The Future of Moral Science

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Glad to amuse. But you have yet to answer the question. How do you arrive at the premise that "burping" is wrong or "murder" is wrong or any other such premise to a deductive syllogism without assuming the premise? Because, unless you are invoking divine prescriptions, this is all you are doing, i.e. assuming, or asserting your premises.

I like these wordgames. Philosophy can't establish the truth of a given premise. Science can, because induction works. The problem is that even if induction works, induction itself as a methodology doesn't establish the truth of the premises. So how does science establish, that a premise is true?

 

[tsig]

I like these wordgames. Philosophy can't establish the truth of a given premise. Science can, because induction works. The problem is that even if induction works, induction itself as a methodology doesn't establish the truth of the premises. So how does science establish, that a premise is true?

By testing it against reality.

 

[tsig]

Glad to amuse. But you have yet to answer the question. How do you arrive at the premise that "burping" is wrong or "murder" is wrong or any other such premise to a deductive syllogism without assuming the premise? Because, unless you are invoking divine prescriptions, this is all you are doing, i.e. assuming, or asserting your premises.

Murder = immoral killing = murder is immoral.


Why does murder = immoral killing? Well it just does because we all know it does and it says so in the dictionary.

Besides it's just silly to ask where morals come from.

 

[phiwum]

Glad to amuse. But you have yet to answer the question. How do you arrive at the premise that "burping" is wrong or "murder" is wrong or any other such premise to a deductive syllogism without assuming the premise? Because, unless you are invoking divine prescriptions, this is all you are doing, i.e. assuming, or asserting your premises.

Sorry, but this question is irrelevant. I have not claimed that morality consists of objective, discoverable norms.

There are, of course, many arguments in classical texts in philosophy which aim at showing that morality is objective, that one can know what the fundamental principles are, that these principles are derivable from an understanding of rationality or whatnot. In fact, surely anyone who has even a cursory interest in the subject should be familiar with Kant and Mill, say.

A summary of these arguments, however, would take us away from the actual point at hand: evaluating the thesis that science can derive moral claims. Even if we find philosophical arguments lacking, we would have no reason to suppose so much the better for science in this regard.

 

[mijopaalmc]

Murder = immoral killing = murder is immoral.


Why does murder = immoral killing? Well it just does because we all know it does and it says so in the dictionary.

Besides it's just silly to ask where morals come from.

What part of "in the field of ethics, murder is defined as immoral killing" don't you understand?

It's almost as if you fail to grasp that the meaning of words is determined by convention and not by some sort of intrinsic meaning of the word.

 

[Dani]

Glad to amuse. But you have yet to answer the question. How do you arrive at the premise that "burping" is wrong or "murder" is wrong or any other such premise to a deductive syllogism without assuming the premise? Because, unless you are invoking divine prescriptions, this is all you are doing, i.e. assuming, or asserting your premises.

How do you arrive at the premise that deduction is right without assuming the premise? Because, unless you are invoking divine deduction, this is all you are doing, i.e. assuming, or asserting your premises.

But seriously. How about "we just assert some premises because we can't go any further, epistemologically, and we call those premises axioms"?

Axioms, you know, those things that can't be tested, just asserted. We've been talking about axioms over and over and you keep asking where do they come from.

 

[Dani]

Why are all vixens female? Maybe if we do an empirical investigations we might find some male ones, right?

Science can answer anything! There's no way a mere convention can beat science in determining the truth of this premise.

Definitions can't empirically test the gender of vixens. Science can, at least, try, inductively or something. Therefore science wins! What's the alternative, divine definitions?

Yeah science!

 

[Manopolus]

Yeah, this has as much chance of happening as Asimov's "future history" science. Sorry, but it's just not possible to create an ethos without non-scientific assumptions. It's sort of like trying to turn lead into gold using nothing but osmosis.

I'm sorry you instinctively hate philosophy while knowing next to nothing about it. It must make life difficult for you.

 

[Tassman]

How do you arrive at the premise that deduction is right without assuming the premise? Because, unless you are invoking divine deduction, this is all you are doing, i.e. assuming, or asserting your premises.

But seriously. How about "we just assert some premises because we can't go any further, epistemologically, and we call those premises axioms"?

Axioms, you know, those things that can't be tested, just asserted. We've been talking about axioms over and over and you keep asking where do they come from.

…also known as ‘self evident truths' – as has been covered numerous times in this very thread. But giving an assumption a label doesn't alter the fact that it remains merely "an assumption”.

In science such assumptions are labelled ‘hypotheses’ but, unlike in philosophy, a scientific hypotheses can be tested and either verified or discarded. To this extent science remains the better option for arriving at the truth - although philosophy is a useful adjunct.

 

[Nonpareil]

Got it. So burping is wrong because burping is wrong.

Uh, and "Don't burp" is wrong because....?

I have been following this train wreck for several pages, and I cannot sit idly by any longer.

