desire this end, for which fleeing is a necessary means. If I do, then the hypothetical imperative necessitates that I flee, and if not, then it is irrelevant to my deliberations. As we can see, the move from hypothetical imperative to a motivation for action goes beyond any scientifically grounded claim.

See above.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

...

Well, no. It’s not. All behaviour is ‘instinctive behaviour’ and socially acculturated behaviour’ - no one deliberates about “what to do” in a vacuum, as you seem to be implying. Thus, if you want a habitable hut the need to heat it to achieve this end is based upon knowledge, implicitly derived from science, and from past experience – either personal or learnt.

...

So your personal experience is science? How do a scientific "we" come into play if it is personal? So gravity is personal also? Or science is the same for that which is personal and not personal?

Could you get a hold on what makes an observation an observation? "I need something" is not an observation as experiences go. It is an experience but not an observation based on an independent observer. That you need heat is not independent of you and you don't see that you need heat.

 

[Tassman]

Sometiimes. Or sometimes, as we also see on TV news (well, not literally), people will push others into the lava so they can steal their stuff. As you said, such behavior risks social condemnation (jail, execution), but some feel the risk is worth it.

True, but not usually (I hope). Such antisocial behavior occurs presumably on the basis of extreme poverty, in which case the question can be asked, how a society could allow such an inequitable distribution of wealth. Or, they are sociopaths in which case they deserve whatever society throws at them.

There are competing urges, I think, and therefore competing "moral codes," though we don't usually use that term for the behavior of what society calls criminals. But someone who thinks: Those rich people have stuff and I need stuff and I know how to get away with taking it is following a survival instinct that's as old as the first tribe member who thought:]i]That other tribe has stuff...[/i] and just as much a part of our makeup and successful survival strategy as altruism and empathy.

I think not so much competing codes within a given tribe, except for the odd psychopath, but certainly between competing tribes. This has always been the case. Such instinctive social behaviour as altruism and empathy are usually maintained within a given tribe – think Moses and the ancient Israelites. But rape, pillage and slaughter are all OK for outsiders – think Moses’ genocide of the Amorites.

But we are advancing. If Moses did today what he did back then he would be charged with crimes against humanity.

There's not just one goal that humans are bred to converge on, and therefore not just one overarching morality that leads to one morally right behavior as a way to achieve that goal. Our survival instincts have served us well, but there are lots of them that are sometimes contradictory, and any given behavior at any given time depends on which has the ascendancy.

Certainly this is true of individuals and segments of society. But overall I do think that social cohesion is the core instinct of the various social species. Without such cohesion there is no survival.

So your personal experience is science? How do a scientific "we" come into play if it is personal? So gravity is personal also? Or science is the same for that which is personal and not personal?

Could you get a hold on what makes an observation an observation? "I need something" is not an observation as experiences go. It is an experience but not an observation based on an independent observer. That you need heat is not independent of you and you don't see that you need heat.

I'm sorry JP but I have no idea what you're talking about.

 

[phiwum]

Hello, Tassman.

We seem to cover some of the same ground over and over, so before we begin looking at your response, I'd like for you to acknowledge what I say here.

In every argument of practical reasoning, a premise about a means-end or other causal claim appears. Everyone in this conversation acknowledges that science can be very useful in justifying these premises. But, of course, the justification of such a premise is distinct from an argument which uses the premise.

So, if you could just put an X here.

[ ] I understand that everyone recognizes that science is good at causal inference, and that beliefs about causality play an essential role in practical deliberation, and so no one in this thread is claiming that science has no role in practical reasoning.
​

Great. Thanks. Now that we all acknowledge that science can provide an effective justification of means-end relations which are an essential part of practical reasoning, we may move forward. In another post, I'll respond to your comments.

 

[Pup]

True, but not usually (I hope). Such antisocial behavior occurs presumably on the basis of extreme poverty, in which case the question can be asked, how a society could allow such an inequitable distribution of wealth. Or, they are sociopaths in which case they deserve whatever society throws at them.

Those are two pretty black and white categories. There are rich thieves (Bernie Madoff) and calling them all sociopaths seems a broad brush, and a way of dismissing them as outliers to your central theory that everyone is trying to work toward a cohesive community.

But in real life, there are lots of minor and major outliers, not all sociopaths, doing things that negatively affect the success of the community because they have other priorities, also bred by evolution.

