The Future of Moral Science

[Tommy Jeppesen]

It's a classification system... and if there wasn't a difference between the two, there would be no consistent basis upon which to sort them from each other.

Factual doesn't actually mean it's a correct statement, however. 2+2=5 is factual in nature by the classification, but is incorrect. Seriously, you never heard of this stuff?

Basically, "shoulds" are opinions and "are's" are facts, although language gets much more complex than that. Really anything that requires an ethical judgement is an opinion I suppose.

Of course, when "in my opinion..." or similar is actually used in speech, what follows can be completely factual in nature. They're using the word opinion to say that they're not completely sure or giving you permission to disagree. That is a different usage of the word which can cause confusion.

Thanks for the answer

 

[phiwum]

What is an objective fact?

An "objective fact" is, of course, a silly term.

Let me say "objective claim" instead. Is the meaning of this term clear enough? We can certainly discuss the appropriate notion of objectivity in this context, but I think your own description of realism adequately captures what I mean.

is it possible to answer morality and ethics while adhering to following terms: With cognitive, logical, rational, reason and without emotions, bias and personal opinion.​

By the way, I want to point out that I'm not advocating realism, I'm not saying that moral skepticism or relativism are stupid positions or obviously wrong. My only point is that the argument that people have different opinions about moral claims and therefore such claims are purely subjective is, to my mind, a weak argument.

 

[Manopolus]

Problem with defining morals is that when someone calls something moral they just mean "something I agree with".

I wouldn't quite say that. Right/wrong (ethically speaking) is in the same class as like/dislike and want/don't want, but it's not quite the same thing. It arises from empathy, rather than being a private emotion. All three are selection processes, but only the last takes into account the assumed effects on others (or on society as a whole, which is merely making it broader).

The angle I've been arguing is that a person/creature/computer/being/whatever cannot be at once completely subservient and still be said to hold an ethic of its own. In this case, the selection process does not belong to the entity in question, but to its master. There are relative degrees of freedom, but a computer will always do exactly what you tell it to and no more (assuming you have access to its programming). The capacity for disobedience is a prerequisite. None of the three terms can apply to any selection process that is completely subservient.

Also, empathy requires some amount of similarity/similar experience in order to have a basis for judgement. I can go into that if you want, but it seems obvious to me. When that empathetic basis breaks down, so does the ethos which depends upon it.

 

[phiwum]

An "objective fact" is, of course, a silly term.

Let me say "objective claim" instead. Is the meaning of this term clear enough? We can certainly discuss the appropriate notion of objectivity in this context, but I think your own description of realism adequately captures what I mean.

is it possible to answer morality and ethics while adhering to following terms: With cognitive, logical, rational, reason and without emotions, bias and personal opinion.​

By the way, I want to point out that I'm not advocating realism, I'm not saying that moral skepticism or relativism are stupid positions or obviously wrong. My only point is that the argument that people have different opinions about moral claims and therefore such claims are purely subjective is, to my mind, a weak argument.

Actually, on re-reading the context in which I wrote "objective fact", I should have said that we can strike the word "objective" as redundant and simply write "fact of the matter in question" to clarify my meaning.

My mistake.

 

[Tassman]

Tasman finally seems to understand the is-ought problem with the declaration that although science can tell you the volcano is going to erupt it cannot tell you you ought to flee. Indeed, it also cannot tell you that you ought to rescue a stranded baby halfway up the volcano or that you ought to rescue a stranger's child instead of your own pet cat or various other normative judgements that require some moral axiom to begin with. So that wraps it up for Sam Harris. Keeping on the volcano theme, it's been a blast!

Neither can nominative arguments without the input from science (or personal experience directly or indirectly based upon it) that volcanoes can kill. Survival is the dominant instinct and this includes the welfare of the group. It is natural instinct as modified by group acculturation that will make us flee, or rescue a stranded baby. And these things can be inferred from empirically based knowledge and social instincts; they don’t require “ought” statement to act.

And I wouldn’t write off Sam Harris and his ilk just yet, despite your missionary zeal to do so. I’ve made it pretty clear throughout that although science cannot as yet answer normative moral questions; the potential is there given that the role of science is to investigate the natural, material universe. So I think Sam Harris is on the right track, when he argues that enormous advances in the cognitive sciences should, in principle at least, be able to establish an objective moral code and answer normative moral questions in due course.

BTW: I’m here soba, why are you playing to the gallery?

 

[Tassman]

Once again, you use the term without defining it.

And how did both arguments arrive at the same result? The normative argument is valid -- if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion. It asserts that a particular action is practically necessary, in the sense that if it is not done, then the agent is behaving irrationally.

Your argument led to the conclusion that the action will be done, a prediction which may well turn out to be false. You've said that it is an inductive argument, but it's not clear what past experiences it is based on. The observation that people usually do what they ought?