Tassman. Murder is wrong because murder means "wrongful killing". All murder is necessarily wrong; if it wasn't, it wouldn't be murder. In the same way, pumpkin pies are necessarily pastry crust with pumpkin filling; if they weren't, they wouldn't be pumpkin pies.

Your quarrel is not with this definition, and your deliberate obtuseness on this point does not help your argument. Your argument, such as it is, depends on showing that science can define "wrongful", not "murder".

It can't, because "wrong" is normative even if there are evolutionary pressures towards certain values, because all that means is that certain attitudes are of evolutionary benefit to humans as a species, not that they have some sort of objective moral weight on the universe. There is no such thing as a universally enforced code of ethics.

But that's beside the main point. In case you missed it this time, I will say it again, as plainly as possible:

You are arguing with the dictionary.

Stop it.

 

[Dani]

…also known as ‘self evident truths' – as has been covered numerous times in this very thread. But giving an assumption a label doesn't alter the fact that it remains merely "an assumption”.

This is tautologically true. So what? What's your point? You don't like assumptions? You think you can develop epistemologically sound theories without assumptions that can't be tested?

In science such assumptions are labelled ‘hypotheses’ but, unlike in philosophy, a scientific hypotheses can be tested and either verified or discarded. To this extent science remains the better option for arriving at the truth - although philosophy is a useful adjunct.

You're saying this as if axioms would magically become testable by invoking the name of science. How do you test deduction? How do you test fundamental normative claims? You don't.

 

[Tassman]

This is tautologically true. So what? What's your point? You don't like assumptions? You think you can develop epistemologically sound theories without assumptions that can't be tested?

An assumed premise cannot be shown to be true, hence the conclusion of a deductive argument cannot be shown to be true either - no matter how valid the argument.

You're saying this as if axioms would magically become testable by invoking the name of science.

The argument, as oft repeated here, is that the premises/hypotheses of science, whilst also assumptions, are nevertheless subject to testing and, at least potentially, empirically verifiable.

How do you test deduction? How do you test fundamental normative claims? You don't.

Indeed you can’t test normative claims. My argument, as per Harris, is that normative claims are not necessarily useful in and of themselves without qualification or additional information. And that deriving inferences from a descriptive claim can often serve the purpose just as well or better.

The problem is that you actually have no argument; just a bunch of assertions, some true but trivial, and some false, but none of which furthers an argument that science can answer normative questions.

Where have I argued that science can answer normative questions? Answer: I haven't. Yet more misrepresentations on your part!

 

[Dani]

An assumed premise cannot be shown to be true, hence the conclusion of a deductive argument cannot be shown to be true either - no matter how valid the argument.

And your point is? Following that line of reasoning, since deduction (and induction for that matter) cannot be shown to be true, anything goes. That's why we need to axiomatically postulate stuff like deduction or induction to make sense. Or if you like, the mundane equivalent: shrug our shoulders upon being asked where do they come from.

To sum up, we just have to accept that some stuff cannot be shown to be true by other means than its mere assertion to make sense at all.

Normative axioms are a different kind of beast. Unlike deduction or induction, they're not epistemic. But, like deduction or induction, they can't be shown to be true either. You just agree with them as starting points, or you don't.

The argument, as oft repeated here, is that the premises/hypotheses of science, whilst also assumptions, are nevertheless subject to testing and, at least potentially, empirically verifiable.

So we're left with the trivial claim that scientific hypotheses are empirically verifiable. On the other hand, from what you've been saying in some of your latest posts, you seem to agree that certain premises can't be tested.

The conclusion seems to be that scientific premises/hypotheses are those than can be empirically verifiable, whereas those premises that aren't verifiable aren't scientific. Not very insightful, and of course uncontroversial.

Indeed you can’t test normative claims. My argument, as per Harris, is that normative claims are not necessarily useful in and of themselves without qualification or additional information. And that deriving inferences from a descriptive claim can often serve the purpose just as well or better.

Whatever it is you are arguing, it seems you finally conceded that you can't test normative claims. That's the core of the controversy.

As for the highlighted part, what's the purpose you're referring to, exactly? If the purpose is to derive normative claims purely from descriptive claims, I'd like to know how you'd do that. If the purpose is to derive descriptive claims from descriptive claims, that's trivially true, and uninteresting.

Where have I argued that science can answer normative questions? Answer: I haven't. Yet more misrepresentations on your part!

You must be kidding:

So, again, do you think science can answer normative moral questions?

Potentially yes.

I will grant you that your claims in this thread have generally been ambiguous enough to allow you to get away with "it's a strawman!". Like sub-atomic particles, they have been neither here nor there, for the most part. Depending on the interpretation, true and trivial, or astounding and false. But this? Seriously? No, there's no possible "misrepresentation".

 

[Tassman]

No. What you mean is "humans instinctively define killing to be wrong".