I think not so much competing codes within a given tribe, except for the odd psychopath, but certainly between competing tribes. This has always been the case. Such instinctive social behaviour as altruism and empathy are usually maintained within a given tribe – think Moses and the ancient Israelites. But rape, pillage and slaughter are all OK for outsiders – think Moses’ genocide of the Amorites.

The problem is that not everyone defines tribe the same. A liberal American might consider a conservative American "not his tribe" and vice versa. There are white people who wouldn't help a black person, even if they live in the same town, and others who wouldn't help a Jew. We still have ethnic enclaves, where new immigrants aren't considered socially part of the tribe or perhaps don't want to be, yet legally they might be citizens and residents of the same city. So there are religious tribes, social tribes, political tribes, geographical tribes, appearance tribes, age tribes, all overlapping and interacting.

Certainly this is true of individuals and segments of society. But overall I do think that social cohesion is the core instinct of the various social species. Without such cohesion there is no survival.

But those other instincts can't be ignored, because individuals are what make up society.

 

[angrysoba]

overall I do think that social cohesion is the core instinct of the various social species. Without such cohesion there is no survival.

and

It is demonstrable that things cannot be otherwise than as they are; for as all things have been created for some end, they must necessarily be created for the best end. Observe, for instance, the nose is formed for spectacles, therefore we wear spectacles.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

http://scholar.google.dk/scholar_ur...arr&ei=LgXiVJXyL8qVatbqgvgD&ved=0CCEQgAMoAjAA

The maximum number as reported by science possible for social group coherence is 1500 individuals. Somehow I should field social coherence beyond those 1500 people, which is the maximum (can be larger but nowhere near that I can hold a large population of say 20.000 people in a social network), so how do I hold social coherence for people for which I am biologically incapable of doing so? Can you answer that, Tassman?

 

[phiwum]

First, I'll note that you missed one of my points. Let me repeat it.

The use of the term "need" there is instructive. It expresses a practical necessity, i.e., is just another word that means "ought". You need to do this, because it is necessary to attain your end. No difference between that sense of "need" and the corresponding "ought" statement -- but you've said that science doesn't derive normative statements.​

You keep saying (rightly, in my opinion) that science cannot derive norms, but then you also say that science can tell you that you "need" to heat the hut.

Well, no. It’s not. All behaviour is ‘instinctive behaviour’ and socially acculturated behaviour’ - no one deliberates about “what to do” in a vacuum, as you seem to be implying. Thus, if you want a habitable hut the need to heat it to achieve this end is based upon knowledge, implicitly derived from science, and from past experience – either personal or learnt.

We make inferences of this sort all the time and they’re a perfectly valid basis for action. E.g. we can’t prove that the sun will rise tomorrow, but we can infer from observation and induction that it most probably will. And so, “deliberating about what to do” tomorrow can be reasonably based upon the inferred fact that the sun will be there. It is not, as you say, “useless” to base your deliberations upon such a probability.

There is a miscommunication going on here.

I have never said that induction or the scientific method are unreliable guides to prediction. Indeed, they are quite useful.

But you claimed to derive "I will heat the hut," as the conclusion of an inductive argument, and just as relevant as the corresponding practical syllogism which concludes "I ought to heat the hut." But this is nonsense. When I deliberate about which action advances my goals, I am not interested in predicting my future behavior on the basis of my past behavior.

So, I have no beef with induction generally, but this particular inductive argument does not replace the corresponding practical syllogism, contrary to your claim.

Science doesn’t set the rules of behaviour but it does provide the only available empirical information about how the world functions and our place in it, upon which we can base such behaviour.

I agree that science is the most reliable means of deducing causal relations and that such relations are an essential part of instrumental reasoning.

I’m afraid I’m really not very interested in what your “moral theorist fundamentally wants”. A “set rules” is “good” if the rules achieve the end to which they’ve been devised, namely conformity to the instinctive norms of behaviour within a group.

Our morals are the instinctive derivatives of self-preservation and procreation in every case and a consequence of natural selection. This has been the case throughout the four and a half million history of hominids on this planet. Are you suggesting that Homo erectus or Homo neanderthalensis were unable to devise practical rules of behaviour without the wisdom of moral theorists to tell them what “good rules” were? <sarcasm>

Thus, while science does not determine that social cohesion is necessarily a “good aim”, it does inform us that it is a fundamental component of our evolved biological make-up and, whether we’re aware of it or not, our overall behaviour as a social species is geared towards this end.

Insofar as science cannot tell us that this is a good aim, then science fails to provide an essential step of moral justification.