A prediction about what I will do is useless to me. I want to deliberate and come to an appropriate choice. Your inductive argument could conclude, for instance, that because I am prone to the Gambler's Fallacy, I am likely to bet on the next roll of the dice, and that conclusion may indeed be probable, but as a rational agent trying to pursue my interests, I am more concerned with what bet is rational, not what bet I am likely to make.

So the two arguments do not lead to the same place at all. There is a world of difference between an assertion that an action is practically necessary and a claim that the same action will probably be done. If this is what you mean by "merely semantic", then I see no reason to dismiss such distinctions as unimportant.

AFAICT both approaches result in the cabin being heated, which is the purpose of the exercise.

And, finally, as I have said a few times now, the heart of morality is normative claims, not predictions about what people will do.

I disagree. The heart of morality is the code of behaviour, based upon our instincts, which we devise for our own protection as a social species. Or do think morality has inherent value, why?

The populace makes the inference because they know that they value life and they recognize that in order to preserve their lives, they ought to flee.

I am stunned that you still don't recognize the basic form of a means end syllogism (involving a necessary means in this case).

I want to bring about X.
In order to bring about X, I must Y.
Therefore, I ought to Y.
​

The second premise, the means-end premise, may well be supplied by science. The first premise is not.

Now, in this case, we have similar reasoning. According to your account (which I am not claiming is correct[1]), the appropriate argument is:

Our society aims to maximize social cohesion.
Rule Y maximizes social cohesion.
Therefore, we ought to adopt rule Y.
​

Science arguably contributes to the recognition of the second claim. And science might also say that the first claim is consistent with how societies have behaved throughout history, but per your own admission, science can't determine that the first premise discusses a good which the society ought to value and pursue.

Science may help select rules which promote this or that effect, but insofar as science does not make claims about which ends are desirable or good, science cannot draw conclusions about morality all on its own.

[1] I certainly do not believe it is the case that morality is merely about social cohesion, or that this is the view of most persons who engage in moral debate.

You do not believe it that morality is merely about social cohesion? Really! Then what is morality about in your view?

Certainly, as an individual, I might recognize that social cohesion is maximized by rule Y, but my personal benefit is improved by breaking rule Y, and I see no good reason not to break rule Y. I think that Tassman's notion of morality lacks any motivation for the individual to behave morally -- though that is, of course, a problem for realist theories in general, as well.

If your perceived personal benefit is achieved by breaking the community rules then you run the risk of the community penalizing you. We are naturally selfish but we are also predisposed, as social creatures, to restrain individual selfishness in favour of maintaining more cooperative groups and adhering to community rules; ultimately it’s in our interests to do so.

Isn't the highlighted exactly the view you've espoused?

My view is that science tells us about the natural world, of which we are a part and from which we can infer what action is required to attain a desired end take in a given circumstance. My argument is about inferences deriving from scientific knowledge as opposed to "ought statements", or “should do” statements which I consider unnecessary.

Basically "ought statements" mean no more than: “If you want to achieve a given end then one should do such and such; this can be equally inferred from the available knowledge with similar results.

 

[Tassman]

I can't speak for others, but while I'd be glad to explain my own position on what's moral, it's fairly irrelevant to this thread, because it's [is] based on the specific family and culture I was raised in, the typical inherited instincts or urges of all humans, and perhaps specific inherited traits. So answers to specific questions--like do you think killing of a tribe member is moral*--are irrelevant, because every human individually and every society collectively will have slightly different answers, all coming from the same source.

I wasn't including you as a part of “this lot” - overall I agree with your position, in particular the above comment which sums up the discussion nicely.

I think that any claim of divine revelation or philosphical deduction are just intellectually/emotionally satisfying trappings to justify the real reasons we think something is moral or immoral, which I mentioned above.

Agreed!

It seems obvious in that example, that if we want to survive, we need to flee. The survival urge is, of course, bred into people after years of those with weaker survival intincts dying off, so this seems like a no-brainer.

Yes, except that our evolved instincts of direct and indirect reciprocity and altruism will impel us to try and save the vulnerable or trapped as well – as we see all the time in crisis situations on TV news etc.

It gets more complicated when science says: The best way to enforce compliance by citizens is to do X. But is forcing compliance moral in any given case? Science can't answer whether forcing compliance, or running from a volcano, is what we ought to do, without an underlying assumption about the benefit of survival or personal freedoms. Personal freedoms vs. compliance will vary among human societies far more than a basic survival trait like fleeing from hot lava. Whether members of a society argue about personal freedoms based on religion or philosophical arguments is irrelevant really, because neither of those are the actual source of their sense of what's moral.
*I'm in the camp that thinks "murder of a tribe member" is a tautology, because all murder is by definition immoral, so that would make it a pointless question. Substituting "killing" makes it more interesting.