Not really. What I mean is that humans instinctively define murder to be wrong, as I said. There are several circumstances when “killing” is not seen as wrong – during warfare for one, capital punishment for another.

 

[Manopolus]

Not really. What I mean is that humans instinctively define murder to be wrong, as I said. There are several circumstances when “killing” is not seen as wrong – during warfare for one, capital punishment for another.

...and many consider vengeance, whether sanctioned by the state or not to be sufficient justification under some circumstances.

 

[Tassman]

And your point is? Following that line of reasoning, since deduction (and induction for that matter) cannot be shown to be true, anything goes. That's why we need to axiomatically postulate stuff like deduction or induction to make sense. Or if you like, the mundane equivalent: shrug our shoulders upon being asked where do they come from.

To sum up, we just have to accept that some stuff cannot be shown to be true by other means than its mere assertion to make sense at all.

Normative axioms are a different kind of beast. Unlike deduction or induction, they're not epistemic. But, like deduction or induction, they can't be shown to be true either. You just agree with them as starting points, or you don't.





So we're left with the trivial claim that scientific hypotheses are empirically verifiable. On the other hand, from what you've been saying in some of your latest posts, you seem to agree that certain premises can't be tested.

The conclusion seems to be that scientific premises/hypotheses are those than can be empirically verifiable, whereas those premises that aren't verifiable aren't scientific. Not very insightful, and of course uncontroversial.




Whatever it is you are arguing, it seems you finally conceded that you can't test normative claims. That's the core of the controversy.

As for the highlighted part, what's the purpose you're referring to, exactly? If the purpose is to derive normative claims purely from descriptive claims, I'd like to know how you'd do that. If the purpose is to derive descriptive claims from descriptive claims, that's trivially true, and uninteresting.





You must be kidding:




I will grant you that your claims in this thread have generally been ambiguous enough to allow you to get away with "it's a strawman!". Like sub-atomic particles, they have been neither here nor there, for the most part. Depending on the interpretation, true and trivial, or astounding and false. But this? Seriously? No, there's no possible "misrepresentation".

With all due respect Dani, you’re all over the place. What is being argued is the science of morality as put forward by Sam Harris et al. You would know this if you had actually been following the whole thread. But I’m not inclined to regurgitate the argument yet again, this thread’s been getting ridiculously repetitive. The gist is that it’s too simplistic to claim that science is unconcerned with morality and, at least potentially, morality could be encompassed within naturalism. If you are really interested I suggest you go back and read it all for yourself.

 

[phiwum]

Tassman,

We still have a few outstanding questions. Top on the list has to do with the nature of morality and the difference between deriving a descriptive claim, such as

Doing Y will bring about X.​

and a prescriptive claim, such as

One should do Y.​

Or, perhaps more to your point, the difference between predictive descriptive claims like

I will do Y.
​

and the above prescriptive claim. You refer to the difference as "merely semantic" but I quite literally do not know what you mean when you say this.

The difference is important, because you concede that science does not derive normative claims (and hence does not derive prescriptive claims), but this is what morality is. Morality is not about what means are sufficient (though, of course, such information is used in deducing what we ought to do) and it is not about predicting what one will do (though, again, this can be useful in deducing what we ought to do). It is about what we should do. If science cannot tell us what we should do, then science cannot draw moral conclusions.

But you have said that, nonetheless, "What science does discover are testable premises upon which rules of behaviour (i.e. moral theories) can be reasonably inferred." (Bolding mine.) I'm not sure what you mean. Rules of behavior are obviously normative in nature, and science does not derive norms, but (from what you've written) one can make a "reasonable inference" from the descriptive claims of science to the normative claims of a moral theory.

At another point, you claimed that moral theories aren't really normative, except for those "deductive philosophy theories", but this was the very same post in which you referred to "rules of behavior", a clearly normative concept, so I am left puzzled by whether you think that "non-normative moral theory" is really a sensible concept and, if so, how.

Thanks for your reply.

 

[Tsukasa Buddha]

Not really. What I mean is that humans instinctively define murder to be wrong, as I said. There are several circumstances when “killing” is not seen as wrong – during warfare for one, capital punishment for another.

Given that what killing is considered "murder" varies tremendously, I highly doubt there is instinctual knowledge here.

 

[phiwum]

At another point, you claimed that moral theories aren't really normative, except for those "deductive philosophy theories", but this was the very same post in which you referred to "rules of behavior", a clearly normative concept, so I am left puzzled by whether you think that "non-normative moral theory" is really a sensible concept and, if so, how.

Thanks for your reply.

The highlighted bit is not a quote, and should not be set off by quotation marks. Sorry.

 

[Nonpareil]

Not really. What I mean is that humans instinctively define murder to be wrong, as I said.

Which is a pointless phrase. The only killings seen as murder are those that are seen as wrong.

There are several circumstances when “killing” is not seen as wrong – during warfare for one, capital punishment for another.

Yes. Which is what you actually need to be looking at: the definition of "wrong".