Even supposing science can tell us that "our overall behavior ... is geared towards this end" (something I doubt), that would not justify this as an appropriate aim for morality. This would be a purely descriptive fact about human psychology, but so what?

I’m sorry phiwum, but this is mostly what I’m interested at this point.

So on what basis would you question whether “these rules are good rules”? Codes of behaviour developed for functional reasons, namely the evolved need to maintain a cohesive society. And yes this is reason enough to abide by or support such rules. They are to our long-term advantage as a species and the predisposition to conform to the rules of the group is instinctive. So such rules are “good rules” if they achieve this goal.

As an individual, I can recognize that a certain set of rules is "to our long-term advantage as a species" and still see absolutely no motive to act accordingly. If science is supposed to give me the basis of morality in terms of "social cohesion" because it's good for the species, science will have to motivate me to care about the species as a whole.

And it's not good enough to claim that I already do so, because that's how I've evolved. Obviously, there are many people who choose their own selfish interests over the interests of the species as a whole.

As I said, however, this is essentially the problem known as "why be moral?" which any realist must also face and it is not my primary interest here. The primary interest is the step from "Science (allegedly) says that we have evolved to care about the species," to "We ought to therefore act in ways which are good for the species."

Not so. Science tells you that you want to survive because it is the demonstrable instinct of all living creatures to try and survive. This is a factual statement, not a moral prescription. So unless you are suicidal, due to advanced terminal illness or a failed romance etc, science can say that as a general rule the urge of all living creatures is to escape the danger.



See above.

I have no doubt that, by and large, persons prefer survival. This is a descriptive fact.

But when I am deciding about what I want, I am not the least interested in what most persons want, or in any evolutionary account of what I have evolved to want. I simply examine whether, indeed, I do desire survival.

And it is my wants that are at issue in determining what action is appropriate. The fact that science might be able to tell me that most humans in this situation will flee the lava is simply irrelevant to whether or not I find rational reason to flee the lava.

Let's talk briefly about the nature of practical reasoning, again using the very simple form involving necessary means.

I want to make the hut habitable.
Unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable.
Therefore I must heat the hut.
​

Let's agree that the second premise may be contributed by a scientific analysis. Let's agree that, indeed, science provides the best means for justifying such analyses.

The first premise does not come from any scientific analysis. It is an expression of personal desire of a strong sort (a motivating desire).

The conclusion is a practical norm expressing the rational requirement that I act.

This is not, by the way, a "philosophical argument". It is simply a representation of a common bit of reasoning that any competent agent would make. Philosophy studies such arguments, but the syllogism isn't philosophical, strictly speaking. In exactly the same way, science studies trees, but this doesn't mean trees are scientific.

So, as we can see, this common bit of reasoning is certainly well-informed by science (in the best case), but the reasoning is not scientific per se. Nor is it philosophical. It's just a representation of how one draws conclusions when there is a necessary means to his end.

 

[Manopolus]

First, I'll note that you missed one of my points. Let me repeat it.

The use of the term "need" there is instructive. It expresses a practical necessity, i.e., is just another word that means "ought". You need to do this, because it is necessary to attain your end. No difference between that sense of "need" and the corresponding "ought" statement -- but you've said that science doesn't derive normative statements.​

You keep saying (rightly, in my opinion) that science cannot derive norms, but then you also say that science can tell you that you "need" to heat the hut.

I think what you're missing is that the sciences already do that to a high degree, and it isn't in a category we'd call ethics. There's no need for the special category at all, since it's basically already covered by an existing category (applied science) that informs us better about what goes in that category then an "applied ethics" category (which properly belongs to philosophy, or is at the very least a convergence of the two) would. The difference is that applied science merely tells you how to do something, rather than whether you should do it. The "should" is often generally assumed, but is also completely subject to disagreement.

 

[phiwum]

I think what you're missing is that the sciences already do that to a high degree, and it isn't in a category we'd call ethics. There's no need for the special category at all, since it's basically already covered by an existing category (applied science) that informs us better about what goes in that category then an "applied ethics" category (which properly belongs to philosophy, or is at the very least a convergence of the two) would. The difference is that applied science merely tells you how to do something, rather than whether you should do it. The "should" is often generally assumed, but is also completely subject to disagreement.

Right, but as you explicitly say, you start with an end, and then scientific knowledge can help one determine what means are appropriate for reaching that end. This is not a purely scientific argument, since it begins with a premise which is not the result of scientific discovery (that is, that I want to attain a certain end).