YES. “What’s moral” is behaviour that’s congruent with our instincts as an evolved, acculturated social species.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Hi Tassman.

I am a skeptic and I will show you how that works in practice:
You: In principle science can make an objective moral code.
Me: So in practice for the past and present science hasn't made a scientific law of morality and thus what you do when you claim morality is subjective like the rest of humanity. I.e. if only science can produce evidence, but if science can't for now produce evidence for objective moral, then what kind of evidence is it in fact and effect that you have for morality?

That is it, Tassman That is the game some of us has been playing - we know that nobody in practice has been able to produce objective morality, including philosophy, religion and science. Now for the words fact, evidence, true/truth and so on no methodology has in practice been able to produce objective facts, evidence and truth about objective morality and that includes science. Science has no privileged methodology when it comes to morality/ethics, but that is not unique to science. Nobody in the recorded history of humanity has in practice been able to do so!

So you want evidence for how it is not in practice possible to do objective morality then understand this - Your claim of "in principle" is nothing but an idea in your head, that in practice is not different form this claim: "I can in principle fly solely by use of my arms." That "in principle" is in practice as empty as yours.
Now if you want evidence for that it is not in principle possible to do objective morality, I will give it to you, but it requires something of you. Yes, you - Tassman - must be able to accept in practice negative evidence. You must in effect be a skeptic and in practice it means the acceptance of negative evidence. I.e. there is no objective morality, because when you try all methodologies available in order for you to come with objective evidence for that, you in practice come up with a negative. Hence "negative evidence".

With regards

 

[phiwum]

I am disappointed to see that you have again ignored my request that you explain what you mean when you say "semantic difference". Let's agree that this term is off-limits hereafter unless you can give a clear definition, okay? Thanks.

AFAICT both approaches result in the cabin being heated, which is the purpose of the exercise.

No, the descriptive argument predicts that the cabin will be heated, whereas the prescriptive argument provides motivation to heat it. That is, your descriptive argument simply says, "This is the sort of action I've been likely to do in the past, and therefore I expect that I will probably do it again." This isn't a reason to act.

In other words, your descriptive argument is simply irrelevant to my practical deliberation. It provides only a prediction of what will happen, not guidance as to what I should choose.

Compare your descriptive argument to the following. First, suppose that many times in my life, I have acted along the lines of the gambler's fallacy when playing roulette. That is, as a matter of fact, if a black number has not come up in four or more spins, then I wager a lot of money that it will come up next time, because (in my mind) it's due.

Now, I'm at the roulette table again and I reason using your inductive, predictive argument about what I am likely to do.

Black has not come up in five spins.
Therefore, I will bet lots of money on black.
​

That's a perfectly good prediction. Given my past behavior, this seems likely. But what I would want to do in that situation is consider what behavior is in my favor, and reason something like this.

I want to hold on to as much money as I can.
Betting on roulette yields a negative expected outcome.
Therefore, I should not bet on roulette.
​

This argument gives a motivation for my action. This is (a representation of) the kind of argument that actually occurs prior to action, when we deliberate on what to do.

I disagree. The heart of morality is the code of behaviour, based upon our instincts, which we devise for our own protection as a social species. Or do think morality has inherent value, why?

I will ignore your question as a non-sequitur and address your claim.

A code of behavior is a set of rules which one is expected to obey. That is, the purpose of the set of rules is to guide behavior. Implicitly, the point of the rules is that everyone recognizes that their behavior ought to conform to the rules, that it is good to act as the rules specify and bad not to. We react with disapproval for those who break the rules because we see it as a transgression, something that they ought not to do.

So, if you see the heart of morality as a code of behavior, then you also accept that morality is, at its essence, about normative claims.

You do not believe it that morality is merely about social cohesion? Really! Then what is morality about in your view?

I don't think it's useful to go into a digression on this point at this time. For now, you'll notice I haven't really challenged your claim. Let's presume that you're right and see whether it follows that science can provide the basis for morality, including a basis for choosing social cohesion as the good we ought to aim for.

If your perceived personal benefit is achieved by breaking the community rules then you run the risk of the community penalizing you.

When I say my benefit is improved, I'm taking the risk of penalty into account. Sometimes, the risk of penalty is negligible compared to the direct benefit of the transgression.

We are naturally selfish but we are also predisposed, as social creatures, to restrain individual selfishness in favour of maintaining more cooperative groups and adhering to community rules; ultimately it’s in our interests to do so.

Your first statement is descriptive, saying that humans are thus predisposed. Your second statement is about our interests, and is wholely unjustified here. You have said nothing that supports this claim.

And, indeed, it is ludicrous to think that adhering to the community's rules is always in our individual interests. There are undoubtedly situations in which my personal interests are advanced by breaking the rules. (If this were not the case, you would have trouble explaining why breaking the rules is so common and, indeed, why rules would be necessary at all.)

My view is that science tells us about the natural world, of which we are a part and from which we can infer what action is required to attain a desired end take in a given circumstance. My argument is about inferences deriving from scientific knowledge as opposed to "ought statements", or “should do” statements which I consider unnecessary.

Basically "ought statements" mean no more than: “If you want to achieve a given end then one should do such and such; this can be equally inferred from the available knowledge with similar results.

You have yet to give such an inference. You've instead given an argument that you've said is inductive, evidently relying on past observations to predict that a certain action is probable, with no account of whether that action is in one's interest or not.

Tell you what. Let's use science by itself, and deduce whether I should run from the volcano or not. Oops! I just said "should", which is synonymous with "ought", "is in my interests", etc. I'm having trouble even expressing what you claim is necessary, but I have received scientific evidence that the volcano will erupt and I am deliberating over what (I ought) to do. Give me a non-normative account that will motivate fleeing without introducing any normative elements such as "ought", "rational requirement", etc.

Because I literally cannot imagine the sort of inference you're describing.

Thanks much.

 

[Dragoonster]

And I wouldn’t write off Sam Harris and his ilk just yet, despite your missionary zeal to do so. I’ve made it pretty clear throughout that although science cannot as yet answer normative moral questions; the potential is there given that the role of science is to investigate the natural, material universe.

You are, as ever, fundamentally misunderstanding what morality and science are. And it's amazing that you now say Harris' naked declaration isn't enough, considering you argued that it was for about 2000 pages. And even with that eschewing are still now actually lying about it, in that you do think science can answer moral questions so agree with Harris, you're just punting it to "not yet". Which is ridiculous. (btw, you're an ilk)

Please take a break and maybe some refresher courses in philosophy and science. Or lacking that, at least have a real epiphany from the Science-Determines-Morality agent that lives on Callisto or the Andromeda Galaxy or wherever and wow everyone with your newfound groundbreaking logical arguments from S-D-M. If you could derive an Ought from an Is that would be earth-shattering, monumental, perhaps the greatest moral, philosophical, scientific (since they'd all be the same) discovery ever made.

Until then, as so many have said, you're living and arguing from 300+ years ago. Neither you nor Harris have brought anything new to any science or philosophy table. And those previous 300+ year ago efforts were a hell of a lot more concrete and well-structured, so still hold up. You and Harris are juveniles tossing paint at a wall and thinking you've discovered a new artform.

 

[Tassman]

Hi Tassman.

I am a skeptic and I will show you how that works in practice:
You: In principle science can make an objective moral code.
Me: So in practice for the past and present science hasn't made a scientific law of morality and thus what you do when you claim morality is subjective like the rest of humanity. I.e. if only science can produce evidence, but if science can't for now produce evidence for objective moral, then what kind of evidence is it in fact and effect that you have for morality?

That is it, Tassman That is the game some of us has been playing - we know that nobody in practice has been able to produce objective morality, including philosophy, religion and science. Now for the words fact, evidence, true/truth and so on no methodology has in practice been able to produce objective facts, evidence and truth about objective morality and that includes science. Science has no privileged methodology when it comes to morality/ethics, but that is not unique to science. Nobody in the recorded history of humanity has in practice been able to do so!

So you want evidence for how it is not in practice possible to do objective morality then understand this - Your claim of "in principle" is nothing but an idea in your head, that in practice is not different form this claim: "I can in principle fly solely by use of my arms." That "in principle" is in practice as empty as yours.

Now if you want evidence for that it is not in principle possible to do objective morality, I will give it to you, but it requires something of you. Yes, you - Tassman - must be able to accept in practice negative evidence. You must in effect be a skeptic and in practice it means the acceptance of negative evidence. I.e. there is no objective morality, because when you try all methodologies available in order for you to come with objective evidence for that, you in practice come up with a negative. Hence "negative evidence".

With regards

Hi TJ,

This is merely an argument from incredulity, i.e. a logical fallacy.

Sincerely,

Tasman.

You are, as ever, fundamentally misunderstanding what morality and science are. And it's amazing that you now say Harris' naked declaration isn't enough, considering you argued that it was for about 2000 pages. And even with that eschewing are still now actually lying about it, in that you do think science can answer moral questions so agree with Harris, you're just punting it to "not yet". Which is ridiculous. (btw, you're an ilk)

Please take a break and maybe some refresher courses in philosophy and science. Or lacking that, at least have a real epiphany from the Science-Determines-Morality agent that lives on Callisto or the Andromeda Galaxy or wherever and wow everyone with your newfound groundbreaking logical arguments from S-D-M. If you could derive an Ought from an Is that would be earth-shattering, monumental, perhaps the greatest moral, philosophical, scientific (since they'd all be the same) discovery ever made.