By the way, I'm not really sure what you mean by "applied science" as a discipline. But, in any case, I've never doubted that scientific discoveries can be mighty useful in practical deliberations, just that such deliberations include elements which are not themselves the result of scientific discovery.

 

[angrysoba]

I think what you're missing is that the sciences already do that to a high degree, and it isn't in a category we'd call ethics. There's no need for the special category at all, since it's basically already covered by an existing category (applied science) that informs us better about what goes in that category then an "applied ethics" category (which properly belongs to philosophy, or is at the very least a convergence of the two) would. The difference is that applied science merely tells you how to do something, rather than whether you should do it. The "should" is often generally assumed, but is also completely subject to disagreement.

The idea that science can inform you in achieving an end is not in dispute by anyone, although it appears to be a handy redoubt for the "science of morality" proponents to retreat to whenever their stronger, and false claim is made, namely that science can tell us what our moral principles ought to be.

 

[Tassman]

and

False comparison! Voltaire’s satire has nothing to do with the demonstrable fact that social cohesion is the core instinct of social species such as us, from which all notions of good and bad behaviour derives. It’s a statement of fact, neither good nor bad, best or worst, it just is.

Your (typically misleading) response indicates that you think morals have an inherent value, i.e. that they are true in and of themselves, rather than arising from our natural instincts. Why do you think this?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

False comparison! Voltaire’s satire has nothing to do with the demonstrable fact that social cohesion is the core instinct of social species such as us, from which all notions of good and bad behaviour derives. It’s a statement of fact, neither good nor bad, best or worst, it just is.

How does science differentiate core from non-core instincts? What exact experiment do they conduct?

Does science say we will follow our "core instincts"? Does science say we ought to follow our "core instincts"? If so, what exact experiment do they conduct to demonstrate those "facts"?

 

[Manopolus]

Right, but as you explicitly say, you start with an end, and then scientific knowledge can help one determine what means are appropriate for reaching that end. This is not a purely scientific argument, since it begins with a premise which is not the result of scientific discovery (that is, that I want to attain a certain end).

By the way, I'm not really sure what you mean by "applied science" as a discipline. But, in any case, I've never doubted that scientific discoveries can be mighty useful in practical deliberations, just that such deliberations include elements which are not themselves the result of scientific discovery.

Applied science is different from science itself in approximately the same way that Chemistry is different from Chemical Engineering. All engineering would be in the applied science category. The knowledge is the same. The difference is whether your primary purpose is discovering the data or applying it as a means to an end.

It's also the difference between a biologist and a veterinarian.

 

[Tassman]

First, I'll note that you missed one of my points. Let me repeat it.

The use of the term "need" there is instructive. It expresses a practical necessity, i.e., is just another word that means "ought". You need to do this, because it is necessary to attain your end. No difference between that sense of "need" and the corresponding "ought" statement -- but you've said that science doesn't derive normative statements.​

You keep saying (rightly, in my opinion) that science cannot derive norms, but then you also say that science can tell you that you "need" to heat the hut.

There is a miscommunication going on here.

I have never said that induction or the scientific method are unreliable guides to prediction. Indeed, they are quite useful.

But you claimed to derive "I will heat the hut," as the conclusion of an inductive argument, and just as relevant as the corresponding practical syllogism which concludes "I ought to heat the hut." But this is nonsense. When I deliberate about which action advances my goals, I am not interested in predicting my future behavior on the basis of my past behavior.

So, I have no beef with induction generally, but this particular inductive argument does not replace the corresponding practical syllogism, contrary to your claim.



I agree that science is the most reliable means of deducing causal relations and that such relations are an essential part of instrumental reasoning.



Insofar as science cannot tell us that this is a good aim, then science fails to provide an essential step of moral justification.

Even supposing science can tell us that "our overall behavior ... is geared towards this end" (something I doubt), that would not justify this as an appropriate aim for morality. This would be a purely descriptive fact about human psychology, but so what?



As an individual, I can recognize that a certain set of rules is "to our long-term advantage as a species" and still see absolutely no motive to act accordingly. If science is supposed to give me the basis of morality in terms of "social cohesion" because it's good for the species, science will have to motivate me to care about the species as a whole.

And it's not good enough to claim that I already do so, because that's how I've evolved. Obviously, there are many people who choose their own selfish interests over the interests of the species as a whole.

As I said, however, this is essentially the problem known as "why be moral?" which any realist must also face and it is not my primary interest here. The primary interest is the step from "Science (allegedly) says that we have evolved to care about the species," to "We ought to therefore act in ways which are good for the species."