Until then, as so many have said, you're living and arguing from 300+ years ago. Neither you nor Harris have brought anything new to any science or philosophy table. And those previous 300+ year ago efforts were a hell of a lot more concrete and well-structured, so still hold up. You and Harris are juveniles tossing paint at a wall and thinking you've discovered a new artform.

Nope. I’m not lying or “just punting it to ‘not yet’".

From Harris’ blog in response to Ryan Born’s critique:

“The point of my book was not to argue that “science” bureaucratically construed can subsume all talk about morality. My purpose was to show that moral truths exist and that they must fall (in principle, if not in practice) within some (perhaps never to be complete) understanding of the way conscious minds arise in this universe..

AND from his Q&A: “Harris: Yes, in principle. Human well-being is not a random phenomenon. It depends on many factors—ranging from genetics and neurobiology to sociology and economics. But, clearly, there are scientific truths to be known about how we can flourish in this world. Wherever we can act so as to have an impact on the well-being of others, questions of morality apply.

You’re free to think he’s wrong just as I’m free to think he may well be onto something. Time will tell.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Tassman, what is a scientific truth?

 

[Manopolus]

AND from his Q&A: “Harris: Yes, in principle. Human well-being is not a random phenomenon. It depends on many factors—ranging from genetics and neurobiology to sociology and economics. But, clearly, there are scientific truths to be known about how we can flourish in this world. Wherever we can act so as to have an impact on the well-being of others, questions of morality apply.

I think someone already mentioned before that a PHILOSOPHY already exists that takes this sort of angle. It's called utilitarianism. However, it relies entirely upon a non-objective assumption which cannot be arrived at by science. You could just as easily make the base assumption that the universe would be better off without humans and there would be nothing scientific to prove you wrong. Admittedly, that's not how human ethics generally function -- except when they do.

Science can inform ethics if a standard is already in place, but it can't create them.

Also consider -- scientists go to great lengths to avoid biasing their results with what they want to be true. Well, what they want to be true can be and often is an ethical judgement... so in a way ethics can't make science either. It's like oil and water. That doesn't mean scientists don't have ethics, of course. The desire to get the objectively correct result is itself an ethic.

The answer to "What should you do?" without a base to work from is another question: "What do you want?" It all boils down to the difference between the definitions of the words "want" and "is" if that helps. The fact that science can't create an ethic is built right into the definition of the two words. It doesn't require guessing at all if you know what the words mean. They're quite simply two distinct categories with no meaningful crossover in their definitions.

 

[angrysoba]

It all boils down to the difference between the definitions of the words "want" and "is" if that helps. The fact that science can't create an ethic is built right into the definition of the two words. It doesn't require guessing at all if you know what the words mean.

It's also been noticed, even by other proponents of the "science of morality", that a number of advocates - such as Shermer - simply come up with an assumption that best fits their political views and then shoehorns in the science around it.

Here's a typical bit of pseudoscience:

When I talk about a moral arc of progress, I mean an improvement in the survival and flourishing of individual sentient beings. I emphasize the individual for four reasons: (1) Natural selection operates on individual organisms, not groups

http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/on-being-right-about-right-and-wrong

That is so laughable. I mean, obviously it is true that natural selection operates on individuals, despite claims from Tassman that it is about the survival of the species as a whole, but it clearly does not follow from that fact that morality has to be about the individual. However, it does conform to his politics.

 

[Tassman]

I am disappointed to see that you have again ignored my request that you explain what you mean when you say "semantic difference". Let's agree that this term is off-limits hereafter unless you can give a clear definition, okay? Thanks.

I think I have, I’m sorry you are unable to understand the meaning of semantic differences.

No, the descriptive argument predicts that the cabin will be heated, whereas the prescriptive argument provides motivation to heat it. That is, your descriptive argument simply says, "This is the sort of action I've been likely to do in the past, and therefore I expect that I will probably do it again." This isn't a reason to act.

In other words, your descriptive argument is simply irrelevant to my practical deliberation. It provides only a prediction of what will happen, not guidance as to what I should choose.

Compare your descriptive argument to the following. First, suppose that many times in my life, I have acted along the lines of the gambler's fallacy when playing roulette. That is, as a matter of fact, if a black number has not come up in four or more spins, then I wager a lot of money that it will come up next time, because (in my mind) it's due.

Now, I'm at the roulette table again and I reason using your inductive, predictive argument about what I am likely to do.

Black has not come up in five spins.
Therefore, I will bet lots of money on black.
​

That's a perfectly good prediction. Given my past behavior, this seems likely. But what I would want to do in that situation is consider what behavior is in my favor, and reason something like this.

I want to hold on to as much money as I can.
Betting on roulette yields a negative expected outcome.
Therefore, I should not bet on roulette.
​

This argument gives a motivation for my action. This is (a representation of) the kind of argument that actually occurs prior to action, when we deliberate on what to do.

Oh dear. Let’s return to your hut example courtesy of von Wright:

I want to make the hut habitable.
Unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable.
Therefore I must heat the hut.

And my semantic variation which to my mind results in the same outcome:

I want to make the hut habitable.
Unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable.
Therefore, because I want the hut habitable, I need to heat the hut.

In short, an “ought” statement is not required to attain the same end. One can infer from accumulated knowledge of what makes huts habitable (i.e. heating) that one needs to heat the hut. The difference is between your assumed premises (unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable) and the tested knowledge that heated huts are more habitual than non-heated huts. I might add that philosophy does not have the mechanism to determine what makes the hut habitual (i.e. heating), whereas science does.

I will ignore your question as a non-sequitur and address your claim.

My question is not a non-sequitur. If you think morality has inherent value, which was my question, then it will affect your entire argument. So, again: “do think morality has inherent value, why?”

A code of behavior is a set of rules which one is expected to obey. That is, the purpose of the set of rules is to guide behavior. Implicitly, the point of the rules is that everyone recognizes that their behavior ought to conform to the rules, that it is good to act as the rules specify and bad not to. We react with disapproval for those who break the rules because we see it as a transgression, something that they ought not to do.

So, if you see the heart of morality as a code of behavior, then you also accept that morality is, at its essence, about normative claims.

You have entirely missed the point, namely WHY is it “good to act as the rules specify and bad not to” and WHY did we arrive at such rules? My answer: Conformity to rules of behaviour within a group is instinctive for social creatures such as us, because morals are derivatives of self-preservation and procreation and a consequence of natural selection.

Your answer would appear to be that morals have an inherent value, i.e. that they are true in and of themselves, rather than arising from our natural instincts. Is that what you think?

I don't think it's useful to go into a digression on this point at this time. For now, you'll notice I haven't really challenged your claim. Let's presume that you're right and see whether it follows that science can provide the basis for morality, including a basis for choosing social cohesion as the good we ought to aim for.

This is not a digression; it’s the core of the argument. ‘Morality is about social cohesion’. What else would it be? Codes of behaviour evolved for functional reasons, namely as a means of restraining individual selfishness and enhancing social cohesion, because the benefits of living in large cohesive groups are demonstrably greater than living alone without community support.

When I say my benefit is improved, I'm taking the risk of penalty into account. Sometimes, the risk of penalty is negligible compared to the direct benefit of the transgression.

This is true regardless of how the rules of behaviour are arrived at.

Your first statement is descriptive, saying that humans are thus predisposed. Your second statement is about our interests, and is wholely unjustified here. You have said nothing that supports this claim.

The benefits of being a member of a group are demonstrably greater than living alone, e.g. protection from predators or enemies, better access to food via hunting or pooling resources - and the modern equivalents. The fact that complex communities arise wherever humans are is testament to the advantages of social cohesion and the rules which maintain such cohesion.

And, indeed, it is ludicrous to think that adhering to the community's rules is always in our individual interests. There are undoubtedly situations in which my personal interests are advanced by breaking the rules. (If this were not the case, you would have trouble explaining why breaking the rules is so common and, indeed, why rules would be necessary at all.)

Most certainly, but again this is true regardless of how the rules of behaviour are arrived at, e.g. divine revelation.

You have yet to give such an inference. You've instead given an argument that you've said is inductive, evidently relying on past observations to predict that a certain action is probable, with no account of whether that action is in one's interest or not.

Tell you what. Let's use science by itself, and deduce whether I should run from the volcano or not. Oops! I just said "should", which is synonymous with "ought", "is in my interests", etc. I'm having trouble even expressing what you claim is necessary, but I have received scientific evidence that the volcano will erupt and I am deliberating over what (I ought) to do. Give me a non-normative account that will motivate fleeing without introducing any normative elements such as "ought", "rational requirement", etc.

Because I literally cannot imagine the sort of inference you're describing.

Thanks much.

All you have to do is rephrase the “ought” statement thus: “If I want to survive the volcano I should flee”. What you are doing is drawing an inference (i.e. an act of reasoning from the factual knowledge or evidence the volcano will destroy me). And the reason I want to survive is because ‘survival’ is the dominant instinct of most life forms – ever tried to kill a mosquito? It doesn't need a normative argument for the mosquito to try and escape the swat.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

...

http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/on-being-right-about-right-and-wrong

That is so laughable. I mean, obviously it is true that natural selection operates on individuals, despite claims from Tassman that it is about the survival of the species as a whole, but it clearly does not follow from that fact that morality has to be about the individual. However, it does conform to his politics.

No, natural selection is not even about the survival of the individual, it is about replication of the fittest genome.