I have no doubt that, by and large, persons prefer survival. This is a descriptive fact.

But when I am deciding about what I want, I am not the least interested in what most persons want, or in any evolutionary account of what I have evolved to want. I simply examine whether, indeed, I do desire survival.

And it is my wants that are at issue in determining what action is appropriate. The fact that science might be able to tell me that most humans in this situation will flee the lava is simply irrelevant to whether or not I find rational reason to flee the lava.

Let's talk briefly about the nature of practical reasoning, again using the very simple form involving necessary means.

I want to make the hut habitable.
Unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable.
Therefore I must heat the hut.
​

Let's agree that the second premise may be contributed by a scientific analysis. Let's agree that, indeed, science provides the best means for justifying such analyses.

The first premise does not come from any scientific analysis. It is an expression of personal desire of a strong sort (a motivating desire).

The conclusion is a practical norm expressing the rational requirement that I act.

This is not, by the way, a "philosophical argument". It is simply a representation of a common bit of reasoning that any competent agent would make. Philosophy studies such arguments, but the syllogism isn't philosophical, strictly speaking. In exactly the same way, science studies trees, but this doesn't mean trees are scientific.

So, as we can see, this common bit of reasoning is certainly well-informed by science (in the best case), but the reasoning is not scientific per se. Nor is it philosophical. It's just a representation of how one draws conclusions when there is a necessary means to his end.

We are going in circles. Every one of these points has been covered several times. My position remains unchanged, namely that the underlying notions of right and wrong, as well as the conformity to rules of behaviour within a group, arise instinctively for social creatures such as us.

Furthermore, as Harris says, “ethics is prescriptive only because we tend to talk about it that way—and I believe this emphasis comes, in large part, from the stultifying influence of Abrahamic religion. We could just as well think about ethics descriptively". Which has been my point all along. Do you really think the hut would remain unheated if one could not make a valid normative claim that it should be heated?

Conversely, your responses appear to indicate a belief that morals have an inherent, intrinsic value, that they are true in and of themselves, rather than arising from our natural instincts. Is that what you think, why? Unless we can clarify these contradictory viewpoints we're talking at cross-purposes and it's pointless to continue the discussion.

Addressed to Manopolus:

Right, but as you explicitly say, you start with an end, and then scientific knowledge can help one determine what means are appropriate for reaching that end. This is not a purely scientific argument, since it begins with a premise which is not the result of scientific discovery (that is, that I want to attain a certain end).

By the way, I'm not really sure what you mean by "applied science" as a discipline. But, in any case, I've never doubted that scientific discoveries can be mighty useful in practical deliberations, just that such deliberations include elements which are not themselves the result of scientific discovery.

Given that the role of science is to investigate the material world, what elements are you suggesting cannot be "themselves the result of scientific discovery". What is the means of discovery for these elements?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

We are going in circles. Every one of these points has been covered several times. My position remains unchanged, namely that notions of right and wrong, as well as the conformity to rules of behaviour within a group, arise instinctively for social creatures such as us.

That isn't your position at all.

Whenever it is pointed out to you that moral views differ by staggering degrees between different times and places, and that the modern morality you espouse is very clearly the product of incremental refinement of moral ideas by philosophers over the past few hundred years, you retreat to saying something like "Oh yes well of course hundreds of years of philosophical refinement happened, but it's all a refinement of underlying "core instincts" so it's still all instinct!". Which is precisely as sensible as saying that aeronautics is a refinement of our instincts, and precisely as useful.

Furthermore, as Harris says, “ethics is prescriptive only because we tend to talk about it that way—and I believe this emphasis comes, in large part, from the stultifying influence of Abrahamic religion. We could just as well think about ethics descriptively. Certain experiences, relationships, social institutions, and technological developments are possible—and there are more or less direct ways to arrive at them”. It is this latter I’ve been trying to argue.

So why do you refuse to answer questions about whether you see any difference between "I will do X" and "I ought to do X"?

Is it because you recognise that your position falls into total incoherence and uselessness, if you admit that the claim above boils down to "whatever it is you actually do is whatever it is you morally ought to do, because the difference between what you do and what you ought is purely semantic"?

Conversely, your responses appear to indicate a belief that morals have an inherent, intrinsic value, that they are true in and of themselves, rather than arising from our natural instincts. Is that what you think, why? Unless we can clarify these contradictory viewpoints we're talking at cross-purposes and it's pointless to continue the discussion.