 

[Pup]

Yes, except that our evolved instincts of direct and indirect reciprocity and altruism will impel us to try and save the vulnerable or trapped as well – as we see all the time in crisis situations on TV news etc.

Sometiimes. Or sometimes, as we also see on TV news (well, not literally), people will push others into the lava so they can steal their stuff. As you said, such behavior risks social condemnation (jail, execution), but some feel the risk is worth it.

There are competing urges, I think, and therefore competing "moral codes," though we don't usually use that term for the behavior of what society calls criminals. But someone who thinks: Those rich people have stuff and I need stuff and I know how to get away with taking it is following a survival instinct that's as old as the first tribe member who thought:]i]That other tribe has stuff...[/i] and just as much a part of our makeup and successful survival strategy as altruism and empathy.

There's not just one goal that humans are bred to converge on, and therefore not just one overarching morality that leads to one morally right behavior as a way to achieve that goal. Our survival instincts have served us well, but there are lots of them that are sometimes contradictory, and any given behavior at any given time depends on which has the ascendancy.

 

[phiwum]

Apologies in advance for what is a lengthy response. Perhaps we should narrow the discussion to make it more manageable. I've highlighted the points that I think are essential, so that you needn't feel compelled to respond to everything I've said.

Oh dear. Let’s return to your hut example courtesy of von Wright:

I want to make the hut habitable.
Unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable.
Therefore I must heat the hut.

And my semantic variation which to my mind results in the same outcome:

I want to make the hut habitable.
Unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable.
Therefore, because I want the hut habitable, I need to heat the hut.

In short, an “ought” statement is not required to attain the same end. One can infer from accumulated knowledge of what makes huts habitable (i.e. heating) that one needs to heat the hut. The difference is between your assumed premises (unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable) and the tested knowledge that heated huts are more habitual than non-heated huts. I might add that philosophy does not have the mechanism to determine what makes the hut habitual (i.e. heating), whereas science does.

Let's start by first noting that von Wright's syllogism is not a philosophical argument at all. It represents the sort of practical deliberation that every person uses in selecting what he ought to do (in the context of a necessary means, at least).

Second, let's note that every single person has explicitly stated that the means-end relation that occurs in a syllogism may well come from science and that this is a good use of science. The means-end relation expresses a belief about causality, and such beliefs are reliable if they are well-justified by science.

Third, let's note that, despite saying that, it is stupid to pretend that we need science to help us determine that huts need to be heated in order to be habitable or that lava may burn us or a million other things that you claim science provides us. Oh, science might tell us that the volcano is nearing eruption, a conclusion we might not reach without the careful observation and deduction science provides, but I'm pretty sure that I can see a hut isn't habitable without heat if it is in a temperate area. We don't allow silly statements like, "Without philosophy, there is no argument, because philosophy introduced logic," and we should not allow stupid claims like, "Without science, you wouldn't know that decapitation shortens one's expected lifespan."

Fourth, let's look carefully at your conclusion.

One can infer from accumulated knowledge of what makes huts habitable (i.e. heating) that one needs to heat the hut.​

The use of the term "need" there is instructive. It expresses a practical necessity, i.e., is just another word that means "ought". You need to do this, because it is necessary to attain your end. No difference between that sense of "need" and the corresponding "ought" statement -- but you've said that science doesn't derive normative statements.
Fifth, you've said that your version of the argument is inductive, with a descriptive conclusion (contradicting your justification in terms of the normative restatement above). But what does that mean? All I can guess is this: Because of past observations, I recognize that I usually do what is necessary to attain my ends. Hence, I conclude that I will probably do so here. Right? That's what an inductive argument would look like, yes?

But this kind of argument does not provide any reasons to do something. It merely provides a prediction that I will do it. This is useless in a situation in which I am deliberating about what to do.

My question is not a non-sequitur. If you think morality has inherent value, which was my question, then it will affect your entire argument. So, again: “do think morality has inherent value, why?”

I want to focus on a couple of narrow points for now, and that point is irrelevant to me. I'm criticizing your argument, not putting forth an original argument as to the nature of morality.

My main interest right now are the following points:

(1) You claim that science does not derive norms (and I don't dispute this claim) but nonetheless science can provide practical arguments about what to do. Since deliberation about what to do is deliberation about appropriateness of action (i.e., normative), this is a contradiction.

(2) You claim that science does not derive norms, but nonetheless can provide a basis for morality, despite the fact that morality is also about appropriateness of action.

(3) You claim that morality, properly viewed, is not normative, although it is a code of behavior (again, a fundamentally normative concept).

You have entirely missed the point, namely WHY is it “good to act as the rules specify and bad not to” and WHY did we arrive at such rules? My answer: Conformity to rules of behaviour within a group is instinctive for social creatures such as us, because morals are derivatives of self-preservation and procreation and a consequence of natural selection.