You never seem to tire of this straw man. I think you have attempted to use it on every single person you have discussed this topic with.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

...
You never seem to tire of this straw man. I think you have attempted to use it on every single person you have discussed this topic with.

The funny thing is how some persons are preoccupied with truth and are against philosophy, yet fail to understand why truth is so deeply connected with philosophy and why skeptics and indeed some scientists are suspicious about the concept of truth. Truth only makes sense in the critical thinking sense if you also got a grip on false, yet many people consider false irrelevant, wrong and bad. It is all about verification, confirmation and so on and what falsification is about seems to be beyond them.

With regards

 

[phiwum]

Applied science is different from science itself in approximately the same way that Chemistry is different from Chemical Engineering. All engineering would be in the applied science category. The knowledge is the same. The difference is whether your primary purpose is discovering the data or applying it as a means to an end.

It's also the difference between a biologist and a veterinarian.

I guess I'm not really getting your point.

Everyone agrees that science has an essential contribution for practical deliberation. The question is whether science can derive (by itself) moral norms, or prudential practical norms, for that matter. And the start of practical deliberation is, roughly speaking, the adoption of an end, an intention to bring something about, and that intentional act is not part of the scientific process.

 

[phiwum]

We are going in circles. Every one of these points has been covered several times. My position remains unchanged, namely that the underlying notions of right and wrong, as well as the conformity to rules of behaviour within a group, arise instinctively for social creatures such as us.

Furthermore, as Harris says, “ethics is prescriptive only because we tend to talk about it that way—and I believe this emphasis comes, in large part, from the stultifying influence of Abrahamic religion. We could just as well think about ethics descriptively". Which has been my point all along. Do you really think the hut would remain unheated if one could not make a valid normative claim that it should be heated?

I really think that the reason the hut will be heated is that the practical syllogism sketched by von Wright is an approximate representation of the actual deliberation that the agent undertakes prior to heating the hut.

I also really think that, in that situation, if the agent does not heat the hut, then his practical reasoning has clearly failed for him, that it is clear, rationally speaking, that he ought to heat the hut.

I think that any account of practical reasoning that fails to include a means of distinguishing good reasoning from bad is no better than a purely physical description of a hockey game that makes no use of the rules and terms of hockey. You might have an account of what happened if you describe the motions of each player, but it is missing certain key ingredients to allow us to understand the actions, evaluate which plays were good and which were bad, know when rules were broken and so on.

Conversely, your responses appear to indicate a belief that morals have an inherent, intrinsic value, that they are true in and of themselves, rather than arising from our natural instincts. Is that what you think, why? Unless we can clarify these contradictory viewpoints we're talking at cross-purposes and it's pointless to continue the discussion.

You're blowing smoke. Tell you what, you tell me which responses appear to indicate a belief in the "inherent, intrinsic value" of morality and tell me why that belief would matter to our discussion, and then I would be happy to discuss it.

But the fact is that I find questions about the nature and status of morality exceedingly difficult to settle definitively. I have some leanings, but I don't think that I have seen any argument which is sufficient to justify or refute these leanings. Any opinions I have about morality are mere opinions, which I cannot support with argument adequate to establish their correctness to a skeptic and hence I make no such claims to the contrary.

So, no, we're not going to pretend that you've discovered that my position depends on a particular view of morality and that I either have to prove that view is correct or else concede that your view is. Your view is a rare gem in the field of ethics, one of those positions that actually is fairly clearly refutable, at least to the extent that it is clear what you mean.

Given that the role of science is to investigate the material world, what elements are you suggesting cannot be "themselves the result of scientific discovery". What is the means of discovery for these elements?

I discover what I want by simply realizing that I have certain desires. Do you doubt that this is the usual way to discover a want? Do you instead undergo a PET scan[1] to learn what you desire?

Any practical deliberation begins with an end to be attained. I don't look for science to discover my ends for me. Rather, I think about what I want.

[1] Or whatever. I know nothing about neuroimaging.

 

[Pup]

We've touched on this question, but I don't think it's been brought up specifically. Are morals intrinsically human-based? In other words, if it's good for the human species, is it objectively good? Can there be morals in a world without humans (where other primates show some sense of fairness, for example)?

The heating the hut example fails immediately if one defines morals as what's best for the ants living in the cold fireplace. Ants cooperate for the good of their society, so they must have some moral sense, if humans do.

How can one approach, scientifically, the answer to whether morals are based on human needs/wants? Or is the scientific approach only able to answer what humans think is moral, based on their needs/wants?