You've said that science doesn't derive normative statements. Any system of rules of behavior is a system of norms. By your own declaration, science doesn't derive such claims.

Yes, I think science could give an account of how we have come to use this set of rules or that, but that's not what a moral theorist fundamentally wants. He wants to know what set of rules is a good set of rules, to what end should such rules tend. And science can only say that our sets of rules have (allegedly) tended towards social cohesion, not that this is a good aim. So science gives no justification for this set or that, unless an end has been selected.

Your answer would appear to be that morals have an inherent value, i.e. that they are true in and of themselves, rather than arising from our natural instincts. Is that what you think?

This is not a digression; it’s the core of the argument. ‘Morality is about social cohesion’. What else would it be? Codes of behaviour evolved for functional reasons, namely as a means of restraining individual selfishness and enhancing social cohesion, because the benefits of living in large cohesive groups are demonstrably greater than living alone without community support.

Not interested. For now, I'll grant that codes of behavior have evolved for functional reasons, but dispute whether this is reason enough to abide by or support such codes. That is, I'll grant the historical claim, but question whether this history is reason enough to think these rules are good rules.

When I say my benefit is improved, I'm taking the risk of penalty into account. Sometimes, the risk of penalty is negligible compared to the direct benefit of the transgression.

This is true regardless of how the rules of behaviour are arrived at.

Yes, I think so, too. That's why I wrote explicitly, "though that is, of course, a problem for realist theories in general, as well."

I think, therefore, that this is another digression, off the main point of our discussion. The problem of motivation to be moral when it's not in one's interest isn't limited to your theory of morality, and so needn't distract us here. Let's put the focus on the features that are specific to your claims here.

All you have to do is rephrase the “ought” statement thus: “If I want to survive the volcano I should flee”. What you are doing is drawing an inference (i.e. an act of reasoning from the factual knowledge or evidence the volcano will destroy me). And the reason I want to survive is because ‘survival’ is the dominant instinct of most life forms – ever tried to kill a mosquito? It doesn't need a normative argument for the mosquito to try and escape the swat.

Well, let's look at your rephrasing.

First, it still includes a normative component. You now have "should" taking the place of "ought", but the meaning is unchanged, so you haven't excised normativity.

Second, it is a conditional statement, in which the "should do X" part occurs in the consequent (i.e., it is what Kant called a hypothetical imperative). By itself, it does not motivate any action at all. Only if I recognize that the antecedent is true do I derive a motive to act, that is, "I should flee."

Now, if science actually tells me that I want to survive (because science tells me this is a drive that evolution has instilled in me), then science has just derived a bald-faced norm: I should flee. Contrary to your claims of science.
Of course, it is silly in the extreme to pretend that science tells me that I want to survive. On the contrary, I feel that desire intimately, without reference to any science texts. Indeed, if I felt the oppression of my troubles so acutely that I found death preferable to life at this moment, no number of scientific references would change my mind. Therefore, to complete the argument, so to speak, I reach for a premise which science does not determine for me: I ask myself whether or not I desire this end, for which fleeing is a necessary means. If I do, then the hypothetical imperative necessitates that I flee, and if not, then it is irrelevant to my deliberations. As we can see, the move from hypothetical imperative to a motivation for action goes beyond any scientifically grounded claim.

 

[Tassman]

Tassman, what is a scientific truth?

A Scientific Theory (or “truth”) is an explanation of a set of related observations based upon proven hypotheses and verified multiple times, resulting in conclusions which have been validated to the extent that we can reasonably act as if they are true, e.g. the theory of evolution, the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, theory of gravity. These are established to the extent that it's not realistic to worry about the possibility of say, gravity ceasing to work.

Whereas philosophy, despite its usefulness in ensuring self-consistency, and preventing false inferences in scientific research, remains an adjunct of science. It cannot arrive at new truths about nature; it relies on existing knowledge upon which to base its premises.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

A Scientific Theory (or “truth”) is an explanation of a set of related observations based upon proven hypotheses and verified multiple times, resulting in conclusions which have been validated to the extent that we can reasonably act as if they are true, e.g. the theory of evolution, the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, theory of gravity. These are established to the extent that it's not realistic to worry about the possibility of say, gravity ceasing to work.

Whereas philosophy, despite its usefulness in ensuring self-consistency, and preventing false inferences in scientific research, remains an adjunct of science. It cannot arrive at new truths about nature; it relies on existing knowledge upon which to base its premises.

So how do you observe that you have a need? What does a need look like, what is its color, shape and so on? Are your needs independent of you as an independent observer? What is observation? How do I verify that you have a need? What kind of the hypothesis do you use to verify that you have a need? What kind of theory do you use? What science book do you consult to understand the verification of the theory of need?